

Speech Transcript

Date: December 15, 2010
Venue: Yeong Bin Gwan,
Hotel Shilla, Seoul

Opening Session

Keynote Speech
RADM Phil Wisecup

Session I

Presenters
Victor Cha
Kang Choi
Evans Revere

Session II

Presenters
Patrick Cronin
Beomchul Shin

Session III

Presenters
Abraham Denmark
Du Hyeogn Cha
Markus Garlauskas

Dinner Speech
General Walter L. Sharp

The EAI has been hosting the ROK-U.S. Alliance conference since 2008 to build a dialogue on the major issues facing the alliance in the 21st century.

The East Asia Institute
909 Sampoong B/D
310-68 Euljiro 4-ga
Jung-gu
Seoul 100-786
Republic of Korea

© EAI 2011

www.eai.or.kr

ROK-U.S. Alliance: Planning for the Future

February 9, 2011

Opening Session

Keynote Speech

RADM Phil Wisecup, President of Naval War College

Good Morning. Madam President Lee, Mr. Chairman Lee of the East Asia Institute, Mayor Kim from Pyeongtaek, and other distinguished participants, thank you so much for inviting us to speak here at this conference. I will give some personal remarks today. And for me this is a return. It is a homecoming. I lived here in Seoul for 2 years from 2005 to 2007. I returned with USS Ronald Reagan to Shinsundae in Busan in 2008.

And today I am here. I am President of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island which is celebrating its 125th year. I am a kid from small town in Ohio, and yet, my family is connected with Korea. My parents married while my father was in the Army and because I will be 57 years old, today you can guess that while my dad was serving in the Army during the Korean War, in Washington D.C., they met and married, and I was born. My family lived here with me in Seoul. My wife and 5 children lived in Yongsan. And we had very good memories of that. I am an operator. And what that means is that I take ships to sea. And I have been doing that now for 33 years. As Naval War College's President, we are actually studying the Korean War this week in Newport, Rhode Island. The previous President before

me also served in Korea. So for the last 6 years, the President of the Naval War College has personal firsthand experience living here, in your country. We are no strangers to this area, nor is the 7th fleet.

It is tough place to operate. And this is what I can tell you. As I flew into Incheon Airport yesterday, I could see the ocean. I was reminded of the history. I was reminded of the difficult conditions. The tides, the currents, the shower water, the fog, the wind, the cold, we know about this. We practice. We practiced with ROK Navy. I have a friend in ROK Navy. In fact, ROK naval officers have been coming to Newport since the international program was founded in 1956. Do the math. That is a lot of Korean naval officials who have studied at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. My Navy friends reminded me last night what this means. This is *In-Yoen*. This is relationships. It is not only in intellectual. It's in our heart. That is my lesson from living in your country from 2005 to 2007 in Yongsan. Maritime partnerships, like the U.S. Navy and the ROK Navy are forged over generations and it is now a part of our cooperative maritime strategy for the 21st century: our commitment to the combined defense, safety, and security so that the Korean people are iron-clad. For me, I am wearing this, listening to ROK Navy leaders. Working here, listening to people like General Baek Sun Yeop, who visited me in Busan onboard USS Ronald Reagan. He told me stories about dealing with the U.S. Navy. My Korean friends told me of their experiences in

the Korean War. All this touched me very deeply. In closing, I would like to offer a quote from our President, Abraham Lincoln, who also lived through difficult times. Lincoln said “the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present.” The occasion is piled high with difficulties, and we must rise to the occasion. As our cases are new, so must we think new and act new. That is what we tried to teach our students at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. We tried to teach them how to think, how to ask questions, and how to look at historical case studies, just like the one here in Korea. I would like to thank the conference organizers for inviting me here, and thank you all for attending this very interesting conference with our distinguished panelists. Thank you very much.

Session I: The Changing Strategic Environment and its Implications for the Alliance

“The Rise of China”

Victor Cha, Professor of Georgetown University

Thank you very much Chairman Lee. Thank you to EAI and to CNAS for hosting very important conference. Mayor Kim of Pyeongtaek, it is a pleasure to be here with you today. Chairman Lee Hong-Koo is not only a colleague I respect dearly but also a good family friend. It is a pleasure to see you here too. And I want to say I am also particularly happy to be here in Seoul with Admiral Wisecup who has very distinguished career in the United States Navy, but what many people do not know is that he was also a Director of the White House situation room which is, may be next to the President, the most important job at the White House because when things are going well or in the crisis he has to make sure everything runs as he should. And the most importantly, for the rest of the White House staff, he had to make sure the president was happy and he did make sure that president was happy because if the president wasn't happy he will take it out on the staff. So we are really grateful to Admiral Wisecup for what he did there as well.

My topic today is on the rise of China, which is something I am happy to talk about because I am kind of tired of talking about North Korea. I was asked to do this as the first speaker to paint a wider picture or scene of how we think about the rise of China. I will try to do that in short time that I have been given. When I teach International Relations at Georgetown, in the first class the very first question I ask to students is, “What is the single most important unanswered question in international relations today?” Students raise their hand and they say the war on terrorism, finding Osama bin Laden, the Middle-East peace process. And I talk to them what I think is the most important unanswered question in international relations today is how the international systems going to deal with the rise of China. Because the answer to that question will affect the way we study International Relations from now on. In thinking about this, how the international system deals with the rise of China, there are three schools of thought in terms of how one can think about this. The first is, from an international relations perspective, one might call an offensive realist perspective. Essential idea here is that in an offensive realistic world, states as they seek more power, as they seek more capabilities, they do not always seek these capabilities to survive but they also seek a desire to change the external environment in which they live. So all nation-states are security seeking states, and all of them are concerned about taking care of themselves. From an offensive realistic perspective, as states grow in power they not only seek their own security but they also seek to try to affect or change international systems in which they live—to try to change it to seek their needs—because this is the most effective way of trying to maintain one's security. So if you take this offensive realist view of China's rise, what you see is more masculine China, in terms of its foreign policy; you see China that, as it rises, wants to redefine the rules of the international system, wants to create its own rules and own institutions by which to govern the international system. And this perspective naturally means there would probably be some sort of clash of interests at least, at the minimum, between the rising power and the lead power in the system like between China and the United States. For offensive realist, this is almost a law-like attribute of the

international relations. As countries grow in power they seek to control their environment. Particularly, as these countries grow in power as they grow in economic capabilities they will eventually seek to dominate the system. Offensive realists would point to the countries throughout history that have done this: Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and the United States. All these countries as they grew in their capabilities sought to change the external environment in ways that suited their interests.

Second way to look at the rise of China is what we call in international relations, a defensive realist perspective. Defensive realism essentially says that states all seek power to survive, but overall rising powers and tensions may not necessarily be revisionists. They may not seek to completely overturn the system. They would seek to grow in power, but largely remain pretty much '*status quo*' that their ambitions overall are limited. Their ambitions are not to overtake or undercut the existing system but to change it in ways that are limited in scope enough to be secure but not in a way that overextends. That would be from the defensive realist perspective. From this view, the rise of China will be something that will be somewhat limited in scope. China would largely be confined to secure its interest within its immediate geographical area, the things that it cares most about: Taiwan, Tibet, and to degree, out to the South China Sea. Essentially, the rise of China would mean will be a some sort of accommodation, on the one hand involving the United States, Japan, Australia, and the continental accommodation on the other, largely centered around China. This does not necessarily mean that there will be conflict between the lead power in the system and the rising power.

The third view, in terms of thinking about how China's rise affects international relations, (and I apologize for the jargon) is from a neo-liberal institutionalists' perspective. In the basic idea here is that changes in the distribution of power in the international system that are created by rising states, they can create conflict and instability but the potential for conflict and instability can be kneeled by and can be lowered by embedding the rising power in the current norms and rules of the international system. Such

that the rising power feels that it wants to be a part of current system rather than seeking to overturn that system. From this view the rise of China is not necessarily a zero-sum game. As China grows in power it will try to play by, and contribute to, the international system. It will become a part of all of the international institutions that govern the globe and they will become a contributing member—one that becomes the rule abider and sees abiding by these rules as being in its interests. In international relations, this particular view is associated with scholars like John Ikenberry at Princeton and some others.

The first conceptual point I want to make here is that how the rise of China turns out will greatly determine how we study international relations from this day forward. If China ends up rising and becoming a part of the international system playing by its rules, becoming a contributing member, then the way we study and teach international relations—whether it is at Georgetown or Naval War College, or whatever it is—will be talking about how liberal institutionalism really is sort of our framework for understanding international relations. On the other hand, if the rise of China leads to conflict or China seeks to overturn this system, and seeks to undercut the system that has been created since World War II, then offensive realism will be the way we understand and teach international relations. So there is a tremendous amount of writing on the questions of China's rise and how it affects the way we study and think about international relations. That is the first conceptual point.

Second point is on policy. I hate that the clearest statement from policies perspective from the United States about how to think about the rise of China is essentially an idea that has been associated with the former deputy of secretary of state and our president for World Bank, Robert Zoellick, when he talked about this concept of China becoming a responsible stake holder. And the idea was essentially that liberal, institutionalist argument. That is, as China rises in power, it needs to contribute more to the public goods of the international system. What I mean by public goods are things like counter-proliferation, climate change, freedom of navigation, the host of things that are all seen to be important in the international system. Things to me

are the clearest statement of the U.S. grand strategy with regard to China for quite some time. Through and during the Bush administration, the previous administration, it did lead to some good cooperation between the United States and China on a number of issues. I think the Obama administration really try to push this concept of “strategic stakeholder” to the next level. I think that China needs to become a responsible stakeholder with the emphasis on the verb, “needs.” And I think for the Obama administration, the change was that they really pushed China. They did not say that China needs to become responsible stakeholder; they said that the China was now a responsible stakeholder. And it has to play a role whether it is Copenhagen, Iran, North Korea, these sorts of things. This led many media to talk about so-called G2, a group of 2 of the United States and China, basically deciding a lot about the global agenda. I think what we have found thus far is that China is not ready to play that role. China may need to or as a future aspirational point may want to become a responsible stakeholder but it is not ready to play that role now. Its behavior recently has largely been quite parochial and it has not been public goods-oriented, public goods provision-oriented. Any contributions that China has made to public goods, whether this is signing on to counter-proliferation sanction against Iran or making small appreciation in their currency, things have largely been tactical moves. They have not represented a genuine understanding of China’s desire to be a responsible stakeholder. So the result is that there’s currently a great deal of disillusionment with China in the international system. Unlike many other administrations, the Obama administration has already, in two and an half years or two years, come a long way in its views on China. Arguably almost any other past U.S. administration has followed certain pattern in terms of China relations: which is they start out very tough on China and then over the course of four years they end up with a much more pragmatically-oriented policy of cooperation with China. You can certainly say that about George Bush administration and George H.W. Bush administration and the Clinton administration. But the Obama administration started out in almost complete mirror image. They start it out very willing to engage with China to see it in a G2 context, and

in after their first year they were quite disappointed with results. And now it had moved much more to policy that is more normal with China. That is, not of engagement that it is relationship in which there is competition, there are complaints, there are things that we want them to do that they want us to do. People now said relationship is bad, but I don’t think it is bad. It’s normal because it is sort of what we normally expect in the U.S.-China Relations.

One other point that I wanted to make on the U.S. views is all you know in the United States we just had mid-term elections. What was very interesting to observe in this election was that for the first time China is actually in issue in the election; it became an issue in the campaign. What is interesting here is that the American public views on China are very different from the sort of elite policy making views. As I just described, the elite policy making views now tell us to be a bit of disappointment with China that they have not been played a role that people hope they would play; in fact, they may not be ready to play that role. But the public view of China completely different. American public view of China, especially during the campaign was China that is rich, (which is completely wrong) and China that owns the United States because it owns so much of our debt. So there is a big gap in the way American public and the elite policy makers’ views on China these days.

Third point is that this evolutionary view on China is not just specific to the United States; it is also the case here in Korea. Condensing a lot of history, from the mid 1980s up until 1992, there is the rule you follow here in this country about improving ties with China. For historical reason, for a variety of other reasons, such that normalization has been in 1992, it was genuinely welcomed in this country. People really saw that as something that is quite important. Then for about 1992 to February 2010, there is still a great deal of interest in improving relations with China, but there is also a crimping realization that the more you interacted with China the more the difference in values became apparent: South Korea being open level democracy China being the country that it was. That action just not as fluent as everybody proves it might be. And we particularly saw this in the business sector, among small and medium size businesses, that rushed to China after

normalization then found a lot of difficulties in terms of doing businesses then came back to Korea after a bit of disillusionment. Now of course from March 2010 till today there has been a fundamental shift in the way Koreans view China. Largely it is result of the *Cheonan* and the Yeonpyeong artillery shelling, but for the first time across the spectrum in Korea not just conservatives but progressives as well, views of China change. There are concerns and there may be a fundamental conflict of interests between South Korea and China, when it comes to North Korea.

This is my final point which is why is China not being more helpful on North Korea, why is China supporting the North rather working with the other parties to reduce the potential for escalation or provocation. Here are essentially four hypotheses. One hypothesis is essentially that China is not working with us on North Korea because they don't want to. This will be a sort of the offensive realist view would be that China doesn't want to work with us on North Korea; they want to support the leadership transition in North Korea; they want to maintain close ties with whatever emerges in North Korea after Kim Jong-il because they want to maintain "the buffer state." They want to maintain this buffer in North Korea.

Second hypothesis is that China does not want to help us on North Korea because it sees the North Korean problem as a good way to distract preoccupied United States. It saps our attention, it forces us to focus on this rather than to focus on the rise of China, and therefore, it intentionally does not want this problem to be solved.

The third view for why the China does not support us on North Korea is that it is not so much that it doesn't want to, but that China is basically incapable of persuading or changing North Korean behavior, and that Chinese diplomacy is overrated that they actually do not have a good record of persuading countries to do things that they want them to do. Therefore, the problem is not that China intentionally does not help South Korea and the United States on North Korea. It is just incapable. It cannot do it.

Forth view is the one that I mean increasingly becoming more aligned with is that China does not support or help on North Korea not because it is incapable of doing

this but it is just afraid of doing this. That is, China has all the leverage and all the tools in terms of putting pressure on the North to denuclearize or to stop conventional provocations. But it is also afraid that if it uses that leverage, it could lead to some sort of collapse or unraveling of the system. And that China this is becoming even more of dilemma for China as it becomes sole patron to North Korea. Because as the sole patron to North Korea, anything that it does could potentially lead to a collapse of the regime, and the Chinese have known reliable metric for determining how much pressure is enough or how much pressure could lead to denuclearization versus how much pressure could lead to collapse.

"The Threat from the North"

Kang Choi, Professor of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security*

First of all, I would like to point out that it is a critical moment to hold a conference like this. Firstly, we need to reflect on how rightly we have perceived and evaluated the threats from the North. I think that we had biased estimation according to the ideological tendency of North Korea rather than based on scientific and objective view. Thus, after going through incidents like sinking of *Cheonan*, attacks on Yeonpyeong Island, or North Korea's exposure of its uranium enrichment facility, it is now necessary that we come up with more objective measures against the threats from the North. When measuring the threats, relatively conservative perspective is needed with our wishful thinking excluded. For instance, aside from simply measuring how many or what kinds of weapons North Korea might have, we need to analyze, by stretch of imagination, how North Korea will politically and militarily use its military force.

I would evaluate that the current situation has not been that improved compared to the past. In short, the threats from North Korea have been diversified and be-

* The following is the translated text from the original presented in Korean.

come more complex. In the past, North Korea was the one who used to mention the possibility of a total-war. However, during last 10 years, North Korea has only been interested in WMDs and nuclear weapons. North Korea has not highly evaluated on the conventional threats. There is even a part in “Perry Report” on the conventional threats: ‘North Korea does not have capability to provoke a total-war and there is remote possibility of provocation.’ Of course this came from the premise based on the fact that the ability of ROK-U.S. joint defensive system was capable enough to counter the North. However, both *Cheonan* Incident and attack on Yeonpyeong Island clearly proved that North Korea now can play with its military force in various ways and that we are very vulnerable to North Korea’s militarily challenge and threats.

North Korea, who used to have only one or two means of military attack, now has several diverse ones. In my opinion, North Korea will be able to maintain its current military power even if its economic power deteriorated, or will be so continuously. Therefore, under any circumstance, North Korea’s military force should not be underestimated, and any possibility needs very careful evaluation and analysis for counter-measures. I say, ‘Complexity of North Korean Threat or Multiplying North Korea Treat.’ In short, there are four challenges we are currently facing.

First threat is the treat coming from North Korea’s conventional military force. It is also possible that North Korea uses its conventional military power in a conventional way, but if it uses its conventional military forces in irregular non-conventional military way, that would create a very serious problem.

Second threat is continuous increase of its capability of mass destruction. On last November 12th, North Korea revealed its sophisticated uranium enrichment facility to Dr Hacker. I doubt if it is the only facility that North Korea has. It does not make any sense to exclude the possibility of North Korea having maybe additionally two or three more active facilities secretly hidden. If I were North Korea, I would re-ask myself what I would like to obtain by revealing this precious facility to the United States. I bet North Korea has already thought about it. “Yeah, this will be a ‘target’ in the future military situation.”

If so, would North Korea have only one ‘target’? If I were North Korea, I would definitely spread and keep the uranium facility in two or three different places. I assume the plutonium that North Korea has been enriching got to the ending point of the progress. It is highly possible that they have already reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods. We estimate 14,000 new spent fuel rods, but even if North Korea reprocessed that much, that would be it. Rather, North Korea is expected to reinforce its nuclear power by continuously operating uranium enrichment program. For North Korea, maintaining its nuclear power is the key way to secure its system.

The third threat we face is the possibility of North Korea’s insecure leadership issue raised since the end of 2008—following the news on Kim Jong-il’s bad health condition and on-going succession process. Of course there are many theories trying to explain whether the succession will proceed without trouble. However, this issue itself challenges us. I will give the details later in my presentation.

The fourth challenge is something that we might overlook. That is, a challenge against human security. There was a news story from *Chosun-Ilbo* that the one whole generation in the North stopped growing due to malnutrition. In other words, so many complex problems such as famine, health and environment exist in North Korea, and this greatly challenges us in building a new community in the region. By recognizing these four challenges, our counter-measures should be much more advanced and complex.

I would like to stress one more time the subject of doctrine. As to the conventional threat, as it was shown in the attack of Yeonpyeong Island, it is expected that North Korea will continue to develop its way to apply conventional threat in non-conventional way, such as using field guns and special operation forces. In this case, it is impossible to exclude any potential threat like terrorism. We need to seriously ponder on how to prevent and manage those kinds of threats in the future. It is not something that we can overcome in the short run. As our society gets informationalized and developed further, our vulnerability grows. Therefore, the way we can choose is either taking an offensive action or defensive action. In my personal view,

combination of both offensive and defensive postures should be pursued. In this current situation where we only emphasize on military factor, it is necessary to combine deterrence with non-military means in order to maximize its effectiveness. For example, expanding mutual understandings between Korea and China, or strengthening cooperation with China would be plausible options to consider.

Second, there are two kinds of threats in terms of North Korea's WMDs. One is the problem of using it and the other is that of proliferation. North Korea's uranium enrichment program brings up these two problems at the same time. The possibility of obtaining a considerable amount of uranium by continuing the enrichment will increase the probability and threats of proliferation. Discussion on how to jointly cope with this situation is as important as bringing this issue to the discussion table with the United States. North Korea has changed our original plans for the counter-measures and also altered the military reality on the Korean Peninsula. We should take enough time and efforts to look back and to come up with ideas to deal with North Korea in the future. Therefore, what we need to start from now on is to analyze how North Korea would use its asymmetric capability. I expect such concerns will be dealt with through Nonproliferation Policy Committee that is to be held starting from coming March. The most important capacity regarding this subject is that of intelligence, securing information and analyzing information. The readiness in our counter-measures will be consisted of humanware, software and hardware.

The third challenge is the succession issue in the North Korean leadership and its unstable system. In my personal opinion, under the current situation, it is unlikely to say that instability of North's system will escalate, but in the long run, there is high possibility. It is stable politically but potential instability factors in economy and society are increasing. However, I would assume that there is a group striving to maintain the current system since they realized the possibility of instability caused by changes in their current system to a new one. Therefore, if we provide 'alternative future' regarding North Korea and reinforce governmental inflow, the changes in North Korean system will

occur as well. But the problem that we face here is that whether we could manage and develop the process for these changes. Thus, it is natural to prepare the 'contingency' case that might happen during the process. Preparing for the contingency would minimize any negative effect that might arise. We might see several challenges if instability of North Korean system came up to the surface. There will be a problem more complex and delicate than war. If that happens, it will be hard for us to solve it by ourselves. We will need many discussions with related and neighboring states, and a clearly defined mutual goal. The most important thing is that we will get cooperation and support from the states through suggesting a suitable vision regarding final-stage. On that level, we need to consider the next step to our dream, the Korean reunification.

Lastly, it is inevitable to think of human security issues when we think of North Korea. It is hard to figure out what accurately current human security situation is like in the North. However, we know of its absolute shortage in food, messed up medical system, environmental destruction and loss of soil from pollution. As you know, its continuous flood and drought every year are one of the big challenges that we have to resolve in the process of reunification. Therefore, increasing our interest in North Korea's human security issues with brotherly affection will be expected.

In terms of policy alternatives, as to North Korea's relatively long-lived regime and no expectation of big changes in Seoul's North Korea policy, it is likely to say that we will gradually improve the situation we will face, and it should be based on a reliable joint-defense system and support from neighboring states. That is, for a while, an approach based on diplomacy is needed to limit North Korea's choice of policy and attempt changes in its regime. Especially, we need international cooperation and support, such as cooperation among South Korea, China and the United States, among South Korea, Japan and the United States, or 5-party-talks for creating mutual understandings. In terms of military, not only modernization of military, but review on what the basics of national defense are is required. In conclusion, utilizing the strategy that lets North Korea follow us, rather than taking actions to chase North Korea would be necessary.

“Going Global: The U.S.-ROK Alliance Beyond East Asia”

Evans Revere, Senior Director of the Albright Stonebridge Group

Thank you very much, President Lee. Let me begin by thanking EAI and thanking CNAS for making this event possible today and for their determination in hosting this forum at such a critical juncture in the history of Korea. Let me also thank Mayor Kim and good people of the Pyeongtaek for their support for this forum. It is an honor for me to participate in this discussion today. And it is real delight for me to be back in Seoul. I have many pleasant memories of my service here over the last 41 years on and off. It just occurred to me as I am coming into the room this is the 41st year that I have been working on in or around Korea. But the most of my fondest memories of that period over the time was that I have spent working on Korean affairs. I do indeed have many good friends and colleagues in the room and will take me the rest of the hour to recognize all of them. I would be remiss of my duties if I did not acknowledge the tremendous service of one good friend and statements by Minister Lee Hong-Koo's work earlier this morning who has probably done more for his country and more for this alliance than any other single person that I know.

The backdrop to today's discussions as has already been made clear is series of very disturbing events that have created and almost unprecedented sense of concern in Korea today. Those are the March 26th sinking of the *Cheonan* and the tragic and shocking loss of lives in that attack more recently, the attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Also resulted in loss of lives and also—not that anybody needs to be reminded of this—for the first time that artillery shells have fallen on Korean soil since the Korean War. As already been mentioned, the recent worrisome revelations about the North Korea's uranium-enrichment facilities in Yongbyon.

The revelations have confirmed many of the long standing suspicions that we have had about the fact that North Korea was indeed developing alternative path to nuclear weapon development. All of these things represented my view of very stark and sobering reminder

of the tremendous challenges facing this bilateral alliance today and of the critical importance and continuing importance of that alliance in dealing with the very real threats that we face today. So as we talk about new developments and new initiatives in this alliance partnership that we have here, I think it is important to keep on very simple but important thing clearly in mind. That is, the core threat that formed the foundation of this alliance relationship in middle of the previous century is very much with us today. And as a result, there is considerable work to be done in here and now to deal with a volatile, provocative and dangerous North Korea. And there is also much works to be done to provide for the continuing defense of the Republic of Korea.

In the light of all that, it seems to be me that the skeptics of the audience might question my purpose here for this segment. I am supposed to talk about the planning for the future. And skeptic might say should not you really be paying a lot of attention to about what is going on right now and what's going to be happen five or ten or twenty years now, because the enemy is literally at the gates. I acknowledge that point but let me deal with this possible skepticism that I had in the recent experience in Seoul at another conference, where just after the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, I was asked to talk about South Korea's soft power. It seemed more than a bit ironic at the time that I was being asked talk about South Korea's soft power, so soon after the demonstrations by North Korea of some of their hard power. But I made the point at this conference, just a couple of weeks ago, that the Republic of Korea's soft power—the widespread admiration and respect that South Korea has in the eyes of the international community, the attractiveness of its economic success, the fact of its amazingly successful democratic transitions, and the appeal of the its culture, all of those things—had played extremely important role in gaining Korea international support and sympathy after the *Cheonan* and Yeonpyeong attacks.

And accordingly, I also made the points that the efforts by the Republic of Korea to continue to amass and spoil up this soft power made eminently good sense even during these troubled times. But at the same time, I offered some additional words of advice. That is, the Republic of

Korea should keep its powder dry as it deals with the current challenge posed by the North. And just as Republic of Korea is capable of walking on two legs (soft power and hard power), I think all of us today don't need to be reminded of the fact this alliances also capable of dealing those with the approximate threat that it faces today. And at the same time, marshalling the energy and the vision needed to strengthen and deepen cooperation as we tried to take this bilateral partnership up to the next level.

That kind of forward looking thinking was at the core of the communicate, issued at the end of the June 2009 summit between President Obama and President Lee when they agreed on Joint Vision Statement for the future of the U.S. and ROK Alliance. That statement declared that our two countries are "building alliance to ensure a peaceful secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia Pacific region, and the world." And that ambitious vision was built on a foundation that was laid by President Lee and President Bush in their summit at Camp David in April of 2008. And both of these initiatives were extremely important steps forward in a bilateral relationship that has seen some difficult times over the years. I do not have to remind anybody in the audience that these steps forward in the relationship actually have their origins in some real concerns that existed not too long ago and not too distant past that there was some serious potential for drift in the U.S.-ROK alliance partnership.

There was a feeling as you would recall that the United States and ROK will not necessarily on the same page on some core issues and relationship that the disappearance of North Korea, the hope for disappearance of the North Korea as their threat in the future could also remove the glue that had held the alliance together for so long. Interest on the part of the both countries in reshaping the alliance was driven by a concern that the alliance's justification needed to be broadened, and that this justification need to go beyond just North Koreans threat if this important partnership was to survive into the future.

Obviously, that North Korean threat has not disappeared. In fact, as already been pointed out by the previous speakers, it has grown, and there is a little concern now that this important justification for the alliance is going to

disappear any time soon. In fact—as others in this conference have already discussed and we will be talking about some more in the next sessions—building a game plan and a strategy for dealing with the eventual demise of North Korea has become an important new task in bilateral alliance coordination, adding an important new dimension to alliance planning for the future.

Thanks to a lot of hard work on both sides and also thanks to political changes in both of our countries, our two governments are again on the same page on core alliance issues, including North Korea. And this has enabled leaders in both of our countries now to turn their attention to the positive alliance of that in further depth, and further breath and substance to this important partnership. And this important development has been driven in large part by the fact that Korea and many Koreans do believe that they have more to contribute to the alliance as an equal partner, not only in dealing with the peninsula matters or the regional security matters, but also globally. This laudable ambition is a reflection of the Republic of Korea's growing self-confidence, and that self-confidence has grown in direct proportion to Korea's economy success, the higher international profile Korea enjoys (thanks to its world-class industries and products), and its growing soft power.

Today, Korea has very strong and respected voice in the international community, and as we all know a Korean is Secretary General of the United Nations and that fact has help Koreans to raise their heads even higher in international community today, and to seek even other opportunities to demonstrate Korea's leadership in world affairs. There's perhaps no better examples of that than the superb stewardship shown by President Lee of Republic of Korea, as Korea hosted shared recent G20 meeting here in Seoul, where some of the most urgent economic challenges facing the international community today were on the agenda. And Korea is also very confidently pursuing new economic and trade partnership with key economies around the world including the EU and (I am delighted to say) with United States. I am very encouraged that the recent U.S.-ROK negotiation on the FTA and come to a conclusion that we will see a whole new dimension added to this new important bilateral relationship.

Korea's leadership, this kind of Korea's leadership, is also going to be an evidence in two years time as Korea hosts the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. Reflecting on all of these examples of South Korean leadership and energy and contribution, one of the points that I want to leave you with here today is that the Republic of Korea's significant soft power and its determination to play a leadership role in international welfares and wide respect and admiration that enjoys can and should serve as the bases for playing even greater international role in the future and that should include (in my view) a greater role in cooperation with the United States in the global arena.

We have seen in the past Korea contribute to efforts in Iraq and in Afghanistan and these are the examples of how the Korea's determination to contribute to resolving conflicts in distant region can add important dimension to U.S.-ROK bilateral cooperation. And we have seen Korea's contributions to relief operations in Haiti to anti-piracy efforts in Gulf of Aden and to the UN mission in Lebanon, and all of these things reflect and enhance interests in the part of Korea in making a real contribution to peace and stability in other parts of the globe.

These sorts of contributions if coordinated with the U.S. efforts in the months and years to come could serve as valuable force multiplier as we go forward in tackling these other challenges. The other areas that Korea can and should contribute to are that Korea has particular interests in efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology material and know-how. This has been major reason for Korea's active participation in the proliferation security initiative (PSI), and here too, Korea's effort could be married with those of United States in other key regions to deal with the ongoing threats that we see and the ongoing threats to the global nonproliferation regime that we see from the spread of WMD and related technology in systems.

In addition to non proliferation as you look down the areas of possible cooperation, it is easy to envision other areas where Korea and the United States could work together and marry our efforts and our energies and skills together in ways that are beneficial to the globe. Here I would include such things as search for energy security

and dealing with climate change. Another potentially fruitful area for cooperation will be to establish a bilateral coordination mechanism for respective official development assistant efforts in other parts of the world. In all of these areas and in more, that I do not have time to mention, created a bilateral cooperation with eased strain on our respected, limited government resources, and allow for rational division of labor between us. And it enabled each side to bring its unique strengths to pair on many of other issues. I have no doubt that American leaders would welcome efforts to create a broader and deeper alliance and relationship with more global scope.

But for my perspective, as I draw my remarks to conclusion here, a key question that remains in this regard is whether the Republic of Korea is ready to press ahead in this regard. Despite the evidence and enthusiasm of President Lee and his administration for more globalized alliance, it indeed remains to be seen of the Korean people will share this aspiration of their broader and deeper and more globalized alliance relationship. Politics in Korea are very complicated, and clear divisions remain on many issues today, including the nature and scope and future of U.S.-ROK Alliance despite the progress we have seen. In some quarters there are remains of suspicions about the U.S. intentions, the U.S. policies, particularly those that might bind Republic of Korea to political or diplomatic courses that some here might feel a bit uncomfortable with.

But I am nevertheless hopeful that the strong support shown by the United States for the Republic of Korea in these difficult times has eased, and maybe even has removed, some of these lingering suspicions about the U.S. motivations. Perhaps, the clear support shown by the United States for Korean allies have served as powerful reminder to our Korean friends that in your hour of difficulty Korea can always count on United States for support. And so looking to the future, political developments in Korea will ultimately determine whether and to what extent Korea wants more globalized partnership with the United States. If they do Koreans and their government are going to have to define those areas where they see themselves as particularly able to contribute, and Korea need to be ensure it develops the infrastructure, the software, the assets of capa-

bilities necessary to support its engagement in a broader and deeper and more globalized partnership. And if Korea does so, I am certain it is going to find the United States ally that is fully prepared to work even more closely with in building the more global partnerships that our leaders have held out as next logical and important step forward in this evolving and successful partnership. Let me end there. Thanks.

Session II: Non-Military Planning for DPRK Collapse

“Scenarios, Priorities, and Joint Planning”

Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor of the CNAS

Thank you very much. Good afternoon. Let me begin by expounding the point of view. That point of view is based on my many years in government service as well as an analyst. Let me say that despite the enormous hard work and intentions of senior officials in what is extraordinary healthy U.S.-ROK Alliance, if there were collapse in North Korea, we are woefully unprepared for that collapse.

Nobody can predict the future. Least of all experts, I mean that literally, if you familiar with the work of Professor Ted Lock, he has empirically proven, testing 82,000 expert predictions, that these experts were wrong more than 50 percent of the time. That is, if you flip a coin, you would be more often correct than an expert.

Military power and economy seem to be in many ways a mirror images of North Korea's system. North Korea now is losing its founding father, Kim Il-sung. It was facing dire economic ties not least because the patronage of two major powers of Russia and China is now on cash bases. They are not giving assistance. They are selling only. And the famine was an expression of the profound economic failure of North Korea. So it was not a surprise that our South Korean allies in the 90s told us again to expect the collapse of North Korea within the next 2 years. It was like predictions we hear today about when Iran will have a nuclear weapon. It is always about one or two years in the future.

And I think that story is important to remember right now because recently, at least one very noted senior South Korean official has been quoted on newspapers around the world as predicting that after death of Kim Jong-il, North Korea is maybe two or three years away from collapse. And I think that is entirely possible. It may be that just because we were wrong in 90s, it does not mean it is wrong to assume the collapse could happen this time. After all, economy really is truly broken. Kim Jong-un is not even Kim Jong-il and the patronage of China could change. That is one of those issues for debate. How China defines its national interest, as Victor Cha said this morning, is hard for us to know for sure. But it could change its calculations of interests in a way that might curtail a lot of patronage that has kept afloat a broken North Korean government. So while Nicholas is absolutely right about the scandal of prediction, we really do not have the luxury to forgo focusing on the collapse scenario. That is, collapse must be part of portfolio of contingency plans between the allies, and those contingency plans take us into not just kinetic area but into a lot of non-kinetic issues.

So my second set of comments really relates to so-called comprehensive approach. This is somewhat like searching for the Holy Grail. Governments around the world including the United States have been looking for the mix of political, military, economic, and other factors that can help prosecute a strategy successfully, even in the midst of conflict. Tomorrow in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will issue the quadrennial diplomacy and development review report. This is a brand-new capabilities' assessment of the State Department, our diplomats, and the United States agency for international development, our development experts. And this is now something that will happen if she has her way every four years so that our civilian power, as she calls it in the report, can be as prepared as our military power. And indeed, the Pentagon has long pursued this kind of planning.

Much of this approach on civilian power grew out of the wars of last 10 years, especially for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where civilian elements of our stability operational plans were lacking. Again, I can go back that I was in the George W. Bush administration as the

number 3 official at USAID at the time and I was sent over to the White House to plan the reconstruction of Iraq before the invasion. And we were told at the outset that USAID, the development experts, did not need to worry about conflict. The military would take care of that. We should assume peace, and just get on the business of building schools and hospitals. This is very dangerous to think that you can compartmentalize expertise and then expect those experts to come together and work seamlessly in a crisis. It does not work that way. So one of the reasons why you need whole government approaches is to plan ahead of time, so that you are less badly prepared than you would be otherwise. And I say that because, as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has been saying for at least a decade, right now the U.S. and ROK have two choices between being badly prepared for what is happening in North Korea in future or being really badly prepared. So that is what preparation is all about. It is trying to minimize our risk and trying to maximize our ability to effectively act in concert. So we can minimize casualties and minimize cost and hopefully best pursue, whatever the strategy is, either in short term in terms of maybe reestablishing some semblance of peace or whether longer term of objective that I think the two nations share, which is peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. But peaceful unification, one, may not be peaceful and, two, it may still be a distant goal. So we have to think about those intermediate steps along the way.

Another issue on comprehensive approach is that, I just want to again underscore, how economies are and an afterthought for national security communities. And yet, economic issues and financial issues, which I would like to tell people in Seoul, are at the heart of strategies for many people and for many countries. So it is vitally important that we attach and combine economics and security whether it is negotiations—so that we think about incentives—future development incentives for instance that were held out or had been held out to North Korea for improving their behavior and for stopping violations. Or whether it is a stick resulting to be cleverer, more stringent financial sanctions and financial measures that could really make the regime in Pyongyang feels the pain for actions

they might contemplate—be the third nuclear test or proliferation or another provocation like the shown in Yeonpyeong.

Anyway, third point is when planning for collapse or planning for any scenario, you do begin with your objectives. And it is very important that ROK and the U.S. officials share common objectives. I think this is probably the richest area of dialogue that has taken place in recent years between our two governments and very successfully: very rich understanding on both sides, good sense of objectives, good sense of North Korean possible actions. I think all of that has been very rich. But we still do not know whether North Korea will indeed be so weak that it actually collapses. That is why we do not have luxury of saying, “it is not going to collapse, it is durable, it did not collapse in 1990s, and let us not plan out it if it happens we will deal with it then.” You cannot do that because it is too irresponsible.

Now in planning for collapse, collapse may not at first appear to be a collapse. When we will know whether it is a collapse? We certainly have to plan for a range of humanitarian scenarios that involve refugees, economic pain, poverty, famine. But this could happen on a scale that we have not seen. We must be prepared to scale up to enlarge the capacity of not just ROK and the U.S. but international community and how that would work but also non-government organizations because they traditionally had a strong role to play. This is planning scenario that is part of collapse scenario that must be undertaken with knowledge of military planners and other national security planners.

I think second part of collapse scenario is that you cannot assume peace. You cannot assume that whatever assistances are being provided, they will be provided in a non-hostile and permissive environment, as they would recall it in the U.S. Therefore, use of force would be part of the delivery, even the economic assistance. And that is a very controversial issue. But it is not the one that anybody seeks. But you may not have choice because the enemy has vote on what happens. If North Korea decides that they are still using force even if they are collapsing, it is not for to tell they are not supposed to do that, but we have to ready for it. Another part of planning for collapse in North Korea

because it could involve force, including attacks on South Korea and including even weapons of mass-destruction, is that you have to be prepared for resilient society. So literally the civil defense drill that is ongoing now is really a token of down payment on the kind of things that needs to prepare society. And there was comment made this morning, and I certainly fully shared the sentiment of the Korean, who said, “We Koreans do not want to be like Israel.” We do not want you to be like Israel, either. But again, you do have a very nasty neighbor to the North who has a lot of capacity to inflict pain and playing its own economic games with South Korea. Because of wealth of South Korea and because of the open economy, you are highly vulnerable—whether the cyber attacks or the kinetic attacks. So working with civil society in the private sector and communities, including communities with our bases, all of that has to be part of planning. And traditionally that was not part of planning. This is a new development. We did not used to think about this planning. Planning was something done in the Pentagon in the United States.

The institute that I used to run was started 26 years ago because they realized that top-secret defense planning needed ideas on the outside, not just ideas inside uninformed officers. So it is that eclectic approach to planning. That is very important. I think the regime upheaval in terms of being prepared for collapse scenario is what China’s role is obviously. China never stops playing a role ever since the just war heard about this morning. And in fact, right now China is using some considerable effect with its economic influence to North Korea. We read in the newspapers, based on the primary authoritative cables, that the North Koreans are bribing or being bribed for gold, copper, extractive industries inside North Korea because it is the one of the few things that they have. That is creating networks of ties and bonds between China and North Korea. How that ties into the military calculations of China is very important thing to think about and talk about in the plan. The role of the allies, again Evans Revere made the statement that I would just want to echo. Because of the bases for United States based in Japan, Japan has a huge role to play in ensuring information logistical support cross-oversea agreements with United States that are absolutely

pivotal. Any kind of planning for collapse that is not closely consulted with Japan would be again a mistake because they have to be brought into something so dire as the collapse of North Korea in terms of planning, in terms of logistics, in terms of support. So those are some of my initial thoughts about planning. I do think that we actually need arrange of planning strategy—planning strategies for coercive diplomacy, our pressure on North Korea as part of the bargaining. We need economics and development as part of the carrot for negotiations for future development of North Korea. We need them for just humanitarian assistants and disaster relief scenarios, short of collapse. We need them for the sudden collapse scenarios that can bring about stabilization issue and bring about ultimately unification, not unification that South Korea just walks into and say ‘here are keys to kingdom, go take it over,’ but rather a messy and contested regional uncertain type of conflict and contingency. So I think that it is important for us advance our strategy through economic and development means. It is important to be ready for the unpredictable by better utilizing this comprehensive approach in ready to talk about the collapse scenarios. I know I have actually told you about how to plan for a collapse scenario, but I made initial comments on my thinking on this very delicate issue. Thank you.

“ROK Non Military Planning for DPRK Collapse”

Beomchul Shin, Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Thank you very much, Mr. Denmark. I want to thank to EAI and CNAS for having me for this important seminar. I also thank to Pyeongtaek city for supporting this seminar. My given subject is North Korea’s non-military counter-measure in preparation of sudden change in North Korea. Well frankly speaking, I am the one who believe that ROK and the U.S. and even China cannot do anything without military intervention during the sudden change in North Korea. We can only hit around the bush without military presence in the north. But anyway, I got this subject and thought what can be done during the sudden change of

North Korea.

I am summarizing my idea based on the timeline of military intervention. We have probably over hundred of researches that have conducted on the issue of North Korea's sudden change. And it is very popular issue since the middle of 1990s. So I think I was also participated over ten times on related projects. My studies can be summarized like this.

The first one is the concept. There are too many different views on the concept of sudden change. So here we need to define the concept and here I suggest the collapse of regime or state in short period of time. Second is the preparing for the sudden change must work for the limitation of humanitarian disaster. But some wants more like unification. And then so we have to discuss about that. So the cooperation between the ROK and the U.S. is necessary. This is the fundamental principle in preparing sudden change. Bases on this, I am going to explain my view and by the way this is 100% my personal view that does not reflect any of the organization and those of KIDA.

First subject is the possibility of the North Korea's sudden change. Indeed many scholars and the government officials have different views. On the one hand, there are inherent problems of North Korea's regime: isolation and worst economy situation and 27 years old Crown Prince with ill dictator. These are the weakness. I heard some interesting rumor yesterday that Kim Jong-un is in fact not the son of Kim Jong-il. No. He is the son of Kim Il-sung of age 72. That is just a rumor and joke. That is why Kim Jong-un so looks like grandfather and then he is raised by Kim Kyoung Hee, Kim Il-sung's daughter. This kind of rumor reflects the weakness of North Korea I think. But on the other hand, there are many factors stabilizing factors in particular to North Korea. The first one, the most important one, is people of North Korea, people obeying with no experience of democracy. I think this is the strongest point of Kim Jong-il's regime. Also Kim Jong-il's regime do the successful propaganda and use the nuclear weapon as deterrence or negotiation chip, because if Kim Jong-il's regime face a serious problem, they can use nuclear weapon as bargaining chip for the survivor of its regime.

There are also contending views but currently at this

stage, there is no probability of sudden change in North Korea. But it depends on how long the time of Kim Jong-il's death; the longer he lives, the less sudden change occurs.

As I mentioned there is limitation of non-military measures because there are many areas in need of military support: for example, prevention or settlement of armed conflict inside the North Korea, providing security for humanitarians support, securing the border region in prevention of North Korean defectors. And in addition, military concerns should be solved prior to related issues. And the fundamental change in North Korea will solved through military measures. However military operation cannot solve all problems so it is worth to look in to non-military measures. As Dr. Cronin already mentioned about the scenarios, there are hundreds of scenarios can be possible. These are some types. Some of them are step by step scenarios and the others are change. But the decision making factors are almost same. So we have to consider participants and security and humanitarian support and resources. These are the key issues we have to examine.

Now we are going to look into the non-military measure before military intervention. This is probably early stage of sudden change or less serious situation. So that is, the sudden change is relatively light but the economic pressure is expected to be high because there will be many requests for humanitarian support. In addition, as time goes by we face ethical issues, whether we support Kim Jong-il regime to minimize the human disaster or we have to wait until it totally collapse. It can be ethical issues. Lastly, we have to consider the amount of resources. There is limited resource in Republic of Korea. So we need more resources from the United States and international support.

The next thing we can consider is strategic structure in North East Asia. Before the military intervention, strategic structure might be relatively simple. There are unlimited participants and the issue can be solved based on common interests of international community and the need of the prevention of humanitarian disaster. Participation from all interested party is encouraged. In relation to strategic structure in the North East Asia, there will be no visible sign of change in existing strategic structure despite of great confusion because China will continue to try and

maintain its influence in North Korea and ROK and the United States. We are striving for more stabilized Korean Peninsula and neighboring nations and international community will work to settle North Korea's problem.

The next issue is security. It seems difficult to secure safe humanitarian support without military intervention. There will be many difficulties in conducting active humanitarian support, and diplomatic discussion on military intervention will be in progress. The interested nations will discuss the type of the intervention: the ROK-U.S. led intervention, neighboring states, UN PKO, intervention by multilateral forces etc. On the other hand, many nations will pay attention to the safety measures on nuclear facilities. There is possibility of nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials. And we don't have means to control nuclear weapons or materials in North Korea without military intervention. Also, tight control of transporting goods in border area might be the only option for South Korea and the United States.

The most important non-military measure before the military intervention is humanitarian support. We have to save people during the sudden change. So we need provide food-aid to prevent victim of starvation. In addition, supporting medical care and sanitation is necessary because there's possibility of epidemics so we need to provide medicine and sanitations.

Probably the most challenging issue at this stage is to prevent North Korea's defectors and the construction of refugee camps. There will be huge migration attempts to obtain food and freedom. Some say hundreds of thousands might or some say even millions defectors might occur during the sudden change. So the number of the defectors will increase if food-aid is not provided in time because they need to survival so they try to move outside North Korea. China and Russia even to Japan and South Korea, there's possibility of refuge inflow. Particularly regarding South Korea, we have high probability of refuge inflow due to geographical, legal and political region because we provide citizenship to North Korean without any condition. So we also have to construct refugee camps and South Korean neighboring nations and countries such as Mongolia, if possible. The questions of recognizing North Korea defec-

tors as refugee is also a big issue because China do not recognize North Korean defectors as refugee. So we have to have a close cooperation with neighboring nations and UNHCR.

Mostly we have to obtain proper resources. Republic of Korea has usable resource which is inter-Korean cooperation fund which amounts to billions of U.S. dollars, but it's not enough. So we need international support and we are expecting the support from the neighboring nations and UN and other international organization.

If North Korea's situation becomes worse, neighboring countries would have to start to think about military intervention. Since we cannot discuss about the topic here, the next issue is non-military measures after military intervention. Here we have many options consider. First, when serious situation occurs and we need to prevent it from spreading. Probably, North Korea's situation is worse than before. Many consider of non-military measure before military intervention. Second is the settlement of Kim Jong-un regime here. It might be different by the aspects of the participation parties. China's intervention will be key factor, because China may want to another pro-china government in the North. So it will result in setting up of an independent government in North Korea or Unified Korea. On the other hand, diplomatic domestic politics of Republic of Korea and the United States will also play critical role. As time goes by, there will be huge domestic debates about its expenditures and obtaining sustainable support. So it might be political issues. After the military intervention, but there will be huge changes base upon participation. The parties of military interventions are the actual participants in North Korea's sudden change, so the intervening nations will be the key players. But even among participants the division of labor is necessary. Who will lead, who will be supported, who will support will be the key issue that would be hotly debated during the circumstances. In addition, there is intervening nations will lead the strategic structure in North East Asia. Again China's intervention will be key factor, and there is possibility of physical confrontation in the process of intervention. Neighboring nations will hope to influence North Korea. So we need intensive discussion at the time.

After the military intervention, security in North Korea will be improved. Therefore, it will be possible to conduct active humanitarian support. In addition, we need to disarm, demobilize and rehabilitate former North Korean military personnel. Probably, in particular, the United States is very active in securing nuclear weapons, all the facilities, materials, and the scientist, technicians and even blueprints. Also we have to start the process of denuclearization and we also need the support from police forces to maintain public security.

After military intervention, humanitarian support such as food, medical and the sanitation assistance will be easier. But there will be another concern of increasing economic burden on participating nations because we have to afford those kinds of expense that comes from military intervention.

In addition, problems of North Korean defectors will remain at this stage. So the number of the defectors expected to decrease and active humanitarian support taking place within North Korea. Returning North Korea's defectors from neighboring nations and constructing refugee camps within North Korea will be hot issue on this stage.

In relation to resources, high-cost is expected from military intervention, so there will be high demand for economic support in and outside of the Korean peninsula. I think, as I already mentioned about international support and particular at this stage, we can expect the Japanese compensation for Korean War. It might be over the billions of dollars, so North Korea can use the money to feed its people and boost its economy. But it is highly probable that we face shortage of resources or great burden of economic support. We must recognize this kind of economic burden during the sudden change of North Korea. We cannot just think about the fantasy. North Korea's sudden change cast a lot of implication to the ROK-U.S. Alliance, so we have to maintain cooperation principle and we have to maintain common objectives. But I believe ROK and the U.S. already agreed upon suggested objective, so we do not have a problem in this field.

In addition I would like to emphasize the crisis management in early stage as I mentioned the faster food-aid come to the North Korea, there will be lesser defectors oc-

cur. So early warning is very critical to minimize the effect and securing prompt cooperation neighboring nations and assessing participation is also very important. Showing responsibility between ROK and the U.S. is very critical. We have agreed that "Korea takes a leading role and United States supporting role" principle should be maintained but we have to consider can South Korea deal with China and Russia without the help of the United States. Can South Korea induce the participation or support from international community? We missed the answer on this question so I personally believe that active role of the United States is necessary. Strategic dealing with neighboring nations and securing support from international community, leading the securing of other nuclear weapons and material, building a domestic country in the Korean peninsula through the support for unified Korea—these are the expectations I have to the United States.

ROK and the U.S. must deal with China, so without or with military intervention. As noticed, China regarded North Korea as strategic balance weight against United States these days. China seems feeling that it is a rival of the United States, so it seems that it is balancing North East Asia by supporting North Korea in hostile relations with the United States. So maybe we have to expect China's behaviors such as economy aid, security and safety, stabilizing border areas, supporting the pro-China factions, securing and procuring of WMDs before the United States' intervention. Including pro-China government and interfering with unification, that is probably the China's affection on the sudden change.

I think we have to consider the post direction toward China and sudden change. It is the question is realistically possible to exclude China. That is the post question I have. Yes, maybe possible, but we have the means of persuasion. I think we have to lead China in a positive way instead of excluding China. I hope, and probably most Koreans hope, that we need unification if North Korea's sudden change occurs, but we have to solve differences among neighboring countries. For example in case of German unification, might be a good example. Here is my conclusion. Possibility of sudden changes in North Korea at current stage is very low. But under the current structure sudden change is

inevitable in the long run. So a thorough participation and preparation is important as I have emphasized. ROK and the U.S. preparation are progressing smoothly but more attention is needed in non-military field. To prevent military tragedy, help is expected in the politics, diplomatic, economic and information sector. Thank you.

Session III: The Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance

“Adapting the Alliance for Future Challenges”

Abraham Denmark, Fellow of the CNAS

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Again I would like to thank EAI and Pyeongtaek for hosting this conference. I will be speaking on adapting the alliance to the 21st century challenges. My comments today are taken from a report that CNAS will be releasing on Friday and event with KIDA. So this is a bit of sneak preview for you all. So I have five main points that I want to cover but since my center was founded by Secretary Kurt Campbell in his final tradition if you look it, the points are actually made a lot more than five and also probably start out for something that is not directly related.

My wife sent me an e-mail this morning. She just read the study that comes out on Friday, and said, “You missed the most important issue in the U.S.-ROK Alliance.” My wife does not know anything about the alliance or Korea or anything. But what she does know something about is Cleveland Indians. And she said that I need to talk about the importance of Shinsoo Choo staying with the Cleveland Indians next year. And I didn’t address in the study so my first point is that Shinsoo Choo needs to stay in Cleveland.

Seriously, the most important point—my first point here—is the America’s future in East Asia: economically, demographically, and militarily. The future balance of global power to the 21st century is going to be in East Asia. China is a big part of it. China’s rise is the big part of it. But it is not the entire story. If you look at demographics, Indians set to overtake China as the world’s most populous country. Economically, the region is experiencing the fast

economic rise while the China has been the fastest and largest, you can see that rise percolating throughout the region. And militarily, while China also has seen significant rise in its military capabilities, we have seen that the rise extend throughout the region: India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. All have been significantly increasing their defense budget in recent years. So America’s future is in East Asia. My second point is Korea is a region’s center—both literally on a map and figuratively. If you look to the west of Korea, you see China which will, as Victor Cha talked about this morning, will define the dynamics of international politics in the 21st century whether it is offensive realism, defensive realism or neo-liberalism. To Korea’s north is the threat from North Korea, the greatest threat to the regions continued stability and prosperity. To the South is the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

My colleague Robert Kaplan wrote his recent book that the South China Sea and Indian Ocean will be as important to international security in the 21st Century as Mediterranean was in the 19th and 20th centuries. And finally to the East, to Korea’s east is the United States. It is an ally but also we see a power that is whose power is increasingly constrained by rising deficits which will challenge ability to have a large defense budgets. Politically, it is a polity that is tired of warfare since the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. And more importantly, it is the rise of the rest and relative decline of American military power compare to rising countries, especially in East Asia. Some examples especially of America becoming increasingly tired of a conflict. A 2010 survey of American public opinion published by the *Chicago*—some on *Global Affairs*—found that 91 percent of Americans said that the United States should focus on fixing problems at home, rather than fixing problems abroad, 71 percent of Americans said that the United States should do it sure to solve our national problems with the cooperation of other countries. And this was actually translated to the issues specifically focused on Korean peninsula on a paper Victor Cha coauthored on the same study. Found that 56 percent of Americans oppose America’s unilateral defense of South Korea should the North invade. But that figure flips to 61 percent of American supporting American participating defense South Korea as

part of the multinational efforts. So the uptake of the point is that the future of Asia is in our hands both America's and Korea's hands. That goes to my third point, which is that Korea must accept these historical challenges. I am going to focus on the military aspects of what that means when it comes to Korea accepting these challenges. As we discussed throughout the day today that South Korea is facing a tremendously diverse set of security challenges from North Korean attack to North Korean limited warfare to collapse of North Korea over the long-term, the challenge of China, and global challenges such as the security of the global commons. Yet South Korea is a small country and cannot possibly be expected to address all these challenges on its own. And this is the why the alliances are going to be so important. That is through this alliance together we can address these many challenges. And the key—I think both Washington and Seoul—is identifying what our priorities are, what we need to focus on and who needs to do what based on our unique capabilities and unique interests and challenges.

One issues that I think is at the center of all of this—when thinking about what does the ROK need in the discussion that will happen later on in this panel—is that South Korea is history of procumbent, of military procumbent, not driven by a degree of planning institute and strategic planning that would be ideal. For example, in months after the sinking of the *Cheonan*, we saw many cries coming out from South Korea: the need to invest in naval capabilities until the attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Then it was the marine corp. and turning those islands into island fortresses. Also there were proposals to spend billions of dollars on these immediate needs. Always following the attack, they are trying to respond to the attack and the weakness the attack identified. Pouring in billions of dollars at these challenges, and while Ministry of Defense has a very a robust effort on contingency planning and looking at future challenges we still need to see a closer link between the thinking about contingencies and actual need for capabilities. And we need to start to think about, and plan about, strategically using things such as modeling and simulation, etc. So in our paper looking at all these various challenges, one of our conclusions—that I will discuss it a bit here we

can go into it later if we need—is the need for adaptable force posture. As Patrick mentioned earlier, human beings let alone strategies, are very bad at predicting the future and identifying what we would actually need in 10, 15, 20 years. If, in 1998, someone would have told Americans that we will going to be spending 9, 10 years in occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be laugh out of the room. But that's the reality that happened. So we are not going to know exactly what kind of capabilities we are going to need. So the focus for the Korean military, especially given the small size of the country and large size of challenges that you will be facing, is need for what I call adaptable force posture, looking at the key capabilities that would be applicable across broader set of contingency. And this is something that needs to be done on across ground, air, naval, and especially C4ISR capabilities, looking what is specifically do we need that can be used in widest variety contingency. An important part of that is building experience in these key capabilities that will be needed. Following the artillery shell in Yeonpyeong Island, there was a discussion in the National Assembly that the Korean militaries are not experienced enough, and that they are not used to being sort of combat situation. And one of the things I look at when we talked about this report that comes out on Friday is that there is an opportunity to build experience in some of the key capabilities that the ROK may need in certain contingencies and scenario.

And this addresses to me a question that is asked earlier in today's conference, which is why should Korea contribute to global issues and global security challenges such as peace keeping, stability operations, and humanitarian assistance in disaster relief, and securing the global commons. And I point to building experience in key capabilities and building skills in those capabilities. And in certain operations, peace keeping operations, stability operations, humanitarian assistance in disaster relief, there are remarkably similarities to some of the kinds of skills and in capabilities that will be necessary should there be a collapse in North Korea. From securing on populations, to providing foods and medical assistances in areas where without much infrastructure to speak of is very similar in some humanitarian assistance and stability operations as it

would be, potentially, in a collapsed North Korea. Korea does send forces obviously to Afghanistan and to Iraq around the world in peace keeping operations. But these forces are rather small and they are put in areas that don't see the full brunt of some of these stability operations that we've seen. So for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, Korean forces generally stay in areas that are relatively stable. I would encourage that Korean military look to these global operations not only as a way to contribute to international system and repay debts because of the Korean War. But it's an opportunity to build experience within the ROK military and spread lessons learned from those operations throughout the force in ways that could contribute to operations closer to home.

My fourth point is that beyond North Korea—obviously North Korea is the biggest challenge that the ROK is going to facing—but beyond North Korea, China needs to be a more outward and more focused element of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Our positive managing of China's rise should be a fundamental element of the alliance. Our alliance should be a vehicle to engage with focus on dialogue, soft security, and cooperation, while preparing and building the capabilities to deter against potential Chinese aggression or coercion over the long term.

My fifth point is that the United States and South Korea need to prepare not only for unification, in the challenges we talked about last panel, but I would argue that we need to start talking about post-unification. That we need to start identifying what are the principles that we want to see in a unified Korea that we can share within the Alliance and talk about more it more broadly. And I would propose a few shared goals for unified Korean Peninsula—democratic, independent responsible player in the international system and the nuclear free. And I will also posit that one of the key principles would be that developing, redeveloping the North is not only the responsibility South Korea's, not only the responsibility of the Alliance, but really the responsibility of the entire world. I also think that we need to start talking about the role of the Alliance and the purpose of the Alliance in post-unifications, and start laying the ground work for what the alliance will play. Obviously, the status of American forces in the Korean Penin-

sula post-unification will be up to the decisions of the unified government, but I think it is important that we start talking about that now, in start building not only within the government but within the minds of Korean people, the idea for what role the U.S.-ROK Alliance will be playing in the future.

Finally, this is probably beyond my fifth point, I think that especially important to talk about the role of building popular support for the alliance not only within the government but also within the minds of Korean people. Especially since this conference is being sponsored by Pyeongtaek city, I just wanted to talk about the role of media in the alliance. We have seen around the world and around the region that American bases are becoming the focus of animosity within the local populations. This is true, this is unfortunately happening around the world and we have chance to, in some way, start fresh with the move of American forces in Korea. And thinking a head about how we can turn American bases in Pyeongtaek and elsewhere into centers for economic development and interaction between the U.S. forces and Korean people. We can lay that ground work now, and should be laying that ground work now. It is especially important in the 21st century, when democracy and technology are combining into a very difficult political environment in which local issues can easily and quickly explode into national controversies in a way that they had before. So really dealing with the population is not only a question of dealing with the people who live in the neighborhood around bases in Pyeongtaek and elsewhere, but really dealing with how the U.S. military is perceived throughout Korea. And this is really foundation for the building long term support for the alliance and building that support for the ground work. So those of the main points, again, I will be releasing the full report on Friday so we can go into some of these issues more in depths in Q&A if you would like. But also, I would like to literate that since we choose a very good player we need to keep him in Cleveland. With that, thank you very much.

“Future ROK Armed Forces in the ‘Strategic Alliance’: Toward the Evolution for a Real Strategic Partner”

Du Hyeogn Cha, Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses^{*}

It is my great pleasure and honor to meet and discuss with prominent scholars and experts. And I would like to express my gratitude to EAI and CNAS for providing such a good opportunity. It would be better to do my presentation in Korean because some of the concept is so crucial that it is very important to avoid even small misunderstanding.

The English title of today’s presentation is “Future ROK Armed Forces in the ‘Strategic Alliance,” and its subtitle is “Toward the Evolution for a Real Strategic Partner.” The main reason I used the expression “real strategic partner” is that there are many barriers that the United States and ROK military need to overcome, and that the United States will have to realistically reassess its excessive expectation toward ROK government. The title illustrates those two meanings.

The expression that I use here, “real strategic partner” contains two meanings. One is my anticipation of having lots more of ups-and-downs left in the Korean military in the process of forming a true strategic alliance with the United States. The other implies a necessity for the United States to compromise its relatively high expectation from this partnership.

My presentation is largely divided into five parts. The first part looks at challenges and opportunities the United States and ROK face as we strive to renew our Alliance since the mid and late 2000. Also, I thought it would useful to talk about some of the unanswered questions after all our efforts in joint statements and summits. I will throw some questions about what ROK should do for the genuine strategic alliance. Fourthly, I will explore the readiness of ROK military—if Koreans are ready to be a partner of this strategic alliance. Lastly, I will suggest some of the ways that we can do to make this alliance lasting even after the transfer of OPCON in 2015.

My presentation contains five parts. I am first looking at the factors that provide challenge or opportunity to the new ROK-U.S. relationship since the mid-ending 2000s. I

consider the questions left after many long discussions of the development for the future ROK-U.S. Alliance, such as several joint statements by the leaders of the two countries, very significant. Based on these questions, I am throwing a question of what to do in order to make the ROK-U.S. Alliance as ‘strategic alliance’ from the Korean view point. The forth question is, whether current Korean military is ready enough for being a strategic partner with the United States. Lastly, I would be looking at the way for both Korea and the United States to cooperate together even after the return of wartime operational control which is planned to be in 2015.

As you well know, the discussion that the ROK-U.S. Alliance needs to develop to suit the future needs is not so new to us. In the beginning of the 1990s when the era of post-Cold War began, there were co-research projects between Korea Institute of Defense Analyses of South Korea and Rand in the United States. There were also several director meetings between the two countries though unofficial. Beginning in the mid-2000, Future of the Alliance (FTA) was held during 2003 and 2004, and it was the first official cooperative body. Through this event, the agreement on base transfer of USFK 2nd division could be made.

We also observed several other major agreements between the two nations regarding defense/security of the Korean peninsula such as the ten missions, and the discussion is still going on at SPI. During the process of forming the ROK-U.S. Alliance in the mid-2000s, as reported on the media, there were signs of distrust differing opinions regarding the new alliance in the future, although both countries were good at keeping their appearances well. Therefore, Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008 pointed out the recovery of the ROK-U.S. Alliance as the most important task in the South Korean diplomacy and security part. Having it on the priority in agenda, the Lee administration deserves a credit for the maintenance of a firm relationship with the United States and development of future-oriented ROK-U.S. Alliance. Not only the relationships that the President Lee formed with the President G.W. Bush, and the President Obama, but also two countries’ mutual understandings and reliance played as catalyst for this positive output of the two countries’ Alliance. In this

context, some analyze that current President Lee's administration is having a honeymoon period of the sixty year history of alliance with the United States. For instance, there was the "Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance" in 2009, and as part of this joint declaration, the two countries discussed the subject of 'extended deterrence.'

This year, the United States' return of Wartime operational control, which was originally planned in 2012, was postponed to 2015. Although it is important to have a great quality of condition in the relationship, having critical mind on how there will be much more complex problems to manage and solve between the two is much more significant. For example, even recent Yeonpyeong Island attack shows the necessity of completely different types of response to North Korea's combination of its conventional way of threat and WMD. In other words, when talking about North Korea in the early 2000s, we could only talk about its nuclear or WMD problems. Now, not only nuclear and WMD factors, but we also need to consider North Korea's threat of attack on our national territory. In addition, the problem of how we are going to manage North Korea's unstable situation is our another task. As the United States has already announced, it has become our new task to manage and deal with different types of threats from the pan-regional and pan-global ones such as peace-recovery activities, terrorism, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Even though the current ROK-US alliance has never been this good compared to the past, I would like to point out that there are still some unsolved tasks. First is whether the misunderstanding coming from two different expressions that refer to the same thing. We have been talking about developing the relationship to make the strategic alliance of the 21st century for the future, but as a matter of fact, this subject already came out around the mid-2000s. In the strict sense, there is only a subtle difference in rhetoric expressions, while the essential concept of the strategic alliance pursued by South Korea and the United States is the same as those of the past administrations, which were comprehensive, dynamic and friendly. I think that there is a subconscious gap when we only created another expression for the same concept without specific problems dis-

cussed on the table: it is time to go beyond this toddling level. For example, when talking about strategic alliance, Koreans favor the meaning of maintaining defense/security in the Korean peninsula, but the United States might have a different idea.

As pointed out in KIDA and CNAS' joint research, has this gap been minimized at all?

When the U.S.-Japan New Security Joint Statement and the subsequent U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation Guideline came out in 1996, most people understood that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not merely to protect Japan but carry out a mutual cooperation in the regional and global matters. Likewise, we need to come up with a strategic alliance that is clear in its role and activities. For this, I think there is a need to question whether there were discussions about division of roles, shared-objectives, or duties of each side.

Next, regarding defense in the Korean Peninsula, the region, and the world, there has been a talk about role-sharing, but the concrete questions like, 'how are South Korea and the United States going to play a leading role,' or 'are they going to get support,' are raised. But it is not clear whether these kinds of specific questions met answers/agreements between the two countries. Or the questions like 'whether Koreans are completely agreed upon its alliance with the United States beyond the subject of Korean Peninsula' or 'do they really think that this is unavoidable trend,' are also raised. We also need to think about whether we have a definite answer for the long-term U.S. army bases in Korea and its system: in other words, subjects like long-term U.S. army bases in Korea for the post-Korean reunification or specific agreement on how the U.S. army could effectively manage its force. We should look back on the history to see whether Korea has overcome its fear of 'entrapment' during extended role of the Alliance in using U.S. army bases in the Korean Peninsula.

What I would like to emphasize the most here is that an alliance is, after all, a deal between the two sides. In other words, every alliance models have started from a deal between the two sides when, for example, one gives justification in return of material benefit.

If the sacrifice of one side is too big, this alliance will

face a crisis or status of re-adjustment. As observed in the discussion of when to return the wartime operational control, what South Korea wants from the relationship would be reliable security. On the other hand, it is possible for the United States to question on why South Korea, a member of G20 with its incredible economic development, cannot throw away band-wagon way of forming alliance. In addition, there is no clear definition on what kind of burden-sharing will be reasonable when talking about business relations with actual money involved. It will be hard to come up with a complete agreement on each side's expectation. It is significant to know what kind of role that Korea should be playing when managing a role beyond just defense in the Korean Peninsula. It is also important to figure out what kind of new commanding relationship or operational capability relationship will be applied, after the return of wartime operational control in 2015. In other words, continuous institutional modification will be needed in order to come up with the most reasonable cooperation model in the strategic, tactical and operational ways.

It is ironic that there is something missing in ROK-U.S. discussion on the wartime operational control that started in the mid-2000s. What was really discussed is only the wartime control, even though this alliance, for the long time, was promised to go beyond the scope of the alliance limited in the Korean Peninsula. If this Alliance was really designed to be future-oriented, it is not right to simply discuss defense of the Korean Peninsula. But along with that line, the two countries should discuss operational cooperation or commanding relationship in the level of regional or world order. In this context, the answer to the question of 'what is the critical point in the strategic alliance with the United States?' can be after all based on the clear conceptualization of the 'new alliance.' Therefore, it is necessary for the two countries to be on a same page when answering to the questions like 'How do South Korea and the United States consider strategic alliance differently than formal forms of alliance' and 'What would two countries define concrete values and concepts in the alliance.' Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, we have been asked of what we would do with the United States when war threats from

North Korea disappear, which was the main reason for the existence of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. When we live without these threats from North Korea, how would the United States persuade Koreans to have U.S. army troops in the South Korean bases? This needs to be defined more clearly. In order to do that, the alliance is required to reach an agreement on what the perception of threat would be like to South Korea without the threat from North Korea. The fact that this already created a subtle disagreement between South Korea and the United States during the mid-2000s makes it all the more significant to continue a regular talk between the two in regards to figuring out what the threat measures are in the future. And if there is any perceptual gap, efforts to fill this gap will be most likely necessary. After all, not only the cooperation between two administrations, but network and common consciousness of public opinion initiatives from both sides regarding the development of alliance are needed. After all, compromise of expectation levels from the both countries is necessary. The United States might feel that South Korea is pursuing band-wagon tactics, but for South Korea, it is hard to give up any factor among economic growth, stable economy or welfare.

For this reason, the United States might say that it is expecting something paramount to its contribution to South Korea for the past 50 years, while South Korea still thinks the United States' expectation to be too much. Thus, what we are asking from the United States, the reliable security, shows how we are seeking only what we want regardless of the United States' current situation. I am saying that we need to seriously think about this. The way the United States is pursuing its global strategy is to look at the world first, the region, and then the Korean Peninsula.

Unlike the United States, South Korea can only form its strategy in the order of the Korean Peninsula-region-and the world. South Korea will need some adjustment to this view. In an operational perception, how we are going to increase interoperability between the two will be a very important issue to bring about the talk. In the trend of cooperation for the possible future wars, it is also important to study how to reconsider the cooperation of ROK-U.S. military forces.

Is South Korean army sufficiently ready for a strategic alliance with the United States? The biggest reason I cannot give a positive answer is that the possibility of reaching to the ultimate goal of first reform of our national security—as well as the budget problem and newly arising threats from North Korea—was low as we only sought the treatment for the future and ignored the currently existing threats.

In this case, our essential source of concern keeps coming from the national security reform when it should be other things like extended nuclear non-proliferation or North Korea's asymmetric strategy. Of course, we see many efforts to develop systems in the South Korean army, but it is impossible to ignore how there are also some weak points like strategic problems of the South Korean army's role in the world beyond the Korean Peninsula: ability of collecting information, cooperating skills or ability of inter-agency cooperation. What the South Korean army needs to figure out is how to fight. This is more important than getting hardware. Knowing how to fight is first thing to do in order to figure out how to cooperate.

Whether we use the term leading or supportive for our role in the defense of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to be clear about how we will fight, what role we will play in what aspects and with what percentage, and what supports from the United States we need to ask for against the North Korean threats in the future.

We also ought to ask whether only the cutting edge of strategy is good, or 'high nomics' best suits the organizing of military strength. We should ask the United States based on these kinds of questions in order to come up with the idea of leading. But we are not.

Therefore, what the South Korean army needs to work on, in terms of its capability, is getting hardware, specific weapons, or putting continuous efforts to transform its mind and software. This will ultimately increase the South Korean power. As it was described not only in the theory of alliance, but also in the international politics, once capability of self-reliance of national defense increases, then there is less necessity for forming alliance. However, South Korea has a little different story. The South Korean government of 1970 did its self-reliance of national security,

and that period has been a sign to our partner that we would not just jump on the alliance structure. But there has not been any agreement beyond just a sign. That is why it is necessary to get away from an excessive reliance on the United States. Along with South Korea's strengthened ability in strategy, tactics and operation, research and development, or extended technical skills on the defense industry is very crucial. Likewise, it is equally important to adjust relationship with the United States to the changing circumstance. Beyond just an expression of friendly ROK-U.S. relations, we now have to show others that South Korea is actually close to the United States for these kinds of reasons, and because of this we will continuously have to be close to the United States. Therefore, it is now time for South Korea and the United States to start talking about the issues that both countries were reluctant to open up for the public discussion.

We often say that we did enough and the United States has not done enough in the partnership compared to what they did to others. But what is the acceptable range of the burden-sharing for both countries? If it is inevitable for the United States to be more flexible as it is going through the process of reorganizing its entire army system, then we need to discuss how acceptable its role could be to satisfy both countries. After talks on topics such as the U.S.'s role or protecting South Korea from the threats from several WMDs, I think following discussion should be what South Korea can contribute to this relationship. It is also time for both South Korea and the United States to be more open in approaching problems like reducing and preventing negative views on issues such as amending problems in Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

“Alliance Management and the Evolving Alliance”

Markus Garlauskas, Chief of the Strategy Division, USFK

I would like to begin by thanking the city of Pyeongtaek and Mayor Kim for sponsoring this event, and also for recognizing that they are the essence of future strategic key-joint for the Alliance. I would also like to say that I appreciate the opportunity to participate, growing relationship

between this Command and the Center for New American Security, and the East Asia Institute. Improving that relationship expanding has not only been my own priority and that of my deputy, Brian Port, but also General Sharp personally. General Sharp will be speaking at tonight's event showing his emphasis on how important he believes this event is. Next slide please. Now, General Sharp's comments this evening will be on the official capacity, however, the opinions I express during the presentation do not necessarily represent the policy or positions of Combined Forces Command, the U.S. Forces Korea, or any ROK or the U.S. government agency. Due to the security constraints, of course, there will be certain details that will not be able to go into this forum. That having been said, I would like to point out that I'm here not just in my capacity in the U.S. forces Korea as introduced, but also as Chief of Strategy for Combined Forces Command, in understanding that I'm trying to portrait this not just from the U.S. perspective, but also from Korean perspective as well. I've worked at the Combined Forces Command headquarter now for 8 years, and much of the work that I do involves trying to match the Korean and American perspectives on issues and to produce documents that say the same thing not just in terms of words but in terms of meaning between in Hangeul and English. We have in the headquarters now plasma screens; they usually paired side by side. That's not because we like seeing the same thing twice. It's because it's important to the leadership and, really to all of us, to make sure that we are seeing the same thing in both languages so we have the common understanding.

My agenda today will be related in many ways with the many of presentations you have seen before, and actually I have to be very thankful for going last. A lot of background that normally I have to provide has already been provided by the presentations before me. I begin by analyzing and summarizing overall challenges we face in terms of transforming the Alliance. We will talk a little bit about what we have done so far in terms of key documents as milestones, and talk about what needs to be done, and I will give you my personal view of what I think transforming the Alliance should look like and how we will get there.

First of all, we use the terms of management and

transformation very deliberately. It is because of the fact that we have to balance this immediate management of the crisis and the threat we deal with everyday with the long term transformation. And the challenge that we face, because of the nature of North Korean threat, and because of the nature of the complex fast-paced world that we live in right now, is that 90% of our time or more, the headquarters and the leadership circles of the Alliance are focused on managing these near term crisis and near term friction and near term threats. So we have only limited amount of time to focus on transformation, and making long term improvements. We really have to manage with what we have, and the transformation that we want to make to get to where we want to be oftentimes does not receive amount of time and energy that really should, just because of the nature and environment that we are faced with. But transformations, make no mistake, is absolutely critical, because it is only through changing how we do businesses in our Alliance from the tactical all the way up to the strategic level, and using that to change the environment on the Peninsula and in the region and the world. We truly will be able to make progress in dealing with those problems that right now we are merely managing. I want to emphasize here that the No.1 issue that we manage from day to day basis is the threat from North Korea, but within that, and I think that you have heard from several other presentations today. There is a primary focus within that overall focus on North Korea and deterring and preparing for full-scale North Korean attack. And that focus requires tremendous amount of defend resources and tremendous attention and energy, and it will continue to require a degree of focus and energy. However, unfortunately in some ways, it robbed us of the ability to focus on longer term transformation and also the focus on the full range—the full spectrum—of threats that North Korea poses. When we talk about transforming the Alliance and transforming capabilities to meet future threats, I think we need to be careful. Right now, the future threat is here. It has been proven. I question the idea that we did not anticipate these North Korean capabilities or North Korean actions. I will tell you that I personally saw an irrational testimony from command of Combined Forces Command that emphasize the capability of North

Korea, with very little warning, to execute asymmetric strikes to use limited amounts of military force in pursuit of its objectives. It was almost more surprising that North Korea has not chosen the route that has chosen this year earlier. And so in that way we have to recognize the threats posed by North Korea are not simply the full-scale attack or the instability we have seen lately focusing on. It is the global threat and the global challenge. So when we talk about working together as a global alliance, we have to recognize that the first place where we start that is viewing North Korea as a global threat. North Korea has a global illicit network. North Korea participates in proliferation passing in both directions of missile and nuclear weapons technology around the world. That is already out there, that is open source, you can read that in newspaper. And that has been acknowledged in testimony both the national assembly and the U.S. congress. And so our Alliance cannot have a Peninsula focus by nature. If it is focused on North Korea, and not simply on deterring an attack and preparing for war with the North Korea, if it's focused on truly dealing with the challenge posed by North Korea, it must be global. So we have to take steps to transform to become a truly global alliance.

Looking at Alliance transformation, as we move forward, there are really two key documents that we have as our world map of transformation. The first one is the Joint Vision for the Alliance that we signed and presented in the summer of 2009. And that is really a vision and perhaps the destination in many ways. The one that is not precise in its language that does not layout an action plan for how we get there. Then we have a Strategic Alliance 2015, which is a much more precise document, but is much more limited in terms of what it approaches, of course it only goes out to the 2015, and in strategic term that is relatively short period of time. And it is primarily focused on defense and security issues, and it does not address full range of all of the things that are within the Joint Vision for the Alliance, although it addresses a good number of them. I am not going to go into details and what is in the Joint Vision Statement, but I would say it is really important that we review this document and look at it when we have this discussion. There is a lot of talk of the Joint Vision State-

ment. But as far as really absorbing what is in that document, what was agreed to, and what was discussed, I think a lot of time we gloss over some of the key points. But the statement itself really is such a powerful tool right now. If we can build on that Joint Vision Statement, if we can develop answers on some of those unresolved questions of how we get to what is in that Joint Vision, I think we will go a long way to transforming the Alliance and really transforming the environment in which the Alliance operates, and to be in great support of the interests of both the ROK and the U.S.

Strategic Alliance 2015, I know it is not fully understood by everyone in this room and part of what we are doing as we move forward is communicating what Strategic Alliance 2015 is and what its real value is to the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The essence of Strategic Alliance 2015 is to synchronize a wide range of Alliance initiatives through 2015, and as a part of that, there comes a comprehensive implementation plan and monitoring plan to keep those initiatives on track. The initiatives is most often highlighted there as transitional wartime operational control of ROK forces in 2015, another key element is the planning aspect: planning for a wide range of contingencies and threats that may come from North Korea. And then there is a lot of nibbling elements come to that in terms of organizational structure training, acquisition and these sorts of things. But the more strategic element, beyond just dealing with the operational situation on the Peninsula and dealing with the immediate threats from North Korea, is also to put posture the Alliance over the long term to resolve certain friction points and to be able to posture the U.S. element of the forces of the Alliance to be better positioned for the long term. While hubs of the Peninsula consolidated overtime, setting the conditions for forces to be able to deploy from the Peninsula, and deal with the global challenges and issues. Another key element that comes with that is the reassurances to the ROK that any such deployments are going to be within the Alliance structure and they are not going to undermine the defense of ROK that any of those actions are going to be within the consideration of the security requirement of ROK.

To go back to the Joint Vision Statement, there is a key

element within the Joint Vision Statement that is often lost that I want to emphasize here. That is, the Alliance's vision of unification. The idea of unification is a fundamental objective of the Alliance that is often lost. Particularly, when actually talking about unification, we are talking here specifically about peaceful unification on the principles of free democracy and market economy. That is really a stated objective of both ROK and the U.S. Presidents. But based on that vision, what have we done to actually advance that particular objective? What have we done to enshrine that objective as a primary element of the Alliance? So I believe we have an obligation to consider how the Alliance as a whole shapes conditions of reunification, how it supports process of reunification that is ongoing, how our Alliance is going to establish and maintain the secure post-unification environment after the reunification of the Peninsula. There is a military element to each one of those things. And so that requires tension and thought, and that is going to require adjustment of priority, when you think about it. It is not just dealing with what do we do in the situation where North Korea attacks or North Korea initiates aggression, but what we do on a daily basis that help shape the conditions for a peaceful unification; not only deter North Korea from doing things, but how we get North Korean people and North Korean elites to come to a place where unification is possible. That is something that we have to devote certain amount of time, intellectual energy and efforts to. Even though the North Korean threat is immediate, we have to manage that threat; we have to deter against it; and we have to prepare to defeat; we have to do something to transform the conditions on the Peninsula not just transform the Alliance itself in order to be able to answer those three questions, and achieve this vision that we have in the Alliance of peaceful unification and the principles of free democracy and market economy.

What is the transformation of the Alliance that gets us to this point where we can actually use that to transform the Alliance and to transform the environment around us? The first step of that process is the fact that we really have to come to the point that we all view this Alliance is the global and regional alliance, that it has the capabilities, the processes and the policies that enable the Alliance to tackle

North Korea as a global, complex problem. The illicit networks in North Korea and the connections North Korea has in the world, the entire package of the problem that North Korea poses to the region, comprehensively are addressed side by side within the Alliance, that is a critical element of transforming the Peninsula, regional environment and the position of the Alliance for the long term future. Another key element is the integration and the building of the connections between the two partners of the Alliance with other partners that share similar values and similar interests in dealing with the same challenges. Now, I am not proposing that ROK and the U.S. Alliance becomes the core of some kind of new Alliance construct, but it has to be within the existing constructs—for example the United Nations or agreement on the proliferation security initiatives—and it has to be recognized that part of that is going to require a change in thinking where it is not always just ROK and the U.S. The key element to this is the UN command structure that we have, where the General Sharp wears the additional hat as the commander of UN command. That is a powerful vehicle that the Alliance can use as one avenue, to be able to be a partner with another countries that share these interests in the region and globally without diluting Alliance. For example, they do not have to sit down separately necessarily on every occasion with the other countries that share those interests. They can sit down together to deal with the North Korean issue with the other countries, providing additional support and additional capability to the Alliance. The next step is a part of this. The Alliance has to be enduring and future-focused. The Alliance cannot be simply based on dealing with the immediate North Korean threat. It has to be based on assured understanding of what are the things that bind the Alliance together beyond North Korea, and what is the role this Alliance after unification, after there is no longer North Korea. It's the elements like building the connections between the local communities where the U.S. bases are. There are elements of building this enduring Alliance that's all the way from the grassroots level, a personal relationship between the U.S. service members and the people living in the local community in Pyeongtaek. That has to be a part of the transformation of the Alliance to place

greater emphasis on that to enable that.

Another key element is the means to have an inter-agency and whole government approach while we are doing the Alliance. We have to be able to synchronize our own power. We have to have the capability to use the strengths and weaknesses, the varying strength of ROK and the U.S. in terms of soft power and hard power, in close counsel. We have to recognize that even though dealing with North Korea's hard power, it has got to be the one aspect of our strategy that, in long term, the U.S. occasion which will ultimately resolve the security threats from North Korea is really in many ways a soft power problem more than a hard power problem. If we use our hard power to deal with North Korea in the short term, in a way that undermines our soft power in the long term, it will be detrimental to the Alliance. So, it is important that as we transform we have to have the same ability to coordinate and synchronize the Alliance's use of soft power as the Alliance's use of the hard power.

The question of agility and flexibility, obviously, is a huge element of dealing with this wide range of threats from North Korea. To achieve this idea of full-spectrum dominance, to be able to deal with North Korea in any given situation, we are not behind the power, and we can quickly deal with whatever challenge they pose. And that requires an approach all the way from the bottom to the top level that has close coordination on a daily basis. That allows us to be able to use inter-agency and whole government approach to the problem set as they are emerging, instead of reacting.

Lastly, to enable all of this, we need to be transparent and communicative Alliance. That has to be at each level and particularly starting with inter-governmental level, the maximum amount of transparency. As the Alliance comes to positions and has a common voice on issues of shared concern, this has to be communicated to domestic audience effectively and is communicated internationally. So there is no question about where the Alliance stands on the particular issues and the fact that ROK and the U.S. stand together. This question of reassuring Korean people to correct abstract perception to overcome is very important to be able to achieve all these other aspect of transformation

of the Alliance. If we were not to communicating at the ground level to the typical American and typical South Korean about where we are going with the Alliance and why, these initiatives may not have the domestic support that they need in the long term to succeed. And so even if the ROK and the U.S. government agreed even on time, if there is not the support from the people of the ROK and the U.S. to go on the particular direction, because they do not know which direction they are planning on going, then any transformation effort is doomed to fail. That is the key final element.

So I would like to close it by saying that overall construct of ROK and the U.S. Alliance that is global, that is strategic and that is moving toward the joint vision. There are three key elements how the military alliance fits in with that. First of all, military alliance in the future has to be capable of dealing with the wide range of challenges not only on the Peninsula but regionally and globally. And we are moving on that direction on the Strategic Alliance 2015. We are definitely moving into that direction. But we have to continue that progress after 2015, and not get pulled back into looking at a historical legacy on the view of threat and the challenges that we face. The second element is that the military element of the alliance should not attempt to take on the job itself. It should become a foundation element between a larger, expanding global strategic alliance rather than seeing itself always as the primary and the most important element within the alliance. The concern that I have is because the linkage between ROK and the U.S. military is so strong, and because the Mutual Defense Treaty is the cornerstone of the Alliance, we have to be careful that it does not turn from the cornerstone into a stumbling block and prevent us from really moving further. That is absolutely critical. Lastly, the military element in the Alliance has to be focused on not just dealing with threats from North Korea, but on shaping conditions for unification as part of its daily process on supporting unification as it would happen in a variety of scenarios, hopefully in a very peaceful scenario. Lastly, everything you do from pertinent planning to strategic communication has to be designed to support the Alliance. The military alliance is going to last beyond Korean unification, and it is not just

about the North Korean threat. One last point I would like to make about these three elements is that it is going to require more than just ROK and the U.S. military addressing issues to achieve but a forum like this and discussions that take place outside of the military and outside the government. There are going to be tremendous positive impact on the ability of military element of the Alliance to do these things and to address these issues. Thank you.

Dinner

Dinner Speech

General Walter L. Sharp, Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK

Doctors Cronin and Lee; Distinguished guests;

I am honored to give this speech tonight and answer your questions afterwards. I only have 150 PowerPoint slides, so this should be fairly painless. Ok, in reality there are no slides, but I am going to speak to you and make a few points about current events and our Republic of Korea - U.S. Alliance future initiatives.

President Lee, thank you for your kind introduction. Dr. Cronin and Dr. Lee, thank you for the invitation to speak here tonight. It is always a privilege to speak to the members of the Center for New American Security, and the East Asia Institute. Thank you also for your continued efforts to expand and deepen the discourse on Northeast Asian affairs, and for recognizing the important role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance in Northeast Asia.

This year we commemorated the 60th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Throughout the year and across the peninsula, the Republic of Korea and our combined military forces hosted numerous 60th anniversary events to remember the sacrifices of all of our Korea War veterans. The many memorials and re-enactments held since June served as a reminder that we have yet to achieve the desired complete peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and must remain forever vigilant in order to deter aggression and fight and win if deterrence should fail.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance is one of the most successful Alliances in the world and serves the interests of both of our nations in the region. Although our Alliance has deterred all out war we continue to face a belligerent North Korea that persists in attacking the ROK. The struggle today is how do we deter provocations and the continued violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

To better address the current and future threats and challenges, both our governments have committed to transforming our alliance through the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan. The new plan synchronizes all of our alliance efforts to ensure we have our plans, our organizations, our capabilities and systems, and our exercises established to facilitate OPCON transition on 1 December 2015 as well as continue to strengthen our alliance to enable us to more agilely and quickly address the threats of today and better shape the future security environment. Included in our plan is a ROK-U.S. whole of government approach that extends our capabilities into the realm of deterring or defeating North Korean limited attacks.

While the Republic of Korea and United States are working towards the long-term transformation of the alliance, we are also moving ahead quickly with our near-term deterrent actions and responses to continued North Korean belligerence. Recently the U.S. and ROK underscored this effort in two high-profile events. First was the trilateral meeting between the U.S., ROK and Japan held in Washington D.C. Then last week Admiral Mullen led a joint DoD and State Department delegation to Seoul. After a full day of very productive consultations, ADM Mullen was emphatic about America's support to the ROK and warned North Korea not to mistake the restraint they see today for a lack of resolve.

The Senior Delegation led by Admiral Mullen reaffirmed our commitment to the ROK - U.S. Alliance and our resolve to meet our mutual security objectives on the peninsula and in the region. An increasingly belligerent North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is clearly a regional problem. Admiral Mullen was clear in his recent remarks that we look

forward to working together with the ROK and Japan in ensuring continued security and stability in the region and that China bears a unique responsibility to assist in guiding North Korea to act more responsibly.

Though involving less loss of life than the attack on the *Cheonan*, the North's attack on the Northwest Islands crossed a significant threshold and represents a worrying trend towards more frequent and more violent provocations. While the north may believe that they can shake Alliance resolve through these actions, it is having the opposite effect. Alliance resolve has never been stronger and we will strengthen the Alliance further still both in terms of capability and commitment.

It is difficult to determine exactly why North Korea engages in attacks and provocations, but it is likely that a complex mixture of motives and objectives are operative, including an effort to buttress regime legitimacy and cohesion among the elites, as well as to shore up succession while addressing policy goals. Our task, then, is to find ways to change North Korea's strategic calculus and end the cycle of provocations.

As we address North Korean belligerence together with our Republic of Korea allies, we continue to press on without interruption to execute the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan. When I spoke with this group last, I shared with you some of my initial thoughts regarding the new plan. Since then we have taken great strides. On October 7th, the ROK and U.S. Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff met for their annual Military Committee Meeting, followed on the next day by the 42nd annual Security Consultative Meeting between the ROK Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense.

At the SCM the ROK Minister of National Defense and Secretary of Defense Gates signed the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation and Strategic Alliance 2015. These agreements provide a blueprint for the implementation of the Joint Vision Statement, signed by our presidents on in June of 2009, and provide the necessary structure and process for us to build a comprehensive strategic alliance.

The Secretary and the Minister pledged that the ROK and U.S. will continue to enhance close Alliance

cooperation to address a broad range of global security challenges by broadening and deepening the scope of Alliance cooperation with particular emphasis on a whole of government approach.

During ADM Mullen's recent visit, he consulted with ROK Chairman of the Joint Staff General Han Min-koo. Both our countries reconfirmed that we need to ensure our plans, our force posture, our training and our exercises are focused on full-spectrum operations to deter, and if necessary defeat, a rapidly evolving threat. We will conduct more combined exercises to ensure increased interoperability in critical locations and in war-fighting capabilities, including command, control, communications and intelligence in a command structure where the US is in a supporting role to the ROK. We are taking a long-term view that ensures our near term actions are guided by the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework as laid out at the SCM.

Strategic Alliance 2015 provides the necessary structure and processes to operationalize the Defense Guidelines and Strategic Vision. SA 2015 is a comprehensive implementation plan that allows the Alliance to synchronize multiple key initiatives to better align with the transfer of wartime operational control and ensure that we progress toward important objectives effectively and in a manner that maximizes the benefits of each element of SA 2015.

Our ongoing efforts to implement SA 2015 are already yielding benefits that I believe will render us better able to address, deter, and respond to these North Korean limited attacks. For example, we continue to make progress in improved coordination, in exercises, planning, and C4ISR capabilities.

SA 2015 lays the foundation that enables us to realize the full extent of our Alliance's capabilities to not only deter or defeat a full scale North Korea attack, but also to enable us to better address limited attacks. Further SA 2015 enables a greater contribution to peace and stability in Asia and around the world. It is an important step in support of the goals contained in the U.S. Global Posture Review that lays out a plan for the continued forward presence of U.S. forces in this region.

We will regularly assess and review Strategic Alliance 2015 at the annual SCM/MCM through 2015, with particular attention paid to the evolving North Korean threat. At the Security Consultative Meeting this past October the Secretary and Minister noted the importance of the OPCON Certification Plan in ensuring that the transition is implemented with validation that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless. This includes a U.S. commitment to provide specific bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities and to provide certain enduring capabilities for the life of the Alliance.

The key elements of SA 2015 include the following:

First, Realistic plans and exercises based on the full range of possible North Korean actions including provocations, limited attack, and full out direct attack

Second, changing our ROK-U.S. organizational structures and command and control relationships by 2015

Third, development of additional ROK capabilities that allow them to lead the warfight

Finally, realizing greater efficiency by consolidation of U.S. forces into two enduring hubs around Pyeongtaek and Daegu

SA 2015 is about much more than the transition of war Operational Control. It synchronizes on-going initiatives using a whole of government approach to propel the Alliance into the future. Recent North Korean provocations and attacks only serve to highlight the criticality of the increased capabilities and deterrent value that will result from the full implementation of SA 2015.

An important aspect of SA 2015 is the continual adaptation of our exercise and training program to ensure that we provide the most realistic training possible. In light of recent events we will seek ways to further adapt our exercises to address limited, as well as full scale, North Korean attacks. All of our exercises are designed to improve our interoperability and demonstrate unwavering Alliance resolve to maintain peace and sta-

bility in the region.

The recently planned and executed series of naval and air readiness exercises provide an example of how the agile, adaptive alliance envisioned by SA 2015 will make us more responsive to future threats and more able to execute them in a very compressed timeline.

We have successfully executed three exercises in this on-going series. Operation Invincible Spirit was the first of the series and was completed on July 29th, soon after the completion of the 2 + 2 meeting here in Seoul. The second exercise in this series was an anti-submarine warfare exercise conducted in the seas off the west coast of Korea in September. The ASW exercise served to improve the readiness and proficiency to defend against subsurface attacks by the U.S. and ROK forces. Our most recent exercise involved the Carrier Strike Group George Washington, which allowed the alliance to improve interoperability and combined command and control. We will also take advantage of our biannual theater level exercises, Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian and other future exercises to continue to improve our alliance capabilities and readiness to respond to not only limited North Korean attacks but also a north Korean full out attack.

In addition to our alliance exercises, the Republic of Korea is involved in a number of other regional multinational exercises each year. Recently the ROK hosted a 15-nation Proliferation Security Initiative exercise. I greatly applaud the Republic of Korea's continued leadership in not only regional affairs but also in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations around the globe.

The consolidation of U.S. forces into two enduring hubs is another important aspect of SA 2015. Under the Land Partnership Program and Yongsan Relocation Program, otherwise known as LPP and YRP, U.S. Forces in Korea will consolidate into two enduring hubs, beginning in 2012, the relocation should be complete around 2016 allowing for the eventual reduction of the U.S. footprint from 110 camps down to 48 installations. To be clear, this does not translate into a reduction of our forces. Our strength on the peninsula will stay at its

current level for the foreseeable future.

Consolidation of forces is an important enabler of tour normalization, another initiative aimed at both increasing the effectiveness of the Alliance and sustaining the Alliance well into the future. Presently the vast majority of the service members serving with U.S. Forces Korea come on one -year unaccompanied tours. In the future through tour normalization we will give the option to our service members to come to Korea on a two-year unaccompanied tour or a three-year accompanied tour.

As we normalize tours we significantly enhance the effectiveness of our forces. Tour normalization enables further increases in the realism and efficiency of our training and exercise program, and provides a more capable force to respond to North Korea's continued belligerence.

Tour normalization is important to the Alliance in more than just a purely military sense. There is no reason that families should not be together here in Korea, one of the world's most vibrant and dynamic societies. Allowing families to accompany their U.S. service member to Korea lowers the level of stress for service members who have deployed many times.

Ultimately, the ROK-U.S. Alliance is a relationship between two peoples and by bringing more families to Korea I believe we will build stronger bonds between our countries. In much the same way that Korean students have studied in the U.S. and served as an important bridge between cultures, I believe that our military families do the same. There is no greater signal of our confidence in the importance and capability of the Alliance than the presence of our families now and in the future.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance is about more than North Korea. Based on our shared values, our countries are primed to cooperate and act on a global basis to contribute to international security. One of the cornerstone strategic documents underpinning our goals, and the bilateral policy document that SA 2015 is designed to operationalize, is the Joint Vision for the Alliance approved by Presidents Lee and Obama in June 2009.

Through the Joint Vision Statement, we have committed to building a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope. While SA 2015 is an enabler for full realization of this vision, the incremental milestones in the plan allow for continual progress.

As the ROK-U.S. Alliance becomes stronger and more agile under SA 2015, it becomes a contributor in the broader Pacific context, and in so doing increases regional transparency and understanding. In the near term we also look forward to dispatching troops from the peninsula to participate in a range of regional military exercises and should they be required, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions.

One example is USFK's recent support of the deployment of the ROK Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan. We worked closely with the deploying ROK team, providing crucial information and intelligence. We also embedded a small contingent from USFK into this PRT to support the PRT's mission and ensure an effective link between the PRT, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan.

President Lee has discussed his vision for an expanded global role for the ROK. Regarding the ROK's military role, President Lee said,

Our military should actively cooperate with the international society when the need arises for us to contribute to world peace and security.

As we move forward implementing the vision of our presidents, we look forward to engaging in a range of military cooperation and security assistance activities where the interests of the ROK, the U.S. and the region are all aligned. I look forward to U.S. Forces Korea facilitating and supporting the ROK military in these regional and global initiatives.

I envision an Alliance in the future that is not only designed to counter nation-state threats, but is also prepared to respond to and manage a range of non-traditional security challenges directly as an Alliance, or by providing the necessary stability and security on the Peninsula, and in the region, that enables the nations of

the region to independently and collectively determine and execute responses. Again, going back to the Joint Vision Statement, our presidents committed to working closely to address a broad range of challenges. The habits of cooperative action and the capacity building achieved through bilateral and multi-lateral training opportunities are the keys that will allow us to meet future challenges.

The Joint Vision also addresses peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and development assistance. In a world where some of our greatest challenges are found not in opposing nation states but rather derive from non-state actors and the chaos they engender, peacekeeping and development assistance are indispensable and I believe the ROK is committed to tackling these challenges.

America's alliances provide strategic latitude and confidence to our partners in the region to adopt novel approaches to tackling challenges and in weaving rising powers into the fabric of Asia in ways consistent with our shared political and economic values. The U.S. presence and system of Alliances increases the prospects for creating such a set of constructive bilateral and multilateral relationships.

North Korea poses a significant threat to the Northeast Asia region as it continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile efforts. It will take the ROK-U.S. Alliance, as well as support from other regional allies to

work to change North Korea's strategic calculus and to break the cycle of provocations. The enhanced readiness, improved capabilities, and an overall force posture that will better allow us to anticipate provocations, to deter them, and to respond rapidly, proportionately, and decisively to those that do occur. Our message to North Korea is clear, we will not tolerate attacks against the civilian population and all provocations will be met with the utmost response that the combined ROK -U.S. instruments of national power can bring to bear and that the laws of land warfare permit.

I also call on North Korea to cease its development and testing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations Security Council and every responsible nation in the region have called on the north to abandon these weapons programs. The ROK -U.S. Alliance remains strong will not be intimidated by North Korean threats and SA 2015 will enable us to successfully counter any threat North Korea may wield.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance is a vital element in providing security, stability, and prosperity on the peninsula and in the region. The Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan will ensure that we will be strong and ready to take up this enhanced regional role and that we will always be prepared to deter North Korean aggression and to fight and win if deterrence fails. Thank you very much for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions. ■

Program of the Conference

Date: December 15, 2010

Venue: Yeong Bin Gwan, Hotel Shilla, Seoul

08:40-09:00	Registration	Venue: Emerald, Young Bin Gwan
09:00-10:00	Opening Session	
	Opening Remarks	Sook-Jong Lee, President of EAI
	Welcome Remarks	Sun-Gi Kim, Mayor of Pyeongtaek City
	Congratulatory Address	Hong-Koo Lee, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, EAI Yoo Chul Won, Chairman of the National Defense Committee
	Keynote Speech	RADM Phil Wisecup, USN, President of Naval War College
10:00-12:00	Session 1	The Changing Strategic Environment and Its Implications for The Alliance
	Moderator	Sook-Jong Lee, President of the EAI
	Presenters	“The Rise of China” Victor Cha, Professor of Georgetown University “The Threat from the North” Kang Choi, Professor of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security “Going Global: The U.S-ROK Alliance Beyond East Asia” Evans Revere, Senior Director of the Albright Stonebridge Group
	Discussants	Woosuk Choi, Journalist of Chosun Ilbo Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor of the CNAS Abraham Denmark, Fellow of the CNAS Sukhee Han, Professor of Yonsei University Hyeong Jin Kim, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Sang-Hyun Lee, Senior Research Fellow of Sejong Institute
12:10-13:50	Luncheon	Venue: Topaz, Young Bin Gwan
	Speaker	Seong-Min Yoo, Congressmen of Grand National Party
14:00-15:30	Session 2	Non-Military Planning for DPRK Collapse
	Moderator	Abraham Denmark, Fellow of the CNAS
	Presenters	“Scenarios, Priorities, and Joint Planning” Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor of the CNAS “ROK Non-Military Planning for DPRK Collapse” Beomchul Shin, Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
	Discussants	Victor Cha, Professor of Georgetown University Namhoon Cho, Senior Research Fellow of the Korea Institute For Defense Analyses Dongho Jo, Professor of Ewha Womans University Young Se Kwon, Congressman of Grand National Party Evans Revere, Senior Director of the Albright Stonebridge Group Seongji Woo, Professor of Kyung Hee University

15:30–15:40	Coffee Break	
15:40–17:40	Session 3	The Future of ROK–U.S. Military Alliance
	Moderator	Young-Sun Ha, Professor of Seoul National University
	Presenters	“Adapting the Alliance for Future Challenges” Abraham Denmark, Fellow of the CNAS “The Future of the ROK Military: What Does the ROK Need?” Du Hyeogn Cha, Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses “Alliance Management and the Evolving Alliance” Markus Garlauskas, Chief of the Strategy Division, United States Forces Korea
	Discussants	Victor Cha, Professor of Georgetown University Nam Hoon Cho, Senior Research Fellow of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor of the CNAS Chaibong Hahm, Director of Asan Institute for Policy Studies Jin Ha Hwang, Congressman of Grand National Party Evans Revere, Senior Director of the Albright Stonebridge Group Seongho Sheen, Professor of Seoul National University Yong-Weon Yoo, Military Professional Journalist of Chosun Ilbo
18:30-20:00	Dinner	Venue: Lilac, 3F
	Speaker	Gen. Walter Sharp, USA, Commander of United States Forces Korea