.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] During the early stages of the pandemic, The Philippines government had successfully managed the spread of COVID-19. However, the government’s use of strong lockdown measures has plunged the country into a deep economic recession, highlighting the adverse effects of a trade-off between a country’s health and economy. The populist's rule in the Philippines has led to democratic erosion, weakening the institutional ecosystem designed to combat corruption in the country. Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance analyzes how the democratic recession has negatively affected public accountability in the Philippines. Using the example of the outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the pandemic crisis, the author insists that populism triggered authoritarian tendencies in the country, which then diminished the role of democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances. Francisco A. Magno claims that the revival of democratic institutions is crucial for the Philippines to fight corruption judiciously and systematically.   ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction Previous studies indicate that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes or young democracies.[1] In this regard, it is interesting to consider how authoritarian tendencies have diminished the role of democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances that control corruption. The outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the Corona Virus Disease (COVID)-19 health crisis in 2020 exemplifies how democratic recession has negatively affected the state of public accountability in the Philippines. This study probes into whether the COVID-19 pandemic further promoted democratic recession and corruption risks in the Philippines. It examines the patterns of irregularities emerging from the implementation of public programs aimed at responding to the crisis. Poorly designed institutional arrangements and weak democratic controls foster opportunities for the commission of illicit transactions in the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, it considers the importance of reviving democratic institutions as a key effort in fighting corruption on a long-term basis. The eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic brought to the fore severe corruption vulnerabilities in many countries. However, even before the pandemic, it is estimated that an average of 10-25 percent of a public contract’s value may be lost to corruption.[2] Globally, over USD 7.8 trillion are allocated annually for public health.[3] With more public funds being made available to fight the pandemic, better safeguards are needed to prevent corruption. The COVID-19 crisis hastened corruption. The potential for corruption in pandemic times is greater, especially when pressures for swift government action may lead to shortcuts that damage the integrity of institutional processes. The main risk areas include the withholding of accurate health data, irregularities in public procurement, the purchase of sub-standard equipment, and misappropriation of health budgets.[4] The COVID-19 pandemic is acknowledged to have begun on November 17, 2019, with the first recorded case of the disease in the city of Wuhan in Hubei Province, China. In the succeeding weeks, cases of people infected with the virus piled up. However, the government kept a tight lid on health data and even reprimanded the local doctors who warned of the new disease. The Chinese government informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of the existence of the virus only on December 31, 2019. Such lack of transparency prevented health authorities globally to take preventive action and contain the transmission of the COVID-19 virus across cities, nations, and borders.[5]■       [1] Ina Kubbe and Annika Engelbert, "Corruption and the impact of democracy." Crime, Law and Social Change 70, 2 (2018) 175-178. [2] UNODC, Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances. New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf (Accessed on October 18, 2013). [3] WHO, Global spending on health: A world in transition, WHO/HIS/HGF/HF Working Paper, No. 19.4, Geneva: World Health Organization (2019); https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/health-expenditure-report-2019.pdf?ua=1 (Accessed on February 6, 2020). [4] Sarah Steingrüber, Presentation at the “25 years of fighting with the nation the perennial pandemic of corruption” Virtual Town Hall Discussion, Transparency International-Philippines and Stratbase ADR Institute, August 28 2020. [5] Sarah Steingrüber, Monica Kirya, David Jackson, and Saul Mullard, Corruption in the time of COVID-19: A double-threat for low-income Countries, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2020.     ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.     Typeset by Junghye Suh, Research Associate   For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] Indonesia is one of the many democratic countries faced with the dilemma of simultaneously hosting a nationwide election and local elections amid a pandemic. Forced to balance itself between controlling the spread of the virus and sustaining its economic and political agenda, Sri Nuryanti, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, analyzed how Indonesia depended on democracy during the pandemic. The author asks whether democratic values are suitable for coping with the pandemic, based on data showing that democratic countries tend to have poorer performances than authoritarian countries. Indonesia is facing many challenges since the country’s response has a significant impact on the national economy. Therefore, Sri Nuryanti’s research deals with the questions of the dilemma faced by Indonesia, the responses of the Public and Private Sector, the change in behavior of the people after the pandemic, and the impact COVID-19 had on domestic and foreign policy.   ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Abstract Ever since COVID-19 was announced as a global pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), many democratic countries have faced two challenges: containing COVID-19 and defending democracy. Indonesia is one of the democratic countries, faced with this dilemma of hosting the Simultaneous Local Elections in 270 regions consisting of 9 provinces, 37 cities, and 224 regencies on December 9, 2020, amidst the pandemic. Therefore, the main issue lies in whether the Indonesian government will prioritize controlling the spread of the virus, prioritize sustaining economic and political agenda, or touch upon both problems. This working paper focuses on how Indonesia defended democracy amid COVID-19. The literature review will be utilized to examine how democratic countries responded to the pandemic. This will be followed by an analysis on how difficult the policy-making process is to protect society from COVID-19, especially in a country like Indonesia, and analyze the responses of COVID-19 related policies.   Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic, Crisis, Democratic Governance, Public Policy, Policy Responses   Introduction The first COVID-19 case of an Indonesian citizen was reported to be on March 2, 2020. During the early stage of the pandemic, people thought that the virus would fade away naturally with time. Therefore, Indonesia was already mid-pandemic when policies were applied to contain COVID-19. In the very beginning, Indonesia’s policies consisted of evacuating the Indonesian citizens from Wuhan, China, and designating specific hospitals in Galang Island (Riau Islands province) to only treat COVID-19 patients. The hospital offered services including observation, shelter, and quarantine facilities to control the spread of COVID-19 on Galang Island. The facility could hold 1,000 beds and construction was completed on April 6, 2020. [1] The policy above shows that the Indonesian government tried to counter the spread of the virus by treating the affected patients in a secluded island. Furthermore, the Indonesian government established a special team to accelerate the efforts to combat the spread of the coronavirus under the coordination of the BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/ Indonesia National Board for Disaster Management). As creating a coordinated COVID-19 response between the government, ministerial departments, and other stakeholders was complicated and as new policy dilemmas emerged, maximizing efforts to control the pandemic was found to be challenging.[2] Bloomberg, a private financial, software, data, and media company based in the US, launched a report called the “Covid Resilience Ranking.” This report follows the development of the COVID-19 responses, fatality rate, number of infected cases, and PCR tests completed for various countries. Reports are released every month, taking into account the social and economic disruptions. The report also gives an overview of the capacity of local health care systems, the impact of virus-related restrictions, and other COVID-19 related issues. From Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, dynamics of the Covid 19 pandemics in many countries can be observed. This research utilized data that was published in December 2020.[3] ■     [1] Chandra Gian Asmara, “RS Galang untuk Covid-19 Beroperasi, Intip Fasilitasnya!” [Galang Hospital for Covid-19 Operates, Peek at the Facilities!], CNBC Indonesia, April 08 2020, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200408122625-4-150577/rs-galang-untuk-covid-19-beroperasi-intip-fasilitasnya (accessed in 21 December 2020). [2] Agus Wibowo, “Arahan dan Strategi Ketua Gagus Tugas Penanganan Covid-19 untuk Pemerintah Daerah” [Directions and Strategies of the Chairman of the Covid-19 Handling Task Force for Regional Governments], Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, March 17 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). [3] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ .     ■ Sri Nuryanti is currently researcher at the Research Center for Politics at Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). She is also currently appointed as the Director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute (ERI).     Typeset by Junghye Suh, Research Associate   For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Northeast Asia - Part II     The outbreak of COVID-19 has proven that new forms of threat can heavily affect the development of democracy as well as democratic practices. COVID-19 is not only a life-threatening issue; it is also evolving into a problem for the maintenance and promotion of democracy. In order to address this global issue, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) has been conducting research on the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance based on country cases since 2020. EAI had published eleven working papers for the first part of this research project in March. This second part of the working paper is the updated version that includes any changes and updates that occurred. The first set of Part II working papers includes the cases of Northeast Asia.     1. Jung Kim | South Korea’s COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Optimization between Health and Economy 2. Maiko Ichihara | The Fairness Trap: Vaccine Reservation Systems and Chaos for the Elderly in Japan 3. Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, Bumdari Dagva-Ochir | Global Pandemic: Challenges and Opportunities for Democracy in Mongolia  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] The State Emergency Committee in Mongolia shifted the country to the “Total Readiness Stage” from “High Level of Readiness” in November 2020 as a strong measure to combat COVID-19. However, this decision failed to earn trust from the society full of uncertainty. There was public frustration with the economic situation due to the lack of clarity on how to regulate daily activities. The high alert regulations, which lasted ten months, also failed to prove any substantive results. In this regard, Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, the CEO of The Academy of Political Education, and Bumdari Dagva-Ochir, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia, explore the factors of the negative atmosphere among the society that mistrusts the feasibility of government and its capacity to set appropriate recommendations. The purpose of the study is to diagnose political risk management in Mongolia, identify the positive effects of quarantine on governance, and explore the interrelationship of social factors and individuals caused by counter pandemic decisions of government. The authors lead to the conclusion by following the gradual lockdown and vaccination situation in Mongolia while analyzing the impact COVID-19 measures brought on democracy, human rights, and media.     ※The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction [1] As countries around the world have begun to implement their own risk management policies, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared COVID-19, the new infectious disease, a pandemic. According to articles 11.2 and 11.3.3 of the Law on Disaster Protection, issued by the State Emergency Committee (SEC) on February 13, 2020, the “high level of readiness” against COVID-19 was partially initiated in Mongolia. This resolution was pursuant to Article 4, Resolution No. 62 of the February 12, 2020 Resolution of Government of Mongolia. [2] The Law on Disaster Protection identifies and specifies the measures for the three levels of readiness to combat the coronavirus: everyday level of readiness, high level of readiness and all-out level of readiness.   In Mongolia, the first verified community transmission case was announced on November 11 and as suggested by the SEC, the government shifted the country to the “Total Readiness Stage” on November 12. However, there was a strong sense of uncertainty and mistrust in Mongolian society regarding the transition to the “total readiness stage.” The Mongolian government declared the country to be at this level as the first week was filled with panic, as decisions changed daily and there were discrepancies in the information source. Mongolian citizens also became frustrated with the economic situation of businesses and individuals and the lack of clarity on how to regulate day-to-day activities.   However, the ten months of high alert regulations set by the SEC did not yield substantive results. Therefore, this research aims to study the factors that contributed to the social atmosphere that doubts the viability of government and their ability make appropriate recommendations.   The main goals of the research are the following: 1. To determine whether Mongolia has a political risk management system 2. To identify positive effects of quarantine on governance (the ability to differentiate between populist politicians and whether democratic governance can be more efficient in correcting decisions and information) 3. To identify psycho-social features that are caused by quarantine and government decisions and implementations (Psycho-social refers to the interrelationship of social factors and individual attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors). ■   [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] “Disaster Protection Law”, Law of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar city, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/12458?Lawid=12458; “On transfer to the ready rate”, Article 4, Number 62, Resolution of the government of Mongolia, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/15081?Lawid=15081.     Bazarvaani Ariunbayar is the CEO of the Academy of Political Education and the project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mongolia. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Science, National University of Mongolia.   Dagva-Ochir Bumdari is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia. She was awarded a doctoral degree by Kokushikan University in 2013.   Typeset by Junghye Suh, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] Japan was one of the earliest countries that signed a contract with Pfizer for 120 million doses in July 2020. However, the subsequent approval process was comparably slow and the vaccine reservation system caused chaos for the Japanese society. The municipal offices started vaccine reservations for the elderly first, but there were huge problems in the design of the system; the mismatch between spot availability and eligibility for reservation, and an online-centric reservation system without sufficient offline support. The elderly were thrown into confusion either because they are vulnerable to the new system or because the system went down with an incapable number of people approaching at the same time. Maiko Ichihara, associate professor at Hitotsubashi University, insists that the root of the problem is, paradoxically, the emphasis on the fairness of opportunity and not giving consideration to individual characteristics. The research shows that the problem of superficial fairness is widely ranged in human rights issues in Japan by taking instances of refugees and female politicians in Japan. The author points out that it is time for the Japanese society to reconsider the approach to realize equality by taking into account the features of each vulnerable group.     ※The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction COVID-19 vaccination in Japan has caused confusion for the elderly. Although a substantial portion of the elderly is not familiar with the Internet, municipalities used online reservation systems and designated an incomparably large number of elderly people as able to reserve spots at once. The reservation sites went down due to the large number of simultaneous accesses and, unfamiliar with such systems, the elderly users were at a loss to understand the situation. They also tried to make reservations by phone, but the phone lines were jammed and calls could not be answered. In anxiety, the elderly rushed to municipal offices in large numbers and vented their anger when they learned that the offices would not accept their reservations in person.   The root of the problem lies in the fact that many municipal offices tried to ensure fairness of opportunity without taking into account the characteristics of the target population. After explaining the confusion surrounding the vaccine approval process and the characteristics of the vaccine reservation systems in Japan, this paper analyzes how the reservation systems were problematic from the perspective of equity. The final section discusses how fairness should be interpreted in order to protect human rights. ■     Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   Typeset by Junghye Suh, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] As the second part of the Pandemic and Democratic Governance in Asia series, Jung Kim, Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, explores the outperformance of South Korea’s COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy. The author throws a question of why the national performances of the trade-off between lives and livelihoods during the COVID-19 pandemic have varied among nations. This study shows that social risk, rather than social capital, such as social trust or confidence in authorities, is the key factor of large-scale collective action that explains the variation in national pandemic policy performances. This theory is supported by a descriptive comparison of pandemic policy performances across OECD countries over quarterly periods in 2020, and an examination of the determinants of COVID-19 pandemic policy optimization. He further explains that the agility of citizens in South Korea to the pandemic is decisive to the successful pandemic policy optimization.     ※The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction How have policymakers and citizens responded to the COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy? Why have some nations succeeded in minimizing the trade-off between protecting lives and protecting livelihoods, but not others? Why and how has South Korea outperformed most other advanced democracies in dealing with the trade-off? [1]   Building on a growing literature that analyzes the trade-off between health and the economy in designing and implementing national COVID-19 policy responses (Desierto and Koyama 2020; Cheibub, Hong, and Przeworski 2020; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020), this study attempts to answer the above questions examining the case of South Korea in a comparative perspective. This research argues that contra conventional wisdom that social capital is the explanans of variation of national pandemic policy performances, social risk is much more important to facilitate large-scale collective action, which is the political foundation of voluntary civic compliance with government non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) policy recommendation and ultimately successful pandemic policy optimization between health and the economy.   A simple theoretical framework of pandemic policy optimization will be introduced in the next section. The third describes a quarterly comparison of national policy responses across OECD countries in 2020. The following section provides a case study analysis on the determinants of pandemic policy optimization in South Korea. ■   [1] Why some nations have outperformed others in vaccinating against COVID-19 is the question that this study will explore in the next round of research project. For now, I suggest that the better the health performance of a nation is, the poorer the vaccination performance of it has. See the appendix for a preliminary association between the total COVID-19 cases per million and the people vaccinated per hundred in OECD countries as of May 14, 2021.     Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on to pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   Typeset by Junghye Suh, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

Political Finance in Asian Democracies: Reforms for Transparency and Integrity     The term “political finance” is used to describe all funds that are raised and spent for political purposes. Across democratic countries, various models exist based on which political parties and candidates can raise funds for political campaigns and contest for public offices. Regarding the use of political funds, a system of checks and balances is crucial to ensure level of the playing field for all associated actors. In this working paper series, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Taiwan provided an overview of their respective systems of political finance. Through comparing, contrasting, and providing comprehensive feedback of each system, the authors examined viable ways to enhance transparent political finance systems.   In order to address this issue, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) has been conducting research on the System of Political Finance Across Asian Democracies based on country cases since 2020. As part of this research project, EAI has planned a working papers series composed of four working papers.     1. Ridho Imawan Hanafi, Sri Nuryanti ∣ Indonesian Political Party Finance for a Better Accountability 2. Iman Amran, Aira Azhari ∣ Political Funding in Malaysia: Starting from the Ground Up 3. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob ∣ Regulating the Use of Money in Politics: The Case of Pakistan 4. Chin-en Wu, Yun-han Chu ∣ Campaign Finance in Taiwan  

[Editor's Note] Taiwan is often mentioned as an exemplary case of economic development and democratization. As Taiwanese politics opened its doors to diverse democratic actors from political parties to citizens, the country’s money politics has been activated as well. During the late 1990s, the Political Donations Act was enacted, and the law has since played a vital role in regulating the transparent political finance in Taiwan. The author Chin-en Wu and Yun-han Chu from the Academia Sinica and Asian Barometer analyze the regulatory framework in detail, showing the law’s willingness to reduce the would-be coercive influences of wealthy donors from individuals, corporations, to foreign countries by setting a cap on the amount of money flows into the politics, and specifying possible categories of donors. However, the authors point out that despite these institutional settings, as shown in the Sogo case, violations of the act still prevail. Many corporations have circumvented the rules by borrowing the name of their subsidiaries. In addition, difficulties in proving the quid pro quo relationship between the politics and donors complicate the situation.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Often hailed as a successful model of economic development and democratization, Taiwan experienced tremendous success in economic development and democratization in the late twentieth century. The authoritarian ruling party announced political liberalization in 1986, which lifted martial law and allowed for the organization of political parties and the issuance of newspapers. In 1992, Taiwan held its first general election for members of parliament, which marked the beginning of democracy. In the year 2000, it passed the two party-turnover test of democratic consolidation suggested by Samuel Huntington.   Along with political openness, money politics unfolded (Chu 1992). When election expenses are huge and political parties or candidates have insufficient funds, politicians and parties can only rely on substantial donations from enterprises. In order to obtain preferential policies from the government, some companies donate substantially to political parties. In some cases, companies that have financial problems still donate to political parties and candidates to ask for their help to survive.   During the late 1990s, both parties strongly endorsed the enactment of the Political Donations Act. Many drafts were then proposed in the Legislative Yuan, but the legislators could not reach a consensus. After the DPP came to power, it implemented a series of reform policies, including strict bribery investigation, prosecuting elected leaders and civil representatives involved in corruption, and accelerating the speed of investigation. The Political Donations Act was finally promulgated during the Chen Shui-bian administration right before the presidential election of 2004, eighteen years after the beginning of the country’s political liberalization.     ■ Chin-en Wu is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance.   ■ Yun-han Chu is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and a Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He serves concurrently as president of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Professor Chu received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987.     Typeset by Juhyun Jun, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) [email protected]