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These are summaries of presentations given during the First United States-China Relations Forum on January 25, 2016. These summaries do not reflect any official position by EAI.
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute
Presentation by Ui Seon Kang and Bo Yeon Kim
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute has long plagued Sino-Japan relations. The conflict dates back to the war between the two countries in the closing years of the nineteenth century as Japan’s power eclipsed that of the traditional Asian powerhouse China. Now the tables are turning again and a rising China has been more assertive of late about demanding back control over the islands which, according to China, it conceded unfairly during the peace treaty which ended the Sino-Japanese War. The issue is further complicated by the presence of the U.S. which has pledged to defend the islands as a part of its mutual security treaty with Japan, thus making the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands a potential flashpoint in the U.S.-China relationship. Here we will try to outline the positions of both countries and then offer predictions on how this issue may progress in the future.
The U.S. Position
The U.S. does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the U.S. expects China and Japan resolve this matter through peaceful means such as dialogue, rather than actions that raise tensions. However, the scope of U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security includes the islands. This point has been mentioned several times. For example, in April 2014, President Obama reiterated that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation Security “covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands” and that “historically they have been administered by Japan.” He went on to say that the U.S. and Japan “do not believe that they should be subject to change unilaterally.” Moreover, Obama stated that U.S. “doesn’t take a position on final sovereignty determinations with respect to Senkakus” and “the United States’ position is that countries should abide by international law.” During the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in May of 2014, the position of U.S. regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was emphasized and China’s unilateral declaration of the ADIZ in the East China Sea including the Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was mentioned. The U.S. Secretary of Defense reaffirmed that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are covered under the mutual defense treaty between U.S. and Japan...(Continued)
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A Quest for Status and Influence?
Presentation by Lamyae Dahbi
China has recently been the center of international attention following Xi Jinping’s ascension to the top leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi has stated that “the period extended to 2020 is a period of strategic opportunity for China’s growth and development.” He has also announced his intention to have closer economic, political as well as cultural ties to other Asian countries through what he defined as “major-country diplomacy with China’s own characteristics”. This has marked the biggest shift in Chinese foreign policy in decades. It is a shift from a low-profile path of non-interference and focus economic growth to a more assertive and active role in world affairs, all the while maintaining and advancing China’s sovereignty and security interests.
China’s Three Core Objectives in Asia
At present, China can be seen as seeking to achieve three major goals in Asia in order to gain closer relations with its neighboring countries and avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. First, China is pursuing the goal of regional economic integration. This is represented by many projects initiated in the region such as the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, collectively known as the One Belt, One Road initiative. Active promotion of bilateral and multilateral FTAs with eminent economic powers, such as Japan and South Korea, has also been a priority...(Continued)
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The Future of the Asian-Pacific Economic Order
Presentation by Gordon Gatlin and Sola Kim Discussion by Jihye Jeong
The China-U.S. economic relationship is best described as competitive interdependence. The half a trillion dollar yearly U.S. trade imbalance with Asia, and China in particular, is matched by Chinese international reserve holdings well over three trillion dollars. At the same time the two nations have embarked on ambitious economic projects that are, at least for now, mutually exclusive. Despite obstacles that could lead some to argue the contrary, the long-term view points to the two superpowers finding avenues to converge their economic projects, especially the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The U.S. TPP Strategy
Economically the U.S. faces two structural problems in East Asia. It must find a way to import less and export more to the region. More fundamentally, the U.S. is concerned with Chinese ambitions. President Obama has repeatedly warned that China wants to “write the rules” in order to benefit its more protected, central-planned economy which will lower environmental and labor standards. The U.S. has a larger economic strategy where by setting high standards through the TPP now, essentially before China becomes too powerful, this agreement can be used as a stepping stone to further economic liberalization and integration in Asia-Pacific along the lines of the U.S. vision.
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