EAI MPDI Working Paper No. 4

Author

Sangbae Kim is a professor of international relations, at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. His major research concerns are with information, communication, and networks in international relations. His selected works include Standards Competition in the Information Age: Wintelism and the Japanese Computer Industry (in Korean), (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2007); Information Revolution and Power Transformation: A Perspective of Network Politics (in Korean), (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2010); International Relations of Arachne: Challenge of the Network Theory of World Politics (in Korean), (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2014).

I. Introduction

In recent years, South Korea has come to be regarded as an emerging middle power in world politics, and growing are concerns that South Korea should play diplomatic roles corresponding to its increased material capabilities. South Korea has recently strived to figure out a new vision of middle power diplomacy: what kinds of roles are expected of it, and in which issue areas it plays those roles in effective ways. The exemplary fields, about which South Korea’s roles of middle power are discussed, include non-traditional security issues such as atomic energy, global warming, and cyber security, and other economic issues such as official developmental aid (ODA), global trade and finance. Of them, cyber security issues are considered as one of the newly rising agendas that South Korea is likely to play a meaningful role as a middle power.

Cyber security issues have largely been the domain of computer experts and specialists since the Internet began as a small community where an authentication layer of code was unnecessary and the development of norms was simple. But then it grew, and everything changed. Although cyberspace offered the arena for business and social activities, it also became an environment for crime, hackings and terrors. Governments, private companies and non-state actors are making efforts to develop indispensable capabilities for securing their resources and activities in cyberspace. Foreign policy makers and International Relations scholars are struggling to understand cyberspace’s basic structures and dynamics, which are different from traditional security sectors. It is obvious that cyber security issues are turning into a major concern of International Relations in various senses.

Amid the fast spread of hacking technologies, many countries and international organizations focus more on crafting security measures and enhancing multilateral cooperation to fend off cyber threats, which could be as devastating as physical military strikes. For example, they are making efforts to build a global framework for Internet governance, of which cyber security is one of the contentious sub-fields; but their consensus has not been framed yet. In particular, the United States and China, two world powers in the 21st century, are recently conflicting with each other over hackings and espionage. The issue of cyber security is becoming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides. Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (Lieberthal and Singer, 2012: pp.1-2).

South Korea, which has a high reputation as an “Internet Strong Nation,” is expected to play a contributive role in the cyber security sector. South Korea boasts cutting-edge digital technology, efficient computer networks and the world’s top high-speed Internet penetration rate. But behind these feats is an unpleasant truth: its vulnerability to cyber threats, suspected as North Korea’s offences. It is worried that the on-line attacks are likely to be coupled with off-line nuclear attacks. It is urgent and crucial for South Korea to build capabilities enough to fend off any offences through cyberspace. However, securing cyberspace is not solely based on fostering material capabilities, but also figuring out diplomatic solutions among committed actors. In this context, this paper analyses the opportunities or difficulties that South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is facing in the cyber security sector.

This paper maintains that existing studies of middle power are inadequate for providing a guideline for South Korea, particularly in the realm of cyber security. They mostly look to individual countries’ attributes or capabilities to explain the generalized roles of middle power in world politics (Gordon, 1966; McLin, 1967; Holbraad, 1971; Pratt ed., 1990; Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, 1993; Cooper ed., 1997; Otte, 2000). Thus, they fail to explain the proper roles of middle power under a certain structural condition that might be a more essential determinant for middle powers’ action than for world powers’. In contrast, network theorists in International Relations adopt an anti-attribute imperative that rejects all attempts to explain actors’ actions solely in terms of actors’ attributes. They maintain that it is an actor’s “position,” not its attributes, that creates opportunities for a country, and that how actors are connected to others influences its diplomatic discretion. In this context, this paper adopts this notion of “positional approach,” which has an origin from network theories, to understand middle power diplomacy (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Goddard, 2009; Nexon and Wright, 2007; Nexon, 2009; S. Kim, 2014a; 2014b).

Relying on the positional approach, this paper primarily identifies complex structures of the cyber security sector. Indeed, this approach provides a framework to understand the distinct modalities and dynamics of cyber security issues, which this paper calls the “asymmetric inter-network politics.” It looks at the triple structures: i) techno-social structure of cyberspace, ii) issue-specific political structure in global cyber security governance, and iii) geopolitical structure generated by the U.S.-China competition. Identifying the structural conditions in the domain, this paper explores the possibilities or the dilemma of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the cyber security sector. In particular, this paper uses network theories to deduce a series of conditions under which South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is more or less likely.

This paper is composed of five sections. In the first section, it outlines the notions of structural positioning and positional power as theoretical frameworks. In the second section, it explores the technological structure and social dynamics of cyberspace, in which various actors are interacting. In the third section, it examines the inter-network politics of global cyber security governance, and investigates competing ideas and interests behind it. In the fourth section, it looks at the U.S-China conflicts over cyber hackings, regulatory policies, and security discourses. In the fifth section, applying the positional approach to middle power diplomacy, it suggests that South Korea should manage three strategies of brokerage, collection, and complement in coping with the inter-network politics of cyber security. This paper concludes with a brief summary of this paper, and presents further research concerns.

II. Positional Approach to Middle Power Diplomacy

Network theories provide IR theorists with an alternative account of middle power diplomacy; they hold that a particular type of network creates favorable conditions for participating actors and how actors are positioned in the network facilitates their ability to compete or cooperate with others (Goddard, 2009: p.253). In this view, middle power’s actions are dependent upon the structural condition of the network in which a country ties to others. In other words, depending on how the structure is shaping, middle powers are likely to enjoy a certain degree of roles. Then, comparing to other theoretical approaches, how does the network perspective define the structural condition—i.e., “structure” in general?

While the neo-realists notion of structure understands structure as an entity that is derived from the categorical attributes of actors (Waltz, 1979), network theories look at the relational context of actors’ interaction. Structure is emerging from “continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligation” (Tilly, 1998: p.456; Goddard, 2009: p.254). Here, structure is understood as the relational configuration among actors or the patterns of transaction themselves. Relatively durable, but fundamentally dynamic interactions constitute the structural conditions in which actors operate (Nexon, 2009: p.25). In short, structure is not a kind of fixed entity reducing to actors’ internal properties or attributes, but a social relationship among or across actors (Nexon and Wright, 2007).

This view is useful to identify the role of middle power occupying a specific position in the network. It is not an actor’s attributes or interests but its positions that enable middle power’s agency. The positional perspective in social network theory holds “that how actors are positioned in a network facilitates their ability to act as entrepreneurs. Because social and cultural ties provide power, information, and ideas, an actor’s ability to introduce new norms, manipulate symbols, and radically influence political outcomes, all depends on network position” (Goddard, 2009: p.257). Middle powers’ strategies are more likely to succeed if they accommodate the requirements of the structural conditions in the network. If the concept of middle power is defined in terms of structural position in a network, what specific roles would a middle power play under a certain network structure?...(Continued)