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The Current State of South Korea's Democracy

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Introduction

For students of democratization, the experience of South Korea has been an example of how a nation can successfully transition to and consolidate democracy (Hahm 2008). However, a number of recent scholarly efforts have begun to lose faith in this assessment, disputing the promises of South Korea's democracy (Kang 2016; Haggard and You 2015; Lee 2015). This paper endeavors to contribute to an understanding of the current state of South Korea's democracy by examining the empirical foundations of the debate.

In order to fulfill this objective, this article detects the analytic limitations of binary categorical and unidimensional discrete measures in differentiating between democracies. Introducing an innovative dataset from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project as a multidimensional continuous measure of democracy (Coppedge et al. Forthcoming; Lindberg et al. 2014; Coppedge et al. 2011), it first scrutinizes the state of South Korea's democracy today from a cross-national perspective. Locating South Korea within the Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries, it shows that the status of South Korea's democracy is virtually at the bottom of the sample of advanced industrial democracies across all dimensions of democratic authenticity, quality, and depth.

In the penultimate section, this paper deals with how South Korea's democracy has evolved since undergoing democratic transition. At the aggregate level, it confirms that, across all dimensions, South Korea's democracy, after attaining its highest level in the late 2000s, has continued to be eroded over the past ten years. At the disaggregate level, it shows that the erosion of democratic authenticity has originated from, among other factors, the decay of freedom of expression; that the erosion of the liberal quality of democracy is attributed in large part to the decay of judicial constraints on the executive; that the erosion of the participatory quality of democracy has its biggest

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root in the decay of participation in civil society; that the erosion of the deliberative quality of democracy is caused largely by the decay of engaged society; and that the erosion of democratic depth has its foundations in the increasing inequality in the distribution of resources. The concluding section implies that South Korea's democracy today is in an extremely perilous position from a comparative perspective across nations as well as over time in every dimension of democracy.

The Status of South Korea's Democracy: A Cross-National Perspective

This section and the following address the questions of where South Korea's democracy is from a cross-national perspective and how it has evolved over time. Depending on their analytic aims, political scientists have conceived democracy either as a binary-categorical variable—a political regime can be either democratic or non-democratic, or as a unidimensional-discrete variable—a political regime can be more or less democratic. The Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) index¹ and Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR) index² represent the former strategy of measurement that has the classificatory strength to make a distinction between those nations with 'minimalist' attributes of democracy and those without them. As shown in the second column of Table 1, the BMR index classifies all thirty-five OECD countries as democracies, without discriminating analytically among them.³ According to this binary categorical measure, South Korea is as democratic as the other OECD countries.

The Freedom House (FH) score⁴ and Polity score⁵ embrace the latter strategy of measurement that possesses the diagnostic advantage that the DD and BMR indices lack, differentiating between good and poor democracies. As displayed in the third and fourth columns of Table 1, there emerges a variation in democraticness among OECD member countries, ranging from 3.5 to 1 in FH scores and 6 to 10 in Polity scores.⁶ According to this unidimensional discrete measure, in the FH scheme, South Korea is more democratic than Greece, Latvia, Mexico, and Turkey, as democratic as Hungary, Israel, Italy, and Japan, and less democratic than the other OECD countries. According to the Polity scheme, it is more democratic than Israel, as democratic as Belgium, Latvia, and Mexico, and less democratic than the other OECD countries. As most (26 out of 35 OECD member countries in FH score and 25 out of 34 in Polity score) attain the highest score in each scheme, however, the capability to distinguish between advanced democracies appears to still be somewhat lacking. Moreover, the unidimensional measurement of the FH or Polity scores appears to constrain the ability of researchers to capture the complexity of mature democracies, including OECD countries.

Conceiving democracy as a multidimensional continuous variable, the V-Dem index provides us a unique opportunity to measure various aspects of democracies using a more fine-tuned set of scales (Lindberg et al. 2014). The V-Dem index consists of multidimensional indicators that include: (1) electoral democracy⁷; (2) liberal democracy⁸; (3) participatory democracy⁹; (4) deliberative democracy¹⁰; and (5) egalitarian democracy.¹¹ The level of electoral democracy captures the *democratic authenticity* of a polity to fully qualify as a "free representative" democracy "instead of falling into another regime category" (Fishman 2016: 296). The degree of liberal, participatory, or deliberative democracy is reserved for a political system's *quality of democracy* to link to normative aspirations for outcomes

that “may become possible under democracy but are clearly not required for a polity to warrant admission into the democratic regime category” (Fishman 2016: 296). The level of egalitarian democracy reflects the democratic depth of a polity to identify variation in elements of democratic life “such as the forging of spaces favorable to the political participation and influence of socially disadvantaged sectors” (Fishman 2016: 303).

Table 1. Different Measurements of Democracy in OECD Countries

	<i>BMR</i>	<i>FH</i>	<i>Polity</i>	<i>V-Dem</i>				
				<i>Electoral Democracy</i>	<i>Liberal Democracy</i>	<i>Participatory Democracy</i>	<i>Deliberative Democracy</i>	<i>Egalitarian Democracy</i>
Australia	1	1	10	0.921	0.870	0.707	0.827	0.826
Austria	1	1	10	0.886	0.816	0.672	0.816	0.833
Belgium	1	1	8	0.914	0.849	0.663	0.849	0.881
Canada	1	1	10	0.890	0.831	0.631	0.805	0.833
Chile	1	1	10	0.898	0.838	0.601	0.787	0.694
Czech Republic	1	1	9	0.913	0.850	0.647	0.770	0.842
Denmark	1	1	10	0.927	0.903	0.718	0.912	0.906
Estonia	1	1	9	0.921	0.875	0.679	0.847	0.866
Finland	1	1	10	0.921	0.889	0.658	0.875	0.885
France	1	1	9	0.958	0.910	0.746	0.903	0.925
Germany	1	1	10	0.786	0.748	0.577	0.758	0.741
Greece	1	2	10	0.882	0.790	0.591	0.812	0.790
Hungary	1	1.5	10	0.764	0.644	0.530	0.450	0.645
Iceland	1	1	-	0.880	0.800	0.711	0.788	0.829
Ireland	1	1	10	0.915	0.831	0.654	0.795	0.847
Israel	1	1.5	6	0.747	0.610	0.488	0.587	0.602
Italy	1	1.5	10	0.875	0.747	0.698	0.776	0.803
Japan	1	1.5	10	0.875	0.813	0.615	0.804	0.824
Latvia	1	2	8	0.893	0.825	0.718	0.807	0.819
Luxembourg	1	1	10	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	1	3	8	0.676	0.493	0.433	0.509	0.388
Netherlands	1	1	10	0.911	0.852	0.632	0.830	0.868
New Zealand	1	1	10	0.895	0.834	0.753	0.699	0.826
Norway	1	1	10	0.928	0.901	0.674	0.906	0.906
Poland	1	1	10	0.895	0.817	0.643	0.761	0.815
Portugal	1	1	10	0.924	0.869	0.654	0.835	0.868
Slovakia	1	1	10	0.800	0.703	0.595	0.584	0.668
Slovenia	1	1	10	0.837	0.769	0.674	0.679	0.777
South Korea	1	1.5	8	0.805	0.702	0.559	0.632	0.707
Spain	1	1	10	0.912	0.828	0.673	0.847	0.866
Sweden	1	1	10	0.925	0.896	0.689	0.902	0.897
Switzerland	1	1	10	0.943	0.908	0.839	0.929	0.913
Turkey	1	3.5	9	0.574	0.410	0.310	0.366	0.417
United Kingdom	1	1	10	0.957	0.928	0.743	0.894	0.915
United States	1	1	10	0.941	0.902	0.691	0.893	0.797

Sources: The BMR index is from information available at <https://sites.google.com/site/mkmtwo/data>; FH scores are from information available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>; Polity scores are from information available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>; and V-Dem indices are from information available at <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/> (accessed on October 10, 2016). Note: All data is from 2012 except for the BMR index, which pulls data from 2010.

As presented in the fifth to ninth columns of Table 1, the five indicators in the V-Dem dataset reveal South Korea’s levels of democratic authenticity, quality, and depth. It earns a score of .805 for electoral democracy, .702 for liberal democracy, .559 for participatory democracy, .632 for deliberative democracy, and .707 for egalitarian democracy. To put these numbers in a comparative perspective, I have reassembled comparable statistics from other OECD countries for each indicator, calculating the mean value of the sample with a 95 percent confidence interval, into three clusters: (1) the group of countries that fall short of the lower boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval; (2) the group of countries that are between the lower and upper boundaries of the 95 percent confidence interval; and (3) the group of countries that go beyond the upper boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table 2. Democratic Authenticity in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.845)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.873<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.902<)</i>	
Slovenia	0.837	Chile	0.898	France	0.958
South Korea	0.805	New Zealand	0.895	United Kingdom	0.957
Slovakia	0.800	Poland	0.895	Switzerland	0.943
Germany	0.786	Latvia	0.893	United States	0.941
Hungary	0.764	Canada	0.890	Norway	0.928
Israel	0.747	Austria	0.886	Denmark	0.927
Mexico	0.676	Greece	0.882	Sweden	0.925
Turkey	0.574	Iceland	0.880	Portugal	0.924
		Italy	0.875	Australia	0.921
		Japan	0.875	Finland	0.921
				Estonia	0.921
				Ireland	0.915
				Belgium	0.914
				Czech Republic	0.913
				Spain	0.912
				Netherlands	0.911

Source: see Table 1.

Table 2 shows that the mean value of democratic authenticity in OECD countries is .873 and the level of South Korea’s democratic authenticity (.805) falls below the lower boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval (.845). The authenticity of South Korea’s democracy, together with those of Germany, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey, falls below the OECD average score.

Table 3. The Liberal Quality of Democracy in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.761)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.802<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.842<)</i>	
Germany	0.748	Chile	0.838	United Kingdom	0.928
Italy	0.747	New Zealand	0.834	France	0.910
Slovakia	0.703	Ireland	0.831	Switzerland	0.908
South Korea	0.702	Canada	0.831	Denmark	0.903
Hungary	0.644	Spain	0.828	United States	0.902
Israel	0.610	Latvia	0.825	Norway	0.901
Mexico	0.493	Poland	0.827	Sweden	0.896
Turkey	0.410	Austria	0.816	Finland	0.889
		Japan	0.813	Estonia	0.875
		Iceland	0.800	Australia	0.870
		Greece	0.790	Portugal	0.869
		Slovenia	0.769	Netherlands	0.852
				Czech Republic	0.850
				Belgium	0.849

Source: see Table 1.

Table 3 displays an ordering of the OECD countries according to their degree of liberal democracy. The mean value is .802 and the 95 percent confidence interval is between .761 and .842. South Korea's liberal quality of democracy (.702) fails to reach the lower boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval. In addition to South Korea, other countries that fall into the below-average group in this category include Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Slovakia, and Turkey.

Table 4. The Participatory Quality of Democracy in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.610)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.643<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.677<)</i>	
Chile	0.601	Norway	0.674	Switzerland	0.839
Slovakia	0.595	Slovenia	0.674	New Zealand	0.753
Greece	0.591	Spain	0.673	France	0.746
Germany	0.577	Austria	0.672	United Kingdom	0.743
South Korea	0.559	Belgium	0.663	Denmark	0.718
Hungary	0.530	Finland	0.658	Latvia	0.718
Israel	0.488	Portugal	0.654	Iceland	0.711
Mexico	0.433	Ireland	0.654	Australia	0.707
Turkey	0.310	Czech Republic	0.647	Italy	0.698
		Poland	0.643	United States	0.691
		Netherlands	0.632	Sweden	0.689
		Canada	0.631	Estonia	0.679
		Japan	0.615		

Source: see Table 1.

Table 4 contains the standing of the participatory quality of democracy in OECD countries, with a mean value is .643 and a 95 percent confidence interval between .610 and .677. The participatory quality of democracy of South Korea (.559) falls short of the lower boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval. Along with South Korea, Chile, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel,

Mexico, Slovakia, Mexico, and Turkey constitute the group of countries ranking below-average in the participatory quality of their democracies.

Table 5. The Deliberative Quality of Democracy in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.725)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.772<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.818<)</i>	
New Zealand	0.699	Austria	0.816	Switzerland	0.929
Slovenia	0.679	Greece	0.812	Denmark	0.912
South Korea	0.632	Latvia	0.807	Norway	0.906
Israel	0.587	Canada	0.805	France	0.903
Slovakia	0.584	Japan	0.804	Sweden	0.902
Mexico	0.509	Ireland	0.795	United Kingdom	0.894
Hungary	0.450	Iceland	0.788	United States	0.893
Turkey	0.366	Chile	0.787	Finland	0.875
		Italy	0.776	Belgium	0.849
		Czech Republic	0.770	Estonia	0.847
		Poland	0.761	Spain	0.847
		Germany	0.758	Portugal	0.835
				Netherlands	0.830
				Australia	0.827

Source: see Table 1.

Table 5 presents the deliberative quality of democracy in OECD countries. The mean value is .772 with a 95 percent confidence interval between .725 and .818. The deliberative quality of democracy in South Korea (.632) fails to reach the lower boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval, falling into the below-average group that consists of Hungary, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.

Table 6. Democratic Depth in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.751)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.795<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.838<)</i>	
Germany	0.741	Austria	0.833	France	0.925
South Korea	0.707	Canada	0.833	United Kingdom	0.915
Chile	0.694	Iceland	0.829	Switzerland	0.913
Slovakia	0.668	Australia	0.826	Denmark	0.906
Hungary	0.645	New Zealand	0.826	Norway	0.906
Israel	0.602	Japan	0.824	Sweden	0.897
Turkey	0.417	Latvia	0.819	Finland	0.885
Mexico	0.388	Poland	0.815	Belgium	0.881
		Italy	0.803	Netherlands	0.868
		United States	0.797	Portugal	0.868
		Greece	0.790	Estonia	0.866
		Slovenia	0.777	Spain	0.866
				Ireland	0.847
				Czech Republic	0.842
				Netherlands	0.911

Source: see Table 1.

Table 6 reveals the democratic depth of the OECD countries. The mean value is .795 with a 95 percent confidence interval between .751 and .838. The democratic depth of South Korea (.707) fails to surpass the lower boundary of the confidence interval, placing South Korea into the below-average group that consists of Chile, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Slovakia, and Turkey.

Table 7. The Aggregate Level of Democracy in OECD Countries (2012)

<i>Below-average group (<0.709)</i>		<i>Around-average group (<0.752<)</i>		<i>Above-average group (0.796<)</i>	
Germany	0.696	United States	0.788	Switzerland	0.906
Netherlands	0.676	Italy	0.780	France	0.888
Slovakia	0.670	Spain	0.775	United Kingdom	0.887
South Korea	0.612	Australia	0.774	Denmark	0.865
Israel	0.607	Greece	0.773	Norway	0.853
Hungary	0.607	Slovenia	0.770	Estonia	0.834
Mexico	0.418	Canada	0.755	Sweden	0.828
Turkey	0.310	Japan	0.755	Finland	0.819
		Poland	0.751	Portugal	0.811
		Chile	0.743	Ireland	0.809
				Austria	0.805
				Czech Republic	0.804
				Belgium	0.804
				Latvia	0.802
				Iceland	0.802
				New Zealand	0.802

Source: see Table 1.


All in all, South Korea’s place among advanced industrial democracies falls short of our expectations in all dimensions of democratic authenticity, quality, and depth. Out of 34 OECD countries, South Korea ranks 29th in democratic authenticity, 30th in the liberal quality of its democracy, 30th in the participatory quality of its democracy, 29th in the deliberative quality of its democracy, and 28th in democratic depth. In every dimension of democracy, South Korea is one of the six countries—Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Slovakia, and Turkey—that are consistently ranked at the bottom. As shown in Table 7, according to aggregate grades of democracy,¹² the place of South Korea (.612) is 30th, falling below the lower boundary of the confidence interval (.709) and standing ahead of only four countries—Hungary, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey. To take into account FH data that disqualifies Mexico and Turkey from democratic status and Polity data that assesses Israel as a borderline democracy, South Korea’s democracy virtually lies at the bottom of all advanced industrial democracies.

The Status of South Korea’s Democracy: A Historical Perspective

The V-Dem indicators enable students of democratization to investigate the status of South Korea’s democracy not only across nations, but also over time. Moreover, each dimension of the V-Dem indicators can be broken down into disaggregate components: (1) democratic authenticity

consisting of (a) freedom of association; (b) clean elections; (c) freedom of expression; (d) elected executive; and (e) suffrage; (2) the liberal quality of democracy consisting of (a) equality before the law and individual liberties; (b) judicial constraints on the executive; and (c) legislative constraints on the executive; (3) the participatory quality of democracy consisting of (a) civil society participation; (b) a direct popular vote; (c) the power of elected local governments; (d) the power of elected regional governments; (4) the deliberative quality of democracy consisting of (a) reasoned justification; (b) common good justification; (c) respect for counterarguments; (d) range of consultation; and (e) engaged society; and (5) democratic depth consisting of (a) equal protection; and (b) the equal distribution of resources.¹³

Figure 1. Democratic Authenticity in South Korea, 1985-2014




Source: see Table 1.

Utilizing these distinctive properties of the V-Dem data, in this section, I have evaluated the historical evolution of South Korea’s democracy over the past thirty years at the aggregate as well as disaggregate levels. Figure 1 shows longitudinal changes of democratic authenticity in South Korea between 1985 and 2014. The right panel decomposes the aggregate index of democratic authenticity, which is displayed in the left panel, into five components. At the aggregate level, the status of democratic authenticity leapt from .367 in 1986 to .688 in 1988, continued increasing to .871 in 2007, and then gradually decreased to reach .724 in 2014, a level comparable to the figure recorded in 1992. As the figures for elected executive and suffrage remained the same over time, the recent erosion of democratic authenticity is attributed to the change of freedom of asso-

ciation, which diminished from .900 in 2003 to .838 in 2014, of clean elections, which shrank from .946 in 2006 to .896 in 2014, and of freedom of expression, which dwindled from .955 in 2007 to .799 in 2014. In terms of magnitude, the decay of freedom of expression seems to be the most critical factor explaining the erosion of democratic authenticity in South Korea.


Figure 2. The Liberal Quality of Democracy in South Korea, 1985-2014



Source: see Table 1.

The historical evolution of the liberal quality of democracy in South Korea is illustrated in Figure 2. At the aggregate level, it jumped from .176 in 1986 to .522 in 1988, continued to rise progressively to .782 in 2004 and then deteriorated to .620 in 2014, a level comparable to the figure recorded in 1992. At the disaggregate level, the component of equality before the law and individual liberties have improved somewhat, moving from .927 in 2012 to .956 in 2014. The component of legislative constraints on the executive has slightly worsened, falling from .920 in 2007 to .898 in 2014. The component of judicial constraints on the executive has dramatically waned, shrinking from .859 in 2002 to .748 in 2014. The recent erosion in the liberal quality of democracy in South Korea appears in large part due to the decay in judicial constraints on the executive.

Figure 3. The Participatory Quality of Democracy in South Korea, 1985-2014




Source: see Table 1.

Figure 3 captures the longitudinal evolution of the participatory quality of democracy in South Korea. At the aggregate level, it soared from .132 in 1986 to .325 in 1988, continuing to improve to .629 in 2004 and then diminishing to .489 in 2014, a level comparable to the figure recorded in 1994. At the disaggregate level, while the component of direct popular vote remains the same, the component of elected regional government power has improved from .950 in 2012 to .985 in 2014 and that of elected local government power has upgraded from .875 in 2012 to .970 in 2014. The component of civil society participation has clearly dropped from .893 in 2003 to .744 in 2014. In short, the recent erosion of participatory quality of democracy in South Korea seems to have something to do with the decay of civil society participation.

Figure 4 illustrates the historical changes in the deliberative quality of democracy in South Korea. At the aggregate level, it leapt from .101 in 1986 to .460 in 1988, continuing to reach .778 in 2007 and then fading back down to .592 in 2014, a level comparable to the figure recorded in 1993. At the disaggregate level, all except for the component of engaged society have shifted up and down over time: reasoned justification went from 2.292 in 2007 to 1.998 in 2012 and then back up to 2.041 in 2014; common good justification went from 3.746 in 2007 to 3.274 in 2012 and then to 3.361 in 2014; respect for counterarguments shifted from 3.547 in 2007 to 2.915 in 2012 and then back up to 3.178 in 2014; and range of consultation changed from 3.673 in 2007 to 3.099 in 2012 before moving back up to 3.410 in 2014. The component of engaged society has consistently declined over time, moving from 4.144 in 2007 to 3.702 in 2012 and 3.679 in 2014.¹⁴

In sum, the recent erosion of the deliberative quality of democracy seems to be caused by the decay of engaged society in South Korea.

Figure 4. The Deliberative Quality of Democracy in South Korea, 1985-2014




Source: see Table 1.

Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the longitudinal evolution of democratic depth in South Korea. At the aggregate level, it jumped from .296 in 1986 to .559 in 1988, continuing its upward movement to reach .779 in 2007 before plunging down to .634 in 2014, a level comparable to the figure recorded in 1992. At the disaggregate level, while the component of equal protection has greatly improved from .865 in 2012 to .932 in 2014, the component of equal distribution of resources has significantly worsened, going from .924 in 2012 to .855 in 2014. In other words, the recent erosion of democratic depth is more likely to be attributable to the increasingly inequitable distribution of resources in South Korea.

All in all, since South Korea's democratic transition in 1987, the nation's democracy improved considerably in terms of authenticity, quality, and depth up until the late 2000s. Since then, it has substantively worsened in every measurable dimension of democracy, falling back to the level of the early 1990s. To summarize our findings at the disaggregate level, (1) the decay in freedom of expression, among others, is the largest factor that has caused the erosion of democratic authenticity; (2) the decay of judicial constraints on the executive has had the highest impact on the erosion of the liberal quality of democracy; (3) the decay of civil society participation has been the most significant cause of the erosion of the participatory quality of democracy; (4) the decay

of engaged society has had the most critical influence on the erosion of the deliberative quality of democracy; and (5) the decay of the equal distribution of resources has had the greatest bearing on the erosion of democratic depth.

Figure 5. Democratic Depth in South Korea, 1985-2014



Source: see Table 1.

Conclusion

Employing a new dataset from the V-Dem project that provides us a multidimensional continuous measure of democracy, this paper finds that South Korea falls below the average of all OECD countries across all dimensions of democratic authenticity, quality, and depth.

It also reveals a consistent downward trend across every dimension of democracy in South Korea over the past ten years: the decay of the freedom of expression critically affects the erosion of democratic authenticity; the decay of judicial constraints on the executive is the main source of the erosion of the liberal quality of democracy; the decay of civil society participation has a significant bearing on the erosion of the participatory quality of democracy; the decay of engaged society is a critical factor in the erosion of the deliberative quality of democracy; and the increasingly unequal distribution of resources is the primary cause of the erosion of democratic depth. In short, it seems as though today South Korea’s democracy has arrived at its most hazardous juncture since its inauguration thirty years ago. ■

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Endnotes

¹ See Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). The data is available at <https://sites.google.com/site/joseantoniocheibub/datasets/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited> (accessed on October 10, 2016).

² See Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). The data is available at <https://sites.google.com/site/mkmtwo/data> (accessed on October 10, 2016).

³ In the BMR measurement scheme, 1 indicates a democracy and 0 indicates a non-democracy.

⁴ See Freedom House (2016). The data is available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016> (accessed on October 10, 2016).

⁵ See Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2016). The data is available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> (accessed on October 10, 2016).

⁶ Mexico and Turkey are no longer considered to be democracies according to the FH criteria that defines a minimum threshold of 2.5 to qualify as democratic. No OECD countries falls short of the Polity criteria, which sets a minimum threshold of 6 to qualify as democratic.

⁷ The electoral democracy indicator measures the extent to which the ideal of an electoral democracy, or *the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens* is achieved. It is a composite index consisting of (1) a *clean elections* score to measure the extent to which elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; (2) an *elected executive* score to measure the extent to which elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country; (3) a *freedom of association* score to measure the extent to which political and civil society organizations can operate freely; (4) a *freedom of expression* score to measure the extent to which, in between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance; and (5) a *share of population with suffrage* score to measure the extent to which the ideal of an electoral democracy is achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive (Coppedge et al. 2016: 44).

⁸ The liberal democracy indicator measures the extent to which the ideal of a liberal democracy, or *the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority* is achieved. It is a composite index, in addition to the degree of electoral democracy, consisting of (1) an *equality before the law and individual liberty* score to measure the degree of constitutionally protected civil liberties; (2) a *judicial constraints on the executive* score to measure the degree of the establishment of rule of law and an independent judiciary; and (3) a *legislative constraints on the executive* score to measure the degree of effective checks and balances that exist against the executive power (Coppedge et al. 2016: 46).

⁹ The participatory democracy indicator measures the extent to which the ideal of a participatory democracy, or *active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral*, is achieved. It is a composite index, in addition to the degree of electoral democracy, consisting of (1) a *civil society participation* score to measure the degree of engagement in civil society organizations; (2) a *direct popular vote* score to measure the degree of direct rule by citizens; (3) a *local government* score to measure the degree of influence of second-level sub-national elected bodies; and (4) a *regional government* score to measure the degree of influence of first-level sub-national elected bodies (Coppedge et al. 2016: 47).

¹⁰ The deliberative democracy indicator measures the extent to which the ideal of deliberative democracy, or *the process in which political decisions are made is motivated by the common good* is achieved. It is a composite index, in addition to the degree of electoral democracy, consisting of (1) a *common good* score; (2) an *engaged society* score; (3) a *range of consultation* score; (4) a *reasoned justification* score; and (5) a *respect counterarguments* score. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions— as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to the final decision— among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion (Coppedge et al. 2016: 48).

¹¹ The egalitarian democracy indicator measures the extent to which the ideal of egalitarian democracy, or *material and immaterial inequalities should not inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate*, is achieved. It is a composite index, in addition to the degree of electoral democracy, consisting of (1) an *equal distribution of resources* score to measure the extent to which resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and (2) an *equal protection* score to measure the extent to which the rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups (Coppedge et al. 2016: 49).

¹² The aggregate level of democracy indicator is the average score of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and egalitarian democracy.

¹³ For details, see endnotes 7 to 11.

¹⁴ For the components that form the deliberative quality of democracy score, I used measures of the original scale due to coding problems that I found in the V-Dem dataset Version 6.2. This procedure does not produce any bias in the detection of longitudinal changes. Compare the outputs in online analysis between original and relative scales at the V-Dem website, available at <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/> (accessed on October 16, 2014).