EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 9

Author

Kang Choi is a professor and Director-General for American Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1992 to 1998, and from 2002 to 2005, Professor Choi worked in the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). When at KIDA, Professor Choi assumed various positions such as Chief Executive Officer, Task Force for Current Defense Issues, Director of International Arms Control Studies, and one of the editors of Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He has done more than 60 research projects on arms control, crisis/consequence management including pol-mil games, and the ROK-US security alliance. From 1998 to 2002, he served in National Security Council Secretariat as Senior Director for Policy Planning and Coordination. He was one of South Korean delegates to the Four-Party Talks. Professor Choi has published many articles including “An Approach toward a Common Form of Defense White Paper,” “International Arms Control and Inter-Korean Arms Control,” “Inter-Korean Arms Control and Implications for the USFK,” “Future ROK-US Security Alliance,” “A New Approach toward Inter-Korean Arms Control,” “North Korea’s Intensions and Strategies on Nuclear Games,” and “A Prospect for US-North Korean Relations: beyond the BDA issue.” Prior to obtaining his PhD from the Ohio State University in international politics, Professor Choi received his Master’s Degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in International Politics and his Bachelor’s Degree from Kyung Hee University in English Literature.

“We go together” is the well-known motto of the Combined Forces Command (hereafter CFC). As the phrase tells us, since the beginning of the ROK-U.S. alliance in 1953, with the signing of ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, this bond has been one of the key elements in each country’s security strategy. For the United States, the ROK-U.S. alliance has served as a critical pillar of its East Asian strategy. For the ROK, the alliance relationship with the United States has been one of the cornerstones in its national security. For almost six decades, the Republic of Korea and the United States have overcome various challenges together. In the process they have deepened and widened their cooperation, not only in the area of military and security concerns but also in the political and economic arenas. Furthermore, the successful economic development and democratization of South Korea have contributed to the expansion of common interests and shared values, and created more opportunities for cooperation and the sharing of responsibilities.

However, over the past several years, the ROK-U.S. alliance has experienced severe stress, if not crisis, and has gone through “physical” adjustment or adaptation. Each side has had a different rationale and motivation for the changes and failed to understand those of the other side. South Korea has approached the alliance from a peninsular and subregional perspective, with little attention to, or understanding of, the U.S. strategic shift in its defense transformation and transformational diplomacy, whereas the United States has approached the alliance issue from a global and transformational perspective. The process of change itself has been poorly managed and trust between the two allies has eroded. Some have argued that the ROK-U.S. alliance has entered into a terminal phase with little hope of recovery. Despite the fact that concerns about the alliance were constantly raised throughout the Roh Moo-hyun government from both sides of the Pacific, South Korea and the United States resolved many sensitive, perhaps overdue, issues such as the realignment, or relocation, of U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), strategic flexibility, transfer of special missions, operational control (OPCON) transfer, and so on. Unfortunately, these adjustments have been made without a clear common vision or blueprint. Whether intentionally or not, both sides have rarely arranged for in-depth discussion of the strategic assessment and vision that should have guided the whole process of alliance adjustment. Instead, the process has been driven by a series of pending issues at the time and by domestic political mood, especially in South Korea. With the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in February 2008, South Korea began to reemphasize the importance of its alliance relationship with the United States, seeking to restore the traditional ROK-U.S. relationship and to transform it into a “twenty-first-century strategic alliance.” For the United States, the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government appeared to be a significant milestone for repairing and strengthening ROK-U.S. relations. The U.S. administration, for its part, emphasized the implementation of the agreements that had already been reached between the governments of the two countries and underscored the global aspect of the alliance in the new century. The United States once again has had high hopes and expectations for the ROK-U.S. alliance.

On June 16, 2009, upon their second summit, President Lee Myung-bak and President Barack Obama adopted the long awaited “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.” In the Joint Vision Statement, two leaders envisioned the future of their nations’ alliance by stating that “we will build [a] comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust. Together, we will work shoulder-to-shoulder to tackle challenges facing both our nations on behalf of the next generation” (emphasis added). Upon President Obama’s more recent visit to Seoul on November 18 and 19, the two leaders agreed to hold the U.S. and ROK foreign and defense ministers’ meeting, the so-called 2+2 meeting, in 2010 and to adopt guidelines for the implementation of the Joint Vision Statement. Eight months later the meeting took place in Seoul. While they did not adopt the guidelines, two sides have shown a strong determination to strengthen and transform the alliance, which will be able to tackle not only traditional security challenges coming from the North but also various challenges of the twenty-first century at both the regional as well as the international level.

Realization of the vision requires much additional attention to and an accurate understanding of both the challenges ahead and the ways in which a clearly defined alliance can meet those challenges. A strategic alliance for the twenty-first century, moreover, will have to be built in concrete terms and actions, because we have already passed the stage of rhetoric and declaration. For that purpose, let us review the fundamentals of the alliance and set a new roadmap for it.

Alliance Adjustment in Retrospect

What We Have Accomplished

South Korea and the United States have discussed and settled various issues related to the adjustment, or transformation, of the alliance using diverse channels since 2003. Despite different perspectives and understanding of the issues, the two allies have hammered out agreements on the overall adjustment of the U.S. military base system, most notably the relocation of the Yongsan base, the reduction and realignment of the U.S. Second Infantry Division, and the overhaul of the “Land Partnership Plan” through the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) Talks. They also came to a consensus on issues related to alliance operations, such as “strategic flexibility,” Comprehensive Security Assessment (CSA), Joint Vision Study (JVS), wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer, and Command Relations Study (CRS), through discussions in Security Policy Initiative (SPI) Talks. However, differences of opinion came to light in the process, and with regard to strategic flexibility and the CSA, the two countries managed to find only partial closure rather than reaching a complete settlement. The process was poorly managed and thus trust and confidence between the two sides were damaged with the spread of anti-American sentiment in South Korea and the erosion of pro-South Korean, or pro-alliance, sentiment in the United States.

In parallel efforts, the two countries have reinforced the role of their existing deliberation procedures by establishing additional new high-level consultation mechanisms such as the “Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA),” the “Security Policy Initiative (SPI),” and the “Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP).”

At Gyeongju, South Korea in November 2005, President Roh and President Bush adopted a joint declaration, the crux of which was the “development of the ROK-U.S. alliance into a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial alliance” (emphasis added)...(Continued)

Acknowledgement

This article incorporates the ideas from Korean-American Alliance: A Vision and a Roadmap (2006) edited by Young-Sun Ha.