EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 18

Author

Kim, Sungbae is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). In that position, he provides advice to government and contributes to development of policy on North Korea and Korean Peninsula issues. Prior to this position, he served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of National Unification (2006). Before taking up that position, Dr. Kim served as Senior Director and Director (2003-2006) of the Strategic Planning Bureau, National Security Council (NSC) of Korea. Dr. Kim earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Seoul National University.

I. What Made North Korea's Nuclear Threat “Underbalanced”?

The balance of power principle has prevailed on the Korean Peninsula since the Cold War began. The Korean War can be understood from this point of view. The military buildup has increased continuously between the two Koreas even since the signing of the armistice, and both big and small military conflicts keep occurring. These circumstances have resulted in a kind of strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula. However, a decisive factor that might change the inter-Korean strategic balance arose in the early 1990s: North Korea’s nuclear development.

North Korea's nuclear development was first detected in its initial stages in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was never effectively stopped, and the North is now considered to be at a nuclear arsenal stage with an accumulation of nuclear materials and two nuclear tests. Notably, in November 2010, North Korea's uranium enrichment program was revealed in addition to its existing plutonium-based nuclear program, which made the North Korean nuclear issue of greater concern. North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 marked a critical stage, making North Korea a de facto nuclear state. But South Korea’s response was unexpectedly restrained. There were no strong sanctions against North Korea nor a corresponding attempt at nuclear armament. What made this happen?

Why was North Korea's nuclear armament not stopped? According to realist theory, the logic of the security dilemma should have called for a balancing behavior, but the actual responses were limited and even resembled a de facto appeasement policy. The U.S. option might have been restricted by the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Any sanctions against North Korea, military or economic, could not be imposed if opposed by South Korea, the United States’ ally. What were South Korea's responses? North Korea's nuclear armament decisively changed the military strategic balance in inter-Korean relations. Although South Korea ought to have responded more proactively to the North Korean threat, it did not, from the standpoint of realism. Even without a preemptive military strike, strong sanctions against North Korea ought to have been imposed, given that security concerns were the highest priority in the South Korean decision-making process. Yet the Roh Moo-Hyun administration largely continued to draw on existing inter-Korean relations and only joined the sanctions against North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council following the first nuclear test, the most critical phase in the North Korean nuclear program. Was this action a policy failure or an exceptional case? If we just want to evaluate South Korean policy then we could stop here, but if we want to carefully analyze it then a much more complex analysis will be required.

Neoclassical realists call a threatened country’s behavior “underbalancing” when it has failed to recognize a clear and present danger, has simply not reacted to it or has responded in a paltry and imprudent way (Schweller 2004, pp. 159–160). It is debatable whether we can call the Roh administration’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear threat “underbalancing.” Liberalists as well as realists might not consent to this argument. From a liberalist perspective, the Roh administration's response was a rational choice that reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations, because excessive military measures or strong sanctions against North Korea might have caused unnecessary military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and compromised the entire inter-Korean relationship. Strict realists may not regard the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” either. In their view, any balancing act was not needed at that time, because an aggregate strategic balance was already working on the Korean Peninsula since the U.S.-ROK alliance was in place. Rather, they might have viewed the Roh administration’s response as over-engaging behavior, which was too sensitive to North Korea’s reaction. However, defining balancing behavior as a militarily meaningful measure is a too narrow and military-centric approach. Even the concept of “soft balancing” was developed to describe limited and indirect balancing strategies through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining, contrasted with “hard balancing” such as military buildup and alliance formation (Paul 2005, p.58). The Roh administration’s response to North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was even below its own threatened level, let alone the level that the conservatives and the United States demanded. There are enough grounds for taking the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” for it neglected even “soft balancing” It was, however, “underbalancing” on a specific issue rather than in an aggregate power structure.

Nevertheless, this paper is not based on the neoclassical realist approach. The Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain using neoclassical realist theory even if there was some kind of “underbalancing” phenomenon. Neoclassical realism notes the role of domestic politics. The distortion in foreign policy by domestic politics is fully considered in foreign policy studies. The problem is that as shown by the complete differences in the policy toward North Korea of the Roh and Lee administrations, South Korean domestic politics can be an “overbalancing” factor as well as an “underbalancing” one. How can we explain such differences in policy preferences? We need a more complex approach than comparative foreign policy theory. In the case of South Korea, it is impossible to generalize about how domestic politics is reflected in foreign policy with several domestic variables. In South Korea, inter-Korean relations are deeply linked to domestic politics, because policy toward North Korea includes cultural elements such as identity and norms.

This discussion will analyze how the domestic politics of South Korea are reflected in the North Korean nuclear issue, the highest national security concern when North Korea conducted its nuclear test in 2006. Especially, it will show how cultural elements such as norms and identity shaped the South Korean government’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat in term of constructivism. Yet the global cultural environment on which constructivism focuses will not be dealt with in depth here. Constructivism tends to note the effect of the domestic cultural environment in addition to the international one. But the global cultural environment such as the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and non-proliferation norms have had a relatively insignificant impact on the South Korean government's policy decisions. I will therefore review the relevance of various alternative approaches that can be used to explain South Korea's underbalancing behavior in response to North Korea's nuclear threat.

II. How to Explain South Korea’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: A Brief Theoretical Review

1. Neoclassical Realist Approach

The nuclear issue is the most typical military security issue in the international political arena and can be expected to be strongly explained by realist international political theory that stresses high politics. According to traditional realism, all nations pursue their national interests, defined as power. Yet there is an inevitable limitation to national power; the balance of power is a major factor that determines the behavior of nations (Morgenthau 1985). And the most explicit form of power is the military and nuclear weapons that are the most destructive means.

Thus the balance of power is the most effective tool for analysis to explain a nuclear issue. Structural realism, pioneered by Waltz, emphasizes the concept of the balance of power in a different context. Under an anarchical international system without global government, nations have the same functional property as units in that they have to put the top priority on their survival and safety rather than on cooperation with other nations. Therefore, the most significant element in international politics is the distribution of power; in this context the balance of power is the core factor that can explain and predict the behavior of all nations (Waltz 1979). Nuclear armament, in particular, is a critical factor that can change the strategic balance among nations in a fundamental way. North Korea's nuclear development can be interpreted from a realist point of view. There are various interpretations of the nuclear negotiating strategy of North Korea. Yet it cannot be disputed that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons program in order to secure its survival and safety. It is generally understood that the strategic factors for North Korea's nuclear weapons are the increased security vulnerability with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc; the fear of U.S. attack, which intensified following the Iraq War; the diverging gap in South-North Korea national capabilities; and the burden from the conventional arms race with South Korea due to the North’s own economic difficulties. Whatever the factors might be, nuclear armaments can be perceived as the most effective tool to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment.

The problem is whether realism can explain South Korea’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat. Traditional realism regards a state as a unit pursuing power as a human being does. And structural realism sees the international anarchic structure as defining the behavior of an individual state. Either way, realism takes a state as a rational unitary actor. A state naturally shows balancing behavior toward external threats, but this has not been the case on many occasions, such as the response to North Korea's nuclear threat in 2006. South Korea did not take any meaningful military measures at that time. In this regard, we might take note of the geopolitical risk that the South Korean government faces. The possibility of full-scale war, as experienced in the Korean War, limits options in North Korean policies. But overemphasizing the geopolitical risk might lead to ignorance of the fact that there are various levels of sanctions and diverse types of military sanctions, such as military exercises and deterrence measures. In any sense, the Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain from a realist point of view.

Even within realism, international politics theory based on a positivist hypothesis of rationality has been questioned. Neoclassical realists note the process and interaction of agents and acknowledge that the response of a state to an external threat can be influenced by domestic circumstances. The closer the policymaking process and actual state's society relations to a unitary actor, the more accurate realism's prediction is. Conversely, when states are divided at the society level, they are less likely to behave in accordance with balance-of-power predictions. According to Schweller, a neoclassical realist, we can explain an actor's choices by two reasons, the first being an actor's preferences, that is, willingness, and the second being the ability of the actor to balance, given the political and material hurdles that must be overcome to do so. Schweller posits four variables that are comprehensive enough to explain state responses to threats: elite consensus, government or regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite cohesion. He insists that incoherent and fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats, because elites view the domestic risks as too high and are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society (Schweller 2004, pp. 168–170).

A neoclassical realist approach indeed has some implications concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. It is true that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated over the past twenty years since the early 1990s despite some progress. North Korea was suspected of developing its nuclear program in the early 1990s and is supposed to be a de facto nuclear state today. From a neoclassical realist viewpoint, this situation is the result of a lack of proper responses to explicit external threats and a typical “underbalancing” phenomenon. In Schweller's framework, it is the result of South Korea's specific domestic politics. It is true that the South Korean state-society was fragmented during the same period. Particularly after the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, the entire society as well as the political elites was rendered almost dichotomous over inter-Korean relations and the policy toward North Korea. But it is not enough to explain South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat only by reference to the cohesion of society. Schweller's framework, based on the British and French experiences during the interwar period, cannot be applied to South Korea, which has a different historical background. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to explain the Lee administration's response to the North Korean nuclear issue, which is the very opposite to the Roh administration’s, while societal fragmentation and cohesion have not changed. It does not make sense to explain that South Korea's response has changed completely after only two years, with a change of actor's preferences due to adjustments in domestic political circumstances. Rather, it would be more plausible to say that the policy preferences of the two administrations were different socio-psychologically. It is true that domestic politics are relevant in balancing external threats. But in the South Korean case, cultural elements such as norms and identity are much more influential than political and economic interests.

2. Liberalist Explanation

Liberalists have much to say about South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat. They would resent the concept of “underbalancing.” “Underbalancing,” which is very value-oriented, is a concept based on the assumption that a proactive balancing action has to be taken. But liberalists would not consider the Roh administration's response to be “underbalancing.” To them, it was the appropriate response to prevent tensions from accelerating on the Korean Peninsula. In their view, a kind of under-engaging has happened under the Lee administration, to the extent that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated to a much greater extent. The motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear threat has been to prompt the United States to negotiate the lifting of financial sanctions against North Korea rather than to create a substantial and immediate threat to cause a strategic imbalance between the two Koreas. Taking excessive military measures is overbalancing that might cause military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In the liberalist view, the Roh administration's choice reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, it was a rational choice to maintain inter-Korean relations through a measured response rather than through sacrificing the entire relationship by strong sanctions against North Korea. This means that the so-called spill-over effect” worked, as liberalism and functionalism would say. Liberalist approaches are based on the hypothesis that the state is basically a rational actor. But if we understand that the Roh administration's choice was not the best but was inevitable and rational, it, at least, comes from the fact that the actor (the Roh administration) had a liberalist's view. The Lee administration showed another choice in sacrificing its inter-Korean relationship in order to protect its security interests. Still, the liberalist approach also cannot effectively explain why the two South Korean administrations under almost the same state-society structure made opposite political choices.

3. Constructivist Alternative

The constructivist approach is relevant in analyzing the Roh administration’s response to the North Korean nuclear issue in that it emphasizes cultural elements such as norms and identity. South Korean domestic politics became more diversified as the country went through rapid industrialization and democratization over the past half century, and the influence of domestic variables in the decision-making process has greatly increased. Thus, we can explain South Korean behavior by analyzing public opinion on specific foreign policy issues or bureaucratic interests. We can also simply use ways of analysis such as cognitive consistency, group thinking, and psychological stress.

However, the Roh administration's response to North Korea's first nuclear test that I analyze here seems to have been more affected by discourse politics and cultural elements than by political interests, being much more relevant than the personal level cognitive and psychological elements of political elites.

Constructivism focuses more on the cultural-institutional elements of a state's environment and identity than on the physical environment surrounding it, shaping the national security interests or the security policies of a state. Katzenstein defines norms as collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. The former is called "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will make the relevant others recognize a particular identity, and the latter is called "regulative effects" that specify the standards for proper behavior (Katzenstein 1996, p. 5). Taken together, norms establish expectations about who the actor will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave (Katzenstein 1996, p. 54). Norms influence policy decision-makers to prefer or avoid particular polices on the grounds of norms, and the public or experts present or support specific norms to affect policymaking...(Continued)