EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 26

Author

Jung-nam Lee is associate professor of Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University, Seoul, Korea. Her research interests include contemporary Chinese politics, and focus especially on political transformation and China’s foreign policy. Her published works include: “Outlook on Chinese Foreign Policy in the Coming Era of Xi Jinping from China’s Perspective,” in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 24, 3 (September, 2012); Democracy and China (ed.) Seoul: Asiatic Research Institute Press, 2012; “China’s idea of East Asian Order: A Comparative Study of ‘Harmonious World Theory’ and Sino-centric Tributary System,” in The Korean Journal of International Relations 50, 3 (Spring 2010), “A Critical Analysis of the theory of Chinese‐Style Democracy” International Area Review 13, 2 (Spring 2010), “China’s soft power in East Asia: an estimation based on the outcome of surveys of six countries” in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, 2 (June 2009), and a number of other articles in academic journals.

I. Introduction

Since diplomatic relations were established between Korea and China in 1992, the relationship between the two countries has developed rapidly, according to various numerical statistics. In terms of economic exchanges, the countries’ trade volume—which totaled no more than 6.4 billion USD in 1992—increased to 240 billion USD in 2011, multiplying 37 times over and exceeding Korea’s aggregate trade volume with the U.S. and Japan. Last year, the volume of direct investment flowing from Korea to China amounted to 50 billion USD, with the number of Korean firms in China reaching 50,000. China has become Korea’s top economic partner, and according to the 2011 figures, Korea is now China’s third-largest economic partner after Japan and the United States (U.S.), although the figures exclude Hong Kong (Cheong 2012). The number of people travelling between the two countries has also increased apace: from 130,000 people in 1992 to 6,410,000 people in 2011, recording a remarkable 49-fold growth. A total of 130,000 people currently participate in student exchange programs (64,000 Chinese students in Korea and 68,000 Korean students in China) and direct flights run between the two countries 837 times a week (Kang 2012, 5).

The nature of Korea–China relations has also evolved since the “the good neighbor” days of “friendly cooperative relations” at the time when diplomatic relations were first established in 1992; in 1998, the countries announced they would pursue “cooperative partner relations in the 21st century,” and in 2003, a new framework of “comprehensive cooperative partner relations” was inaugurated. More recently, as a result of the Korea–China summits in 2008, the countries’ diplomatic relationship has been enhanced even further, to the level of “strategic cooperation relations”, the highest grade of diplomatic ties recognized by China since 1978 (Lee 2009, 103-108).

However, although Korea–China relations have developed and strengthened without any major hindrances for years—and the two countries have enjoyed a sort of diplomatic honeymoon—conflicts rose to the surface around the dawn of the 21st century. The Garlic Dispute in 1999-2000 put an end to the special honeymoon period for the two countries and relations were normalized based on mutual interests (Chung 2011, 262-286). Thereafter, many diverse conflicts and disputes rose to the surface: the dispute over the history of Goguryeo Kingdom during 2003–2004; the dispute over the Registration of Danoje Ceremony in Gangreung as an intangible cultural heritage site of UNESCO; the negative statement of the speaker of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Department on the Korea–China Alliance in 2008; the conflicts between South Korea’s strong stance against North Korea and China’s comprehensive policy for North Korea; the conflict related to the sinking of the Cheonan warship, and bombing on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010;the murder of a Korean Maritime police officer by Chinese fishermen, the delicate conflict related to the funeral process of Kim Jeong-il at the end of 2011; and the issues concerning North Korean expatriates in 2012. These conflicts have soured the public perception of state relations in both Korea and China and have stood as obstacles to the further development of a healthy strategic partnership between the countries. The results of public opinion polls readily corroborate this claim. As seen in Table 1, people in both countries appear to be recognizing that the relationship between the two countries is not improving, but rather deteriorating (see Table 1).

It is worth noting that early on, the conflicts between Korea and China were mostly economic and cultural in nature, but from 2008, strategic concerns such as the Korea–U.S. alliance, relations with North Korea, and the North Korean nuclear weapons program began to appear as major sources of diplomatic disagreement. In light of these pressing issues, the two countries upgraded their diplomatic relationship to the level of a strategic cooperation partnership to solve strategic issues with mutual cooperation; ironically, conflicts over strategic issues have become the core subjects of dispute between the both countries.

In fact, the two countries of Korea and China have not managed to create a substantial cooperative relationship in the political and diplomatic sense, in spite of their conspicuously successful economic partnership. Although more than 40 summit meetings have been held and military exchanges have been made, summits consisting of reciprocal visits have been made no more than seven times and military exchanges have been made only superficially. The reason why cooperation between the two countries has been weak (in terms of the diplomatic and security sectors) is mainly owing to the presence of a perceptual gap between China’s recognition that Korea still stresses the importance of its relationship with the U.S. concerning its security issues, and Korea’s recognition that China is overly sensitive about the public debate pertaining to the North Korea problem. This gap has been too large for a diplomatic quick fix and has impeded the development of better relations between the two countries (Kang 2012, 5).

With the rapid economic rise of China, the concept of the G2 (“The Group of 2”- the United States and China) has gained international currency, however informally. G2 is the term used to refer to the group of the strongest two countries in the world, U.S. and China, which tackles together political and economic issues in the international community (Bergsten 2008, 57-69; Kissinger 2009; Brzezinski 2009). What may be called the emerging “G2 era,” marked by the renewed and heightened interest of the United States in East Asia, solidly defines the China–U.S. relationship as a key variable and determinant of Korea–China relations. With the onset of the G2 era, the gap in recognition between the Koreans and the Chinese has been reinforced, worsening the relationship between the two nations. As strategic competition has exacerbated between China and the Unites States, the latter nation has tried to contain China by reinforcing the Korea–U.S. relationship. Meanwhile, China has tried to reinforce its relationship with North Korea to maintain security and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and to secure a strategic buffer zone against the United States. Therefore, whenever strategic issues arise (such as nuclear threats), Korea is suspicious that China takes a loose position to secure the benefit of a buffer zone by maintaining the current North Korea regime, and China, in turn, is suspicious that Korea–U.S. relations plays a certain role in containing China as the United States returns to East Asia.

Therefore, this study claims that, with the emergence of the G2 era, mounting tensions between Korea and China have hampered the practical progress of these two countries’ “strategic cooperation partnership”. For this purpose, I look into the popular perception of current strategic threats and diplomatic challenges in the two countries, analyzing the results of Korean and Chinese public opinion polls. Next, this study observes how such public perceptions affect the recognition of Korea–China relations. In conclusion, this study discusses how, and along what lines, Korean and Chinese perceptions should change to promote the strategic relationship between Korea and China in the G2 era.

II. Theoretical Discussion and Research Methods

1. Public Opinion Polls and the Study of Foreign Policy

According to constructivist theory, the most important factors that comprise social structure are not physical matters, but perceptual ones. Further, the identity of the actors and the benefits they derive in that structure are not given naturally or from the outside, but are developed through shared concepts in the society (Wendt 1999, 1). From this viewpoint, the actors and structures are social entities and they are developed and reproduced through the process of mutual interactions (Chung 2000, 20). Viewed from this constructivist approach, the foreign policy of a country is not determined externally, but is composed of shared concepts in the society. Moreover, through the interactions between international society and domestic opinions, foreign policy is developed and reproduced based on socially shared concepts. From this standpoint, then, it is very important to analyze the direction and characteristics of a given country’s foreign policy by way of public opinion polls...(Continued)