The year 2010 has witnessed rapid progress in galvanizing international support for preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This is the culmination of the vision set out by President Barack Obama in his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, for a world without nuclear weapons, a vision that is now coming to fruition. A year after the speech, on April 6, 2010, the United States Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review, which clearly defines a decreased role for nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. Two days later, the United States agreed with Russia to reduce nuclear arsenals by a third under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). On April 12 and 13, the first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington under the leadership of President Obama with forty-seven countries in attendance to move one step closer toward the world free of nuclear weapons. Finally, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference was held in May 2010 to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. This two-month period is often referred to as a “nuclear spring,” which has served to undergird another important pillar of the Obama administration’s foreign policy on addressing global nuclear nonproliferation. Yet, it still remains to be seen how his bold nuclear initiative will be developed in the international community.

 

The East Asia Institute invited Dr. Igor Khripunov, Interim Director and Adjunct Professor at the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia, on June 1, 2010, to evaluate the Washington Summit and discuss challenges in improving the nuclear nonproliferation regime as well as for the next nuclear security summit in Seoul. Dr. Khripunov addressed many important questions regarding the nuclear summit meetings and nuclear security, which include outcomes of the Washington Summit, nuclear security and nuclear safety, implementation challenges, security culture, and recommendations for the 2012 summit in Seoul. The following is a summary of Dr. Khripunov’s presentation and the discussion that followed.

 

Presentation

 

The Washington Nuclear Security Summit

 

Since the Prague speech in April 2009, President Obama has been pushing for a world without nuclear weapons by reducing existing nuclear arsenals, strengthening the NPT regime, and working to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 was held in this context to collectively promote a new nuclear security culture, share best practices, and raise global standards for nuclear security. While there is a lack of global consensus on nuclear threats and the reluctance of some governments to support the idea of a global nuclear security summit, forty-seven states and three international organizations did participate in the Washington summit. Most significantly, three nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT were in attendance: India, Israel, and Pakistan.

 

The summit concluded with a communiqué that addressed various aspects of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation as well as a work plan to promote a world free of nuclear weapons. Dr. Khripunov placed an emphasis on several critical components of the communiqué, which include: 1) increasing national efforts to improve nuclear security and accounting of nuclear materials with strengthened regulations; 2) seeking consolidation of stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium; 3) promoting universality of key international treaties; 4) expanding resources for the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop guidelines and provide advice; and 5) sharing best practices for nuclear security in ways that would not infringe upon the rights of states to develop peaceful nuclear energy. In addition, the need for increased bilateral and multilateral assistance received considerable attention.

 

As part of global efforts to implement the communiqué, the Washington Summit issued a work plan that provides specific guidelines for the international community. The work plan primarily focused on developing a global nuclear security culture, related education and training, as well as research on new nuclear fuels, detection methods, and forensics techniques. Mr. Khripunov noted that nuclear technology suppliers need to support the creation of national nuclear security capacities in recipient countries including the development of human resources. This recommendation is particularly relevant to the South Korean government, which is now seeking to further expand its foothold in the international nuclear energy market and thus is subject to strict obligations as a supplier.

 

The Washington Summit Agenda

 

The agenda of the Washington Summit was largely intended to demonstrate the successful hosting of an international gathering and an outcome that would be satisfactory to all participants. In this regard, the Obama administration did not make any huge leap in nuclear disarmament. Rather, it placed more emphasis on setting the stage for the ratification of various provisions, with limited steps each time, and demonstrated successful achievements in terms of enhancing nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism.

 

Dr. Khripunov reiterated the synergies and interdependence of five key elements for the nuclear nonproliferation regime: nuclear disarmament, nuclear export control, nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, and nuclear counterterrorism. The Washington Summit recognized that ensuring nuclear security will be a major step forward to prevent potential nuclear terrorism. In addition, the interdependence and interaction of these five components are crucial as well in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Nuclear disarmament, for example, requires countries to faithfully comply with the NPT obligations and enhance safeguards, and thereby improving nuclear security.

 

Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security

 

Dr. Khripunov pointed out that it is important to review the two concepts of nuclear security and nuclear safety as they are often misused interchangeably. Nuclear security is primarily associated with malicious or negligent acts by humans that would cause or threaten harm to other humans. These intentional acts require responses focusing on intelligence gathering, physical protection, and vigilance and compliance. Nuclear safety, however, mostly deals with unintended acts or conditions that could cause harm to humans or the environment from radiation releases. The most effective responses involve engineered protection and safety management. Given the lack of the clear-cut distinction between the two terms, the best model, as suggested by Dr. Khripunov, is the coexistence of security and safety that share the common goal of limiting nuclear risks.

 

Implementation Challenges for the Nuclear Security Summit

 

Lack of Universality

 

Most conventions in the international nonproliferation regime have been developed within the organizational context of various agencies including International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and the United Nations. This inevitably leads to diverging goals and institutional arrangements lacking a coherent set of shared visions and promises. Such inconsistencies pose enormous challenges in reaching a consensus on definitions and provisions and ultimately a universal solution. In fact, a comprehensive convention on terrorism is still in the negotiating process due to the lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism. This perceivable lack of universality will also be under discussion at the next nuclear security summit meeting in Seoul.

 

A Two-Tiered Structure of the Legal Framework

 

Both hard and soft legal components form the structure of the legal framework in the international nonproliferation regime. Negotiated by states through an established diplomatic process and thus binding under international law, hard legal mechanisms entail specific obligations, verification, and enforcement. It may involve sanctions for violations. In contrast, the soft legal component is developed by experts through informal consultations or proposed unilaterally. Often without specific obligations and enforcement mechanisms, the soft legal framework is not considered binding. However, the non-binding nature of soft mechanism attracts more participants given the absence of forceful elements. While some pieces of the soft legal framework have become binding upon ratification, they are hardly imposed in most cases. Accordingly, the challenge ahead is to find the optimal relationship between the hard and soft components of the legal framework.

 

The Human Factor

 

Another crucial aspect to consider in implementing provisions of the Washington Summit is the human dimension of nuclear terrorism, a very unpredictable yet vital component of nuclear security. The breakdown of the human factor, intentional or unintentional, may cause the entire system to collapse and expose it to external dangers. A crucial example of such dangers was the November 2007 incident at Pelindaba nuclear research facility, South Africa, in which several armed men managed to break into the control room of the facility. This incident revealed a serious breakdown in security linked strongly to the human factor. One of the solutions for overcoming the breakdown of the human factor is improving security culture. Security culture, which is widely accepted as a final product of the transformation of the human factor for adequately responding to security threats through appropriate use of technology and other tools, can be achieved through four phases of training, education, awareness, and commitment.

 

The road to the 2012 Seoul Summit

 

The successful 2012 summit meeting in Seoul will enable the South Korean government to project to the rest of the world its image as a strong advocate for nuclear nonproliferation. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul will also demonstrate that its neighbor North Korea, claiming to be a nuclear state, is further isolated internationally. Moreover, the summit will promote South Korea’s overseas nuclear technology exports to such countries as Turkey and Jordan. In 2010, South Korea’s potential in the nuclear technology market has gained momentum following the nuclear reactor contract signed with the United Arab Emirates (UAE)...(Continued)

 

 


 

 

Igor Khripunov is a Director of the Center for International Trade and Security.

 

Discussants

Du Hyeogn Cha (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)

Chaesung Chun (East Asia Institute/ Seoul National University)

Kyung-young Chung (Catholic University of Korea)

Jihwan Hwang (Myongji University)

Dong-Joon Jo (University of Seoul)

Young-Ho Kim (Korea National Defense University)

Jay Nash (Center for International Trade and Security)