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Abstract

This working paper builds upon an emerging literature regarding sensitivity to foreign-imposed regime change in Chinese foreign policy. I argue here that China's misgivings about foreign-imposed regime change affect China's response to intervention at the UN Security Council also. First, the paper establishes the connection between regime change and intervention at the UN Security Council. Next, the paper categorizes why Chinese scholars and policymakers deride regime change using an analysis of Chinese-language sources. Last, the article draws on recent UN Security Council cases of intervention to reflect on the practical implications of China's sensitivity to regime change for its engagement in UN Security Council-led intervention.

Introduction

This working paper builds upon an emerging literature regarding sensitivity to foreign-imposed regime change in Chinese foreign policy.[1] Scholars assert that considerations of regime change appear to be key in Chinese foreign policy. Wang and Lieberthal classify concerns about regime change as a major source of Sino-American friction and strategic distrust.[2] Christensen suggests that stable Sino-US relations hinges on the United States convincing China that the United States

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[1] Foreign-imposed regime change is shortened to 'regime change' in this working paper, and should not be confused with 'regime change' in leadership of the People's Republic of China.

[2] For a discussion of regime change as a source of strategic distrust, also see Kenneth Lieberthal and Jisi Wang, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," (Washington D.C.: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012).

is not pro-actively targeting China for regime change.[3]

I argue here that China's misgivings about regime change are not limited to affecting Sino-US relations, but also affect China's response to intervention at the UN Security Council. China was outraged with the toppling of Gaddafi in October 2011 leading to regime change in Libya, condemning the escalation of the bombing campaign as overstepping the UN Security Council mandate of civilian protection.[4] When debating possible modes of UN Security Council-sanctioned intervention into the Syria crisis, Chinese officials have often stressed that "China opposes any externally imposed solution aimed at forcing a regime change."[5] In escalating UN Security Council sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China made pointed remarks reminding the United States "don't seek regime change; don't incite a collapse of the regime…"[6] Repeated statements like these belie a serious concern for China about the tensions between regime change and UN Security Council-sanctioned intervention.

However, the connections between regime change and non-consensual intervention have only been discussed in a limited sense, despite growing policy relevance for understanding the boundaries of intervention today.[7] Regime change — broadly defined as the "alteration of a country's fundamental political institutions"[8] remains central to the study of international relations. In the post-11 September landscape, foreign-imposed regime change has re-emerged as a foreign policy tool and goal applied to target dictators in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Sudan, for example, and as a domestic policy goal of street-led movements trying to instigate political change during the Arab Spring, for example. This follows the wave of color revolutions in the 1990s. Both regime change and intervention often require the use of force in explicit violation of state sovereignty — the cornerstone of modern international relations — and are costly in blood, treasure, and potential to exacerbate existing conflict. However, the literature largely approaches regime change from

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[3] Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015).

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Death of Gaddafi's Son and Others in NATO's Air Strikes," May 3, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t819910.htm (accessed September 19, 2016).

[5] United Nations Security Council, "6826th meeting (S/PV.6826), August 30," (2012). See Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, "Explanatory Remarks by Ambassador Wang Min after General Assembly Vote on Draft Resolution on Syria," August 3, 2012, http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t958262.htm. United Nations General Assembly, "General Assembly, in Resolution, Demands All in Syria 'Immediately and Visibly' Commit to Ending Violence that Secretary-General Says Is Ripping Country Apart (GA/11266/Rev.1)," (2012).

[6] Quoting Ambassador Liu Jieyi. United Nations Security Council, "8042nd meeting (S/PV.8042), September 11," (2017), 7-8.

[7] Nesam McMillan and David Mickler, "From Sudan to Syria: Locating 'Regime Change' in R2P and the ICC," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 5, no. 3 (2013); Dire Tladi, "Security Council, the use of force and regime change : Libya and Cote d'Ivoire," *South African Yearbook of International Law* 37, no. 1 (2012); Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection: Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," *International Affairs* 87, no. 4 (2011).

[8] John M. Owen, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

the lens of US foreign policy, reflecting the experience of the dominant state in the system.[9] In shifting the focus to the UN Security Council — the one institution explicitly and directly charged with governing international peace and security — allows us to reflect on the reality that the UN Security Council must navigate such matters in consideration of intervention. In this UN Security Council setting, China must address crises ripe for intervention, and therefore engage in the possibility that mandated actions can — and indeed in practice have — spilled into regime change.

Though China espouses a firm commitment to more conservative principles in regards to intervention, it is flexible in the application of these principles in practice, emphasizing its commitment to limiting intervention to conditions of UN Security Council authorization, host state consent and regional support.[10] China's participation in UN Security Council-led intervention is split into five phases. Once China assumed its seat at the UN Security Council in 1971, China refused engagement with all peacekeeping commitments: no voting, funding or contributing personnel through 1980. In its second phase, China started casting peacekeeping votes,[11] though mostly favouring abstentions, so as not to obstruct nor agitate for intervention. In its third phase,

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[9] Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War* (Washinton D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007); *Outlier States: American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regime* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012); Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter, "Ensuring Peace: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Postwar Peace Duration, 1914–2001," *International Organization* 62, no. 4 (2008); Anne Sa'adah, "Regime Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution Building, and Democracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 3 (2006); Adam Roberts, "Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights," *American Journal of International Law* 100, no. 3 (2006); W. Michael Reisman, "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea," *American Journal of International Law* 98, no. 3 (2004). Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change," *Comparative Politics* 38, no. 4 (2006); Toby Dodge, "Iraqi Transitions: From Regime Change to State Collapse," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 4/5 (2005); Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," *International Security* 37, no. 4 (2013); William G. Nomikos, Alexander B. Downes, and Jonathan Monten, "Correspondence: Reevaluating Foreign-Imposed Regime Change," *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013/2014). A notable exception is Jay Butler, "Responsibility for Regime Change," *Columbia Law Review* 114, no. 3 (2014).

[10] Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis," *World Politics* 26, no. 3 (1974); *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Sally Morphet, "China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council: October 1971 - December 1999," *Security Dialogue,* 31, no. 2 (2000); Nigel Thalakada, "China's Voting Pattern in the Security Council, 1990-1995," in *The Once and Future Security Council*, ed. Bruce Russett (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Joel Wuthnow, *Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto* (London: Routledge, 2013); "China and the Processes of Cooperation in UN Security Council Deliberations," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 1 (2010); Jonathan E. Davis, "From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44, no. 2 (2011); Courtney J. Fung, "What explains China's deployment to UN peacekeeping operations?," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 16, no. 3 (2016).

[11] Starting with a 1981 vote to extend the mandate of the ceasefire-monitoring UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 495 (1981) of 14 December 1981 (S/RES/495)," (1981).

China deployed its first peacekeeping personnel,[12] and continued to abstain from authorizing Chapter VII, non-consensual interventions.[13] China entered its fourth phase of supporting peace enforcement missions and increasing its deployment numbers in 1999 when China voted in favor of a series of peace enforcement and transitional administration missions for East Timor.[14] Most recently, China regularly votes for Chapter VII, non-consensual intervention and deploys combat troops, sending "comprehensive security forces" to Mali in 2013, for example.[15] The record shows China's calibrated 'exceptions' regarding intervention, accommodating the international community's waxing and waning interest in these activities. Despite this flexibility, China remains consistent in framing its support for enforcement or violations of consent as exceptions due to the case at hand, and not a strict departure in China's principled position. This framing reflects China's views that the use of force is only acceptable as a last resort; and serves as a blunt instrument to resolve conflict *because* it disregards consent and state sovereignty.

However, unlike intervention, which may be permissible at times, China systematically dismisses any positive value in regime change. Regime change is routinely written off as an illegal activity taken at the behest of hegemons, leaving target states destitute and politically unstable, challenging China's ability to protect its overseas interests. Even worse is the sneaking suspicion that United Nations authorization is abused to achieve regime change — or worst yet — that the United Nations *willingly* takes part in regime change. This outright rejection of regime reflects China's "significant concern to delegitimize the regime-change mode of external intervention promoted by the Western powers."[16]

Analyses regarding China's drivers to support intervention emphasize securing China's overseas interests;[17] acquiring operational exposure;[18] reaping reputational benefits[19] and addressing

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[12] Starting with deploying to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia in 1992. United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 745 (S/Res/745), 28 February," (1992).

[13] The one exception was UNITAF in Somalia, which was justified as Mogadishu no longer had a sitting government. "Resolution 794 (1992): Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3 December 1992 (S/RES/794)," (1992).

[14] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1264 (1999): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4045th meeting, on 15 September 1999 (S/RES/1264)," (1999); "Resolution 1271 (1999): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4056th meeting, on 22 October 1999 (S/RES/1271)," (1999).

[15] Quoting China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Kathrin Hille, "China commits combat troops to Mali," *Financial Times*, June 27, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e46f3e42-defe-11e2-881f-00144feab7de.html.

[16] Citing Wang Yizhou in Zhang Diyu, "Yizhang foujuepiao de zhengyi (Controversies Around a Veto)," *Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs)*, no. 5 (2012): 21.

[17] Stefan Stähle, "China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," *The China Quarterly* 195 (2008); Erik Lin-Greenberg, "Blue Helmeted Dragons : explaining China's participation in United Nations peace operations" (Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009).

[18] Philippe D. Rogers, "China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 2 (2007); Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, "China's Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications," (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009).

[19] "The People's Republic of China," in *Providing Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of UN Peacekeeping*, ed. Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

status and identity concerns.[20] These works do not explicitly address the relationship between regime change and intervention in forming China's response. Despite China's rise, suspicions about foreign or domestic hostile forces creating disorder at home remain "a paramount feature of Chinese leaders' foreign policymaking."[21] Therefore, refuting attempts to subvert sovereignty remains an integral commitment due to the need to protect China's sovereignty and political stability.[22] With such deeply-held beliefs that the "ultimate goal of 'Western powers' is to overthrow [Chinese leadership's] rule,"[23] China remains committed to preventing initiatives via the UN Security Council that could challenge China's security and stability. So, while China has become increasingly flexible regarding the parameters for intervention, it remains clear that China views regime change as non-permissible.[24]

This working paper proceeds as follows. First, it establishes the connection between regime change and intervention at the UN Security Council. Next, the paper categorizes why Chinese scholars and policymakers deride regime change using an analysis of Chinese-language sources. Last, the article draws on recent UN Security Council cases of intervention to reflect on the practical implications of China's anti-regime change position for its engagement in UN Security Council-led intervention.

Regime Change and the United Nations Security Council

Regime change can occur, at one extreme, through a direct military intervention using force to abruptly remove senior leadership of a government.[25] Regime change can also occur as a by-product following non-militarized intervention (dispatching aid to rebels, the use of legal tools to target heads of state etc.). It is important to separate regime change as the publicized, explicit goal of intervention from when it occurs as a "side-effect of international involvement… that is structured around other objectives, such as economic liberalization or democratization…"[26] It is by the latter pathway to regime change that most overlaps with the UN Security Council's purview regarding international peace and security, where the UN Security Council is not immune to ad-

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[20] Courtney J. Richardson, "A Responsible Power? China and the UN Peacekeeping Regime," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 3 (2011); Fung, 2016; Jing Chen, "Explaining the Change in China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: a norm change perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 58 (2009); Chien-pin Li, "Norm Entrepreneur or Interest Maximiser? China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2001-2010," *China: An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (2011).

[21] Chen Zheng, "China Debates the Non-Interference Principle," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 3 (2016): 373.

[22] Jisi Wang, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (2011).

[23] Chen, 2016, 373.

[24] Courtney J. Fung, "Separating Intervention From Regime Change: China's Diplomatic Innovations at the UN Security Council Regarding the Syria Crisis," *The China Quarterly* (forthcoming).

[25] For considerations of regime change along a continuum, see Daniel Byman, "Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects," *Political Science Quarterly* 127, no. 1 (2012).

[26] McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 292.

dressing the most extreme of intervention — country cases that take place against a public discourse calling for regime change, which seeks to extend the boundary for acceptable intervention to include legal and military tools to target governments with egregious domestic human rights records.

The United Nations has accepted a widening definition of what constitutes threats to the peace and therefore what activities are permissible under Chapter VII aegis.[27] No longer are UN efforts limited to inter-state threats to international peace and security but include efforts to address genocide, crimes against humanity, state failure, for example. In an era where states themselves abuse citizens, often with support of senior government officials, this puts the UN Security Council in the position of potentially directly or indirectly addressing regime change by its intervention measures.[28] Scholars wryly observe that in the post-Cold War era, a much more targeted use of force against senior government officials would have saved much blood and treasure, instead of intervention against whole states.[29] In reality, the UN Security Council agenda is populated with a variety of cases where there is a backdrop of public discourse on regime change — as was in the most recent cases of intervention into Libya and Syria, for example. The public noise calling for a government to be fundamentally altered *in order* to address the mass abuse at hand makes these potential cases for intervention entirely different from those where the government is viewed as a partner in attempting to address mass human rights abuse. Furthermore, the UN Security Council is also using newer instruments — like targeted sanctions, no-fly zones, peace enforcement missions, and international criminal tribunals — to execute its mandates. In so doing, these tools give the UN Security Council the means to implement significant changes to host state institutions.

To be clear though, the murky relationship between regime change and UN Security Council sanctioned intervention is not limited to questions regarding the use of military force. For example, the UN Security Council can prosecute and hold heads of state accountable for human rights violations through the International Criminal Court.[30] The UN Security Council can make a referral of any country case to the International Criminal Court, invoking authorities under Chap-

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[27] Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention," in *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[28] McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 292.

[29] Michael J. Struett, *The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 74.

[30] Carrie Booth Walling, "The UN Security Council and Its ICC Referral Resolutions: Advancing or Curbing the Justice Norm?" (paper presented at the International Studies Association's 57th Annual Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, March 16-19, 2016). Previously, these efforts were limited to support of context- and geographic-specific ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia. See David M. Malone, "International Criminal Justice: Just an Expensive Mirage?," *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (2008). See also, Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2, no. 1 (2001); Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, "The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007).

ter VII of the UN Charter.[31] Therefore, the UN Security Council can act without concern for state consent or nationality.[32] In effect then, a referral of a case can and has led to indictments that actually target heads of state, in the case of Sudan[33] and Libya,[34] where neither states are parties to the Rome Statute. An indictment is a clear message that the leader is an unfit head of state, needing to undergo trial — therefore, effectively removing them from power.[35] If the head of state rules with a more centralized, autocratic government structure, then the relationship between an International Criminal Court referral and regime change can be even more prescient[36] by affecting changes to key domestic institutions, perhaps seeding or giving momentum to greater political change. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, which indicted President Slobodan Milosevic, set the precedent for an international criminal referral leading to government ouster, and others assert that "regime change appears to be a pre-condition for the ICC to achieve its

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[31] Alternate pathways include if a state party refers a situation where crimes are alleged to have occurred; or if the prosecutor receives information that crimes have occurred within the Court's jurisdiction and with the authorization of the pretrial chamber of judges. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction when the crimes occur on a signatory state that has ratified the statute, or when the perpetrator has the nationality of a state that has ratified the statute. However, the ICC is "structurally configured" to emphasize national solutions to these international crimes. McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 300. State consent underlines the Court's jurisdiction — and under the principle of complementarity, the ICC has overlapping jurisdiction with national courts — deferring to national courts "unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution" (article 17). The "positive pillar" of UN Security Council referral of cases to the ICC, is in contrast to the UN Security Council's "negative pillar" to defer or suspend investigations and prosecutions into crimes for up to twelve months at a time. Franklin Berman, "The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council," in *Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos*, ed. Adriaan Bos, et al. (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999); Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, "The Relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council," in *The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court*, ed. Carsten Stahn (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015).

[32] Article 13b of the Rome Statute. The authority of the UN Security Council to refer cases to the International Criminal Court is partially derived from the precedent set by ad hoc tribunals, which were established as subsidiary organs of the UN Security Council. For example, see Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 827 (1993): Adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993 (S/RES/827)," (1993). Also see, Ian Johnstone, "Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument," *European Journal of International Law* 14, no. 3 (2003).

[33] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1593 (2005): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005 (S/RES/1593)," (2005).

[34] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1970 (2011): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011 (S/RES/1970)," (2011).

[35] Bass notes that before the 1990 Iraq War, George H. W. Bush had already threatened Hussein with a war crime trial in the context of regime change. See Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 210.

[36] However, the benefits of a relationship between ICC referrals and regime change is contentious. Ruiz Verduzco notes the "dangerous consequences" of the ICC being "perceived as a tool to promote regime change". Ruiz Verduzco, 2015, 32. Arbour notes there is the further problem that by explicitly linking the ICC to regime change is that it "would make an already elusive Security Council consensus in support of intervention completely unattainable." Louise Arbour, "For justice and civilians, don't rule out regime change," *The Globe and Mail*, June 26, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/for-justice-and-civilians-dont-rule-out-regime-change/article4372211/.

goal of ever seeing leaders like [Libyan Prime Minister Muammar] Gaddafi and [Sudanese President Omar] al-Bashir in the dock."[37]

The International Criminal Court's purposely contemporary jurisdictional mandate means that the Court has in practice intervened in ongoing crises.[38] Crucially, the International Criminal Court goes beyond prior legal instruments,[39] which all rely upon state leaders essentially volunteering themselves for punishment. In practice, the International Criminal Court has focused on officials' accountability, since holding heads of state and political leaders to standard means that the Court can most efficiently use its limited resources, while also achieving an ancillary goal of deterring any future perpetrations of massive human rights abuse.[40] At the same time, "in many modern conflicts, including those in Libya and Syria, the state itself, or at least its officials, have embarked on a deliberate rampage against part of the population."[41]

Therefore, the UN Security Council has an expanded definition of threats to international peace and security and a broader array of tools at its disposal. The combination of these two conditions can lead to a blurring of intervention and regime change. Having established what China's efforts have been regarding UN Security Council-led intervention, the next section focuses on why regime change appears to be so problematic for China, especially in relation to intervention.

Chinese Language Sources on Regime Change

Using the Chinese National Knowledge Index, I searched for the subject term 'regime change'[42] across China's core newspapers and academic journals focusing on politics, military affairs, and law. I set aside the references to non-violent, domestic political transitions in Japan, the United

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[37] Mark Kersten, "The ICC and Regime Change: Some Thoughts but Mostly Questions," *Justice in Conflict*, January 31, 2013, http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/01/31/the-icc-and-regime-change-some-thoughts-but-mostly-questions/.

[38] It can only prosecute crimes under two conditions: after 2002, when the Rome Statute came into effect and once a state became a signatory and member The contemporary mandate is further underscored in Article 58 of the Rome Statute, which permits issuing an arrest warrant when it can prevent additional criminal activities by a defendant. For a discussion of the contemporary jurisdictional mandate issue, see McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 298. See also Belinda Cooper, "The Limits of International Justice," *World Policy Journal* 26, no. 3 (2009). Though this is not to say that the International Criminal Court is the only justice mechanism with a contemporary mandate; the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is another noteworthy example.

[39] For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Convention Against Torture of 1984, amongst other articles of international humanitarian law.

[40] Robert Cryer, "Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Pragmatics," *Göttingen Journal of International Law* 1 (2009): 54; Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, "Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?," *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016).

[41] Arbour, 2012.

[42] Regime change is translated into two terms: *zhengfu gengxuan* 政权更替 and *zhengfu gengti* 政权更迭. Some degree of ambiguity exists between the two terms, and they can be used interchangeably in the same publication. This ambiguity is supported by the absence of a precise definition in Chinese government policy statements of 'regime change' and what combination of actions constitute regime change.

States and North Korea (e.g. the change in regime from Kim Jong-Il to Kim Jong-Un). This left writings citing examples of regime change to include targeting Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria amongst others. 'Regime change' appears in 2000, the same year that the Chinese National Knowledge Index started cataloguing China's core newspapers, but only with a negligible count (see graph 1). The term slowly picks up traction, reflecting reporting and editorials about various regime change crises. In contrast, the term 'regime change' has longer roots in academic writings (see graph 2), with a subject term 'regime change' producing a first appearance in 1979 in the academic journals database.[43] A spike in analysis on regime change follows the colored revolutions in the early 2000s, with interest surging following the opening of the Arab Spring.

Graph 1: Chinese National Knowledge Index subject search for 'regime change' in the core newspaper database, no duplicates

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[43] An earlier result in 1962 is an outlier, focusing on theatre and the 1848 French Revolution.

Graph 2: Chinese National Knowledge Index subject search for 'regime change' in the academic journals database, no duplicates

A key overall finding is that sources unanimously critically dismiss regime change, without exception. Analysis of these two sets of sources reveals thematic objections regarding regime change, often overlapping in each individual publication. The first set of concerns regarding regime change is focused upon the use of illegitimate 'authority' to execute regime change on a target state. Writings systematically note that 'Western' countries — typically identified as the United States, but also France and the United Kingdom — are the primary proponents of regime change. These states are routinely criticized for not only domestic interference in the target state, but for forcefully executing regime change for their own selfish interests. For example, one author argues "… the West is very elated with their success on Syria, however, they are gradually ceding rationality because of their flailing hegemonic ambition to make regime change."[44] and that "the real goal of the West in doing this is not to (improve) the so-called human rights and democracy in Syria, but for reasons that are deeper and more complicated. First, Syria is of great geopolitical and military significance…Second, the al-Assad Government adopts an anti-America foreign policy…all of these have made America unhappy with Syria's current government. (The United States) has long been eager to subvert it and build a pro-West regime in order to permeate and control this significant spot more effectively."[45] Commentators abide by the view that the only

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[44] *"Dangqian, xifang guojia zai Xuliya wenti shang chouchumanzhi, dan shiji yi rijian bei wu jiezhi de tuidong zhengquan gengti de baquan yexin mishi le lizhi."* Tian Wenlin, "Zai Xu gao zhengquan gengti shi zhanlue duanshi (Promoting Regime Change in Syria is Strategic Shortsightedness)," *People's Daily*, June 11, 2012.

[45] *"Xifang ciju de zhenzheng mudi bing bus hi weile suowei de renquan minzhu, er shi youzhe fuza shenyuan de yuanyin. Shouxian, Xuliya juyou zhongyao de diyuan zhenzhi diwei, shi bingjia bizheng de zhanlue yaodi…Qici, Asede zhengquan chi fanmei de waijiao zhengce…suoyou zhexie dou shi Meiguo yizhi dui Xuliya xian zhenfu jiwei buman, zao jiu xiang dianfu ta, jianli yige qin Xifang de zhengquan, bianyu Xifang geng hao de shentou kongzhi Zhongdong zhe yi zhanlue yao di."* Liu Junhua, "Cong guojifa shijiao kan Xifang dui Xuliya de ganshe (On the Western Interference in Syria in View of the International Law)," *Nanjing University of Finance and Economics Scholarly Papers* (2012).

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legitimate authority to regulate international peace and security is the UN Security Council. Therefore, efforts to 'usurp' authority by Western states for their own motives is entirely unacceptable.

A second theme in Chinese-language discourse are the misgivings about the aftermath of regime change. Once the original government has been targeted, modified or even deposed, Chinese scholars emphasize that the immediate result is social turmoil, chaos and disaster. For example,

> However, after two years, countries (that have achieved regime change during the Arab Spring) have not realized their expected political stability and power, economic development and prosperity, and a peaceful and enlightened society. In contrast… conflicts resulting from all kinds of disputes have trapped this region into turmoil and chaos that no one has expected beforehand…[46]

Analysts see that these cases of regime change "sank [countries into] corruption and scandal of internal conflicts"[47] and cases of "continuous political instability"[48] for which no state claims responsibility.

The virtual collapse of states post-regime change, leads to a third theme in Chinese discourse: that regime change brings unpredictability to the management of China's overseas interests in the targeted states. For example, in the context of the Libya and Syria interventions, commentators assert that "From the aspect of our own interests, China needs energy, light industry and labor markets. Also, it is possible that the Middle East is a market for China's sophisticated products … Wars and chaos is this region is contradictory to China's national interests."[49] Yet with the regularity of regime change, there has been a gradual reassessment of how China maintains its interests abroad, with Chinese government entities and firms now maintaining contact with both the ruling parties and the opposition parties of these countries.[50]

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[46] "*Raner, shi ge liang nian, dang shi guo bu jin meiyou shixian qi yuxiang de zhenzhi wending yu qiangda, jingji fazhan yu fanrong, shehui xianghe yu kaming, faner…ge zhong maodun de chongtu jiang gai diqu xingshi dai ru daole renhe ren shixian dou weiceng yuliao dao de dongdang hunluan jingdi…*" Yu Ping, "Alabo xuezhe dui 'Alabozhichun' de kanfa (Arab Scholar's Views on 'Arab Spring')," *Contemporary World* (2013): 48.

[47] "*Xianru fubai he neidou de chouwen zhi zhong*" Zhang Hong, "Wukelan weiji zhong de jiazhi chongtu (Clash of Values Perked up in Crisis-plagued Ukraine)," *Peace and Development* 4 (2015).

[48] "*Zhengzhi jushi chixu dongdang*" in relation to the attempted case of regime change in Syria. Wu Ningbo, "Lun 'baohu de zeren' de guojifa kunjing yu chulu (On the Dilemma and Outlet of the International Law of the 'Responsibility to Protect')," *Administration and Law* (2015). See also, Liu Baolai, "2012 nian de zhongdong: liluanfenfen wei jian tian (The Middle East in 2012: Endless Chaos)," *World Affairs*, no. 1 (2013); Liu, 2012.

[49] "*Cong zishen liyi lai jiang, Zhongguo xuyao Zhongdong de nengyuan, xuyao Zhongdong de qinggongye shichang, xuyao laowu shuchu shichang, erqieyou keneng Zhongdong shi Zhongguo de gao jianduanchanpin de shichang, biru daxing jixie shebei, feji, jian chuan deng deng, ruguo zhege di qu xianru zhanluan de hua, bu fuhe Zhongguo de liyi*" Huang Jie, "Zhongdong luanju heshiliao – fang zhuming Zhongdong wenti zhuanjia Yin Gang jiaoshou (When will the Chaos in the Middle East End - an Interview with Professor Yin Gang, and Expert in the Middle East)," *Weishi*, June 15 2013.

[50] Miwa Hirono, "China's Proactive Diplomacy in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the Principle of Non-Interference" (paper presented at the China and the Challenges in Greater Middle East, Copenhagen, November

A fourth theme in the Chinese discourse identifies that regime change does not occur just between individual enforcing states and those that are targeted for regime change, but stretch into the role of the United Nations in authorizing and executing regime change. Chinese-language sources reveal two strands of thought upon this theme. First, that the use of the United Nations as a venue to execute regime change is an abuse of the UN system built upon foundational principles like respect for state sovereignty.[51] Authors remain skeptical of attempts to use 'humanitarianism' as the excuse for regime change.[52] Using the excuse of UN authority for regime change is unacceptable to China.[53] A second theme reflects deeper anxieties with suspicions that the UN Security Council itself is focused on *purposefully inducing regime change* (i.e. that regime change occurs not because of an abuse or reinterpretation of a resolution — but was the actual goal of the UN Security Council).[54] Chinese-language sources argue that China must hold a firm line to prevent a trend of UN Security Council-authorized regime change.[55]

One last important theme of concern is whether such regime change policies will set precedent to challenge the core interest of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over China. Challenges to CCP control are conceived of in two ways: that examples of regime change can embolden internal challenges to state authority or that China itself will be targeted by powerful states as a regime change candidate. For example,

> For China, Ukraine political upheavals and political games between Russia and US (Europe) in Ukraine have in fact touched China's core interests… that is… their spillover effect on China's national security… risks of separatism have long existed for China.[56]

10, 2015); Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Hang Zhou, "Projecting China's Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference," (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014). Liu Hongming and Liu Shuguang, "Dui Fei touzi de zhengzhi fengxia: xin dongxiang yu yindui jianyi (Political Risks of Investment to Africa: New changes and Suggestions on How to Respond)," *Transnational Business* (2012).

[51] For example, see Qian Wenrong, "The Impact of Neo-interventionism on the International Order," *Peace and Development* 1 (2013).

[52] For example, see Wang Yusheng, "Zhongguo waijiao de bianyu bubian (The Changes and Consistencies of China's Diplomacy)," *Jiefang ribao*, October 29, 2012; Xingtang Wu, "Guoji xinshi dongdang duobianxia, Zhongguo waijiao ying jianchi 'sanbu' yuanze (With the Turbulence of the International Situation, China's Diplomacy Should Insist on the 'Three NOs' Principles')," *Dangdai shijie (The Contemporary World)*, no. 4 (2012). And see also online commentary like, Lin Bo, "Xifang 'xin ganshe zhuyi' weihai wuqiong (The 'Western Neo-interventionism' is Hazardous)," *CRI online*, February 21, 2012, http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/02/21/5951s3566144.htm.

[53] For example, see Huang, 2013.

[54] For example, see Wu, 2015.

[55] See Huang, 2013. Qu Xing, "Lianheguo xianzhang, baohu de zeren yu xuliya wenti (The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Issue)," *International Studies* 12, no. 2 (2012); Yan Xuetong, "Zhongguo foujue Xuliya jueyian de libi (The Pros and Cons of China's Veto on Syria)," sohu.com, February 8, 2012, http://yanxuetongvip.blog.sohu.com/203112403.html (accessed February 22, 2017).

[56] "*Dui Zhongguo eryan, Wukelan bianju ji E Mei (Ou) zai Wukelan de boyi, qishi yijing chuji dao le Zhongguo de hexin liyi…zhe jiushi…dui Zhongguo guojia anquan de waiyi xiaoying, qi yingxiang burongxiaoqu, zhide jingti.*" Zhu Lumin, "Wukelan bianju dui Zhongguo guojia liyi de yingxiang (Impact of Ukraine's Political Upheaval on China's National Interests)," *Pacific Journal* 22, no. 7 (2014): 34.

Authors list Taiwan, Xinjiang, the Diaoyu Islands, South China Seas and Sino-Indian territorial disputes are also sites where secessionists could be emboldened to achieve their own interests at the expense of China's state stability. On the latter theme, Chinese analysts argue that "if a ruler leaves office … because of external power, the order of this world is lost. Once the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs is broken through, you can randomly exert intervention to any country that you do not like"[57] — and that states like China, which challenges Western liberalism, can become a target itself. These writings reflect a central theme that even incidences of regime change that appear geographically remote to China *are* a threat to China's core interests.

Implications

There are three implications that follow the exploration of regime change and intervention in Chinese foreign policy at the United Nations. Cases for intervention that are perceived to have the potential to cross-over into regime change may very well prove to be the most difficult to address at the UN Security Council, given China's wariness about regime change. Such a condition may hold even if those cases, on face value, only request relatively minimal non-militarised interventions (e.g. discursive pressures, like press statements or presidential statements). In contrast, concurrent cases of intervention that are not perceived to lead to the potential for regime change appear to present China with less concerns. The question then is what creates the perception that regime change is a potential and acceptable outcome for an intervention? Plausibility probes indicate that this might be related to whether there is a concurrent general public discourse regarding the crisis and regime change, and whether there is elite discussion framing regime change as a potential solution to the crisis.

Two cases that followed the Libya intervention can be used to illustrate these points. I use the immediate post-Libya timeframe as this is arguably a period when Chinese officials would be most sensitized to regime change possibilities via intervention. For example, the Côte d'Ivoire case moved through the UN Security Council with relatively little protest from Chinese officials, despite the UN using increased force to effectively enforce a transfer of power to the elected head of state following escalating post-election violence. [58] The unanimous endorsement of Resolution

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[57] "*Dan ruguo yige tongzhi zhe de xiatai, hushi you benguo renmin de liliang qu tuidong, ershi jiezhu waili, zhege shijie zhixu jiu luan le. Bu ganshe neizheng zhege yuanze yidan bei tupo, ni jiu keyi suyi tiao shijie shang kan bu shunyan de guojia shishi waibu ganshe.*" Huang 2013.

[58] ECOWAS, the AU, the European Union, the *Organisation international de la Francophonie*, and the Carter Center electoral observers declared the opponent candidate Alassane Ouattara the winner. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General Choi also certified the outcome of the Independent Electoral Commission after a short delay. Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council followed suit, declaring Ouattara the winner. United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Press Statement on Côte d'Ivoire (SC/10105-AFR/2079)," news release, December 8, 2010, https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc10105.doc.htm. For a discussion, see Fabienne Hara and Gilles Yabi, "Responding to the Conflict in C'ôte d'Ivoire: An Exploration of the Roles of ECOWAS, African Union and UN and their Interactions," in *Responding to Conflict in Africa: The United*

1967 called for the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to receive an additional 2000 peacekeepers with special military and police capabilities and the transfer of three attack helicopters. The UN Security Council also took the unprecedented move of authorizing UNOCI to use all means necessary to protect civilians, but without the requisite language that emphasized the sovereignty of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire.[59] UN helicopters fired on government military installations[60] and the presidential palace,[61] and the more robust mandate was undoubtedly key to installing the newly elected regime.[62]

Despite its much more robust mandate, the C'ôte d'Ivoire discussions for intervention occurred without an external discussion of regime change. Graph 3 illustrates literally a handful of articles that were of interest during the time period of intervention — and most of these articles list the C'ôte d'Ivoire case as an incident of unrest against other cases of regime change.

Graph 3: Combined ProQuest news sources of two separate searches: 'Côte d'Ivoire' and 'regime change' within five words, 2011 – 2016 and 'Ivory Coast' and 'regime change' within five words, 2011 – 2016.

Nations and Regional Organizations, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Also, Alexandra Novosseloff, "United Nations Operation in C'ôte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Joachim A. Koops, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015).

[59] Walter Lotze, "A Tale of Two Councils – The African Union, the United Nations and the Protection of Civilians in Côte d'Ivoir," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 3, no. 3 (2011): 368.

[60] Adam Nossiter, "Strikes by U.N. and France Corner Leader of Ivory Coast," *The New York Times*, April 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html; Mark John and Ange Aboa, "Battle rages in Ivory Coast, UN fires on Gbagbo bases," *Reuters*, April 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/ivorycoast-idAFLDE7331FN20110405.

[61] Aislinn Laing, "Ivory Coast: UN and French helicopter gunships attack Laurent Gbagbo residence," *The Telegraph*, April 10, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/cotedivoire/8441674/Ivory-Coast-UN-and-French-helicopter-gunships-attack-Laurent-Gbagbo-residence.html.

[62] Marco Chown Oved, "In Côte d'Ivoire, a Model of Successful Intervention," *The Atlantic*, June 9, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/in-c-te-divoire-a-model-of-successful-intervention/240164/.

There was sparse elite discourse that identified C'ôte d'Ivoire as a target site for regime change. The robust intervention in C'ôte d'Ivoire was instead framed as a technical solution for the post-election violence and an extension of the existing UNOCI mandate.[63]

In contrast, the possibility for intervention into Syria has faced much more opposition from China. For the state with the lowest number of vetoes at the UN Security Council — casting an average of a handful a decade — China has cast an unprecedented number of vetoes in the Syria case alone. In so doing, China has not only shielded the Assad regime from UN Security Council action, but spent these vetoes over more innocuous potential interventions involving threatened sanctions, verbal censure, or requests to meet a peace plan agreement, for example.[64] In explanations for its votes, China has been clear that preventing regime change was key for Beijing.[65] For example, China's Ambassador to the United Nations Li Baodong stated that China "firmly oppose the use of force to resolve the Syrian issues, as well as practices, such as forcibly pushing for regime change, that violate the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the basic norms that govern international relations."[66] Evidently, the perception of regime change as a possibility for the Syrian government may very well have shaded China's decision on how to respond to the crisis.

Discussions for intervention in Syria took place against calls for Syrian regime change, potentially heightening China's concerns that the UN Security Council could be used to instigate regime change. Graph 4 illustrates that the public discourse on Syria and regime change as reported in news sources picked up as the crisis began, peaking as the UN Security Council discussed opportunities to act.

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[63] For example, see ibid.

[64] for example, United Nations Security Council, "France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution (S/2011/612), October 4," (2011); "Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution (S/2012/77), February 4," (2012); "France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution (S/2012/538), July 19," (2012); "Draft Resolution (S/2014/348), May 22," (2014); "Egypt, New Zealand and Spain: draft resolution (S/2016/1026), December 5," (2016); "Draft Resolution (S/2017/172), February 28," (2017).

[65] Fung, "Separating Intervention From Regime Change," forthcoming.

[66] Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, "Statement by Ambassador Li Baodong, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria," January 31, 2012, http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t930411.htm.. For similar comments see, United Nations Security Council, "6826th meeting (S/PV.6826), August 30," 2012.

Graph 4: ProQuest news sources search of 'Syria' and 'regime change' within five words, 2011 - 2016[67]

Elite discourse from states that typically spearhead calls for intervention at the UN Security Council — France, the United Kingdom and the United States — show active discussion and advocacy for Assad's departure within months of Syria entering the UN Security Council agenda.[68] These three states made a coordinated statement that President Assad must step aside,[69] and through 2012, they emphasized 'all options' were available to remove Assad from power.[70] The discourse from the think tank and advocacy groups viewed Syrian regime change as practically

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[67] The original source of this graph is from Fung, "Separating Intervention From Regime Change," forthcoming.

[68] France Diplomatie, "Entretien du Président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy, avec L'hebdomadaire "L'Express" (Interview of President Nicolas Sarkozy with L'Express)," (2011). Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa," (2011). Foreign & Commonwealth Office and William Hague, "Syria: Foreign Secretary comments on situation in Hama," GOV.UK, July 5, 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/syria-foreign-secretary-comments-on-situation-in-hama.

[69] See Macon Phillips, "President Obama: 'The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way'," The White House, August 18, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad; Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, "Assad must go, Obama says," *The Washington Post*, August 18, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go-obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html. See also France in the United Kingdom, "Syria – Joint statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, and David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," August 18, 2011, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/French-British-and-German-leaders.

[70] Foreign & Commonwealth Office and William Hague, "Foreign Secretary statement to Parliament on the crisis in Syria," GOV.UK, June 11, 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-the-crisis-in-syria. France Diplomatie, "Entretien du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Laurent Fabius, avec 'France Inter': Extraits, Paris, 29 août 2012 (Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius' Interview with France Inter)," (2012); John Kerry, "Remarks With French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and U.K. Foreign Secretary William Hague," U.S. Department of State, September 16, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214266.htm..

inevitable.[71] Syria was seen as "the third Arab country [the Obama] administration has targeted for regime change this year,"[72] and that "[many] governments … believe [intervention in Syria] is an excuse for regime change. After all, Britain has called for regime change in Syria before, it funds the Syrian opposition, and has stretched the meaning of previous UN resolutions to justify regime changes in Iraq and Libya."[73] Experts emphasized the means available to achieve such an outcome.[74] These data points illustrate that throughout the crisis, decisions at the UN Security Council were taken against a public discourse on Syrian regime change. This background fine-tuned concerns that UN Security Council led intervention could mean regime change, as had been the case in Libya.

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[71] Elliott Abrams, "America Watches As Syria Crumbles," *National Review*, July 18, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/309916/america-watches-syria-crumbles-elliott-abrams; See also Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh, "Getting Serious in Syria," The Brookings Institution, July 29, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/getting-serious-in-syria/; Tamara Cofman Wittes et al., "Syria, the U.S., and Arming the Rebels: Assad's Use of Chemical Weapons and Obama's Red Line," June 14, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/14-syria-us-arming-rebels-assad-use-chemical-weapons-and-obamas-red-line; Michael Doran, "5 truths about Syria," Politico, September 3, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/opinion-michael-doran-5-truth-syria-096178; David Roberts and Michael Stephens, "Bloody days ahead as the Assad regime is decapitated," RUSI, July 19, 2012, https://rusi.org/commentary/bloody-days-ahead-assad-regime-decapitated. Daniel L. Byman, "Finish Him: Why the World Needs to Take Out Bashar al-Assad Now," The Brookings Institution, February 2, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/02/02-syria-assad-byman.

[72] Robert M. Danin, "Calling for Regime Change in Syria," Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/syria/calling-regime-change-syria/p25677.

[73] Jane Kinninmont, "Syria: UK Must Focus on Diplomacy," Chatham House, September 1, 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/194051.

[74] For example, emphasizing support for domestic groups to unseat Assad: International Crisis Group, "Syria's Mutating Conflict," (Damascus/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012). See also Andrew Quinn, "With focus on opposition, U.S. races against time on Syria," *Reuters*, December 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-usa-idUSBRE8B51K320121206; Jon B. Alterman, "A Tale of Two Crises," (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). Emphasizing legal tools to unseat Assad: Arbour, 2012; Clark A. Murdock, "What Has Syria Taught Us about the Right Time to Use Force?," in *2014 Global Forecast: U.S. Security Policy at a Crossroads*, ed. Craig Cohen, Kathleen Hicks, and Josiane Gabel (Washington, DC; Lanham: Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013); Steven A. Cook, "It's Time to Think Seriously About Intervening in Syria," *The Atlantic*, January 17, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/its-time-to-think-seriously-about-intervening-in-syria/251468/?single_page=true; Robert M. Danin, "Danin: How to help Syria without intervening militarily," *CNN*, January 22, 2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/22/danin-how-to-help-syria-without-intervening-militarily/; Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Sanctions Alone Won't Topple Syria's Assad: Meghan L. O'Sullivan," *Bloomberg*, February 22, 2012, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-02-23/sanctions-alone-won-t-topple-syria-s-assad-meghan-l-o-sullivan; Michael Stephens, "Arguments for Military Intervention in Syria," RUSI, February 8, 2012, https://rusi.org/commentary/arguments-military-intervention-syria; Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Four Military Options in Syria," The Brookings Institution, August 30, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/08/30-syria-ohanlon (accessed October 19, 2016); Ed Husain, "We Intervene in Syria at Our Peril," *The Atlantic*, February 1, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/we-intervene-in-syria-at-our-peril/252335/; James Phillips, "Preparing for a Post-Assad Syria," The Heritage Foundation, January 19, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/us-policy-for-a-post-assad-syria.

A second issue the predicament of open-ended, ambiguous goals and end-states in the context of the use of military force to implement mandates. Many UN mandates involve ill-defined goals — peaceful democratic transitions, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups — that are open-ended, context-specific goals for actors to achieve. However, these aforementioned goals are unlikely to involve the potential for the use of force beyond a smaller deterrent option. In contrast, efforts like imposing a no-fly zone and implementing civilian protection presents two issues for regime-change-hesitant states like China: executing these mandates can open the possibility of the use of force as compellence or more, with the potential for a greater array of military tools and escalation of violence — and these measures can mean targeting the state itself. In so doing, there is a grey space where implementing the mandate can segue into measures involving decapitating the state. For example, what does implementing a no-fly zone actually look like in practice? Should implementation be focused on removing aircraft in the skies, or reducing support capabilities across a variety of aircraft-related functions including airstrips, defense installations, and military materiel convoys? These are not just academic debate, but issues that shadow UN Security Council debates about intervention, exposing underlying concerns about regime change.

For example, as the Libya crisis unfolded, the United States joined France and the United Kingdom in support for a no-fly zone against Gaddafi in mid-March 2011.[75] This led to the push for the UN Security Council to authorize Resolution 1973 to implement a no-fly zone "in order to help protect civilians"[76] and take "all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack."[77] However, Resolution 1973 crystalised these grey area implementation problems, passing with abstentions from Brazil, China, India, Germany and Russia — all five states pushing that practical answers about the enforcement of the no-fly zone and protection of civilians mandate had been left unanswered. More importantly, however, for considerations here, interviews reveal that the no-fly zone dominated Chinese officials concerns regarding Resolution 1973.[78]

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[75] For analysis of changes in US policy, see Mark Landler and Dan Bilefsky, "Specter of Rebel Rout Helps Shift U.S. Policy on Libya," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/world/africa/17diplomacy.html; Jo Becker and Scott Shane, "Hillary Clinton, 'Smart Power' and a Dictator's Fall," *The New York Times*, February 27, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html?_r=0; Michael Hastings, "Inside Obama's War Room," *Rolling Stone*, October 13, 2011, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-obamas-war-room-20111013; Colum Lynch, "Amb. Rice: Leading from behind? That's 'whacked.'," *Foreign Policy*, October 31, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/31/amb-rice-leading-from-behind-thats-whacked/. Josh Rogin, "How Obama turned on a dime toward war," *Foreign Policy*, March 18, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/18/how-obama-turned-on-a-dime-toward-war/.

[76] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1973 (2011): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 17 March 2011 (S/RES/1973)," (2011).

[77] Ibid.

[78] Interview with official from the PRC Mission to the UN, New York, 11 June 2013. Interview with official from the PRC Mission to the UN, New York, 6 June 2016. Interview with official from the PRC Embassy to Washington, Washington, DC, 2 June 2016.

Chinese concerns about the Resolution 1973 mandate were driven in part by the US position that a no-fly zone itself would be "too little, too late,"[79] as Gaddafi reported he was within striking distance of killing rebels in their Benghazi stronghold.[80] As US Ambassador to the UN Susan E. Rice explained, "we'd be flying around up in the sky with a great investment of political capital and military assets with zero ability to affect what was going on the ground, which is where the slaughter was taking place."[81] Therefore, the United States led the push to "put teeth in this mandate,"[82] looking for "UN support for more than a no-fly zone."[83] What became known as the 'no-fly zone plus' emphasized three components: enforcing an arms embargo; imposing a no-fly zone, and the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. The United States pushed for airstrikes against ground, air and naval assets that threatened civilians, and expanded the legal authority to use force against Gaddafi's troops and military installations. The United States negotiated for an opening regarding arming rebels, using all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack "notwithstanding" the arms embargo language of Resolution 1970.[84]

NATO took over enforcement of the no-fly zone on 25 March 2011, with a full transfer of operational authority at the end of that month.[85] By the beginning of April 2011, the coalition had grounded the Libyan air force and degraded the command and control for these air systems, aiding rebel groups in establishing control over the east of the country. With the prevention of the imminent attack of Benghazi, the debate reopened about how to best interpret Resolution 1973. The confusion about political ends and their connection to the use of military means only increased. Criticisms continued about NATO's shifting objectives, and its simultaneously selective implementation and expansive reinterpretation of the mandate.[86] Chinese officials continued to emphasize that NATO had overstepped their UN Security Council mandate in their no-fly zone; calling for an immediate ceasefire and peaceful political settlement of by the relevant parties.[87]

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[79] Quoting US officials in Landler and Bilefsky, 2011.

[80] "Libya to stop fighting Sun. to let protesters surrender," *Al Arabiya News*, March 17, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/17/141889.html.

[81] Lynch, 2011.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Becker and Shane, 2016.

[84] Laura Trevelyan, "Libya: Coalition divided on arming rebels," *BBC News*, March 29, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12900706.

[85] For a detailed analysis of how NATO came to take on the execution of the Resolution 1973 mandate via Operation *Unified Protector*, see Hylke Dijkstra, *International Organizations and Military Affairs* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 157-77.

[86] Much of the criticisms revolved around whether NATO and other national forces were favouring rebels, and the interpretation of what efforts were permitted to support civilian protection "notwithstanding" the arms embargo of paragraph 9 in Resolution 1970. For a summary, see Micah Zenko, "Libya No-Fly-Zone Is Anything But," *The Atlantic*, July 19, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/libya-no-fly-zone-is-anything-but/242169/.

[87] Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on March 22, 2011," March 23, 2011, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t809578.htm (accessed July 19, 2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's

Presidents Obama and Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron published a joint op-ed article that called for Qaddafi's departure, though not by force.[88] These heads of state were clear that "so long as Qaddafi is in power NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds."[89] Therefore, NATO required Qaddafi to stop attacks on civilians, withdraw military forces and permit humanitarian access before NATO would withdraw its operations.[90] It it still not a matter of public record when the policy transitioned to one of forcibly removing Qaddafi,[91] but analysts assert that NATO took Qaddafi's ability to attack civilians as the opening to interpret the mandate as permitting regime change.[92] These practical problems of open-ended, ambiguous goals and end-states in the context of the use of military force to implement mandates are precisely highlighted here in the Libya case. Competing interpretations of the mandate intent and context on the ground only further compound this problem.

A third issue to consider is the 'Trojan horse' problem, where states are concerned that apparently legitimate requests for intervention are in fact efforts to push through regime change on the sly.[93] Though Libya is not the first case of such 'buyers remorse,'[94] analysts argue that regime change in Libya produced China's veto outcomes for Syria precisely because of this Trojan horse problem.[95] UN Security Council-authorized resolutions were used as stepping stones for foreign-imposed regime change and the removal of Gaddafi. Therefore, China refuses to endorse intervention into the Syria crisis out of concern of ulterior motives producing the same result. As one Chinese official noted: "regime change in Libya left [us] with this feeling that … we had been fooled."[96] Moreover, throughout the arc of this particular conflict, China's position has consistently been linked back to the Libya affair.[97] While this argument seems logical — two closely timed crises of the Arab Spring on the UN Security Council agenda must surely impact each other, the Trojan horse problem is worth some further consideration. As McMillan and Mickler point out, a more cynical problem exists:

Republic of China, 2011. See "Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Attends the UN Security Council Meeting on Libya," June 16, 2011, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t831724.htm.

[88] Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, "Libya's Pathway to Peace," *The New York Times*, April 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15iht-edlibya15.html?_r=0.

[89] Ibid.

[90] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Statement on Libya," April 14, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_72544.htm. See also Dijkstra, 2016, 157-77.

[91] Micah Zenko, "The Big Lie About the Libyan War," *Foreign Policy*, March 22, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/.

[92] Dijkstra, 2016, 163.

[93] McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 286.

[94] Alex J. Bellamy, "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq," *Ethics & International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005).

[95] For example, see Liu, 2012; Yun Sun, "Syria: What China Has Learned from its Libya Experience," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 152 (2012).

[96] Interview with official from the PRC Mission to the UN, New York, 11 June 2013.

[97] Libya is repeatedly used in the context of China's position on Syria. For example, see statement by Ambassador Li Baodong, see United Nations Security Council, "6531st meeting (S/PV.6531), May 10," (2011), 21.

> … the simple accusation, by critics, that would-be-interveners harbor intentions of regime change may now act as its own Trojan horse, gaining legitimate entry into debates about intervention but then serving to undermine claims for international engagement with contemporary conflicts and masking other ulterior motives served by non-intervention.[98]

In an awareness of being tarred with such 'ulterior motives' accusations, China has focused efforts on delegitimizing 'regime change' as a positive aspiration and foreign policy goal.[99]

Conclusion

I have argued here that China's misgivings about foreign-imposed regime change affects China's response to intervention at the UN Security Council. Regime change is explicitly focused on fundamental transformations of domestic institutions in the target state. Not only does regime change concern relinquishing control over territorial sovereignty (as in the case of intervention), but regime change goes to the heart of the matter of unseating and transforming governments. A key problem to address is the source of China's harsher stance against regime change. Evidence suggests that China's sensitivity to regime survival is assumed to translate into concerns about regime change elsewhere.[100] Understanding how to respond to China's suspicions and sensitivity regarding regime change is key for the United Nations to successfully address international peace and security.

If a goal remains to maintain China's steady trajectory of positive engagement with the intervention regime — including those actions that may move towards enforcement — it is key to not use UN Security Council-authorized intervention to deliver regime change. Such outcomes have only served to further concerns about the validity of complementary efforts regarding the responsibility to protect or the use of the International Criminal Court, let alone the role of the UN Security Council in regulating international peace and security writ large. Arguably the perception of such ulterior motives limit China's support for intervention. Such disquiet reflects China's concerns with the material basis for its role in international politics, but also its focus on the normative underpinnings of global governance. In China's view, regime change is not an activity that the UN Security Council should be endorsing, and as the Syria case illustrates, China

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[98] McMillan and Mickler, 2013, 286.

[99] Fung, "Separating Intervention From Regime Change," forthcoming.

[100] Ji You, "China's National Security Commission: theory, evolution and operations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 98 (2016): 181. A core interest for China remains securing "state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability…" Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's Peaceful Development," The State Council of the People's Republic of China, September 6, 2011, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm (accessed February 23, 2017).

has repeatedly shown its willingness to contest the definitions of an 'appropriate' intervention in the international peace and security order.[101] Whether such a clear delineation of intervention from regime change is politically feasible and practical to maintain once an intervention has begun is a related matter to consider. ∎

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[101] By 'order,' I mean the norms and institutions that reflect the interests of the dominant state in the system, the United States. For a discussion of the term, see Naazneen Barma et al., "A World Without the West? Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Implications," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2, no. 4 (2009): 527. However, to assume a single order is problematic, and as Johnston asserts "there are likely to be different, even contradictory, "issue specific orders" operating at the same time, in the same geographical spaces, and involving the same states." Alastair Iain Johnston, "China and International Order: Which Order?" [unpublished paper], January, 2017, 9. For a view of multiple international orders, see Randall L. Schweller, "The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001).

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