EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.22

Author

Jennifer Lind is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Master’s in Pacific International Affairs from the University of California, San Diego, and a B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley.

Professor Lind is the author of Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics, a book that examines the effect of war memory on international reconciliation (Cornell University Press, 2008). She has also authored scholarly articles in International Security and Pacific Review, and has written for wider audiences within the Atlantic and Foreign Policy. Professor Lind has worked as a consultant for RAND and for the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, and has lived and worked in Japan. Her current research interests include the resilience of the North Korean regime, planning for U.S. military missions in the event of North Korean collapse, energy competition and its security implications for East Asia, and democratization and stability in East Asia.

This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.

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Abstract

 

Analysts have speculated that regime type has a powerful influence on how states remember, and thus on the potential for international reconciliation. Scholars argue that whereas authoritarian regimes purvey chauvinist myths about their past behavior, democracies are more likely to remember the past in conciliatory ways, because leaders have electoral legitimacy, and because of a free marketplace of ideas. In this paper, (1) I deduce a hypothesis from this conventional wisdom. I show evidence that only democracies are willing and able to engage in self-reflective national debates about their past violence, and such debates have (as shown by the case of Germany) led to conciliatory remembrance. However I challenge the conventional wisdom with two arguments. (2) Authoritarian regimes do not necessarily always have incentives to foment xenophobic nationalism: they sometimes purvey xenophilic myths about states with which they seek reconciliation. Also, (3) I deduce an argument showing that a free marketplace of ideas will not necessarily eradicate myths as efficiently as many scholars believe. A free marketplace will supply the ideas demanded by its consumers, who often eschew self-reflection and guilt in favor of a more self-centered, and sometimes chauvinistic, historical narrative.

 

The political effects of memory have emerged as an important issue in contemporary international affairs. Scholars argue that the quality of a country’s remembrance affects international trust and the prospects for reconciliation among former adversaries. Nationalist, xenophobic remembrance is said to create disputes and sustain mistrust; scholars argue that conciliatory remembrance facilitates reconciliation. For example, Turkey and Armenia’s tortured process toward diplomatic normalization has been obstructed by Ankara’s refusal to acknowledge or apologize for Turkey’s mass killing of Armenians in 1915-1918. Holocaust denial by prominent Iranian leaders creates consternation in Tel Aviv and around the world, elevating threat perception and empowering advocates of a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Arab-Israeli relations are fraught by disputes over history; Japan’s refusals to acknowledge its World War II atrocities aggravate relations in East Asia.

 

Analysts have speculated that regime type has a powerful influence on how states remember, and thus on the potential for reconciliation. Scholars argue that authoritarian regimes, challenged for legitimacy and relying on a controlled marketplace of ideas, purvey chauvinist myths about their past behavior. This elevates distrust of their intentions among other states, triggers disruptive conflicts over history, and obstructs reconciliation. Conversely, scholars expect that in democracies, electoral legitimacy of leaders and a free marketplace of ideas lead to more conciliatory remembrance, enabling states to move relations forward.

 

Understanding the effect of regime type on national remembrance is important for many reasons. Although regime type is not necessarily a manipulable variable, a better understanding of what drives memory in autocratic versus democratic states is essential as individual countries or the international community become increasingly activist in their attempts to influence how states remember. Moreover, given speculation about political liberalization in East Asia (Chinese political liberalization and Korean unification), understanding how changes in governance are likely to affect remembrance and nationalism in those countries makes this issue particularly salient for the region.

 

This paper makes several contributions toward advancing a debate about the link between regime type and national remembrance. (1) I deduce a hypothesis (the “Scapegoating Authoritarians”) from the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes are more likely to purvey chauvinistic myths about the past, elevating mistrust and creating international disputes over history. Bringing to bear evidence, I note that it is true that only democracies are willing and able to engage in self-reflective national debates about their past violence, and such debates can (as shown by the case of Germany) lead to conciliatory remembrance...(Continued)