The Developmental State Revisited:
Political Regime, Industry Characteristics, Policy Networks, and Leadership

Chair: Ezra F. Vogel (Harvard University)
Discussant: Jorge I. Dominguez (Harvard University)

The 1997 “Asian crisis” has forced rethinking on East Asia’s “developmental state.” In spite of many laudable endeavors, however, we still lack an analytic framework capable of explaining both its economic success before 1997 and its failure in 1997 within one logically consistent, historically informed and theoretically integrative way. Our goal is to fill in this vacuum by going back to the heyday of developmental states and explain their success in spite of serious “structural” limitations, including opaque regulatory frameworks and weak corporate governance, which allegedly transformed a bubble into a systemic financial crisis in 1997. Through our knowledge of what happened in 1997, we can retransform East Asia’s developmental state into a historical as well as analytic puzzle and acquire a set of strategic questions with which to highlight a few hitherto underemphasized qualities, dimensions and preconditions of developmental states.

In particular, we intend to go beyond Chalmers Johnson’s technocratic conception of developmental states as “plan rational” (1982) by bring in political regimes (Haggard and Kaufman 1992) as an integral part of developmental statism and emphasize political choice on three issues as decisively affecting regime stability and policy characteristics: how to install political regime; what to choose as institutional means to formulate policy and assure compliance; and whether to rule through ideological appeals and organized societal groups. Through a focus on regime dynamics and political relations, moreover, we hope to critically reevaluate Peter Evans’ concept of “embedded autonomy” (1995) as well as Daniel I. Okimoto’s idea of “networks” (1989) and point to societal elites, political leadership, and industry characteristics as key variables which determine a state’s prospect for transforming itself into a developmental rather than a predatory actor and sustaining such a role through time.

The proposed panel includes one five-nation analysis (Dominguez on political regime dynamics); two two-nation studies (Hutchcroft on networks in developmental versus predatory states; Noble on industry characteristics), and one three-issue case study (Kim on political leadership). To give a common benchmark for theorizing, all papers include Korea, a country more frequently praised and supported by international institutions as a “model” developmental state than any other country before 1997. Dominguez compares it with four Latin American cases, Hutchcroft with the Philippines, and Noble with Taiwan. The three, in addition to Kim’s paper, details important ways by which political
regime, policy networks, industry characteristics, and political leadership affect public policy choice and decide the state’s developmentalistic propensity.

**Paper Presenter 1**

Jorge I. Domínguez, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University,

Abstract: *The Perfect Dictatorship: Authoritarian Rule under Pak Chung Hee, Compared to Latin American Cases*

What is a “perfect dictatorship”? I hypothesize that such a regime provokes little societal resistance at installation. Its leaders act jointly to consolidate the regime and to broaden the support coalition by agreeing upon succession rules to rotate the presidency within the authoritarian regime. They delegate policy-making authority to civilians in areas of their competence. They emphasize consultation, not open contestation, prefer cooptation to repression, eschew ideological appeals, compel social actors into regime-licensed organizations, and deactivate civil society. I assess how Korea’s under Park Chung Hee compared on these dimensions to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, all under authoritarian rule.

**Paper Presenter 2**

Paul D. Hutchcroft, Department of Political Science, UW-Madison

Abstract

Less than four weeks after Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, Park Chung-Hee did the same in South Korea. In each case, incumbents with extensive executive authority claimed that harsh measures were necessary to address major challenges and build a stronger basis for democracy. The authoritarian regimes that emerged were based on a high concentration of personal authority and power, and a weak role for the ruling political party. Despite these similarities, the two regimes displayed enormous divergence in historical foundations, institutional characteristics, personal goals, and developmental outcomes. Through a focus on the nexus among bureaucracy, military, and regime, this paper explores why Park’s authoritarianism—unlike that of Marcos—did not degenerate into a morass of crony capitalism.
Paper Presenter 3

Byung-Kook Kim, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University,

Abstract: “Machiavelli’s Prince?: Park Chung Hee”

What are the limits of structural explanation? How, when, and under what conditions can political leaders be relatively free from structures and even reshape structures? This paper looks for answers to such questions on agents and structures by conceptualizing Chalmer Johnson’s developmental state and Daniel I. Okimoto’s policy networks as an artificial construct with a narrowly instrumental function to realize particular collective goals and by emphasizing political leadership in this collective endeavor of problem solving. The paper compares agent roles across three issue areas during Park Chung Hee’s presidency (1961-1979): regime formation, state building, and transnational coalition politics.

Paper Presenter 4

Gregory W. Noble, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

Abstract: Industrial Policy toward Steel and Autos under Park: Comparisons with Japan and Taiwan

Abstract:

Despite the great influence of the developmental state model in comparative politics, many specialists in Asian politics emphasize the differences among Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. A review of industrial policy during the Park era suggests that a new synthesis is in order. In the key—and oft-cited—cases of steel and autos the developmental state was at work in all three countries, but its operation varied across industries, being more direct in the case of steel. Two remaining differences across the countries: Korea’s aggressive resort to policy loans, and the greater embedding of Japanese policy in a public-private network.
Bibliography


