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Q1: View on Trump's foreign policy

Chun: So the first question is about your view of U.S. national security strategy. Actually the White House released that document two weeks ago and you are a specialist not just in American politics but also your view about realism in the strategy the document says they will pursue flexible realism, more pragmatic and more flexible. But it may sound like President Trump is continuing to pursue a transactional approach which is not very conventional if you look at the history of U.S. foreign policy. So what's your view about President Trump's approach to foreign policy and that so called flexible realism?

Kirshner: Well, I would be very reluctant to attach the phrase “realism” to the Trump administration and to the national Security strategy. I don't see the “realism” in it. I think that when members of the administration use the word realism, they sort of think of it as a synonym for “we're really tough guys” or “the world is a dangerous place” or “we're not afraid to,” you know, “use forces” and stuff like that. But in terms of the kind of discipline of realism is understanding how the world works or following policy ideas that might flow from realist principles. I don't think these folks are very well tutored in those ideas. I just think they like the sound of that word. I also don't really have much kind to say about the national security “strategy” itself. “Strategy” implies interaction. “I do something in anticipation that others will do something else.“ If you look at this document, it's more like “this is what we're going to do, this is what we're going to do, this is what we want” and there's not a lot of thinking about what the implications of those things might be. So it's not really it's oddly named to even call it a “strategy.” It's more of a proclamation or kind of a list of preferences. And in that sense, it's not very coherent. When I read it, I see within paragraphs themselves the administration saying one thing in one sentence and something that sounds very different in another sentence. So it's a kind of, it's a confused and tangled document. However, we can glean some very significant things from it. The document is very, very focused on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America. And that, if there's one takeaway from this document, it must be that that this administration views dominating the Western Hemisphere as “job one” and it will therefore devote more resources to that. And what that must mean is that if it's going to devote more resources to that, it will devote less resources to other things. Now I think it's a very curious and even 19th century view of the world to spend so much time focused on Latin and South America. But that is, if there's one clearly understandable, identifiable thing in this very muddled document, it is that Latin America is priority number one. And so I think the world really needs to attend to that. And the other thing is a little, a little odder which is a fixation on the Middle East and especially the Persian Gulf Region. And here's where I think the document is a little self contradictory. The document notes correctly that Persian Gulf oil is much less important to the U.S. than it was say, 50 years ago and that the U.S. is, you know, has so called energy independence and that the U.S. is a major player in energy production. I think they even call it like U.S. energy domination. The document boasts and it is a very boastful document. And so they say “Persian Gulf less important than it was before. We're an oil kind of superpower.” And yet at the same time they kind of doubled down on U.S. security commitments to the Persian Gulf. Whereas if you most realists, if you want to use the word “realism” again, trying to assess the balance of kind of threats and dangers and opportunities and resources of the United States the Persian Gulf Region is probably a place where they would peel back from. And yet I would list the Persian Gulf as number two on the national security strategy. And it is puzzling, although it's not as puzzling if you think about the extent to which the Americans are currently ruled by something of a personalist regime. And so we may not be thinking of this as a national security strategy but it also has elements of what is good for the ruling clan what might enrich the ruling clan and the ruling clan wants to do a lot of business in the Persian Gulf region. And that might be more than national security strategy might explain the current American disposition towards security guarantees in the Persian Gulf than some kind of coherent articulation of what the principal areas of importance are to the United States as a whole. So again, I think it's a very confused document. I think it is a document that is not sensitive to the concept of “strategy” but we can glean some things from it. The emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, the still attention to the Middle East. And strangely I think the, it craves to settle the Ukraine war presumably on Russia's terms. And that is a rather dramatic about face of United States policy and of what we would traditionally think of as in the best interests of the United States. I think those are the three principal takeaways from this document that again, I think is not one that lends itself to sophisticated analysis by an outsider.

Q2: Origin of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe doctrine

Chun: Yeah those are very insightful criticisms. So let me ask about Western hemispheres or from the outsider's view in Asia you know, the mentioning of Monroe doctrine, which I thought it was in 1823 or something. But Trump revived the doctrine in the term of Trump corollary of Monroe doctrine, which it's a political statement but I think it underestimates the sovereign rights of Latin American countries. So in this 21st century, it's a little bit outdated and probably with the effect of inviting other great powers to establish their own, sphere of influence which is not very good, actually the opposite to the liberal international order. So what is the origin of this thinking in the current times in the U.S.?

Kirshner: Well, I think the last point you raised is the most important one. So I want to start with that and then we're backwards to the Trump corollary, to the Monroe doctrine because as you rightly observe, the U.S. seems to be asserting that it should be permitted to dominate its near abroad by reasons which it seems fitting. And if it's going to do that, and that outsiders cannot do those things in quote unquote its “hemisphere.” And if the U.S. is asserting that, then as you note, would seem to suggest to other regional powers that maybe they ought to be allowed to dominate their near abroads without interference from other powers. And this I do think is a dangerous and destabilizing precedent to try and set.

But as I said, this is not a document that is thinking things through in that way, right? When I said, it's not really strategy pronouncements. So a strategy would be “if I do this, what types of responses will I elicit? What will be the consequences of those behaviors around the world?” And I think you're really right to put your finger on the notion that if the U.S. says here's how the world works, great powers dominate their near abroads no questions asked and they get to do whatever they want. Well they'll, they might have what I'd like to call the “tyrant's takeaway,” which is what are the lessons that will be learned by other militarized powers who might want to dominate their near abroads?

I do think I'm repeating myself a bit, but this is so dangerous and so destabilizing and also so I think not thought through. But now if I could track back to the first part of your question, which is important and I don't think it's quite as important as this huge unspoken consequence of this, is that this so called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe doctrine, as you said, something that was originally articulated in the early 19th century isn't fully fleshed out, right? I mean what I could not describe what the Trump Corollary to the Monroe doctrine is in a sentence we do know the president of the United States really enjoys attaching his name to things. And so perhaps the people who wrote this document thought that they would please their superior by calling something by his name. We have a Trump Corollary to the Monroe doctrine. What that actually means in practice again, is unspecified and I don't fully understand it beyond an assertion of dominance.

But with regard to South America, again, I want to dive into the inherent contradictions of this because if there is an anxiety that drives part of this, right? First, there's a kind of will to dominate. “This is our space we will dominate it. Why? Because we're tough guys and that's what tough guys do.” But if there's an anxiety underlying it, it is that China has become an extremely important economic player in many of the countries in South America. And many South American countries rely heavily on their ability to export to China. It's a very important part of their economies. Now if the U.S. wanted to somehow wean South American economies off of their so called “dependence” on China's markets, well, what would that involve in practice? Probably it would involve reorienting trade relations to increase their trade relations with South American nations.

But if you look at the document and the pronouncements from the administration more generally, this is not an import friendly administration. This is an administration that views imports as somehow undermining America. So it's really hard to see from a political standpoint how the United States is going to elicit behavior from South American states to get them to shift away from their economic relations with China if the United States is going to be hostile to the idea of embracing more intimate economic relations with the states of South America. So again, there's not a ton of coherence there. There is this declaration “we will do whatever the heck we want to do however, the heck we see fit, even if it involves things that very much look like war crimes.” We're talking about kind of the shooting of survivors from the boats that the administration took out off the coast of South America and “we don't care what anybody thinks about that”. Which again is kind of a precedent setting style of behavior that we need to be attentive to. So once again, I don't see realism I see confusion. I see pounding the table. I see the assertion of dominance. I see kind of strutting, but I don't see a well-thought-through or articulated policy or plan.

Q3: View of U.S.-China policy in the NSS document

Chun: Great. Great. Yeah. You touched upon the China element in the Western Hemisphere and, and we are wondering about the U.S. China policy in the document. So one is about trying to reduce Chinese influence in the Southern Hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere and Southern and Central America. Because to most of the Latin American countries, China is the number one trading partner right now maybe expanding their political influence. That leads to the question about U.S.-China policy when they deal with Indo Pacific strategy. So when U.S. says that as you said, “regional domination in the Western Hemisphere,” but they say they should protect a balance of power in the Pacific meaning that China can be a big power but it should not dominate the region. Which is actually the opposite of Trump's version of his own sphere of influence maybe China is confused. “Is there any deal for our great powers a domination for sphere of influence?” or you're not you know, prove Chinese influence in the Pacific region. So what do you think about U.S.-China policy generally in the document?

Kirshner: That doesn't mean they're going to go to war but there's been an alertness to this. This is a, you know, a very, very powerful state that is getting more powerful and it lives in that neighborhood and so much of U.S. policy was oriented toward “well, what will be our political and defense style reaction to the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia?” And most administrations again with in very different ways understood that to be one of the principal geopolitical challenges that the U.S. was facing. And I do think it's interesting the extent to which that particular challenge, which to most quote unquote “realists” would seem to be a very high level problem to address, is not on the front burner with regard to the American vision of how the world works. And so I do think that's also telling and I do think that regional actors need to be aware of that. You know, again, what we know is that America has announced that it's going to devote more resources to the Western Hemisphere. America has announced that the Middle East is still very important to it. Well, what does that mean? I mean to me, it implies that the American engagement with East Asian politics is, represents a lower priority and that could be significantly consequential.

Q4: Prospects on U.S.-China relations

Chun: Right. Right. Great. So if I read the economic security aspect of the document, you know, President Trump puts a lot of emphasis on the economic relations with China and trying to get benefit maybe from the negotiations next year in April, Trump will visit China. So maybe try to maintain the status quo militarily but try to gain as much as possible economically from China. And there is a weak point for United States in terms of getting the critical minerals, like rare earth material. And President Trump should revive the American economy before the midterm election. So maybe this is an exaggeration but the document, it's more about next year before the election rather than the long term. As you said, it's very confusing. So we are having some mixed signal in Asia. How to you know, I get on terms with us, China relations is it going better or is it getting worse? So it's confusing.

Kirshner: I think it's understandable to be confused. I mean, this is, I think to an unprecedented extent in modern American history, a very personalist administration that is, that it is guided by the whims of the president which isn't to say that we haven't had important, influential and charismatic presidents throughout our history who were at the top of the leadership structure and directing policy. But this president is more mercurial than most American presidents have been. And also trusts his own instincts more than, I think, any other president really has. And also again changes his mind a lot about things. This is not what you would call kind of a deep strategic thinker. I mean, I don't mean to say that in a partisan way. I was never or I spent a lot of my career criticizing President Nixon. He was not a president who I admired as a person or as a president but President Nixon was a deep strategic thinker. He had a savvy command of world geopolitics. He understood what he was trying to accomplish and he took logical measures to pursue the policies that he wished to pursue. I tended not to agree with those policies but as a thinker, he was smart and far-sighted and understood how the world works. I would apply none of those things to President Trump, who does at the same time, however, have an extraordinarily confident sense of his ability to do those things. But part of those things involves turning on a dime with regard to many basic foreign policy questions. And if I were countries abroad trying to figure out how to deal with that, I would be a little concerned. I mean, we can see many diplomats choosing the strategy flattery. That they meet with the president and say nice things about him, and he seems to really enjoy that and it puts him in a good mood for a while. What the half-life is of that I'm not sure or confident but it is the strategy that many diplomats have embraced and it does, in the moment, seem to work. What again how that translates into understanding the American strategic posture globally? I'm not as confident of them.

Q5: Advice for East Asian countries' foreign policy

Chun: Right. Well, speaking of Nixon, there was a, you know, a big concerning South Korea when he declared the so called Guam Doctrine in 1969. “You have to take care of your own security, Asian security by Asians.” So now President Trump's idea have given us a big concern for South Korea. We are dealing with North Korean nuclear threats, a rising China. So last question is, what's your advice for the East Asian allies in dealing with the situation which is very, you know, uncertain in terms of the future security. So can we rely on the U.S. commitment to East Asia especially nuclear extended deterrence which is critical to South Korea and also in their relations with China?

Kirshner: Well, I'm a little cautious about being in the advice business, but I'm happy to be in the analysis business. I mean the U.S. has a security relationship with South Korea that is intimate and deep. And it would be no small thing for the U.S. to change that relationship. But on the other hand, were I making decisions about foreign policy in East Asia in a country that historically had warm relations with the United States, I would feel required to assess my confidence in whether or not the U.S. would sustain those relationships over time. When push comes to shove, would they be there? And I'm not saying that as an analyst that the U.S. is clearly going to abandon traditional allies. I'm saying as an analyst, traditional allies must entertain that possibility to a much greater extent than they ever did before. We've discussed the fact that Trump is very transactionalist in his thinking. Alliances aren't really about transactions, right? Alliances are about shared sensibilities and partnerships and long term relationships. And you can't really count, how much I'm benefiting from it on one day or another. But rather it's a vision of whether “I think the world is a better place for me and my partners if these security arrangements are sustained or not.” And again, that type of far-sighted thinking about trying to shape the world and create an environment that is conducive to the interests both of the United States and its partners, does not strike me as the way this administration thinks about things. And so again, I'm not in the prediction business. I would never say something like the U.S. is going to abandon this ally or something like that. But I would say that the U.S. is posturing as a country that is a less dependable ally than it has been in the past.

And if I can take a little of the heat out of this in terms of Korea, I think this is certainly true in Europe. If I was a European leader and I said, “if I get into trouble, are my American friends going to have my back?” I wouldn't. I wouldn't have the same level of confidence about that, that I would have you know, over the past say 75 years. And that's just something that all countries have to make assessments about. And I do think that those assessments will generally be more significant at the political level than the military level because most of the time, most countries aren't at war, but most of the time most countries have to make decisions about how they will orient their political behavior. And so what I think we're likely to see is a hedging, a recalibration of political behavior by the part of states all over the world, outside of the Persian Gulf region perhaps, to say “I need to rethink whether I need to shift my behavior in case of the possibility that the Americans,” to use an American colloquialism, “decides to just suddenly pick up their marbles and go home,” because that is on the table in a way that I don't think it has been in the past.

Q6: Possibility of a swingback in U.S. foreign policy after Trump

Chun: Yeah, the really last question, I really want to ask one more question. Theoretically, when we look back on 30 years of unipolarity, I think that one single country, even though it's really powerful like the United States, will have some limits in leading the liberal international order because there are so much increasing demand for international collective goods like security arrangements, the role as a last resort of the open international economy. So for the last 30 years, the U.S. has too much things as a burden. So even though President Trump is transactional, I think that there should have been more transaction between U.S. and alliances to share the burdens in advance, but we failed to do that. We just let the U.S. deal with all the difficult problems. So after we adjust this burden-sharing or the division of authority or responsibility between U.S. and alliances like South Korea.

So there is some mood in South Korea even though we are entertaining President Trump but we are adjusting our roles with more responsibility because if we want to maintain the liberal international order, we should step up. We understand that. So the hope is that, as you said, we are not in a prediction business, but after Trump is gone, there might be some you know, assurance in the U.S. that the allies will step up and they will help us. So we can be more global with a little bit more engagement with the global affairs. Do you think that kind of swinging back of U.S. policy can be materialized?

Kirshner: Well, I think it is a healthy thing. And I think all American presidents going back again, 50 years if not more, for allies of the U.S. to take a larger role in their own kind of defense and their defense spending. And this is something that administrations have chafed at for decade after decade after decade. And I think the president can point to the idea that he has certainly put the fear of God in many of the allies and gotten them to be more assertive with their own defense spending than any previous American president has done. And if he wants to count that as an American success story, I'm prepared to count that in the plus column for him. But your question is a more general one.

Does that mean that cooperation between the U.S. and its traditional allies, will in the coming years, be enhanced or not? I think that is an open question. I think that is also a question of American domestic policies, politics excuse me. I mean you're right to note that you know, at some point we will be beyond the Trump administration. And so the question is whether the Trump administration will have left an indelible transformation on the way in which the U.S. imagines its role in the world? Or whether it will be more of a passing phase. Well, sitting here in the United States, I do think it's hard to imagine that there won't be permanent consequences of the Trump administration's policies even when Trump himself has left the stage. And so, I do think we are going to see a more dangerous, less stable world as a consequence of the new disposition that we will be able to associate with the United States. I think that's unfortunate, but I'm not here to bemoan what's fortunate or what's not fortunate. 'm here to observe that, as the U.S. withdraws from the world scene, and as the U.S. becomes again, very transactional in its attitude about the rest of the world, and in many ways extractive, bullying, that will elicit reactions that will elicit behaviors from other states and it will affect the disposition of overall world politics and the prospects for international cooperation more generally. My own instinct is that that will be not a productive thing for global problem solving.

Chun: Okay thank you very much. Thank you for taking your time to join us. We really learned a lot. Thank you for your excellent insights and wisdom.

Kirshner: It's been a real pleasure talking with you.

■ Jonathan Kirshner _Vincent Q. and Mary Ann Giffuni Professor, Boston College.

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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