EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 27

Author

Sukhee Han is currently an associate professor of Chinese studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He completed both undergraduate and MA program at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Yonsei University. He continued his M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. degree programs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. With the completion of his Ph.D. in 1998, he moved to Beijing and accumulated his career as a lecturer at Peking University’s School of Government and as a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Professor Han’s area of interest is in Chinese security and foreign policy as well as business practices in China. His recent English publications include “South Korea between the United States and China since the Global Financial Crisis” (2010), “The Evaluation of Beijing Consensus: A Case of China-Angola Relations”(2009), “China’s Pursuit of Peaceful Power Transition: A Case of ICT” (2009), “Public Diplomacy between China and the World: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay, A Test Case”(2009), “The Rise of China, Power Transition and South Korea's Soft Hedging”(2009), “Support and Apprehension: Chinese Views on the US Presidential Election”(2009), and “From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea’s New China Policy” (2008).

I. Introduction

Traditionally China has emphasized peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as an important strategic interest in its security. As East Asian history demonstrates, China has long perceived the Korean Peninsula as a strategic catalyst for its security and safety, and therefore it has never allowed any other power, other than itself, to exercise control of the peninsula. China has decided to intervene in Korea militarily four times—in 1592, 1627, 1894, and 1950—combating the potential challengers for securing its own suzerainty over the peninsula. Although China’s sphere of influence shrank to the northern half of the peninsula in the wake of the end of the Korean War in 1953, its interest in North Korea as a strategic buffer has remained consistent until the present. Given Pyongyang’s strategic value as a buffer state, Beijing’s primary objective with the North has been the survival of its backward and fragile regime, and peace and stability remain as the necessary prerequisite for its regional security.

However, the recent security environment on the peninsula has never achieved the expectations of China as it has grown. A series of Pyongyang’s arbitrary military provocations, including its sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, its bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010, and its unauthorized launch of a long-range missile in April 2012 have profoundly undermined the security environment around the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the sudden death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 has further aggravated the regional sense of security uncertainty. This unstable security situation per se may be indicative of the term “status quo minus.” Status quo minus implies a situation in which a weak and isolated North Korea raises an imminent security threat by “demonstrating an enhanced capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction and adopting more bellicose rhetoric and behavior.” (Goldstein 2006, 131-136) In this context, economically desperate North Korea tends to implement aggressive provocations on the basis of its belief that Pyongyang’s assertive behavior helps its regime survival. Subsequent U.S. military counteraction against North Korea’s violence will inevitably force China to intervene in the North Korean quagmire.

As a political ally, economic supporter, and diplomatic patron to Pyongyang’s regime, China has exerted whatever diplomatic influence and intervention it can on the North as far as these help maintain peace and stability in the region. Once it intervenes, China’s strategic objective is to shift the security situation on the Korean Peninsula from a status quo minus to a status quo plus. “Status quo plus,” in contrast to status quo minus, indicates a situation in which North Korea stops imposing a serious threat or provocation to neighboring states. In this context, the risk of intense crisis or military confrontation remains “at a modest level,” by the major presence of U.S. military stationed in South Korea. Also, the U.S. security alliance works as a hedge against a deterioration of strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula. To the extent that North Korea’s belligerence can be successfully constrained, security and stability on the peninsula and broadly in the Northeast Asian region may be sustained.

For China, status quo plus seems to be the most preferred security context for the region. China believes that status quo plus shapes North Korea to be kinder, gentler, and more reform-oriented. It also understands status quo plus as “the best way to ensure Pyongyang’s survival,” without any sudden major changes. (Scobell 2004, 16-17) Therefore, China, in pursuit of reaching a status quo plus has to deal with three different North Korean issues: North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Pyongyang’s economic predicament, and the North’s violent provocations in the region. Despite no immediately satisfactory outcome expected in a short time period, China has consistently implemented its political, economic, and diplomatic influence to shift the regional security situation from status quo minus to status quo plus.

II. The North Korean Threat and Status Quo Minus

The major reason to define the post-2010 security situation on the Korean Peninsula as status quo minus is that North Korea, despite its economic backwardness, diplomatic isolation, and political volatility, poses a variety of security threats to the Northeast Asian region. North Korean threats can be classified into three dimensions. First, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat for about twenty years has continued to undermine Northeast Asian regional stability. Despite the Agreement Framework of 1994 and the eight-year-long Six-Party Talks, North Korea has continued to develope its nuclear devices, and it ultimately tested them twice in 2006 and 2009. Even after the nuclear tests, no specific diplomatic measures have been found to dismantle Pyongyang’s unauthorized nuclear development except the Six-Party Talks. (Nanto and Manyin 2010) Despite the death of his father, however, Kim Jong-un seems to have no intention of giving up his nuclear program and therefore the Six-Party Talks have little chance of meeting their founding goal: North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement. Although China has consistently argued for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, China falls short of convincing the regional powers and in the meantime the North’s nuclear threats are getting more serious for South Korea’s security. (Chanlett-Avery 2012)

Second, North Korea’s military provocations toward the South have caused profound security threats to the entire region. Two cases, including the tragedy of the Cheonan in March 2010 and the North’s bombardment of the South’s Yeonpyong Island in November 2010, have shown that North Korea can provoke security threats to the South at any time without declaration of war. (Thompson 2010; Swaine 2010; 2011) Furthermore, these provocations have also showed that the bilateral confrontation on the Korean Peninsula risk being escalated to a face-off between the regional powers: the United States and China. The cases of the Cheonan and Yeonpyong divided regional security structure into two alliance systems, the U.S.-Korean alliance and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, and the potential confrontation between the two alliance systems creates regional instability. (Michishita 2009, 139-152) To maintain regional security and stability, the vicious cycle that begins from North Korea’s provocations to the South, as a first step, should be controlled. Pyongyang’s provocations, alarming Seoul and prompting it to improve its defense capabilities, forced the implementation of a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise. And China, suspicious of U.S. military intentions, tends to be at odds with the United States and South Korea, while improving its diplomatic and economic ties with the North. At this stage, the key point is how to stop North Korea’s further provocations toward the South. For regional crisis prevention, China’s diplomatic influence on the North is essential. (Byun 2010)...(Continued)