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Q1: General view on President Trump’s foreign policy.

Chun: So the first question is about the general your view about President Trump‘s foreign policy, (Q2) the second one probably will be about China relations.

Ross: I think it's important to stress that it's very hard to see a grand strategy out of Donald Trump. I think we all understand his economic policies are working across purposes to his security policies. So here he is undermining cooperation with Japan, undermining cooperation with India, undermining cooperation with South Korea, who our Pentagon believes are critical partners in contending with the rise of China. So we don't really see an inter-agency process here, and we see Trump prioritizing a coercive economic policies. The impact of that is to undermine confidence in American security policy.

And furthermore, we know there are people in the Pentagon who believe that the United States needs to contend more against China with India, Japan, Australia with the Indo Pacific strategy and that Donald Trump has little respect for “non-great powers,” shall we say. Whether it is the European countries, whether it's Taiwan, whether it's Ukraine and whether it's South Korea as well, or even Japan.

So the foreign policy as a whole is undermining American security in East Asia. We do see however, that the Pentagon is constantly pushing back against the president's economic policies, trying to remind the president that security matters.

So we do see that there's this push and pull, pulling and hauling, between his economic instincts and the security imperatives. Now it's very hard for the United States to recover from Donald Trump's economic policies and his overall lack of attention to American allies despite the efforts of the Pentagon to pull the president back to the center.

Q2: What would be the most desirable foreign policy of South Korea in the current U.S.-China relations?

Ross: Countries don't like uncertainty either because they're afraid they'd be abandoned during critical moments. And there's only one way to adjust to this uncertainty and that's to improve relations with China. Because if you cannot count on American support, on security, and if you cannot count on the stability of economic agreements going forward, you may well pay a high price in Chinese retaliation, but without American support. And so the risk is that you make agreements with America that may be helpful or seem helpful but in reality they keep getting renegotiated.

Security commitments erode and you're faced with greater Chinese pressure simultaneously. I can't think of a worse situation for South Korea, for the Philippines, for Taiwan, and other countries in East Asia. This is what the president has done. I see no evidence that he is reconsidering this.

So our allies have no confidence in American policy going forward. And we do see in Canada for example, an effort to increase cooperation with China and other countries. We see Australia increasing cooperation with China. We see [South Korea] trying to increase cooperation with China. The Chinese are willing to use what leverage they have against American allies who have lack of confidence in America.

We see South Korea between an “unreliable America, an unpredictable America” and a “China willing to use coercive policies to compel South Korea to reconsider cooperation with America.”

Q3: Will Trump’s “America First” policy persist after his term is over?

Chun: Considering public support for President Trump in the United States, after his term is over, do you think that Trump's “America First” policy will continue and with some pressures on allies like South Korea?

Ross: About post-Trump, Part of the problem with our pressure, our attention is that Donald Trump carries out excessive “public diplomacy.” This has two problems. One, we see his flip-flops back and forth. Well, that's not good for the U.S. reputation is it? That's just not good. it's just not good. But then second, publicizes the degree of U.S.-China differences. This degree of public diplomacy, I believe, would end with the new president. There would continue to be issues over technology, over rare earth, but they would be negotiated quietly and deals would be announced that would look to be progress rather than simply short term solutions to long-term polemics.

So I think we do have the prospect of improving our diplomacy within three years. That would be a good thing.

Q4: In light of the recent rare earth export controls, how do you assess China's intention to deal with U.S. pressure?

Chun: Turning to China. you know, recently China, you know escalated export controls on rare earth materials and that is a well prepared, well calibrated response to President Trump’s pressure. So how do you assess China's intention to deal with U.S. pressure?

Ross: Well, I think first of all, any Chinese new regulations are simply regulations for approval. They do not automatically exercise greater constraints, restraint or controls over exports. They give the Chinese government greater ability to control those exports if they wish to. China uses this leverage not just against the United States but against other countries to persuade them to cooperate less with American policy.

And for many countries, I think they will decide that cooperation with China is important to their economic security and that because the United States is an unreliable partner and it is carrying out economic protectionism against them as well, they will have little choice but to manage relations with China so as to maintain their access to the Chinese market and as to maintain their access to Chinese rare earths and exports.

And this will require South Korea somehow to deal with how you cooperate with American tariffs, how you deal with shipbuilding, how you deal with science and technology restrictions and simultaneously, not risk access to the Chinese market.

I don't see the rare earths issue as decisive because China won't manipulate.

And so it is basically saying to other countries, including South Korea, how we can be flexible.

Q5: How do you assess the prospect of a Taiwan contingency?

Chun: You know everybody is curious about American policy community's view of a potential Taiwan contingency. That's the usual question. So Has the sense of urgency these days changed recently in Washington?

Ross: Well, I think the Washington beltway, our think-tank community is increasingly captured by the dominant narrative coming out of the State Department or the White House. We're seeing very little debate among think tank analysts and that's unfortunate.

I think, number of things to think about in Taiwan, the, both the Secretary of Defense and the former Commander of Naval Operations made very clear that China would not have the capability to invade Taiwan until 2027. So we're at least two years out.

Second, the Secretary of Defense on his way out said it would actually be maybe 2028. And then he said, even if they have the capabilities, I'm not sure they want to invade Taiwan. And so the leadership of the Pentagon has made clear that they don't think this is a war China wants. And I understand their perspective. Imagine the Chinese launching a war against Taiwan.

First you have to land on the beaches of the east coast of Taiwan. And then you got to fight through Taiwan military. Then you have to march through Taiwan's urban, suburban sprawl.It would make Ukraine look easy.

They would have to fight suburban households the entire way. Then they’ll have to fight urban warfare in Taiwan's major cities. And the United States is selling Taiwan the perfect equipment to arrange long-term protracted warfare against the Chinese occupation.

One way I think about this is that we say that Xi Jinping wants to realize the Chinese dream that may be. But suppose he fails to realize the Chinese dream, and goes down in history as the most weakest Chinese leader in history, and he doesn't want that. Moreover, the Chinese are still winning. The balance of power in the Taiwan strait continues to tilt toward China away from the United States.

Ultimately to go back a step. I think it's important to recognize that other than Japan, the three countries in East Asia that have an inconsistent policy of managing the rise of China are all democracies. It's South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines. But over time democracies will also have to contend with the rise of China. The rest of East Asia has said we're not taking sides and ultimately, Taiwan, I think the Chinese understand, will be compelled to adopt a similar perspective. The KMT continues to talk about the 1992 consensus. They have a very good possibility of winning the next election. Why would the Chinese want to use force under those circumstances? Rather, I think the Chinese strategy is to continue to put great pressure on Taiwan.

With its military, with its coast guard, with its air force, with its navy, similar to what it's doing on Taiwan, in perhaps the hope that Taiwan starts a crisis. The same way the perspective was that Nancy Pelosi was at fault for a visit to Taiwan or the same way the perspective was the Philippines was at fault for Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

This would allow the Chinese to announce a two-week military exercise to close the trading space with Taiwan. Just two weeks. And that would leave the U.S. helpless to respond. So I don't think the Chinese want a war, they want a crisis. That would be the way to minimize conflict with South Korea, minimize tensions with Australia, and achieve its purposes with Taiwan to undermine U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.

Q6: Perspective on the “modernization” of ROK-U.S. alliance?

Chun: Well, you know, from South Korea's perspective, there is a discussion about so called “modernization of alliance” in which U.S. is requesting that South Korea should do something in dealing with deterring against any possible Chinese actions against Taiwan. But given South Korea's geo-strategic constraints, it's highly unlikely that Seoul would participate in any direct military engagement in this situation. So we are trying to understand, is there any realistic understanding in Washington of these limits, and how are the expectations are calibrated accordingly?

Ross: Well, for the last 20 or 30 years, South Korea has had a clear policy that American forces in South Korea are there to defend against North Korea. In any out-of-area contingencies American bases cannot be used. Now the Yoon government began to erode this commitment somewhat. But I think Americans clearly understand this as the issue. American strategic flexibility was never popular in South Korea. We understand that. And I think you're right South Korea's geopolitical considerations.

Let's be somewhat straightforward about this. One of my recent visits to China, a former Chinese military leader said it would take them 20 hours to destroy every U.S. military facility in the Philippines. South Korea is no different. This is part of the problem the United States faces, is that the strategic utility of South Korea is diminishing with the rise of China, and yet we are doubling down on our cooperation against China.

There's something of a contradiction there if you're a U.S. security planner where South Korea's contribution to American defense is diminishing, yet America's commitment to South Korea is growing. There's a problem there. That's why I say the next administration.

There's considerable uncertainty in the direction of American policy toward its alliances. So we completely understand this.

And part of American policy is designed to lock in our contributions to these countries. So if there is a conflict with China, we have such hand in glove cooperation that cooperation will be more assured than otherwise. This is certainly the purpose of AUKUS. It's the purpose of American deployments on the island chains south of Japan.

Q7: The Prospect of China’s role in the inter-Korean relations

Chun: So the last question will be about North Korea. Considering Kim Jong Un's recent multilateral meetings with leaders like Xi Jinping and Putin in early September and the Chinese military parade, it seems like there is a historically strong relations between among these three countries. So we need to assess China's policy toward North Korea these days, especially when North Korea strengthens its ties with Russia. So do you think the trilateral this authoritarian alignment will grow stronger? Which will make North Korea in a better position?

Ross: So we have seen great obviously Russia-North Korean cooperation. One has to ask whether there's any consequential significance to this. That is to say, if the Russians cannot defeat the Ukraine army, it's not clear what contribution they can make to North Korean security or to North Korean offensive capabilities. So I see this as primarily a diplomatic relationship where Russia is isolated, North Korea is isolated and they're coming together.

China's been far more cautious. So we are reading frequently from North Korea how North Korea wants to move forward in cooperation with China. We haven't seen China say that. China's been much quieter in response to South Korean cooperation with China.

Now I think China would be more than willing to encourage North Korea to negotiate with the Lee government in loosening restrictions, whether it's economic ties, whether it's summits. This is certainly in Chinese interest. That is to the extent that one, China can help South Korea, that's good for China; two, to the extent that there's less tension on the peninsula that gives America less opportunity to enhance its presence, that's good for China.

So I think despite everything we see, China is going to be able to say to North Korea “now is the time to compromise.” Now of course, we've seen North Korea accepting, if you will, the status quo in North-South relations, right? They have given up this, at least declaratory policy and unification. They've blocked various access routes to the South. They’ve talked about “no unification.”

Certainly China will not put pressure on the North for unification. But we do see the North more willing to accept the status quo and that the Chinese would certainly put pressure on them to do so, I believe, by improving relations with South Korea. So I see this “axis,” as some might call it, as somewhat overblown.

South Korea should have significant compromise in a number of respects in dealing with North Korea. So we do see this from the Lee government. So I think I think South Korea can have confidence in dealing with North Korea and the Chinese can certainly help in that regard by putting pressure on North Korea to try and have some sort of cooperation, economic symmetry, trade, so on and so forth.

Chun: Great, great. I have so many questions but I have to postpone it to December. thank you very much. Excellent insights. ■

■ Robert S. Ross_Professor at Boston College, Associate and Executive Committee member at  John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University.

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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