Beom-Shik Shin is a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

On August 24, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002. After the summit, many speculated upon the impact this meeting would have upon the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear program. Although some experts viewed Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia as merely a form of begging bowl diplomacy, such analysis underestimates recent efforts by Russia to engage Northeast Asia. Moreover, the strategic significance of the summit is reflected in the agreement reached between the two leaders which would imply that the summit could be a watershed moment in bringing about new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and among neighboring countries. Particularly, the proposed Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project would have a strong impact on the political geography of Northeast Asia.

In November 2011, South Korea and Russia held their own summit in St Petersburg where the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline project was reconfirmed. Moscow even expressed its willingness to build the pipeline, passing through North Korea, at its own expense. Such a very active participation from Russia though could provoke certain competition with China in the region.

The future course of this project is expected to be decided during the negotiation process between Russia’s Gazprom and South Korea’s KOGAS. Yet in South Korea, domestically, this issue of building a gas pipeline could be controversial in many ways. There are concerns regarding security matters related to North Korea as well as a lack of trust in Russia. At the same time, the responses from the United States and China must be taken into account. As 2012 is the year of leadership change for many countries in the region, it is also possible that the project will become unnecessarily politicized and eventually jeopardized. Therefore, South Korea should carefully prepare an action plan for realizing this project in order to take advantage of this opportunity amid changing dynamics in the region.

In recent years there has been much talk of the United States “returning” to Asia, but Russia is also making its own return. This gas pipeline project shows how Russia intends to use its vast energy resources to facilitate its ambition to play a new role in Northeast Asia. This Issue Briefing addresses the impact of Russia’s reengagement and how South Korea should respond by considering both the positive and negative effects.

The Russia-North Korea Summit and Bilateral Relations

To understand the significance of the agreement drafted at the Russia-North Korea summit, it is necessary to understand the background of how the summit came about.

First, the Russia-North Korea summit can be interpreted as a sign that Russia has begun to consolidate its position in Asia and strengthen its influence over the region. One aim of this is to solidify its identity as a “Euro-Pacific State.” Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had only a limited role in the region due to various internal and external factors, such as its weakened economy, misdirected foreign policies, lost channels of influence toward Asia, the North Korean nuclear problem, and diplomatic tension between the North and the United States, as well as its opportunistic behaviors in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, from Moscow’s perspective Washington’s policy has been to prevent Russia from reconsolidating its strategic influence in Asia. Recently though, Russia has made efforts to increase its influence over issues related to the Korean Peninsula even at its own expense, backed by its resurgent power from energy resources. Russia’s recent effort to revitalize various agendas for cooperation with North Korea is a good example of it becoming involved on the Korean Peninsula. Russia provided fifty-thousand tons of food aid to North Korea for flood relief and is now considering sending the equivalent amount again. Through these efforts, Russia is trying to elevate its relationship with North Korea to a strategic cooperative partnership. Moscow clearly recognizes that the Korean Peninsula has been at the core of Northeast Asian politics. Furthermore, it still remembers its past diplomatic failure when Russia was left out from the Four-Party Talks to deal with the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. The Kremlin now strives to reinvigorate the Russia-North Korea relationship and enhance bilateral strategic cooperation which has not been the same since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this context, it is important to take note that Russia has revived the North Korea-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology and has also restarted discussions to seek a resolution to the debt problem which has been the biggest barrier to furthering bilateral economic cooperation. These actions are reminiscent of Russia-North Korea relations in 2006-2007 when Russia carried out efforts to resolve the tensions surrounding the Banco Delta Asia issue. During that time, Russia sought to maximize its economic interests by promoting the Trans-Korea Railway Project and energy cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. In the end, this kind of opportunistic approach by Russia yielded no benefits as the Six-Party Talks eventually broke down. The reactivation of the North Korea-Russia Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation which had been halted since 2007 is important, particularly during this current period of high tension on the Korean Peninsula. This move also indicates that Russia is now willing to pay the price for becoming involved. In fact, North Korea’s debt to Russia which is approximately ten billion dollars is not really a huge burden for Russia. Resolving the debt issue though indicates a strategic decision on the part of Russia since full-scale economic cooperation between the two countries can only happen after the debt problem is solved. The Kremlin’s willingness to resolve this outstanding issue implies that it is willing to rebuild its strategic cooperative relationship with North Korea. The recent bilateral summit signals that a major step has been taken toward this goal.

Russia’s new approach also suits the needs of North Korea’s leaders as they seek to adjust its current over-dependency on China. Since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government in 2008, North Korea has experienced a decrease in its foreign currency earnings, which it had enjoyed with the Mt. Geumgang tourism project and Kaesong Industrial Complex. At the same time, Pyongyang has negative relations with the United States due to the ongoing nuclear issue and faces further difficulties with heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula following the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In this situation, North Korea had to rely more on China for both economic and security support. As the North Korean regime has proclaimed that it will achieve a “Strong and Prosperous Nation” by 2012, it will have to draw back from its excessive reliance on China in order to revive its self-reliance ideology of Juche. By using the concept of “balance of dependence,” a number of North Korea experts believe that the recent efforts to build a close relationship between Russia and North Korea reflect Pyongyang’s efforts to rebalance its ties with Beijing.

Alongside this, North Korea also expects to procure a stable source of energy and electricity by improving its relations with Russia. According to the itinerary of Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia, he visited the Bureya hydroelectric power station and the junction point of East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (ESPO) at Skovorodino. On his way back to Pyongyang via northeastern China, he stopped by the Daqing oilfield which is at the intersection of Chinese and Russian pipelines. While this shows the desperate need of Kim Jong-il to solve North Korea’s chronic energy shortages, compared with his visits to China, this trip to Russia is indicative of something different. During his visits to China, Kim Jong-il only visited symbolic places which he used to propagate North Korea’s future intention to carry out economic reform and opening. However, the places that Kim Jong-il visited during his visit to Russia would imply that he is more interested in the pragmatic help he can get from Russia.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s remarks on the result of the summit and the related media reports indicate that there is a convergence of Russian and North Korean interests. After the summit, the Kremlin sought to emphasize to the world that the meeting was not about strengthening its relationship with North Korea. Rather, Russia wanted to underscore Kim Jong-il’s agreement on its plan to funnel Russian natural gas to South Korea via North Korea. It also announced an agreement to launch a trilateral special committee on gas pipeline construction. What then are the reasons for Russia’s active pursuit of a Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project?

It can be simply interpreted that Russia needs to develop a new market for natural gas exports as it is well known that natural gas sales are critical for its economy. Yet Moscow is facing challenges as the demand for its natural gas has decreased due to China’s focus on importing natural gas from Central Asia through connecting new pipeline from the region and U.S. interest in developing its domestic sources of shale gas. Therefore, Russia is now shifting its focus to Japan and Korea as potential new customers.

However, such economic interests cannot be the only motivation for Russia’s eagerness on the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project. Energy resources are a strategic commodity, therefore energy diplomacy should be understood as a strategic calculation that not only considers economic factors but also foreign affairs and national security. Russia’s status as a major gas exporter to Europe means it has a significant leverage over Europe. The Russian pipelines that spread all over Europe are the core channels for Russia to impose pressure on European countries. The massive investment by Moscow in the construction of energy supply pipelines to Asia over the last few years can also be understood in the same context. The construction of the ESPO pipeline and the launch of the Eastern Gas Program will be the crucial steps toward expanding Russia’s influence over Asian countries. There are many ways in which Russia is extending its major energy pipelines. For instance, it has extended the ESPO pipeline from Skovorodino toward Daqing and it is now used to supply Russian petroleum to China. This extension drew much attention from the world as it seemed to indicate that these two major countries had finally formed an energy alliance.

Now Russia is attempting to strengthen its influence over the two Koreas by connecting its gas pipelines to the Korean Peninsula. If Russia succeeds in creating a powerful channel of influence through these pipelines then we could expect Moscow to play a more active role as a mediator in resolving tensions on the Korean Peninsula as well consolidating its status in the region. This would make the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project a worthy investment for Russia.

The other interest for Russia with the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project will be to set the groundwork for future projects in Asia, such as an electric power grid connection and railway line extensions. Ultimately these projects will enhance Russia’s network with Asian countries. Furthermore, promoting these projects will help Russia to secure human and material resources which are crucial for developing the local provinces of the Russia Far East and Siberia regions. On October 13, 2010, Russia held a special ceremony to celebrate the completion of the repair work to the railway line connecting Khasan in the Russia Far East to North Korea’s northeastern port city Rajin, a project that was done solely at Russia’s own expense. If the Russia-North Korea railway line is connected to South Korea in the future, it is estimated that two hundred thousand railway containers could be transported through this route every year. Subsequently, it will help facilitate the integration of the Russian Far East and Siberia with the vibrant economies of Northeast Asia. Domestically, this would help Russia resolve the chronic uneven regional development. In terms of Moscow’s foreign policy goals, it would consolidate its identity as a “Euro-Pacific State” and help establish its place as a global power again.

Reviving strategic cooperation with Russia is also beneficial for North Korea as well. During the buildup to the 2011 summit, North Korea sounded out the possibility of military cooperation with Russia by requesting for arms such as new fighter jets. Moscow though was obviously uncomfortable with such a request, since providing strategic arms to North Korea might stir up an arms race among neighboring countries and destabilize the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, it seems like there was some discussion on bilateral military cooperation when Kim Jong-il visited. At the summit, Russia announced that the two countries will hold joint military exercises at some point in the future. This military cooperation between the two countries will, above all, help to relieve North Korea’s sense of insecurity. From the North Korean leadership’s perspective, this will help to shape desirable conditions for balanced diplomacy between China and Russia. Presumably, Russia is also keeping an eye on China in responding to North Korea’s requests for enhanced security cooperation. Recently, China has leased the port of Rajin which is close to the Russian border and Chinese warships have already paid a number of visits to the port.

The Russia-North Korea summit, therefore, was the junction where the interests of the two countries met. North Korea needs Russia to diffuse its excessive reliance on China and to secure economic support. Russia wants to revitalize its relationship with North Korea to restore its channel of influence on the Korean Peninsula and more broadly Asia...(Continued)

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Chaesung Chun for helpful comments.