EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 1
 

Abstract

The paper examines the increasing influence of various domestic factors such as academics, media, and public opinion within the context of newly developed internet technology, on the foreign policy making of the People’s Republic of China in the last decade. The basic research questions of this study are: Has there been an emergence of societal forces, independent of the Communist Party, that have begun to exert influence over the foreign policy making process? If so, how is it affecting the ability of Chinese government to frame and implement foreign policies?  It argues  that due to an open door policy and the increasing development of information technology, China's hierarchical, elite-driven foreign policy making structure has experienced profound changes; these changes, which are characterized with decentralization, professionalization and institutionalization,  have created opportunities for societal forces to influence the decision making process.  It suggests that globalization has produced a certain amount of transnational forces within Chinese society, and the degree of its influence depends on how the public is informed and manipulated and the degree of the country’s integration with the world. When the public has more access to information about the outside world and internal development, the societal pressure influencing foreign policy behavior becomes more visible. 

Author

Yufan Hao is Professor of Political Sciences at Colgate University. He obtained his MA and PhD from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1984 and 1989 respectively and was a McArthur Fellow at Harvard University Center for International Affairs 1988-1989. He was a visiting professor to Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Renmin University of China. His latest books include Chinese Foreign Policy Making: Societal Forces in Chinese American Policy Making, (Ashgate, London, co-edited, 2005); Bush’s Dilemma: Experts on the Possible Trend of American Foreign Policy (Shishi, Beijing, co-edited, 2005); Power of the Moment: American and the World after 9/11 (Xinhua, Beijing, co-authored, 2002), White House China Decision (Renmin Press, Beijing, 2002). Currently he serves as the Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at University of Macau.

This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.

The spring of 2005 was quite turbulent in China-Japan relations. Along with the issues of Security Council bid, the history textbook, and gas exploration in disputed waters, Japan stated on the Chinese Lunar New Year that the Senkaku Islands were officially Japanese. In February, Japan and the US declared a closer military bond. After another visit by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where convicted Class-A war criminals are honored along with other Japanese war dead, the bilateral relations plunged to their lowest point since 1972, when a nationwide anti- Japanese riots erupted in China. Angry Chinese protesters marched at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing eggs and rocks protesting against school textbooks they say whitewash Japanese wartime atrocities in China, and against Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and against Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. After a week of violent protests against Japan in Beijing, thousands marched on the Japanese consulate in Shanghai, smashing its windows with rocks, pelting it with paint bombs and attacking Japanese restaurants along the way. Protest spread to several large cities in the south, as Chinese massed outside Japanese stores and consulates, calling for a boycott of Japanese products and demanding that Japan own up to war crimes of 60 years ago. The rising anti-Japanese sentiments within Chinese society have made it more difficulty for the Beijing leadership when making their policies towards the Tokyo. Chinese government became tougher towards Tokyo and publicly registered its objection to Japan’s bid to UN Security Council. Meanwhile, Chinese government began to clamp down harder to keep the capital peaceful before Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura’s visit. University students were warned by email not to protest. Top anti-Japanese activists in Beijing were rounded up to prevent further protests. China even began to control media coverage of Sino-Japanese relations and had cancelled a few academic conferences and workshops related to Japan.

Why did the Chinese leadership decide to take a tough stand toward Japan at the time China is trying to show to the world its peaceful intention of rising up? At the same time, what made the Chinese leaders try continually to maintain relations with Tokyo, not hurting 178 billion dollars in annual trade between the two economic powers?

What happened in the spring of 2005 seems to illustrate a long overlooked element affecting Chinese foreign policy making: the influence of social forces. Since 1949, Chinese foreign policy has been traditionally viewed as highly centralized, dominated by a few powerful, personalized seniors acting free from domestic public pressure. Never before has Chinese leadership considered the interests and opinions of various domestic political constituencies. What  happened in 2005 in China’s policy towards Japan seems to illustrate an interesting change. Beijing leadership had to accommodate domestic outcry in the wake of the certain external events, even though they wished to maintain and continue to improve Sino-Japanese relations. The moment may have arrived in China when policy makers cannot create policy initiatives without a serious consideration of public opinion, and support within the bureaucratic apparatus. This may represent a gradual but significant shift from the Communist Party’s centralized control over Vhina’s foreign policy making, relatively free of social pressure, to a new pattern characterized by increasing domestic restraints...(Continued)