Author

Kyung-young Chung is Director of the Institute of Foreign & Security Policy on East Asia, and taught national security courses at the Korea National Defense University and the Catholic University of Korea. He graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He received a Master of Science in Systems Management at the University of Southern California and a Master of Military Arts and Science at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, respectively. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics at the University of Maryland College Park.

He was a senior researcher of the Research Institute on National Security Affairs and commanded troops along the Demilitarized Zone. He was a policy practitioner at the Army Chief of Staff Office and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a war planner at ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Dr. Chung joined the Presidential Transitional Team and he was a policy advisor for NSC and the Ministry of National Defense.

The areas of his study and concern are ROK-U.S. military relationship, North Korea’s military strategy, conflict management, and security cooperation.

THAAD Deployment as a Controversial Issue

Pros and Cons debates on the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Korean theater have already taken place in several venues. Currently, the Republic of Korea (ROK) government is at a crossroad of either cooperating with the U.S. as an ally to deploy THAAD due to national survival considerations in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, or accepting China’s request to refuse the system due to ROK’s national interest including the economic importance with China.

In consideration of the imminent security situation and controversial political arguments, this paper will conduct a threat assessment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Then, the paper will address the current reality of the ROK-U.S. combined missile defense system and capabilities of THAAD along with X-band radar. Furthermore, the paper will focus on examining the position of the concerned countries. Finally, the paper will concentrate on analyzing the pros and cons of THAAD in terms of political and diplomatic, military strategic, and economic implications. The paper will make policy recommendations for respective key actors.

Threat Assessment of North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile

The 2014 Defense White Paper published by the ROK Ministry of Nation Defense estimated that North Korea is in a substantial position to obtain ballistic missile capabilities delivering nuclear warheads and develop KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threatening the continental United States. In 2014, North Korea test-fired 111 missile rounds consisting of FROG, SCUD, ER, and Rodong Missiles in order to increase accuracy of their missiles. North Korea conducted surprise and clandestine long-range missile test-firings employing Transportable Erector Launchers (TELs) at medium and high altitudes toward the East Sea crossing inland over North Korea from missile sites in the vicinity of the border between North Korea and China, as well as sites near the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In addition, North Korea test-fired a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) on May 8, 2015.

It is noteworthy that North Korea adopted preemptive nuclear strike as its nuclear doctrine. Since the third nuclear test on Feb 12, 2013, North Korea has pursued a self-defense deterrence strategy in order to prevent opposing forces from attacking by signaling massive retaliation employing nuclear warheads. On March 31, 2013, the North Korean Supreme People’s Congress adopted the constitutional law regarding further strengthening the status as a nuclear state. The moment when North Korea reorganized the Strategic Rocket Command into the Strategic Command in Feb 2014, preemptive nuclear strike became the more significant doctrine.

Especially, Kim Jong-un proclaimed the year 2015 as the time for a great war of unification and approved the ‘Seven Days War Plan’ at the extended Workers Party Central Military Committee on Aug 25, 2012. The War Plan dictates that the Korea People’s Army (KPA) take the initial momentum with asymmetrical weapons systems including nuclear missiles and occupy the Korean peninsula prior to the deployment of U.S. augmentation forces. In 2014, Kim Jong-un paid 73 on-site visits to strategic weapon systems test-firings as well as exercise and training for operational plan implementation. It seems highly likely that North Korea will test-fire a KN-O8 missile as an ICBM in the foreseeable future given that we observed the modified KN-08 missile during the parade for the commemoration of 70th anniversary of the North Korea Workers’ Party foundation on October 10, 2015.

In that context, the Republic of Korea-U.S.’s are committed to preventing attacks with asymmetric assets such as a nuclear warhead delivered by a missile which would inflict a catastrophic number of casualties.

Status of the ROK-U.S. Combined Missile Defense and THAADS

The ROK-U.S alliance has taken synchronized efforts to cope with the North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat through Extended Deterrence Policy Coordination Committee (EDPC) and Counter-missile Capabilities Committee (CMCC) and eventually established the ROK-U.S. Deterrence Strategy Committee in September 2015.

In connection with this strategic environment trend, the ROK forces plan to establish Kill-Chain and Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) systems against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Kill-chain strengthening war fighting capabilities in accordance with the 4D concept (detect, defend, disrupt and destroy) and KAMD consisting of PAC-3 and Long & Medium SAM as ground-to-air missile are scheduled to be fielded around the mid 2020 years.

South Korea is vulnerable because it is insufficiently equipped to defend against the 1,000 missiles of North Korea with only 48 PAC-2 anti-missile missiles. South Korea decided it will develop its own indigenous long range surface-to-air missiles instead of purchasing THAAD. In the meantime, U.S. forces in Korea are equipped with PAC-3 missiles which have a range of 15-40 km with a 24 km altitude limit. The PAC-3 is not sufficient for protecting U.S. forces in Korea since these weapons cover a limited area.

Once THAAD is placed in the field, it has a range of 200km and altitude of 40-150km as an anti-missile weapon system consisting of launchers, missiles, radar, fire control, and communication support equipment. AN/TPY-2 has two mode X-band radars: Forward Based Mode (FBM) with range of detection of 1,800 km and Terminal Based Mode (TBM) of 600km.

Figure 1. Missile Defense on the Korean Peninsula

Source: “S. Korea faces tough decision on THAAD: Experts call on Seoul to make decision

strictly based on security interests,” The Korea Herald, Nov. 6, 2014.

Position of Concerned Countries related to Deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces in Korea

The Republic of Korea

The ROK government’s position on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. forces in Korea is based on the three No’s: “no official request from the U.S., no review, no decision.” Strategic ambiguity might be South Korea’s stance, considering China’s protest against THAAD’s deployment, in parallel with the inevitability of the deployment to protect the U.S. soldiers and assets in South Korea against North Korea’s missile threat.

In June, 2014, Former Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin, current Chief of the Office of National Security, made it clear that anti-ballistic missile capabilities for USFK will be enhanced in the event of THAAD deployment along with Patriot surface-to-air missiles. On September 16, 2014, former Minister of National Defense Kim continued to insist, “The MD system primarily aims at defending the Continental U.S. KAMD will protect the Republic of Korea. However, objective, range, and function of KAMD are different from those of the U.S. Missile Defense.” In addition, he clearly mentioned that South Korea did not make any decision to procure nor even consider the acquisition of SM-3 and THAAD. It seems that those statements attempted to interdict the continuing debate on joining the MD systems led by the U.S. if the ROK purchases those weapon systems which consists of boost-up, medium, and terminal stages.

On Oct 7, 2014, Defense Minister Han Min-koo made his position clear relating to the issue of the THAAD deployment to the USFK at the National Assembly audit of the government, saying, “Considering the limited assets against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, the THAAD deployment will contribute to enhancing the ROK’s security and defense. The immense range of defense by the THAAD will enormously contribute to the defense of the Republic of Korea as well as the USFK.”

Foreign Affair Minister Yun Byung-se provided the official position regarding the THAAD issue, “If the U.S. will officially make a request on the THAAD issue to the ROK, then the National Security Council will make a final decision based on review by the Ministry of National Defense. If necessary, the ROK government will explain it to neighboring countries including China.”

The U.S.

At the forum hosted by the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) in June 2014, USFK Commander Curt Scaparrotti’s mention that the USFK’s request to the U.S. government for the deployment of THAAD created intense debate. In particular, since some public organizations insisted that the deployment of THAAD to Korea is considered to be symbolically joining the Missile Defense system led by the U.S., this issue was a departure from the nature of THAAD and became a political issue...(Continued)