

Session II Cluster 2 Transcript

Moderator

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This product presents
speech transcript deli-
vered at the MASI 2010
Annual Meeting.

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MacArthur Asia Security Initiative 2010 Annual Meeting

Session II. Cluster Discussion Cluster 2. Northeast Asia

August 6, 2010

- **Date:** July 8, 2010, 14:00~15:20
- **Venue:** Grand Ballroom, Westin Chosun Seoul

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

What we did last year was introduce ourselves. Since we have a limit in budget and since we do not have a format for this meeting, let's share what our research materials and plans are. We have new plans in EAI: making some progress in advancing our writing materials, but we need to expand our mother institutions. But it's not systematic so one purpose for this ASI network is not just to produce research outcomes but also to establish networks to learn from each other. We have some plans for the second year. What I suggest is we take turns to introduce ourselves and your institution, your evaluation of one year's performance. Then we can talk about very freely what we are going to do for the next year. Is there any suggestion for the meeting? (No answer) Okay. May I ask Professor Yen to start?

Tiehlin Yen

Thank you Doctor Chun. What actually I have been talking about in the last session regarding the Institute of International Relations in Chengchi University; what we've been thinking and what we have done. I really have to emphasize that the center for security studies under IIR in Chengchi University is a newly established institute, only established last November, purely based on the funding provided by the MacArthur Foundation. The director of the center Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu was supposed to be here. He had an idea probably 5 years ago, to get

funding from the United States then do the cross strait peace research and eventually, hopefully, that our research would be useful for the cross strait peace and stability. Based on one of my observations, it would be very promising. Because only within the first 6 months, we have been very successful in terms of the exchanges between our institutions and the several different institutions in China.

I got an impression that when I arrived here, and I gained touch with all the participants, everyone knows F. Everybody was asking "do you know F?" So he has been very very successful, that's for sure, and I believe his idea has been shared by everybody here. And he made things happen. And in the very short period of time we had very big project

Like I said in the first session, at the end of this month, there is going to be the PhD. students engaging with each other discussing the future of China and Taiwan together – a one week program. And it will continue, next year, and the year after next. It will be institutionalized if we can get more funding. Hopefully Korean foundation might want to help.

The second big issue is after signed the AFGA, the Free Trade Agreement with China only just last week, people are talking about what's next? Are we going to discuss political issues in the near future or not? There is a lot of debate. There are pros and cons. The current government is working on that. I believe the other side is considering this as well. Because talking about economic issues is already ... we already have a mechanism, already have a system which is not... There is no way to turn

backwards. So what we are really looking at is if there's a possibility that China would initiate something like a signed peace agreement to end hostilities between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If that kind of thing happens, if Hu Jintao in the next 3 to 6 months time, or the end of this year, makes a speech like year 2008, makes a 6 point, us a framework for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to get engaging with each other, saying that we would like to engage with Taiwan to talking about signed peace agreement to end hostilities, what will be the response of the Taiwanese Government? It is a big issue. There is a lot of debate currently in our academic journal public and also in the last slat of yen.

I believe the current administration sees that coming. It's coming soon. And we also believe based on our observations President Hu Jintao has his own personal sense of nation, his own crusade, he wants to leave a legacy. In the year before he steps down in the year 2012, in terms of a cross strait relationship, even though he might not be able to see the unification of Taiwan in his lifetime, he wants to leave a legacy that makes this exchange mechanism between both sides of the Taiwan Strait a permanent one, which is irreversible. No matter which person is in power or the next generation political leadership... no matter what happens, the mechanism will be always there. The devotion between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the people exchange will be still there, will be going on, down the road, forever. So, if that observation is true, sooner or later before the year 2012, something will happen. Something like Hu Jintao publicly announces "we want to sign an agreement." So lots of preparation will be there for us to do. So our institution has mandated ourselves. We have to prepare for that, in terms of a political dialog and in terms of a military confidence building. This institution, Center for Security Studies has to engage in this kind of dialog first. We are thinking we can serve as a platform to let both sides of the active duty officers or people with influence to come to Taiwan or have conferences in the third country or in mainland China to talk about what will be, what will happen, what strategies for both sides that we can bring to the political discussion then help both governments, both

regimes, to understand the issue, understand the challenges, understand the obstacles, the difficulties and find a way to proceed this dialog that makes this cross strait relationship develop positively forever. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

And what kind of research outputs are you focusing on? Like books, or briefings?

Tiehlin Yen

I believe I haven't made myself clear in the first place. I'm really sorry about that. This institute has just been established. That's the first 6 months time. This organization, we have about 30 scholars. Mainly they play part time roles. We divide them into 4 groups. The first is the Defense group talking about cross strait military balance. The second one is the National Security group, talking about regional connections, focused more on the neighboring country's support for cross strait dialog, most importantly, in the future political dialogs and military dialog. For Taiwan, we have to consider, the Taiwan government needs to consider what's the opinion of the opposition party, the general public, and also the opinion of the United States, Japan, and South Korea especially, regarding the future political dialog and the military dialog. The third one is a non-traditional security group. We focus on Taiwan, with a 300,000 armed forces, we do have the capability to conduct the humanitarian assistance, disaster relief kind of work, but this kind of capability Taiwan can contribute. But unfortunately we have never done that, number one is because, China feels not comfortable with Taiwan sending out military capabilities overseas to help do the disaster relief or humanitarian assistance kind of work, secondly the international community does not feel it is appropriate because they worry about Chinese might oppose that the whole thing may be undermined if Taiwan sends out the military force to do these kinds of things. But we really want to emphasize that we have about 200 helicopter fleets, that we have amphibious kind of ships that definitely can contribute if there is another tsunami, or disaster or earthquake. This capability, if you don't use it, it is a waste, sit-

ting there doing nothing, training for the future, an unthinkable kind of scenario, which is no good. We do want to contribute. And at this very moment, our parliament is discussing mandatorily asking the Taiwan armed forces to put the disaster relief as one of the main missions of our military. How do we use the capability we already own to help the international community when there is a disaster happening there. That's the third group. The last one has to be the cross strait relations. That's exactly what I've been talking about. Many focus on the cross strait relations, doing the student exchange, fostering the future leadership, the future elite, understanding each other, in order to, when they are in power, when they are in important positions, they can make decisions based on what they learned when they were young. What they understand about both sides' situations, they will make their own decisions instead of precipitate kind of type. So, there haven't been any specific publications so far, but eventually, over the time we're thinking our research would be fruitful. Because those 30 different scholars, they are working on this. At the end of this year, there might be, we might have a couple of publications but since they are part time, so we don't have the right to ask them, "You have to write something about us." But we have a meeting every now and then, basically once a month, we have a policy dialog inviting the ministers of foreign affairs, defense and also mainland think tanks to talk about all the public issues and policy issues. And also we invited the ambassadors. We call them ambassadors even though we don't have a diplomatic relationship, the director and division chiefs, to give us their point of view, the American point of view on the cross strait issue, all those kind of things. I believe, next year, our annual book will be very, very fruitful. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you very much. You gave us a very good description of the research theme that the institution is going to focus on next year. I think it is more expanded and more well-specified than I heard last year. Thank you very much. Professor, Ferchen, if you...?

Matthew Ferchen

Thank you. So again, Mat Ferchen, of Tsinghua University, Department of International Relations. My overview of this will actually reflects a little bit of my status in the department which is fairly new, and some of the projects are fairly new. I am more familiar with one of the two aspects. Then the others will talk a little bit more about that.

But basically, two related projects; there's the one that's been newly inaugurated as of March, the International Security Forum. And in fact, I've just put out a couple of the publications out in the hallway that have arisen from that. And the first of those was on global nuclear non-proliferation. And there was a conference and a short publication related to that. And then, a more recent conference and publication on East Asian regional monetary integration. And so the plan for this is to for our institution to host every year approximately four different conferences, again with relatively brief publications related to that.

And the other main project that's funded by MacArthur Foundation money in our department is the Chinese Journal of International Politics for which I'm the editor. And I guess the major transition that has happened in the last year with the journal is that we've gone from being biannual to quarterly, and so many of the challenges that we face are directly related to this, and at lunch we were actually having a conversation about some of the challenges we face with this. So originally, the journal was involved in trying to express and public views and research from within China about Chinese foreign policy, about Chinese ways of thinking, about international relations. And so many of our publications were taken, were translated from already published Chinese language articles. We continue to do some of that, but we want to have a mix now of viewpoints from both within China and outside of China on three different focuses.

The first of them is just general IR theory and foreign policy related to East Asia or to China. A second area being China's rise, both in economic and in strategic sense. And then the third area of interest is in, Chinese ideas about foreign policy. So we continue to have these three areas of focus. And now the real challenges are how to both get a

greater mix of submissions to the journal from scholars both within China and outside of China and then also trying to ensure that the range of issues that is discussed reflect these three core areas that we have. And going from a semiannual to a quarterly publication schedule is really the key challenge with this, trying to get out information, trying to make sure that people know about the journal around the world, and so, and then trying to get, because it's a peer reviewed journal, and one of the peer reviewed journals in English edited in China, one of the goals is to really try to get a mix of opinion of both from within the region and then also from institutions, many in the United States and in Europe. So, the goal is to really trying to get this balance of both submissions and then feedback on the review side. And so far, it's been a challenge to try to really increase the number of submissions and the other side of this is then, it was also talked about briefly at lunch, is how to achieve the status of a SSCI standard journal, that's one of the other elements of this. So these are all integrated challenges going into the future. I think that's about it.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you very much. Very concrete description. Thank you. Professor Gu

Jing Gu

Thank you. I graduated from Tsinghua last year. And now I teach in Sun Yat Sen University at Gwangzhou. MacArthur Foundation gave valuable support to the Institute of International Strategies and Developmental studies. The project is mainly focused on the cross strait relations and the Taiwan issue between the United States and China. In the last year, Professor Chu organized three or four meetings covering political, economic, and security issues between Taiwan Strait and between China and the United States. And, this year, we will hold some exchange program between Taiwan Straits. The project strengthened the communication among 3 parties - Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States' understanding of the status quo and the future development of the Taiwan issues. That's all. Thank you.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you. Last year Prof. Chu Shu Long was explaining the main research project. The theme, the cross strait relations, I think there has been a progress in producing conferences and results. Thank you. We have Jennifer Lee with Marcus Nolan.

Jennifer Lee

Hello I am Jennifer Lee from Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington DC. I work with the deputy director and senior fellow, Marcus Nolan, and he couldn't be here. And so, and actually as an institution we are very focused on international trade and finance, so it's all about like G20 or the economic crisis but Marcus and I, we focus a lot on North Korean issues.

So with MacArthur Foundation funds, most recently we have been working on refugee surveys conducted in China and South Korea. We have about like more than thousand samples and through this, we have the questionnaire involves their prison camps issues and economic situation in the country, and the perceptions towards the regime of the general public. And so, we have written a lot of papers in the peer review journals. And, because this is North Korea that we're dealing with, sometimes we have long term projects but at the same time like when new things come up, we kind of have to like shift and then do something with those. So, like when the sanctions was imposed under UNSCR 1874, then we would kind of see how and what kind of effects that has to the North Korean people and if the luxury goods sanctions is actually working, and all that stuff, which it wasn't. And then when the currency revaluation occurred November last year, we kind of tried to see what impact it had on the rural areas and the urban areas, and what the food situation is there. And unlike other North Korean experts, we try to look at the economics aspects of it, but because this is North Korea again, like, there's a lot of politics going into it, and we also look at like human rights issues. So, there's like an array of things that we deal with. And, after the refugee surveys of the project, we moved onto the investment, Chinese and South Korea firms investing in North Korea right

now, and we did a huge survey in China, but we recently did a survey in South Korea, and following the current events, like, we're seeing how the Gaesung industrial complex is going to work out and stuff like that. So, like, it's very interesting, and we're in the middle of doing the quantitative analysis on that, and hopefully, we'll be able to give more information about North Korea to the outside people. And also, we have a book coming out in fall, for the general public, so not for experts anyone like that. So, hopefully that will be a good information source. Thank you.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

I will enjoy reading that book. Thank you. Professor Guo?

Xuetang Guo

My name is Xuetang Guo. First of all, let me express my sincere thanks to the hosts, Professor Lee and Professor Chun. Thank you for your invitation. It is honorable to be here and very insightful and a beautiful discussion. And, a very good place for a meeting place.

So, actually I am affiliated with Rimpac at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. But also I am working for the Center for Strategies and International Studies of Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. Actually it's my university here. So, Professor Ten Chi Mao is the director of the Rimpac, recommended me to be here. As for presence, Rimpac to join the conference, really very impressive, and important.

I would like to introduce a little bit about our research project, both actually. We are, interesting to harvest the name of the two centers, almost the same, just that this Rimpac, there is no word, Rimpac and Strategies & International Studies. So from the names of the centers you can see that we focus more on strategic studies. But for myself, I do China foreign strategy, and sometimes did more on China geopolitics. How China looks at the world and regional order from a strategic view while China is growing as a big power. And do also more sometimes on politics studies, China's foreign policy.

With regard to that of progress, as I, or some mates to that. Jose here, the organizer here, proposed 2 programs,

but actually we have done similar ones already. First of all, first one of this, East Asia security issues and the regionalism in East Asia, and the way of regionalism in this region. For the past 10 years, almost 10 years, from the early 2002, when China entered the WTO and China also planning to abuse their free trade rules in Asian countries, that China's view of the regional order, I think, had already, had been changing, as you can see from the debates on Chinese diplomatic principles early, from the early this century, from 2003, after China entered the WTO. So, for almost seven years, China has been talking about how we change our ideas about the regional order. So when we talk about regional order, regional identity is one of a way to see how regional identity moves forward. Without regional identity, you cannot find actually progress of regionalism. Actually, you have no driving forces here. But for the past 8 to 10 years we have the right to build the frameworks like ASEAN plus one, ASEAN plus three, Asia Pacific Security framework, and APEC, and other East Asian summits and others. The problem is, who will be the driving forces. Who will be the pilot. Can ASEAN play the role that can lead the regional identity building process? And there is something, debates, some doubts on this topic. And how about China? How about Japan, how about South Korea? That means people are talking about, there's no leaders here. Even if Asian country can be the dominant power that can lead the progress. But for the past 5 years, you can say Asian problems, internal problems, they have their social problems, security problems that even they cannot solve among themselves. It means that they don't have their own identity, even among the Asian powers. So, when we talk about this program, the East Asia Security as regionalism, from my point of view, as I am thinking about multilateralization in East Asia, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea, or they have already a trilateralism summit mechanism now, in process or now 3 years, but how do these three powers work together, to lead East Asia regionalism?

Why I put so much attention to regionalism in East Asia, it's because I see the world order, issues like a European Union integration, for Latin America, for the South

African countries, for NAFTA, every region has their own government to government organizations, but the one important phenomenon is there are no other powers, outsiders who can play a big role in this regional identity, or this regionalism. So, ASEAN countries, and plus three in East Asian regionalism should have the same way. Regionally become benefit to regional countries, not only to China, to South Korea, to Japan, and Russian countries. The European Union, as a regionalism, and as a regional identity also benefit for European countries. So, everybody knows that. The problem is how we solve our internal problems, from the security views to economic views and other cultural views even. So for China, Japan, and South Korea, regionally big powers in this region. How do they work together? To deal with the regional security problems, like the North Korean nuclear crisis. How we, the big powers, deal with our economic disputes, trade issues. If we, big powers, the regional big powers, works hard together to move forward rapidly, that means we can make this regional rhythm be built, on a kind of a psychological situation that means we have a regional identity.

So, regionalism first is from the psychological and the social level, that we should build a regional identity. For China, Japan, and South Korea, when we talk about the North Korean issues, we say this is our regional issue. If we move forward to that step, I think regionally our region will be more stable. So China will regard North Korean issue: "it's our Northeast Asian region issue, problem. We should do among ourselves." Then it would be a very, very big step for East Asian regionalism, and integration. So, for this program, East Asia Security and Regionalism: the heart, the core issue in this process, is China, South Korea, and Japan cooperation. So we have many opportunities and also we have many obstacles, these are listed in my future plans submittals.

The second program makes about, also similar, but it talks about more about China, Chinese views and Chinese strategic choices. How China deals with the regional identity difficulties. It's not only China. It's the regional powers together, particularly China, Japan and South Korea. So, on that base, identity or understanding of regional issues, re-

gional identity, China will have a different thinking about ASEAN's role than Japan and South Korea. So when Chinese scholars say, put forward that ASEAN should be, China, Japan and South Korea will be the leading, driving forces in the regional identity or regionalism, ASEAN countries said, will be feared "oh, why you do this?" You know, they have some pictures of that. Actually, this idea is coming from, or the whole, for the whole, the idea is to improve the whole region's regional identity, not only for the Northeast Asia but it is just the beginning of the regional identity.

Another issue is China's perspectives on Japan and South Korea's role in this process. In China, there are some scholars who are very suspicious of South Korea's intentions and Japan's intentions when they put forward that they should play a big role in regional issues. For example, the year before, when the former Japanese Prime Minister proposed East Asia Community just a few Chinese scholars said, "this is kind of a inroad that leads to regional order." Actually, China should change that. For South Korea the same.

Mr. Lee Jin-woo, the president of the Committee of the G-20, proposed that the non G-8 members, countries play a more important role in the process. I think China should strongly support this kind of ideas, you know, China is one of the non G-8 countries, it should do that. China should also change our mind, "don't worry about our neighbors that propose." All these processes, all these actions, is actually if you look at it from a strategic view or a broad view, these kind of moving forces to put forward regional identity, regionalism in this region. So, if you look at it from this perspective, it is unnecessary to overreact it. So this is another result, we should do more about another program, how China should react to these issues.

The third is actually not my specific area but I've looked at it also from a China's Foreign Strategic Review, it's about Taiwan. Professor Yuan, you know, he is you know famous at the topic, he is the chief leader here on Taiwan issue and Cross Strait relations. I do more, personally, I do more on this topic from a China-America relations perspective. From a Chinese foreign strategy view,

Taiwan is just one part of Chinese foreign strategy and how we deal with and maintain the status quo between ourselves and also how we deal with the United States when we talk about Taiwan. But it is now also the key for my point of view in Chinese foreign policy, we should focus, put so much energy or money on that topic, strategically thinking. The Taiwan issue is also a sovereignty issue. It should care more about only the core interests. China should do more to bring Taiwan back. We should take time you know. I agree with that. But the end of our policy, that is the purpose of our policy is to do that. That is our final purpose. That is national interest.

So these are the three programs here in our centers we do. And also I would like to mention that the Center for Strategies and International Studies in my university is very young. I should not say here that we are doing very deep research, or very famous. It means that we are very young, we should learn a lot from EAI and other think tanks, we have so many, many, friends who we hope who can help us. But I believe as even we are young, when we are young university, when we are a young center, but we are hopeful, we are doing more on the projects. Thank you so much.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you very much. With Professor Guo with Rimpac, I think the project became more dynamic than Professor Ten Chi Mao first proposed. And we have a very strong Chinese representation and maybe in the future you have much more in common for the cooperative research for the second and third years. Okay Professor Lee, please?

Shin-wha Lee

Thank you. Well, actually, I'm not the right person to present about Ilmin project because although I was a core member of the preparatory meetings when we prepare for applications. After we got the fund, I left for New York to spend my sabbatical year. So virtually what has happening last year was with my absence. But still Professor Sung-han Kim said we don't have to present anything just to sit here. And we only prepared three page like a, kind of the

achievement report, but since I have a microphone here, let me just try to say what I know, but that doesn't necessarily I am fully representing Ilman Institute.

Well, our project title is kind of future of North Korea in more standardized form, but when we made this application together with the Professor Hyun In-taek, who stepped down as a director here after he got appointed as a Minister of Unification, we sat down together to think about what will be more attractive terminology to attract the funder. So that we came up with "The Day after Tomorrow." No "The Day after Tomorrow" is the environment issue, isn't it? "The Day after." I think that's it. "The Day After." (laughing) That means like, we are interested in different scenarios of North Korea's possible collapse or like a possible regime change. But instead of we think about those scenarios which have been studied a lot, we wanted to focus on what happens right after the collapse or right after the contingency.

So that was the idea, and we start to think about three different stages. First of all, although like types of contingencies or types of the North Korean crises have been much talked, it would be still valuable because unless we know those the types it's very hard to make like a proper response to those crises or those contingencies. So we decided to have a kind of preparatory meetings, and like a build up stages for the first year including the types of the contingencies and what we mean by state failures, compared to other types of the state failures around the world. So that was the first year that I missed.

In the second year, I just came in the middle, is about a consequences of the North Korean contingencies. So not only like a political security consequences, we also spend some time for social consequences, and like even environmental and humanitarian consequences of course, and legal consequences of the North Korea's collapse or North Korea's contingencies.

And in third year, which will be next year, mainly we will think about policy implications. Because the academic, like a, in-depth study is very important to think about those phenomenon, but since North Korea issue is a changing, rapidly evolving subject, unless we are closely

working with the policy making circle, it is very hard to making a viable option to deal with North Korea. So that we will more concentrate on those policy implications next year.

So, little bit detail thing is, first of all for the first stage, that we inviting some various scholars from difference expertise, not necessarily political science or security experts, but also we inviting some professor of the philosophy, and also professors of sociology and even professor of the law. And so we just inviting the various professors groups to discuss about their interpretations or their perspectives on state failures or contingencies. And, we, when I say we in Ilmin Institute, have kind of 3 different big chunks: one is traditional security cluster, one is non-traditional security cluster, and another thing is all other global issues including environment, economy, or energy and others. So basically those 3 groups are there, and Professor Sung-han Kim and myself and another junior professor are working together in various issues, but this, the future of North Korea project, we also made a some kind of division of labor and then having a political security section, or humanitarian economic section, or the legal components we tried to make a work on. But, although we tried to coordinating all the work, we try not to engage in writing ourselves. We tried to invite guest writers and guest speakers, so we are now kind of the collecting all other ideas, and like the papers, of course we are analyzing and summarizing those things and eventually making a report, but what we have for policy brief and the working paper and the background paper. We have three different things. But with the exception of the background paper, the working paper and the policy brief, so far we have seven of them, just commissioned to the external people rather than internal people so that we can have a more variety and comprehensive views.

So, for the first year, roughly we think about three different types of the contingencies of the North Korea. The number one is the change of the Kim Jong-il regime. When I say the Kim Jong-il regime is, not only the change of the Kim Jong-il leadership but also the Kim Jong-il and the Kim Jong-il's people, including his son and his militaries. Number two is the regime change, from an authoritarian

regime to a democratic regime or different types of regimes which might be more favorable to the U.S. or the West rather than to China. And the third is going to be the state collapse. Just North Korea is gone. Then who is going to take care of North Korean part. While South Korea thinks since we are the same nation, reunification will be by South Korea, but that might be the wishful thinking of South Korea, right? So there are a lot of different scenarios we can come up with as well. So that, then we can think about the international response to those contingency plans, right? So in the interest of time if I just only take one example of China, when it comes to Chinese perspective, it might be the worst scenario or the second scenario, like a change of a regime from authoritarian or communist regime to a democratic or the U.S. favored regime. So probably, that's the last thing China wants to see. Of course the third part is also very complicated, but if China has no choice but to choose one of three, probably, China prefers to see the number one. Like a change of the Kim Jong-il regime. There probably, there is some kind of the room, at least a little bit of the room, for the U.S., China, South Korea, and some other country involved can cooperate and discuss about the issue. So those things are like preliminary, like a not conclusion, but discussion we made, where not necessary all participants have the same idea.

And this year, we only got half way through. We have the military and legal consequences of North Korean Collapse. We have both Korean and non Korean, international experts ...One big event left in this year is that we tried to conduct where we invite 20-30 experts to discuss the responses to different kind of North Korea contingencies. Next year, policy implications. For policy implications, we will incorporate types of the contingencies and the consequences of those collapse scenarios, and what we can do both internally and externally, collectively and legally, and maybe in humanitarian ways. So all the different classification we have now and ultimately we are aiming for next year. We should publish a book covering all those issues.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you. We just hope the Kim Jong-il regime doesn't

collapse before your scenarios are completed. Now we have a newly joined member to our cluster. Mr. Stares with very good project.

Paul B. Stares

Thank you. I would like to echo the thanks to the organizers of this meeting. It is great pleasure to be here and as Chaesung said, we are probably the most recent addition to the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Network. Our proposal was approved a few weeks ago and my remarks will be about what we intend to do rather than what we have been doing since we literally are only just starting. Our project is to looking at how to manage instability on China's periphery. It starts with the premise that security in the Asia-Pacific region is highly dependent on the U.S.-China relationship. Because of that it is incumbent on us to try to anticipate areas of potential friction even conflict between the U.S. and China. This is hardly a new focus obviously for many people working on the security issues. I would say that the traditional focus was to looking at the interactions between the strong states and traditional security issues. Our focus is more on trying to anticipate friction emanating from the weak and fragile states. We are trying to anticipate where they happen and we were struck by the fact that the countries neighboring China, the vast majority of them are actually very weak internally and suffer from all kinds of instabilities and you can see this from the various assessments produced annually in the failed state index, various assessments by various risk agencies, private and public and so on. And with few exceptions, most of states bordering China fall into this category. So the idea was to try to anticipate the potential trajectory and how the situation might worsen in some of these countries bordering China and to look at the interest the U.S. may have in these countries, the areas of potential tension between the U.S. and China and to not only anticipate how crisis might evolve but also think about how the U.S. and China could work together to prevent it from happening and moreover if it were still to happen, to try to how the U.S. and China might work together to manage the crisis and to mitigate the consequences of the crises, to prevent it from

escalating and becoming a major source of tension and instability in the region.

So the plan is to focus on 4 or 5 countries, North Korea is an obvious one where both the U.S. and China have significant interests, we have already done quite a bit of work on this area, I published on looking at contingencies in North Korea. Myanmar (Burma) is the second country, the U.S. interests are less engaged, but there are significant interests of the U.S. in the political future of Myanmar. We are concerned about how the situation may unravel over the coming years. Afghanistan and Pakistan are obviously very important where significant U.S. interests and military forces are also engaged, where we have already made the significant investments in the future of those countries so we are extremely concerned, but they are also places where China has significant interests, too. And finally, the Central Asia, we have just seen in the last few months how the situation can deteriorate in Central Asia, in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is not the only country in that area with the potential interests. So there they are 5 or 6 places we are going to focus on and we are open to other suggestions people may have to look at other areas of instability. Nepal is one area, for instance, possible spillover from problems in Tibet is another issue to consider. The idea is to do this in 2 stages, firstly to convene a workshop in Washington in November, inviting the key experts and scholars from the region focusing on those particular countries to get their sense of or their assessment of the stability of those countries and potential areas of friction between the U.S. and China as well as the corporations. And then follow it up with a more focused structure dialog with the Chinese experts that we hope to have in next spring in Beijing. As the result of that, the goal is to produce a series of structured memorandum, we call them contingency planning memos. We already produced these for other areas of the world and at the council, they become very successful series of publications at the council to the point where they actually used heavily by government officials in Washington. And the idea is to repeat the same kind of exercise for these particular countries bordering China and to engage Chinese experts in again how to prevent crises from developing and

how to manage them when they do occur. So hopefully, a year from now when we meet again, I will be able to report to you these all in a successful process and we have engaged in some very good conversations with Chinese experts and other scholars. So what I would like to hear from you and you can tell me privately suggestions for good experts in the region and in those particular countries whom we can invite to Washington in November, to make any other suggestions about the approach that we are taking, and particularly the issues we may be overlooking, areas we may be overlooking, we do not pretend to have a monopoly on common stance in these issues, so again, we are open to your suggestions. Thank you.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Thank you very much. The time is almost up so let me briefly talk about the EAI and the messages I want to share with you. As you know, the EAI has pursued 3 different issue areas: one is the future of North Korea as the Ilmin; the second one is the East Asia alliance network; and the third one is East Asia identity project involving nationalism, history, survey data, and so on. We have published 2 books, one on the future of North Korea and the second one is on the alliance network in the 21st century. And we are studying 2 new book projects and we have published several things, many working papers, issue briefings and very short-term commentaries like on the the *Cheonan* incident and so on.

Our evaluation on ourselves is that we have done fairly well with our research but from now on, I think we should do two things more. Actually I have to share this with you: One is network. As I hear, I think we are doing very well with our own projects but the basic purpose of MacArthur Foundation ASI program is to establish a network among the institutions in East Asia. So I think it is one task we have to accomplish from now on. And we have very many common themes to share so how to concretize it. One plan for the EAI is to have a program which is called Smart Talk. We have done it for many years but we want to expand it. So as of now, we have touched with Tai-

wan and Shanghai and we are planning to travel to Taipei and Shanghai and have a common, small-scale conference, very freely. So we are planning to do that. And I think you might want to do among yourselves or with the EAI. The other way is that we invite the guest writers from outside of the EAI for our working papers and issue briefings. So we invite from, at this point, we are commissioning papers to some U.S. writers and so on. So one thing we have to do is to develop our network among the ASI institutions.

The second point is the Foundation emphasizes that we have to publish a policy relevant output. It is frequently emphasized point. So we, professors and policy researchers tend to produce very academic ones but I think, at this time, based on our research outputs, we need to produce a little bit more policy relevant ideas which will make East Asia better in reality. So if you are interested in it, I think more policy relevant ideas, suggestions, some conferences with policy makers would be great the second and the third year.

So, I think we have to wrap up the session. I think we will have another chances to talk to each other in the other meetings so let's keep in touch. Thank you very much. ■