Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the Asia Security Initiative at the East Asia Institute and an associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Seoul National University.

The Final Deal with Kim Jong-il?

Sanctions against North Korea will realize the policy objectives of South Korea and other nations only when combined with feasible post-sanction plans for the next round of negotiations. International economic and diplomatic sanctions after North Korea’s second nuclear test, which occurred on May 25, 2009, have been successful enough to make Kim Jong-il send gestures indicating a willingness to reengage in dialogue, mainly with Washington and partly with other participants in the Six-Party Talks, including Seoul. Issues are: How should the coming round of talks differ from the past ones? Should the Five Parties (that is, all those except North Korea) prepare a totally different package from the last one under the Six-Party Talks framework? Are there structural differences that will force Kim Jong-il to come to the negotiating table with new goals? Further, how comprehensive should the deal with North Korea really be? What kind of preparations will aid negotiators in finding the leverage to make progress on the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and to avoid a repetition of the past problem of rewarding the North’s brinkmanship?

The so-called “grand bargain” of South Korea and the “comprehensive package deal” of the United States seem to emphasize the need to broaden the agenda of the negotiations in order to solve problems in a fundamental way. Eisenhower’s maxim, “Whenever I run into a problem I can’t solve, I always make it bigger” may apply here, but the problem is what is meant by “comprehensive,” given the failures of the Agreed Framework in 1994, the September 19th statement in 2005, and the February 14th action-for-action approach in 2007.

If we think of Kim Jong-il’s intentions as the essential determinant, the North Korean nuclear problem is inherently a political question. Kim has attempted to create an international environment in which North Korea’s current regime can survive with all its former socialist brethren fallen away. North Korea’s repeated statements that it has developed nuclear weapons because of the United States’ “anti-North Korea policy and aggressive nuclear strategy against the North” reflect Kim’s political and international dilemma. Defining North Korea’s nuclear problem as one of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will not help solve the issue in any fundamental way. At issue is not just North Korean nuclear development but also North Korea itself or,

more specifically, the problem of Kim Jong-il himself (Chun 2009). After the so-called “redirecting” of South Korea’s North Korea policy by the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, and with the advent of the more “balanced” Obama administration, Kim Jong-il’s gestures indicating a willingness to resume dialogue seem to have produced a new momentum. The coming dialogue will be a significant indication of Kim Jong-il’s current situation.

The 2009 Negotiations Will Be Different

First, time has become an increasingly important factor in determining how the story of North Korea’s nuclear game will end. Kim Jong-il’s health problems, despite his improved appearance of late, make obvious the clear limits to his period of governance. This limit constitutes the first difference in the coming stage of negotiations from previous ones. Kim Jong-il has also declared that by 2012, North Korea will begin to establish itself as a “strong and prosperous country.” Since then he has pressed the North Korean people to exert more effort to make this prediction come true, if only to counter his people’s judgment about the legitimacy of his rule and to put aside growing discontent about the aggravated economic situation. Kim’s repeated statements about North Korea’s optimistic future could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, but they could also be a self-destructing prophesy if Kim cannot fulfill North Koreans’ desire for a better life.

The succession process within the North Korean leadership, or at least the preparations for the succession, will determine not only the possibility of realizing a “strong and prosperous” North Korea but also the future of the Six-Party Talks. With no clear guarantee of the next leader’s ability to deal with tremendous domestic and diplomatic problems, Kim Jong-il may not want to pass on the highly difficult nuclear question. Kim’s decision will be a function of his evaluation of the next leader’s political and diplomatic ability, his predictions regarding North Korea’s economic situation and his people’s political attitude, and the content of the “grand” or “comprehensive” deal that will be suggested by neighboring countries. Whatever agreement is reached in 2009 will be highly affected by Kim Jong-il’s thinking about his ever more desperate domestic and personal situation.

Second, China’s importance in any dealings with North Korea has been repeatedly pointed out. Because of its own national interests, China has provided indispensible economic and diplomatic support to its neighbor. North Korea is China’s ally, valuable geographic buffer, and example that shows China’s loyalty and care for a neighboring country to the international community. However, China’s position may change: North Korea, with all its brinkmanship behavior, defies China’s range of protection; China, as a would-be global power, needs to establish itself as a norm-conforming state, which makes the alliance with the North increasingly untenable; and in the future China will be faced with additional serious North Korean problems such as the North’s next leadership and its economic difficulties. China seems to be at a crossroads where it must decide whether North Korea is a buffer or a burden. More important is that North Korea is sure to know that China’s strategic attitude toward it is changing, and that this change is likely to be structural and long-lasting rather than event-based. Beijing seems not to have fundamentally altered its position toward Pyongyang so far. Yet the possibility is growing that China will undertake a serious reconsideration of its policy toward North Korea, and may reorient its approach as a result.

Third, Kim Jong-il’s change of attitude from around June 2009 reflects the success of international sanctions. The United Nations (UN) has provided an effective venue for coherent international sanctions with broad participation of its member states; China and Russia have actively participated in the sanctions effort since North Korea’s nuclear tests; continuity from UN resolution 1718 has been demonstrated in the new resolution 1874; and sanctions have been effectively implemented in the financial area and in the case of North Korea’s suspect ship the Kang Nam in June. At this point international sanctions against WMD-related economic transactions with North Korea will continue for a long time, which will put insurmountable pressure on Pyongyang.

Fourth, the Obama administration has been and will be maintaining a tough and resolute stance in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Past experience in negotiating with North Korea in 1994 and 2005 set a basis against which future relations will be evaluated. Although major figures in the Obama administration have stated that North Korea’s decision to completely dismantle its nuclear programs will bring about U.S. economic assistance, diplomatic normalization, and peaceful policies toward the North, there are strong prerequisites that North Korea will have to meet before these developments will be possible. A particular difficulty lies in the fact that both the United States and North Korea will need to resume the Six-Party Talks where the last round stalled, surrounding the issue of reporting and verification of the North’s nuclear program. As we approach the moment of truth, when no more postponing based on incremental salami tactics is permitted, the tough position of Washington will continue. The domestic political situation of the Obama administration might be another factor as well. Decreasing approval ratings for the President will make the North Korean issue an area where any policy failure is not permissible and any strategic change can only be considered very cautiously.

The above four factors work to make the coming negotiations with North Korea all the more critical. However, there is also a fifth element that increases the situation’s complexity. Conflicting national interests of countries that surround North Korea, especially China and Russia, may exist between the imperative to conform to the international norm of nonproliferation and the more realistic regional interest in maintaining good relations with North Korea. If the desire for positive relations wins out, then the commitment to international sanctions may weaken on the part of some of the North’s neighbors. Because resolution 1874 concerns economic transactions regarding specific items such as weapons of mass destruction, debates may take place over the issue of whether a country’s economic relations with North Korea violate resolution 1874.

All these factors—North Korea’s domestic situation, international sanctions, and each country’s changing strategy—make the coming negotiations different from the last ones, and these factors are structural rather than subject to short-term change. It is not certain which road Kim Jong-il will take in the future. But all involved need to bear these new factors in mind in pursuing a comprehensive deal...(Continued)