



## [After Trump Series 2] Prospects for U.S.–South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.–China Strategic Competition

### Security Cooperation between South Korea and the United States

Young–Sun Ha

Chairman of the Board of Trustees, EAI  
Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University

Chaesung Chun

Chair, National Security Research Center, EAI  
Professor, Seoul National University

#### US–China Strategic Rivalry and the US strategy

These days China, in US strategic thinking, is perceived as pursuing hegemonic power not only in Asia, but also globally. Anti-Chinese sentiment following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has fueled this opinion. China's relatively quick economic recovery adds to the concern over the rise of China. Chinese intrusions into major disputed territories including the South China Sea are increasing, and China continues to expand its global presence by supplying global public goods in many areas especially for global health. Challenges posed by China today make the US more nervous than during the 2008 Financial Crisis. During the campaign years for the presidential election, the US China policy has been heavily politicized and is emerging as an important electoral agenda with other overwhelming domestic political issues.

As the US-China strategic competition gradually shifts toward a hegemonic challenge, South Korea's North Korea strategies are faced with increasing difficulties. A variety of proposals for South Korea's strategy in the middle of US-China rivalry have been presented, but recent changes in US strategy towards China pose challenges to South Korea's position.

The year 2020 marks a milestone in the US strategy toward China. Before 2020, the Trump administration was focused on various economic assistance including infrastructure assistance to Asian countries,

and the promotion of free within the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, which was related to security strategies toward Asia as a whole. At the same time, the administration also pushed for trade negotiations to reorganize bilateral economic relations with China.

However, the Trump administration's China policy has become much tougher in 2020. Since the global onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the US has intended to reduce its reliance on China for core medical supplies by creating an alliance called the "Economic Prosperity Network," and tried decoupling from China in advanced technologies sectors crucial to China's future development. Such US moves are accompanied by a policy to further decouple Asian countries from China. 5G Clean Network, along with the Blue Dot Network, has been proposed to accomplish the task of balancing Chinese efforts for technological and economic dominance.

Furthermore, the security architecture seems to depart from the US-centered bilateral alliance network, namely the hub-and-spoke system, to form a multilateral security system similar to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This attempt can be confirmed by the recent remarks of the Defense Secretary Esper and Deputy Secretary of State Biegun.

The US takes issue with the ideological characteristics of the Chinese regime and President Xi Jinping's leadership. This is well-illustrated in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's recent speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. Pompeo mentioned in his speech that Chinese regime is fundamentally totalitarian Marxist-Leninist one, and that it is forcing coercive governance on its neighboring countries and throughout the globe, thereby weakening freedom. This new Cold War rhetoric implies that the liberal countries cannot coexist with communist China. The US has shifted to an offensive stance towards China, claiming that its engagement policy toward China for the last five decades has failed.

However, it is difficult to conclude that US engagement policy towards China over the past 50 years has totally failed. China has developed under the existing US-led liberal economic order, has not explicitly posed military challenges, and still values the existing global norms. If the US and the international community had not pursued a policy of engagement with China, China's external behavior might have been more aggressive.

Second, the new Cold War type of strategy could give the impression that the US is seeking regime transformation. China, which is well aware of the fact that the end of the Cold War resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union, will have no choice but to respond in a very aggressive fashion. This may eventually lead to a military confrontation between the US and China, having an adverse impact on the neighboring countries.

The new Cold War atmosphere also increases the potential for a confrontation between the US and China to turn into a hot war. After World War II, George Kennan insisted on the geopolitical containment

of the Soviet Union. However, he did not necessarily agree with the use of military means. The NCS-68 advocating for the military containment only came into force after the Korean War when fear of a military attack by a communist regime spread widely. If short-term and high-intensity disputes occur in the South China Sea between the US and China, the current status quo could unexpectedly turn into a hot war. To prevent such changes from occurring in the near future is extremely important.

Fourth, the allies and strategic partners of the US do not necessarily agree with the US perception of China and the strategic calculation in line with a new Cold War. This is not only due to differing perceptions of China, but also due to differences in ultimate policy goals. The US believes that from a global strategic perspective, China's military modernization and stronger national power can be a threat. However, many Asian countries do not feel that China poses a direct security threat with differing degrees.

Confrontational strategy towards China has a number of problems, and, if accelerated, is bound to backfire if it is forced on America's allies. First, the existing US-centric international order arose from a set of policies that encompassed a number of different arrangements. Alliances were formed to promote the active forward deployment of the United States, provide defense support to allies, pursue an international order based on embedded liberalism which benefitted America's allies economically and promoted compromise between governments. Also the US government served as a model for the pursuit of human-rights oriented policies and democracy.

Second, the new Cold War offensive has already provoked a fierce reaction from China. This is because China feels that the new US strategy undermines the ideological legitimacy of the Chinese regime. This move is believed to frustrate China's growth and strengthen the collective security of Asian countries in competition with China. If Asian countries join the US offensive against China, Chinese retaliation will be stronger. If the US fails to provide a viable alternative that can both prevent and respond to Chinese retaliation against these Asian countries, the new Cold War structure will eventually weaken.

Third, if the allies nevertheless decide to join the US-led anti-China camp, we can expect retaliation from China which will hurt the industry sector of Asian countries. This will likely intensify anti-Chinese sentiment, but also it may also lead to anti-American sentiment, as the US has established a new Cold War structure. The US could end up with economically weakened allies who lay some blame on US policies.

### **South Korea's position and the future of cooperation with the United States**

As South Korea's critical interests lie in inter-Korean reconciliation and peace with complete denuclearization of North Korea and South Korea's economic development influenced by close interdependence with China, the US-China rivalry puts South Korea in a very difficult position.

South Korea, as a middle power, must work to design policies that will impact the politics of both the US and China. Under the current circumstances, South Korea should devise various ways to influence US policy towards China. One potential way to achieve this goal is to deliver policy ideas to key policy advisors through Track II talks.

The US is facing major upcoming changes in its policy towards China and its national security strategy. Input from US allies on policy alternatives would enable the US to devise better policies.

Second, Korea must clearly communicate the fundamentals and norms that it wishes to pursue through its policies. It is necessary to devise policies that are based on more universal norms, with concrete logic and theories that support such policy endeavors. Successful policies may eventually influence US policies by setting a good example.

The third option is to present Korea's policy alternatives through strategic dialogues in Track I talks between Seoul and Washington. It is crucial to engage in a strategic dialogue that preemptively presents policies that benefit not only Korea but also the US and the wider international community.

US strategy towards China that South Korea may recommend is as follows. Currently the discourse on China policy in the United States varies. The advocates of the new Cold War confrontation, offensive realists, and liberals all have different opinions on the ultimate purpose of China policy. The supporters of the new Cold War and the offensive realists both emphasize ways to reinforce the role of Asian allies. The former focuses on possible result of the transformation of the Chinese regime, while the latter stresses changes in the balance of power between the US and China, recommending the strategy of off-shore balancing and the increased role of alliances. Liberals argue for consistent and reinforced open engagement with China. The new Cold War is unacceptable to Asian allies and also active US intervention remains necessary. Therefore, South Korea should pursue active diplomatic efforts to maintain the military status quo and enable China's external behaviors to be consistent with existing norms, and foster close cooperation within the international community to positively influence China's future development path.

Second, it is difficult to create a collective security system without invoking aggressive response from China. As a hegemonic power, the US is proposing the idea of broad collective security, considering China's breach of norms and disputes over maritime territorial and transportation routes. When the US still maintains a military advantage over China with the current bilateral alliance system being able to keep China in check, the imposition of artificial collective security could result in a backlash. There must be an alternative to the bygone collective security of the 20th century—an alternative that seeks to create a more flexible and creative network within the current bilateral alliance system. As the United States pursues the multi-domain strategy with close cooperative follow-ups from Japan and the UK, South Korea also needs to consult closely with the United States in terms of division of roles, and interoperability.

Third, complete economic decoupling would entail substantial costs. It is also unclear whether pursuing such a strategy would in fact harm China, as China has the capacity to minimize economic damage through the establishment of the so-called “red supply chain.” Excessive politicization and securitization of markets would inevitably affect the global economic order. Even under the US-led economic order, politicized and secured economic practices could have negative impacts. Therefore, we must find ways to maintain the existing liberal order and international organizations while convincing China to cease its breaching of norms. We must pursue a recoupling, not decoupling, of cooperation.

Fourth, we should actively develop areas that facilitate cooperation with China. In this regard, South Korea’s role in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue is essential. It is true that the visibility of the North Korea nuclear issue has decreased significantly in the US presidential elections. However, the North Korea nuclear issue is a matter of cooperation between the US and China, as Deputy Secretary Beigun commented during a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 22<sup>nd</sup>. Since South Korea is an important party to the North Korean nuclear issue, Seoul must work to exercise its influence on US-China relations by establishing a track record of policy success. The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the successful North Korea policy are vital, but these will become more possible when South Korea reinforces its position within the rapidly changing global dynamics, especially with regard to the US-China relations.

It is not possible to know the next US administration’s US policy. At first, Trump administration’s China policy seemed to lack a long-term strategic purpose. But Trump adopted a tough, hard-line policy blaming China’s norm-eroding behaviors, and it developed into an ideological confrontation. Gradually Trump administration’s policy included trade policy with higher tariffs, economic decoupling, a suggestion of East Asian collective security system, multi-domain operations to counter China’s A2AD, and so on. The evaluation that the past 5-decade long engagement with China completely failed, and the implication that only the change of Chinese regime is likely to moderate China’s behavior is the assumption that other countries cannot automatically share.

Biden administration may continue to adopt several policies of these. But how President Biden will conceive the ultimate end-state relations with China is highly significant. It is natural that we adopt the Cold War analogy, but the nature of international order fundamentally changed. In many areas in which the world needs the cooperation of China, such as environmental degradation, grand strategic concept of containment, total decoupling with China, and isolating China will hurt the primary purpose of future world order.

If competition, especially rule-based competition, and cooperation does not open the room for engaging with China, meaning that the room for inducing not just behavioral changes of China, but structural

transformations of China in various areas, China will respond with confrontational policy. Outside pressure or overbalancing will strengthen Chinese nationalism, which in turn consolidate authoritarian resilience.

Now the military power gap between the United States and China is still largely unsurmountable and when we count alliance's strong support we still have an edge in military balance of power. When the democratic forum works very effectively there is likely to be a still chance to shape the future decisions of China.

There is no doubt that South Korea's most fundamental and long-term strategic purpose coincides with the US. South Korea has developed under the US-led liberal international order and has contributed to strengthening this order showing formidable followership.

The critical thing in enhancing ROK-US security cooperation is to begin a candid strategic dialogue regarding two countries' China policy. It is true that South Korea has avoided a dialogue with the United States regarding its China policy, for fear of disagreement. From now on, the very nature of China's security threats, the risks of China's military strategy, the concrete and staged plan for division of roles between South Korea and the United States, and the plan to mitigate the effect of China's retaliation against South Korea need to be closely discussed between Seoul and Washington.

Disagreements on South Korea's role with the United States in checking China's assertive strategy may be resolved if South Korea and the United States retain a fundamental agreement on planning the future regional architecture, and maintaining the liberal international order. As far as the US and its allies maintain a strong military advantage, there is a room for trying diverse policies to strengthen the status quo and socialize Chinese strategic thinking. Based on the fact that South Korea has a very strong stake in maintaining the current rule-based order led by the United States, two countries need to find a path to enhance common interests based on the roadmap for division of roles.

## **North Korea's Strategy after the Hanoi summit 2019**

After the Hanoi no deal in February, 2019, North Korea has searched for a new strategy to further its position both domestically and in dealing with the United States and south Korea. North Korea's speeches and actions since the breakdown of the February 2019 Hanoi Summit should be interpreted from a perspective that encompasses North Korea's survival strategy based on its three revolutionary capabilities. Chairman Kim Jong-Un, at the First session of the Fourteenth Supreme People's Assembly, gave a policy speech under the title of "On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage," which adhered to the basic principles of the three revolutionary capabilities.

First, Kim stressed the importance of economic self-sufficiency, increased political-military might, advancement of socialist culture, and enhanced roles and capacities of governmental organs by referencing

the revolutionary line of independence, the people-first principle, and party leadership. While Kim positively assessed the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in the context of inciting revolutionary capabilities within South Korea, he also stressed that South Korea “should not waver in their attitude as they see the tide nor pose as a meddling ‘mediator’ and ‘facilitator,’ as they busy themselves with foreign trips, but be a responsible party that defends the interests of the nation speaking what they have to say squarely with the mind of their own as members of the nation.”

He also mentioned that “it is imperative to smash the underhand schemes of the hostile anti-reunification and anti-peace forces within and without in order to sustain the atmosphere of improved inter-Korean relations” if South Korea truly wishes to improve inter-Korean relations, foster peace, and pursue unification. Lastly, in terms of improving its international revolutionary capabilities, Kim Jong-Un meaningfully appraised the June 12th U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit Joint Declaration from 2018 while questioning the Hanoi Summit in February 2019.

Kim asserted that U.S. disregard for the basic idea of ending its hostile policy towards North Korea and its misjudgment that a full-force sanctions regime would bring North Korea down to its knees were what had led to the breakdown of the summit. In following, Kim emphasized that the U.S. should bring new calculations to the table in order to continue a third round of U.S.-DPRK talks.

North Korea’s fundamental strategy has been proposed at the end of 2019. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un replaced his 2020 New Year’s address with a report entitled “On the Orientation of Our Immediate Struggle under the Present Internal and External Situation,” which was presented at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2019. The report came eight months after his speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April, “On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage,” which outlined the basic plan for his national strategy. These shed light on how North Korea subjectively understands its internal and external environments and envisions new measures and policies going forward.

Compared to the speech in April, the December report places particular emphasis on the difficulties posed by North Korea’s internal and external environments. For example, in the report, Kim assesses “that the challenges that have faced [North Korea] in the past several months have been so harsh and dangerous that others would not withstand even a single day but yield to them.” With the increased recognition of both internal and external challenges, Kim has named this year’s propaganda slogan, “Let Us Break Through Head-on All the Barriers to Our Advance!”

In analyzing domestic and international affairs, the December report highlights pressure from economic sanctions as an external challenge and difficulties of building a socialist power as an internal challenge. To begin with, Kim Jong Un points out obstacles faced by North Korea in implementing its three-

step denuclearization policy. Such approach has been continuously echoed in statements ranging from the April 2018 announcement of the new strategic policy line to Ambassador Kim Myong Gil's press conference in early October, which followed the breakdown of working-level talks in Stockholm. For the first step of denuclearization policy, North Korea initiated the discontinuation of nuclear and ICBM tests and dismantlement of nuclear test ground as a confidence-building measure in exchange for a suspension of the joint ROK-US military exercises.

For the second stage, the regime demands for an end to the US hostile policy towards North Korea and the lifting of economic sanctions in place of an immediate dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. These measures are to be taken in accordance with the “action for action” principle and ensure North Korea's regime security.

For the third step, North Korea proposes that nuclear disarmament talks on the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding areas be conducted from the perspective of ‘denuclearization on the Chosun [Korean] Peninsula’ as North Korea moves towards complete denuclearization.

Yet North Korea has declared that it “cannot give up [its] future security just for visible economic results and happiness and comfort, given that there has been no change in [its] external environment owing to the US gangster-like acts both in the days when we went along the road of pushing economic construction and nuclear arms buildup in parallel and at present when we are working to concentrate all our efforts on economic construction and that hostile acts and nuclear threat and blackmail are still being intensified.” The December report further adds that “the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.” Such statements show North Korea's shift towards a second *byungjin* line policy (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons) after the policy of parallel development of the economy and nuclear weapons was declared in March 2013 and the nuclear-based economic construction policy in April 2018.

In regards to external breakthrough, efforts to secure deterrence by developing nuclear weapons and making direct security threats to the US will only complicate rather than resolve North Korea's international challenges. This is because the stronger North Korea's nuclear deterrence grows, sanctions will tighten upon the regime and paradoxically threaten its security. At the same time, it is highly unlikely and impractical for the US—which abides by the principle of nuclear non-proliferation in preserving the international order—to accept a nuclear freeze over North Korea's complete denuclearization.

Secondly, North Korea continues to view the economic front as the basic line of its policy for overcoming internal challenges associated with its development into a socialist power. The regime hopes to

reform the economic sector and mobilize all available production capabilities to sufficiently satisfy the demands of its people and continue pursuing economic development. These initiatives are key to North Korea's current economic agenda.

As such, the December report states that all sectors of North Korea's economy showed a growing trend in 2019 despite "the heinous sanctions imposed by the hostile forces." Yet the report also points out domestic economic challenges, contending that "the conditions of the national economy have not turned better remarkably as a result of the failure of the motive force of its development to recover, and that the state's capability of execution and control for fulfilling the important economic tasks is weak."

Consequently, the report boils down North Korea's economic concern into competition between self-reliance and sanctions. It also highlights that while "it is true that [North Korea] urgently need[s] [an] external environment favorable for [its] economic construction, [it] can never sell [its] dignity which [it has] so far defended as valuable as [the people's] own life, in the hope of gorgeous transformation." According to the report, the forces of sanctions will only increase if North Korea does not place an effort strengthen its self-reliance while awaiting the lifting of sanctions. Hence the report reaffirms the regime's determination to engage in a head-on breakthrough of the tightening grip of the sanctions scheme and destroy it completely with the power invested in its self-reliance.

However, North Korea cannot deal with its economic challenges with self-reliance alone. For China, it took around four decades of reform and opening-up since 1978 for the nation to accelerate its economic growth and emerge into the world's second-largest economy behind the US, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 14 trillion USD and per capita income of 10,000 USD. With a mere 1000 USD per capita income, it will take North Korea an extensive period of accelerated economic growth to survive the global economic market in the 21st century. In that regard, lifting of economic sanctions through denuclearization is a necessity, not an option.

Kim Jong Un ends the December report by calling forth North Korea's revolutionary spirit with the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) at its core. He states that "[North Korea] should not look for the way of getting [itself] adapted to the objective factors to be controlled by them in the current struggle, but make a breakthrough head-on to put the objective factors under our control." Yet it is impossible to successfully overcome current obstacles with nuclear deterrence and self-reliance. North Korea's true head-on breakthrough will be to speed down the path of denuclearization and economic opening-up meanwhile building a regime that can preserve its security and dignity, traits that are priceless.

The December report focuses primarily on North Korea's internal and external capabilities and contains no mentions of inter-Korean relations unlike the previous administrative policy address. This is because South Korea has limited agency to act independently from the international environment and is

largely unable to assist North Korea's old ways of pursuing a head-on breakthrough. South Korea's true role is to cooperate with the international environment and help pave the way for North Korea to develop its own domestic capabilities, until it is stable to run on its own. Only when North Korea chooses this new way of pursuing a head-on breakthrough over its old ways would it be able to overcome its current obstacles.

## North Korea in 2020, and the future task of South Korea and the United States

North Korea's effort to break through the impasse in 2019 is facing an even more difficult phase with the global spread of COVID-19 in 2020. It faces practical limitations in increasing its domestic and international capabilities. The improvement in inter-Korean relations over the past two years was expected to contribute to the strengthening of its domestic and international capabilities but has failed to yield any significant developments. North Korea even blew up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office, which was built under the auspices of the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018.

Kim Jong-Un's decision to demolish the Inter-Korean Liaison Office shows that his political perspective remains dated, resonating that of his grandfather. Chairman Kim Il-sung's press conference from a half century ago still holds significant weight. Chairman Kim Il-sung, amid the shifting global order throughout the mid-1960s, decided to pursue the theory of "revolution-unification" by emphasizing the "three revolutionary capabilities" of North Korea, South Korea, and the world. As it became realistically unfeasible to pursue the theory of a "unification through war," North Korea embodied such "unification through revolution" theories in the July 4th South-North Joint Declaration by addressing them in its "Three Principles of Unification." Since then, and throughout more than half a century during which it adopted the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of December 1991, the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration of 2000, the October 4th Declaration of 2007, and the Panmunjom Declaration/the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of 2018, North Korea remained adamant on the basic principles and languages of the three revolutionary capabilities.

Kim Yo-jong, the first vice director of the United Front Department of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) harshly criticized the South Korean government for its two mistakes twice in mid-June: for anti-North Korea leaflets and for the ROK- U.S. Working Group. During the first announcement, she stated "I feel it is high time to surely break with the South Korean authorities," while mentioning "anyway, now the South Korean authorities are left with nothing to do with us." Such statement warns of a bleak future in inter-Korean relations unless South Korea amends its two mistakes and decides to align with a new strategic line. In North Korea's perspective, the fundamental problem related to the distribution of anti-North Korean leaflets is that they defame the highest and sacred dignity required for the strengthening of its domestic revolutionary capabilities.

Therefore, North Korea is demanding that South Korea's policymakers choose between assuming either traitor and trustee roles based on the principle of national unity residing within the July 4<sup>th</sup> Joint Statement. In addition, the issue North Korea raised regarding the ROK- U.S. Working Group is not just a practical matter. It rather insists that South Korea choose between the path of self-reliance versus subordination. Although Kim Jong-un ordered the suspension of military actions against South Korea on June 23, Kim Yo-jong's threatening statement illustrates North Korea's true intentions.

Given these developments, the reconstruction blueprint of North Korea is still based on its goal of augmenting its three revolutionary capabilities, which dates back half a century. If South Korea agrees to the principles of the North Korean blueprint—as indicated in the July 4<sup>th</sup> Joint Declaration—it can reconstruct its relationship with North Korea in the short term.

However, the bigger problem lies in the fact that North Korea's barren blueprint cannot help bolster the Korean Peninsula into an advanced and civilized nation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; rather by embarking on the blueprint, the Korean Peninsula would stray back to the shadows of the past. It is urgent to create a blueprint that would strengthen Korea's three revolutionary capabilities to fit the 21<sup>st</sup> century; the true Sunshine Policy that would befit such a blueprint would be one that embraces a futuristic North Korea and helps it adopt into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

For attaining these goals, it is necessary for North Korea to reorganize itself politically, economically, socially, culturally, ecologically, and technologically, to adjust itself to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. At the same time, South Korea, as an advanced and civilized 21<sup>st</sup> century nation, should also support the advancement of North Korea, alongside other neighboring countries. Most importantly, South Korea should improve its own domestic political capabilities befitting the 21<sup>st</sup> century in order to achieve the reconstruction of the Korean Peninsula.

## **The Prospect of North Korea's denuclearization under the Biden administration and South Korea's tasks**

Given these backdrop, North Korea policy of the next US Biden administration is likely to be very critical for the future negotiation for denuclearization of the North. Biden's approach, so far, can be summarized as follows: first, principled pragmatism which will be the guiding line for bottom-up approach with North Korea will prevail; second, cooperation with South Korea and other East Asian allies will be essential in accomplishing denuclearization of North Korea; third, to prevent further development of North Korea's nuclear capabilities is important with a view to the ultimate purpose

of complete denuclearization; and fourth, human rights in North Korea will be an essential concern for the Biden administration.

Although top-down approach implemented by Trump administration was effective in facilitating the basic process of trust-building between Trump and Kim Jung Un, obstacles in the detailed stages of denuclearization were not to be overcome just by the summit-level interaction. More than anything else, full, baseline declaration of the report with respect to North Korea's nuclear programs and weapons is the key for developing negotiations. South Korea, with the Biden administration, should try to persuade the North the necessity of the comprehensive report for pushing forward the bottom-up, working-level negotiation between the US and North Korea.

Korean and the US governments. Based on this fundamental consensus, two governments need to find a way to realize this substantial policy purpose and to deliver the message to North Korea that this effort does not target unsettling North Korean political regime. Rather, practical achievements in the process of denuclearization will benefit North Korean people by giving them various assistance from international society. Seoul and Washington should craft a prudent diplomacy to achieve the policy goals of promote North Korea's human rights and make progress in the negotiation for North Korea's denuclearization.

The most urgent task is the joint development of the new way of calculation for the complete denuclearization of North Korea. After the failure of second Hanoi Summit between Trump and Kim Jung Un, North Korea has continuously complained the old way of calculation of the United States and advocated the new way of calculation for the successful summit. At the same time, North Korea strongly advocates his version of three stages of denuclearization as a new way of calculation.

The first stage is the unilateral process of trust-building, the second stage is step by step simultaneous action for the exchange of the partial reduction of nuclear capabilities excluding nuclear capabilities for minimum deterrence and the gradual lift of sanctions and the beginning of the peace-building on the peninsula. The third stage is the implementation of both complete denuclearization of North Korea including minimum deterrence and the complete security guarantee on the basis of abolishment of US hostile policy toward North Korea including USFK and nuclear strategic assets around the Peninsula through nuclear arms control talks in the Asia-Pacific.

It shows that North Korea is ready to negotiate partial reduction of nuclear capabilities as a compensation of gradual lift of sanctions. However it is also clear that North Korea is not yet take the strategic decision to accept the complete denuclearization.

Under these circumstances, ROK and the United States should make joint efforts in developing new roadmap of complete denuclearization and blueprint for North Korea's peace and prosperity

in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In the case of the roadmap of complete nuclearization, bottom-up negotiations can start from the nuclear freeze as a stepping stone for the final goal of complete denuclearization.

However, as North Korea's sincerity of complete denuclearization has not yet proven, North Korea's comprehensive report of verification lists of nuclear capabilities should be needed as a confidence-building measure for the final stage of denuclearization. In the case of blueprint for North Korea's peace and prosperity for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in parallel with the process of nuclear-freeze, gradual sanction-lift and security guarantee for nonnuclear North Korea should begin to be implemented as confidence-building measures of developing friendly relations with North Korea.

For the final goal of complete denuclearization and security guarantee, it is necessary for non-nuclear North Korea to reorganize itself politically, economically, socially, culturally, ecologically, and technologically, to adjust itself to the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this process of self-reorganization of North Korea for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, regional peace system should be built to provide maximum security guarantee for nonnuclear North Korea. At the same time, global support of North Korea's self-reorganization program should be arranged. Moon and Biden's joint effort to design the new way of calculation is one the most urgent tasks in the Asia-Pacific.

■ **Young-Sun Ha** is chairman of the board of trustees of the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University's department of political science and international relations. Ha currently serves as a member of the senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee. He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, president of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and research fellow at Princeton University's Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include *A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea*, *World Politics of Love: War and Peace*, *U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific*; *Korean Peninsula Among Big Powers: 1972 vs. 2014*, *Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order*, *The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement*, *The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century*, and *A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations*. He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and his PhD from the University of Washington.

■ **Chaesung Chun** is the Chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of *The Korean War: Threat and Peace*, and the author of a number of publications including *Are Politics Moral and International Politics in East Asia: History and Theory*.

■ Typeset by: Juwon Seo, Research Associate

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 206) [jwseo@eai.or.kr](mailto:jwseo@eai.or.kr)

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The East Asia Institute

#909 Sampoong B/D, Eulji-ro 158, Jung-gu,

Seoup 04548, South Korea

Tel. 82 2 2277 1683 Fax 82 2 2277 1684

Email [eai@eai.or.kr](mailto:eai@eai.or.kr) Website [www.eai.or.kr](http://www.eai.or.kr)