Editor's Note

In an effort to illustrate the bifurcation of "peace" on the Korean Peninsula, Young-sun Ha analyzes the evolution of reunification discourses following the Korean War. In particular, his paper focuses on the three concepts--"reunification through war", "reunification through revolution" and "peaceful reunification"—that emphasize differences in the two Koreas’ respective interpretations of peace. Such conceptual bifurcation, accompanied by existing political and economic differences, makes it increasingly more difficult for the two Koreas to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Quotes from the paper 

The Korean War and the Concept of Peace

After separate governments were established in the North and the South in 1948, North Korea chose reunification through war as its primary principle, complemented by reunification through revolution with peaceful reunification as the facade.

National Modernization and the Concept of Peace

In spite of domestic and international difficulties, North Korea quickly finished postwar reconstruction under the Three-Year Plan for Economic Revival (1954-1956) and the First Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (1957-1961). In the 1960s, the Soviets and the Chinese withdrew their support for reunification through war. In the meantime, South Korea remained politically unstable, and was enduring greater difficulty recovering from the war than North Korea.

Accordingly, North Korea began to emphasize reunification through revolution over reunification through war. Kim Il Sung called for reunification through strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities in February 1964.

South Korea’s approach of "first construction, next reunification" and the North’s strategy of "strengthen the three revolutionary capabilities" competed against one another. But in 1968, the inter-Korean relationship sharply deteriorated owing to a series of incidents including the Blue House Raid (January 21), the USS Pueblo Incident (January 23), and the Uljin-Samcheok Landing (October 23). After this, the South Korean government switched to a strategy of "parallel advancement of defense and construction".

Détente and the July 4 Joint Statement

While Park Chung-hee was pursuing a three-fold survival strategy that included an improved relationship with North Korea, Kim Il Sung sought reunification through a strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities. Although the two Koreas shook hands, they did so with totally different perspectives and inner hostility towards one another. As a result, the handshake did not lead to a hug but rather regressed to a state of confrontation.

The Post-Cold War Era and the Concept of Peace

The arms reduction proposals by North and South Korea have some commonalities but are structurally in conflict, with discrepancies arising from their totally different approaches to "peace" in Korea. On the one hand, South Korea has pointed out that a relaxation of military tensions on the Peninsula is practically impossible as long as the North, based on the lasting ideology of the national liberation and people’s democratic revolution formed in the 1960s, 1) urges withdrawal of the USFK, 2) denies the legitimacy of the South Korean regime and seeks to instigate communist revolutions in the South, and 3) still displays the potential for a surprise attack. On the other hand, North Korea argues that the main obstacles to the relaxation of military tensions are large-scale military exercises such as Team Spirit as well as the presence of US forces and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the South, which must be removed first and foremost to achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Conclusion 

Modern concepts of "peace" in South and North Korea have developed in a bifurcated fashion throughout four phases: the Korean War (1950s), national modernization (1960s), the détente (1970s), and the post-Cold War era (1990s). Within the divided Peninsula, the concept of "peace" has been intricately entwined with the three options of reunification through war, reunification through revolution, and peaceful reunification, and has over time come to have totally different meanings in the North and the South.

[To] achieve a true resolution to the Korean peace problem in the 21^st century, sociopolitical forces inside and outside the Korean Peninsula must exert co-evolutionary efforts to develop and practice a new, shared concept of "peace".

Author’s Biography

Young-Sun Ha is Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee(2018-). He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (2017), International Politics of Tributary Envoys: The Analysis of Cho’chonnok and Yonhaengnok 16C-19C (2016), and Korean Peninsula among Big Powers 1972 vs 2014 (2015).