매튜 번 하버드대 케네디스쿨 교수는 한국과 미국이 한반도 내 무력 충돌을 막기 위해 취해야 할 자세를 논의합니다. 상대방의 의도에 대한 불확실성은 한미동맹과 북한이 군사적으로 충돌할 가능성을 높이므로, 한국과 미국은 대북 억지력 강화를 위한 군사적 조치에 나설 때 북한의 반응과 대응방향을 예측하고 이를 미리 대비해야 한다고 강조합니다. 나아가 번 교수는 한반도 안보문제 해결을 위해서는 궁극적으로 북한 비핵화가 필요하며, 이와 같은 최종 목표 달성을 위해 체계적인 상호 신뢰 구축 방안을 마련해야 한다고 강조합니다.

※︎ 본 인터뷰 내용은 “핵 경쟁과 동아시아 안보위기: 한미중 대북정책과 군사충돌 시나리오”를 주제로 한 Global NK 국제회의 첫번째 세션에서 발표되었습니다.

I. What should the U.S. and ROK consider to avoid escalation in the Korean Peninsula?

• Whenever a state makes its key decision, its security implication to the adversary and the adversary’s potential response must be considered. In this context, in order to maximize security, the state must assess both the defense-deterrent value and provocation risks.

• What the ROK and U.S. see as deterrent and defensive may be seen as an offensive threat to the DPRK. In crisis, therefore, North Korean misperceptions of ROK-US actions could provoke unwanted escalation.

• Escalation risks link deterrence of large-scale war and smaller provocations. “Core” deterrence, or stopping a full-scale war “out of the blue” is likely to be strong, but deterrence of smaller-scale provocations may fail. Big concern on deterrence lies on the inadvertent steps that could lead to war when small conflicts get out of control.

• In planning responses to provocations, combined ROK-U.S. forces need to consider both the effect on deterring further outrages and the risk of provoking DPRK.

II. Why is crisis management on the Korean Peninsula so difficult?

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #1: ROK-U.S. want conventional superiority for defense and deterrence, but history suggests that side facing conventional inferiority is more likely to use nuclear weapons.

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #2: ROK and U.S. want to improve their ability to target DPRK nuclear forces, thereby exacerbating DPRK fear of such targeting. This increases incentive to build more weapons or even pre-delegate nuclear use authority.

III. How can the U.S. and ROK provide reassurance to North Korea?

• Reduce the temperature, strategically include provocation risk in planning, apply confidence-building measures, and employ nuclear restraints.

■ Matthew Bunn is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.

■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원
    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr