EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 7

Author

Victoria Tin-bor Hui is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Her research examines the dynamics of international politics, the origins of constitutional democracy, and the development of trade and capitalism in the broad sweeps of history, with a special focus on historical and historical Europe. She is the author of War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.

Chinese take for granted China’s “historical oneness.”1 They hold the belief that China or zhongguo refers to a natural territorial and cultural polity with five thousand years of history. Chinese leaders and intellectuals often insist that unification is a sacrosanct value and assert that “prosperity and development are associated with unity, while war and conflict come with separation.”2 Beijing’s “One China” policy is a modern variant of the classical da yitong or “great unity” paradigm.3 As the Lüshi chunqiu, a Warring States text, puts it, “There is no turmoil greater than the absence of the Son of Heaven; without the Son of Heaven, the strong overcome the weak, the many lord it over the few, they incessantly use arms to harm each other.”4 The modern argument refers to the interlocking claims that, although there were eras of division in Chinese history, unification has been the norm, unification after division has been the natural course of historical development, and unification has nurtured stability and prosperity while division has generated chaos and sufferings.

As the unity paradigm seeks authority in history, this paper examines its historical foundation. In tracing Chinese history in the longue durée, I follow the prospective approach and avoid the retrospective perspective.5 That is, I proceed from China’s formative era and search forward for alternative paths and outcomes, instead of viewing the past through the prism of the present. In addition, I follow R. Bin Wong’s “symmetrical perspectives”6 and juxtapose Sinocentric perspectives against Eurocentric perspectives. This does not mean that I naively apply Eurocentric theories to judge (or misjudge) Chinese history. Rather, I analyze if insights from comparative and world history shed light on actual developments in historical China.

This paper is composed of two main sections. In the first section, I address the claim that unification has been the normal and natural course of Chinese history. I problematize the conventional understanding of historical China and develop a precise definition of unification. It is too often overlooked that the very term “China” or “zhongguo” has significantly evolved in Chinese history. Just as the term “Germany” (or any other country) involves a “troubled, contingent history” rather than a polity with “distinctive, enduring characteristics,”7 zhongguo does not entail an unchanging territorial space or a single culture. This term acquired the modern meaning of nation-state only in the late nineteenth century.8 Zhongguo originally referred to “central states” -- in plural form -- in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656-221 BC). Although Qin unified this international system in 221 BC, the Qin empire and subsequent dynasties invariably broke down. In the post-Qin era, zhongguo referred to dynasties that controlled the central plain in northern China.

If we look beyond the conventional Chinese chronology and develop a rigorous definition of unification, then historical zhongguo was more often divided than unified. Unification was not only not the normal existence, it was also not the natural result of division. The unity paradigm holds that unification recurred because the people yearned for it. But all instances of unification in Chinese history were achieved by wars of conquest. As Ge Jianxiong observes, “Unification – this sacred term – has been repeatedly associated with war.”10 Ho Ping-Ti similarly remarks that “Every dynasty was founded on military strength... From the dawning of the first empire in 221 BC to the founding of the PRC in 1949, there has not been a single exception.”11 It is no coincidence that the Sunzi bingfa, China’s famous military treatise written in the Warring States period, begins with this statement: “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way to survival or extinction.”12 Mao Zedong’s assertion “Power comes from the barrel of the gun” is not at all revolutionary in the Chinese context.

In the second section, I analyze the claim that unification is the foundation for stability and prosperity while division is the recipe for chaos and sufferings. From the perspective of international relations theories, international systems may experience war, but they may also maintain stability and peace. From the Eurocentric perspective, international competition is the driving force for liberty, prosperity, and the rise of the West. Remarkably, the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, which most closely resembled the early modern European period, in fact witnessed the emergence of international agreements that provided a modicum of order for several centuries. The classical era even witnessed the birth of citizenship rights and the expansion of international trade. However, Qin achieved unification by stifling citizenship, suppressing trade, and violating international norms. All subsequent unifiers followed Qin’s example, achieving unification by war and maintaining unification by repression. In contrast, division always meant much weaker central control over political, economic, and social life. Division also provided the “exit option” which allowed dissenters to “vote with their feet.” Overall, this paper follows Michael Loewe’s suggestion to carefully examine the presumption that a unified China “contributed more to human welfare than a multiplicity of political units.”13 I close by discussing Sun Yat-sen’s proposal for a federal-democratic system as a solution to break the cycle of coercion...(Continued)