

Session III Group 2 Transcript

MacArthur Asia Security Initiative 2010 Annual Meeting

Session III. Group Discussion Group 2. East Asian Community

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Moderator

Tadashi Yamamoto

Presenters

David F. von Hippel
Brad Glosserman

Participants

Malcome Cook
Ralf Emmers
James Gannon
Jing Gu
Jennifer Lee
Sook-Jong Lee
Nikola Mirilovic
John Schaus
Xiao Fu
Daqing Yang
Tiehlin Yen
Kiho Yi
Feng Zhu

Observer

Chaesung Chun
Dongsun Park

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The East Asia Institute
909 Sampoong B/D
310-68 Euljiro 4-ga
Jung-gu
Seoul 100-786
Republic of Korea

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Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Can we get started? We're missing a couple of people, but we're five minutes into the session time, allocated session. So, let me start. If I may, I would like to say at the onset, I tend to run these things rather informally, please feel informal yourself. And so, it's about time we interact. Because we have done enough of exchange of ideas in the morning, and statements, and so forth, I think we can relax, and it still happens that we have two "relaxing" kind of characters to start the discussion. So we should be able to do that.

We are to talk about the East Asian Community and this is the same theme we took up in the morning, in Group 2. My inclination is, I ask two panelists to make a presentation, and I think I should be honest to say that the time limit will be fifteen minutes. I may be disrupting organizers', kind of , design, but from the experiences from this morning, people went beyond seven minutes limit, and I think just as well be honest and say fifteen minutes, but not more. Is that okay?

Two things that I just wish to register. There was a very interesting cluster discussion, took place just before this meeting, in between morning and then this afternoon session, and I attended that one. A couple of things. It was very noticeable in fact, I would say that two missing elements in the morning discussion were taken up rather seriously and actively in

the cluster discussion. One is the kind of the role of civil society organizations. Civil society, I don't think that there was much discussion in the morning about the role of NGOs. In fact, in my personal view, you can hit back at me, but we tended to talk about the government's role basically and G8, G20, and so forth, and not much about actors, the civil-side actors of businesses and so forth. That, I think, I'll just put on the table, something which might be useful in this discussion as well. Second one is that we talk about East Asia Community when we talk about East Asia Community. We ought to be talking about underpinnings of that community. The community is not made up of contract papers. But, in my view, it has to be underpinned by "real people," and I tend to argue that the civil society organizations can be very useful underpinnings of that kind of East Asian Community. I'm demonstrating that this is a very opinionated moderator but I will stop with that. I just wish to throw these two elements into the discussion. Hopefully that might be useful, and without any further due, I would like to call on, I am sorry, David. I am sorry, I have to look up my own paper to guide myself. David, you have fifteen minutes.

Presenter I: David F. von Hippel

Okay, thank you very much. I am very happy to be invited to make this presentation. I was invited a little bit late as a replacement for another panelist, so I hope you will give me the license to focus on the things that I understand a little better. And if I fail to mention some of the very important elements of issues for and against co-

community that you know well but I don't, that's not because they are not important. It's just because I don't understand them as well as I should.

So my memo here is "Issues for and against the Community: Security, Economy, Energy and Human Security Issues," and the way I am going to approach this is to give you a very short introduction based mostly on what's in the memo, factors supporting and opposing cooperation in East Asia, and sampling of some of the issues where East Asian cooperation would help to address some of the national and regional problems that we see before us; then present a sample methodology for assessing future cooperation options, sort of multi-attribute energy security analysis we've been using for some years developed in concert with colleagues in the region; and then a brief listing of questions for discussion. Along the way, I will show quite a number of images very briefly that illustrate some of the areas where I think there is further ground for cooperation and where looking at those cooperation options from quite a number of different perspectives is very useful.

So, I will start out with some challenges to cooperation. First of all, as we learned in the session this morning, it is very clear to everyone that there is a history in this region of conflicts and conquests, both old and relatively recent that slows down the construction of a community. But, it is its underpinning. There have been policy choices and direct intervention by others, most notably the United States that tended to pull potential participants in community in different directions: different political and cultural perspectives, and legal systems that make certain types of cooperation difficult; economic competition between nations; different perspectives on ideas from outside the region; and different geopolitical aspirations by both within and outside this region by countries that might be part of the community.

And then there is the inter-linked nature of many of these regional problems: environment and energy, and socio-cultural and political elements to many of these problems. Then various factors supporting, see the next slide, some of the regional and global circumstances that offer East Asian countries good lessons and opportunities

to cooperate include energy resource sharing. That Russian Far East region has vast energy resources that ideally could help to fuel the population centers of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. But getting together on those is non-trivial exercise. There are various opportunities for cooperation on technology development, renewable energy, energy efficiency, pollution control. They can address trans-boundary air pollution, climate change, acid rain, and so using clean development mechanisms as financing opportunity is also a possibility.

Conservation of shared environmental resources, whether they are marine resources, rivers, seas, biodiversity, avian flyways, there are a number of problems to be solved by cooperation in the environmental area. Nuclear fuel cycle cooperation to reduce the impacts and costs of building nuclear, not necessarily the power plants themselves, but dealing with the waste and making sure that those costs including those related security of nuclear materials are well dealt with in a way that enhances trust and transparency.

Cooperation on human security issues; refugees; working conditions; ethnic conflicts, some related to energy and especially environmental considerations; and collaboration on one of the things we've worked on so much, the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, which has tied international and regional systems, environmental security, human security, all in and of itself.

We have developed building on work by others, and several others have proposed some additions to it, a framework for analysis of different energy futures, energy environment futures that goes beyond what is traditionally thought of as energy security, which is having enough oil at reasonable price. To look at energy supply, yes, it's one element of total primary energy, the fractions of different fuels that might be involved, but also includes economic considerations; technological considerations, such as diversity of key technologies and research and development spending, reliance on proven technologies and adaptability; includes environmental considerations- greenhouse gases, acid gases, local air pollutant emissions, other types of water pollutants, an exposure to environmental risk, as just to

name a few; includes social and cultural elements- exposure to the risk of social and cultural conflicts of energy systems or environmental impacts of energy systems; and then military security risks- what do you need to do to secure a particular energy system from military risks. And all of these have considerable interplay between each other. Our approach is typically then to develop future scenarios that yield approximately the same services given the same number of people, the same amount of lighting, cooking, and heating and then transport, but in different ways might use different fuels. And then you compare these side by side on a bunch of different criteria not trying to weigh them, but just trying to lay it out in a transparent manner that allows you to look for robust conclusions regarding which policies might offer advantages one way or another.

So at this point, I would like to just show you some of the types of considerations, some of the types of cooperation opportunities and I am going to go through these very quickly. So, here are the results of some work we do with Japanese colleagues Show that, provided the same services with two different cases, one involving renewable energy, a lot more renewable energy and energy efficiency, you reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 33% at the end of this timeline, and you do it at a cost that is near zero. In fact, with today's oil prices it will be less than zero. Then I mentioned the sharing of resources. Here's one particular view of a bunch of different gas pipelines that could be going from Siberian, Russian Far East, down into the population, the main centers of Korea, Japan, notably in this case bypassing the DPRK, although that's not a necessity, and in fact there may be ways to bring the DPRK into that analysis.

Same thing for electrical grid connections. Here, you see the red circle surrounds the KEDO, the Korean Energy Development Organization, power plant that was being built under the grid framework. Now it is no longer, but may be again, as possibly part of a grid inter-connection system going to the Russian Far East.

Shared oil stock piles, another opportunity, you have extra refining capacity, available capacity here in Korea and in Japan, that could be used by other, in concert with other

nations, to guard against oil supply disruptions and price spikes. There is a huge growth in electricity demand, some of which will be fuelled by a growth in nuclear power, and if that happens, as that happens, there will be a number of different opportunities for regional collaboration that could reduce the risks of nuclear materials proliferation. And this particular graph shows a number of scenarios we looked at that give markedly different results, in terms of the amount of plutonium hanging around the region depending on which cooperation strategy you choose. And these cooperation strategies, again, this is cost-per-year dealing with the nuclear fuel cycle, saved 25% in Scenario IV which focuses on a particular set of technologies. Again, opportunities for cooperation where you can see different sorts of outcomes. East Asia will be, this is just Northeast Asia, is growing as a carbon dioxide emitter as its part of the world, and acid precipitation, East Asia produces most of its own acid rain. But the sharing between countries is asymmetric. So that offers an opportunity for the countries with technologies, to help reduce acid gas emissions to work with the countries that are upwind to reduce those emissions.

Then, North Korea. These are some of our results for, our estimates because nobody really knows for sure of energy use in North Korea, showing the unusual pattern of going down over the years and then sort of stagnating in the last few years. So, what do you do about that? Well, one of the things you do is you use more wood, which results in deforestation which has an impact on agriculture, and erosion, and human livelihood-a couple of pictures of deforestation going in areas of the DPRK. And so, you need to work on the demand side. Here we have some images of agriculture providing a compact fluorescent lamps in a village where we worked; of long-distance transport bicycles in rural areas of the DPRK; a truck driven by biomass gasifier, the very labor-intensive agricultural system in the DPRK; transport on trucks, transport of agricultural goods by cart, due to lack of Diesel fuel. We need to work with the DPRK based on their strengths, which are many actually. These are photos of some of the mini-hydroelectric technologies that do work pretty well. Infra-

structure for electricity generation is an important need there. When we were there, there were several factories that were being taken apart. The whole North Korean economy will basically have to be not re-built in its previous image but entirely new image in order to provide a way of peacefully feeding its population.

Again, looking at different paths into the future, choosing paths that have out of focus on energy efficiency offer a good opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, at basically negative cost and that benefit.

We have carried out a couple of engagement activities. These are some photos of our wind power project, some photos from building energy efficiency training project, which we have tried to continue, despite some of the obvious barriers. And we are working on the Korea-Japan's Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Initiative that we hope will bring in some of what we've learned in terms of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation, because nuclear fuel cycle cooperation and parity between Korea and Japan are important elements of being able to sustain the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in this region.

Sample questions for discussion is my last substantive slide here. What approaches can help foster coordinated action by an East Asian Community? Are there specific issues to be focused upon first either because they are central to the solution of others, or more tractable, or more critical? What can we learn from cooperation efforts if that's been successful for those that haven't? Does cooperation uniformly yield positive results or, are there sometimes negative consequences as well-being careful what you wish for that is? And if so, how can those negative consequences be avoided? What role can and should outside actors, including civil society, play in promoting possible cooperation within the region? Outside actors actually wouldn't necessarily include civil society. I misspoke. That would be the United States, for example as an outside actor. Have post-Cold War multilateral organizations in East Asia, they exist, but have they been effective in solving some of these problems? And what tools do we have to help to usefully analyze some of, and advance some of these prospects of cooperation?

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you very much, David. Brad, you have fifteen minutes at the normal pace of speech, if you would.

Presenter II: Brad Glosserman

See if I can do my "normal" pace. That's usually pretty quick. I'll try not to, actually.

First, it's a pleasure to be here. Second, you get sort of a reformulation of some of my rant this morning. I apologize. Hopefully, this would be more coherent. Third, for those of you who actually looked at my memo, I apologize. It is sort of a stream of consciousness, an attempt to make sense of this topic. I am not sure I succeeded. I will not however, apologize for the fact that I am not an academician. As you will abundantly become clear from this presentation and I am, at best, as I said earlier, a "small R" realist. And finally, as penultimate preliminary remark, you can probably guess that I am frustrated by the tone of this conversation. Not just here, but generally as I look into this question of Asian identity and Asian community. That I think this is a vital topic, a really important issue and I am frustrated by the lack of progress. I am frustrated by what seems to be our inability to really get at the big issues and I don't know why that is. And I won't cast dispersions unless someone buys me drinks. Finally, as a preliminary comment, I would say it's difficult to add value to this conversation. And by that, I would mean that I was sent a list of three questions to address, and they are identified: what are the factors that encourage or hinder multilateral cooperation; what's the linkage between nationalism and regional identity; are there feasible plans? I think most of us know the answers to those questions. So I am not going to rehash them. I think we've heard this morning as well and I think in other conversations.

I want to look, I try to ask the questions about what we are really talking about. And at least, answering them providing some tentative and incredibly subject of answers to them, in the interest of providing hopefully some light, maybe some heat, but also hopefully to provoke you into responding and engaging in what I hope will be an important and helpful conversation in trying to figure out what

we're dealing with here.

So, first I ask, what is "we-ness"? - which is, by the way, a great word. I don't know whoever thought that up. And I followed our discussion this morning. We talked about common interests. I don't think that works. Common interests are too broad. It doesn't make a community. It just makes people, nations, groups that have an understanding of interests. I think it takes us backward or reversal of the process.

Second, common purpose. I like that a little bit better. And Yamamoto San asked me, "threatened" this morning, to change the topic of, or to change our assignment, and asked us to define the East Asian Community ourselves. And actually, I thought about it. What I came up with: it's a multi-national construct in the context that we're talking about it, that embraces a shared purpose, and for that purpose, will sacrifice individual goods and rights. Community provides public goods and this is something I just came up with after lunch and I would just put that on the table for us to identify some of the key elements to that, whether you like that or whether it works. And I think it also goes to the comment of Mr. Park this morning about the living community. And I think it embraces as well this notion of NGOs and civil societies, in so far as if we have a common purpose, it seems to me that animating that is this notion of sacrifice. This notion of providing for the group as opposed to really focusing on individual interest, whether it's the individual or state or smaller constituency. So I will put that out there for us to think about as a working definition of communities.

Now, in my paper I note comments of Kenichi Itoh, from the Japan Forum of International Relations, a paper that he did on Asian identity in 2004. He says that we need common values that go beyond common interests. He's on the same wavelength as I am in suggesting that common interests are not enough. He says, starting from the sense of respect, the principle of equality among ourselves, we can and should build confidence among ourselves. The confidence that our neighbors will never resort to use of threat, or use of force, as a means to settle international disputes will take us to the higher level of community

building. And he goes through energy security, environmental community, ultimately he says, we must, before reaching the final stage of an East Asian Community, accomplish a "no war" community in the region. It's a very laudable statement and I like the way that it moves beyond interests. The problem I have with that is practical, my "small R" realist problem. And that is, as soon as we start talking about values in Asia, certain people get nervous. Values are not necessarily a unifying principle for this region, and is seen in many ways a deliberate way of excluding people. So values become problematic and I think we need to acknowledge that in our discussions.

So, if "we-ness" means Asian identity, that's what we are talking about by "we." Then it seems to me that several principles follow from that as well. First, how do we identify Asian identity when we can't agree on what Asia is? I mean, of course, the academics will tell us that Asia is historically a European construct, and it identifies a region East of Europe. I am quite certain that each of us, when asked to define what East Asia is, or what Asia is, will come up with completely different sense, or different group. So Asia identity becomes problematic when we can't identify what Asia is. Second, I sense an intellectual appreciation of the need for identity, but no emotional connection to identity, per se. This is especially true in Northeast Asia. I mean, we've talked all day. This entire project relates to this notion of a need for a community. For whatever the reason, we can debate that. But I don't get any emotional connection to that. More importantly and certainly, I don't get emotional connection and my confrontations and conversations with Southeast Asians any connection to Northeast Asia. So certainly I am not buying into that notion. Third, what are the common features of it? A few years ago, I was in Wilton Park Conference and we had this very discussion and we were completely flummoxed about what would constitute the features of common Asian identity. I think eventually somebody said "chopsticks." That's what defined the Asian identity and this was pretty serious policymakers and scholars. It is culture broadly defined is the most attractive. You know, the conversations I've had with the people over, since last week, since I was handed this as-

signment, you know, we talked about films and that becomes a means of creating an Asian identity of proliferation, if you will, of various national cultures. Here it even gets tricky: J-Pop, K-Pop, T-Pop, whatever. I mean, there's this sense of identity certainly among young people and they are appealed to the same group and they are all attracted by the same films, or the same music. But at the same time, if we talk about proliferation of Asian films, the way people now are making movies that have multinational cast to make sure that they appeal to all the markets, you also have blowback. When you have some people saying, "How can a person of X nationality play this role in this film?" that's an affront and that's an offense. So we've been there. We're treading on a very, very thin ice so to speak. Sports teams, I mean, I was thinking about this in the context of the World Cup. I mean, it's fascinating to me. You ask people, "Who do you cheer for when your team isn't playing?" For example, the Japanese will cheer for other Asian teams. I am not so sure if I've seen many Asian teams cheering for the Japanese when they are not playing. I liked this notion of you share the house, again, Mr. Park has mentioned, attractive. and I think maybe another way of saying that, I acknowledge I am stepping out a little bit, is Confucianism. That becomes the shared value at least in Northeast Asia, a cultural foundation if you will, for a lot of these systems. But that's speculative. I am not sure that everyone would agree with that. So, the most compelling sense of identity is one I think was mentioned this morning, which is the shared sense, the sense of shared grievance, a notion that this region is disenfranchised and poorly represented in international and regional councils. That is underappreciated and misunderstood but as I discussed this at lunch today, somebody said, "If that's the case, then why is it East Asian community? There are other regions in the world that can make the same complaint. So why is it that it becomes East Asia that becomes the common, the foundation of East Asian identity?" And frankly, I am always worried about an identity that this is founded on a negative attribute or grievance. So then I go to the question, I think I asked this morning, which is, "Does the group become the means of defining the identity?" But if this is

the case, it strikes me that ultimately our identity is artificial. In other words, go to the East Asian Vision Group's Guiding Principle No. 13: "We shall develop a shared regional identity by working together to galvanize the aspirations of our peoples, promote greater trust and confidence, and advance common interests." So it's to foster through a new sense of regional community. Except the problem is, in East Asian Vision Group we define the group and then we define identity. Seems to me if we do that, we can create any group, and create any sense of shared identity and it's an ultimately artificial process. That troubles me. Next, I turn to the poll of CSIS elites that Johnston, you get the plug for free. You look at their results of East Asian elites, and they find that the trend in Asia is toward identification with the universal rather than Asian values. And again, to look at the data, more than 80% respondents across the region demonstrates the report for establishment of an East Asian Community. They put good governance, rule of law, free and fair elections, and human rights as priorities, after confidence-building, conflict prevention, economic integration for the future regional architecture. Of their important elements, "develop a regional identity" is the lowest of all of them. Mind you, it still commands 61% approval rating but it's the last in the list. So, CSIS concludes that Asian elites are more confident in national and global institutions than regional ones. We have a problem. I would argue, and I'd attempt to be provocative, that a focus on regional identity is mistaken. One, ultimately, not to mind the academicians in the room, identity is socially constructed. It's all artificial anyway. So I am not sure that gets us very far when we try to focus on identities as our issue. Second, and this is again a realistic perspective, it is that the search for economic efficiency has driven us to larger economic arrangements yet at the same time, the very expansion of economic activity has atomized political identity. So the dilemma, or the contradiction between politics and economics essentially pulls in very different directions, and I don't know how you reconcile those tensions. And I think, in fact, Europe, in recent years has demonstrated precisely that it is a very difficult process to bring the two together.

Finally, in this context, I would say that the rest of the world really doesn't think regionally either. I mean, certainly in North America, NAFTA notwithstanding, we don't think ourselves as North Americans. We're either Canadians, Americans, United States, Americans, that shows you something about the U.S. mentality, or Mexicans. We don't think of ourselves as North Americans. And similarly, as Amitav Acharya notes, even in the EU, and he cites some research that in fact, the identities, discourses, and public spheres fostered by European institutions are still dominated by their national counterparts, or at best, coexist easily side by side with them. And I would say, take a look at the fate of the European Charter, or the European Constitution, and the last couple of elections does not give you much cause for confidence either. So maybe, regional identity isn't the route to pursue.

So, I conclude with two points: the first regards region what I call the region's dilemmas. The first is that it is precisely this process of nation-building which I think makes region building harder. It is the success the attempt of these nations to build what are essentially, young countries. The legacy of colonialism has impressed upon political elites the need to focus on national identity building, which then makes it really hard, since this is still, in many cases an ongoing process. To say, "Okay, it's enough. Let's shift our region to regionalized groups." It's not going to work. Second, leadership ambitions can undermine, or leadership dynamics undermine group ambitions, quite simply. Whether it's Japan against China, or Korea trying to find its own role in Northeast Asia, ASEAN versus the Plus Three, everybody wants to be a lead and I think that undermines the cohesion of the group as well. Third, the success of sub-regionalism makes regionalism harder. Again, John Miller, in a paper about regionalism about seven years ago, said that the reluctance highlighted that the reluctance of Southeast Asian nations to fold themselves into a larger East Asia would, they might be overshadowed by China and Japan. Having forged regional identity of their own, which is based largely on their common interest in resisting great power dictation, Southeast Asians could hardly welcome the prospect of a close East Asia in which

they would be at the mercy of their great northern neighbors. Furthermore, related to that, I would argue that the dynamism of the region, Asia's very success, is diluting the regional identity precisely because everybody wants the piece of the action. So whereas I would see, and I think most of us would probably see the ASEAN Plus Three, the Thirteen as the operative, regional principle, core component, and the fact of the matter is, the Australians and the New Zealanders want a piece of that action as well as India. So it's precisely success, which ultimately dilutes the prospects to the final problem. And finally, I would just identify the very last, two last questions, or two issues we identified this morning. And the first is, there is a fundamental problem within the United States. We are distinctly not part of Asia, but we are integral to the Asian order. How do we reconcile that? And finally, the question to ask I think is, what is "we" for? What is the purpose of this Asian identity or this Asian community? Is it to create a voice? Is it for action? We need to answer these purposes, and then we can decide who fits in the group, and how the group defines itself. Thanks.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you very much. You raised many questions, both of you, David and Brad. I think it will be a couple of hours pass very quickly, as we try to address. So, I would ask you to be brief in your interventions. But you know, I try to make questions simpler. I mean, with due respect to academicians who tend to use words to complicate matters much I mean, really, the simple question I am addressing myself is this: is East Asia Community a useful thing for those who live inside that group, or outside? And I tend to say, "Yes, it is useful." I take that position. Okay, you can blast me. And then, the second question is, what would make people part of that community? Identity question, I think. I think, do we have to be Asians to be part of East Asian Community? And also the question of, can the United States be a part of East Asian Community? You have the answer; a clear answer. I mean, the question is integral to the interest of community, but not the member of the community. That's a very good try, but I think we may have

some different ideas about that. And what's the overall purpose of East Asian Community? I mean, what is it supposed to be achieving? Are we trying to start out, what do we say, the European Community? Or, North American Community? Do we try to advance our cause by constructing that community? So, that's the kind of question I would simplify by what you guys raised.

I think David's analysis, I mean, demonstrations of North Korea, for little, confused me. Why this has to be? Is it relevant theme to be presented? And I came back to the answer, yes it is. But in any case, we are really talking about East Asian cooperation and cooperation as basis of community building. And actually, your long list of things really demonstrated many areas of cooperation where we may be achieving something, where we may not be achieving something. So in that case, I don't think we can come up with some clear-cut answers to all these complex questions at the end of discussion, but nonetheless, I think we can perhaps be a bit clearer as to what debate on the community building our questions. I hope so, and I really applaud the organizers for taking up this East Asian community as the major theme of the discussion because this is going to be discussed from here on by many people. And I think we may be able to make some contribution out of this discussion. So with that, may I go to the people? Please raise your hand, or raise your plate. Ralf?

Ralf Emmers

Thank you very much. I would like to make a comment and then ask perhaps, a question to Brad. I think the comment first. I think, maybe, what we need to keep in mind is to make distinct institutions that have a particular function, and a community with a "big C" which as you argue, forcefully and rightly would need to be constructed around a certain sense of identity. Now, my question to you though is, can such a community be manufactured? Can it be created? I would argue no, not really, and here I would like to make a parallel with Europe because you made some comparisons with Europe. If you are talking about European identity, or European community with a "big C," I think the European Union has very little, in no way really

contributed to that sense of "European-ness." The sense of "European-ness" is the result of the fact that the continent was a battlefield for a thousand years and at some point we reached a conclusion in Europe, well frankly, better to have a common future rather than to continue fighting with one another. The European Union as an institution is disliked by most Europeans because it has become the scapegoat for all the things going wrong in the continent. So the question I have to you is, is it something we need to worry about because it is not something we can create? It is not something we can manufacture from a bottom-down approach. It will have to come from a bottom-up approach. So, I guess I am politely trying to say that this quest for an identity is not something that we in an ivory tower model can design. It is something that will have to result from a popular culture, from trade relations, from economic interdependence. But unfortunately it's not something that can be created. What we can focus on, is to establish useful, relevant institutions. I will welcome your (*sound muted due to technical problems*).

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

May I do this? Do you have comment, somewhat similar, what Ralf made? Just so we can put together a couple or three questions and Brad can answer them clearly and cohesively. I'm sorry. Would you come in?

Andrew Shearer

Certainly. I'd like to thank the presenters for excellent and thoughtful presentations. I want to pose a provocation though, and that is to ask the question, are we getting closer to regional community in Asia, or further away in fact, than we have been? I think there is considerable evidence that we are getting further away. In some ways, economic integration is still intensifying, but in other ways it's not. Look at the failure of APEC to develop a serious free trade agenda. Look at the proliferation of bilateral FTA arrangements, less comprehensive free trade agreements, trade diversions, et cetera, et cetera. The trade picture in Asia looks to me increasingly zero-sum. Look at rising energy competition in Asia. Increasingly again, zero-sum mercan-

tilist energy policies being pursued by a number of the great powers in Asia. Look at the fundamental failure to reach an agreement on maritime rules of the road, the increasing number of maritime incidents between regional military naval forces. Look at the rapidly intensifying military modernization of a number of regional countries. You can debate whether or not it's an arms race, but there's certainly something going on there. So I put all that together, and it troubles me that we talk blithely about which design we should have for original community because when you aggregate the data, it's not clear to me that there's the fundamental structure there on which to build a community.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Sook-Jong Lee? Please.

Sook-Jong Lee

I tried to revert to the idea of emotional connections. I think Brad is, yeah, I think it's too far away (*she is referring to her microphone*). Sorry. Brad raised a question about whether the Asians have emotional connections. Then my question is, "Do Europeans have emotional connections?" And when we say "we-ness," I think there is an implication of "they-ness." When we say "we," and "they," in-group, out-group, they are all relative terms. Somehow it happens in "interaction-ness" conditions. So for example, well, let's talk about some Asian students studying in the U.S.A. It's very easy for them to forge a friendship among Asian students rather than the majority of American students. So there is a kind of nascent, cultural, or historical, the cognitive world, although they are not conscious when they are in the region. So when they face in different circumstances, I think there are emotional connections among Asians. So what I would like to emphasize is nascent background, which is not necessarily to be seen as race. And also, I think it's very true that we think of, in Europe, European identity is based on Christianity, individual cultures, and rationalism, certain Barbarian cognitive modernization perspective, but I think as somebody has pointed out, war, thousand years of war, is a very important instrument for

why the Europeans began to think of the world as European continent. But if you look at the Asians, you know, it's more isolated areas, even though there was the Han civilization world, you know, Japan was not a part of Han civilization, as an island country, and even inside the Japanese medieval period, they didn't have a concept of one same nation even inside. So therefore, in a sense, Asian world was more isolated. And look at the experiences of war. Even though there was a war, between China and Japan, and I don't see that kind of intense conflict didn't exist in Asian region, so to speak. So therefore, if we are looking at the origins of European integration, the European Community of Steel and Coal Corporation, that is based on how to use restrained military industry by controlling production of iron and steel industry. So, therefore, it's not just automatic extension from the same cultural region's identity that led to European integration. So therefore, of course, it cannot be manufactured. But, at the same time, there are many raw materials, the nascent background, even though it is not added up to community, there are some materials we can work on it.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

I would like to get to them, before too long, will let you guys come in first, quickly, and then they can respond. Please.

Malcolm Cook

Yeah, I had three quick points to kind of add to Brad's stream of consciousness that talking about regional community of "capital C's" probably not good. First, the sense of regional grievance that Asian countries don't get enough, say, in the Western-dominated global system, it strikes me that the national grievances within Asia towards each other might be stronger than that sense of common regional grievance. I'm thinking of China's very strong opposition to Japanese seat at the UN Security Council if there was a sense that Asia is not getting enough power at the global table. Stopping your no.2 or no. 1 partner from doing that 2004 Asian World Cup in Beijing would be another example. When we were flying up to this conference in Asiana,

there was a really interesting map. They had Shanghai, Kyoto, Tokyo, very large urban centers, and Dokdo on the map, a rocket of about fifty kilometers mostly of bird shit that was also the name of the first major recent South Korean naval purchase as well. So that's it. Within Indonesia, and within Southeast Asia, just talk about Batik between Malaysians and Indonesians, and you'll soon find out that they don't actually have much of the sense of Southeast Asian, or even Malay, the commonality that everybody else doesn't like Singapore. and Singapore doesn't like being next to them. So I think those kind of sense of national grievance often tied to the nation-building challenges facing all of these countries are much more powerful than a sense at the political and popular level, than the sense that Asia as a collective does not get enough voice globally and Asian countries make sure that their neighbors don't get that. ASEAN for me, is a community of elites only. So if there is a regional identity of ASEAN, it's like a community of elites really, only and maybe most Ministries of Foreign Affairs and associated think-tanks largely charged to developing the idea that there isn't ASEAN regional identity. I grew up, spent three years in Philippines, and I ain't talk about too much about Southeast Asia or Philippines at all, much more talk about their regional identity in the West Coast or the United States. And finally, being a realist with a "capital R," if you really look at the ASEAN Plus Three grouping as some kind of nascent state representation of an East Asian Community, who's not in it again, is more interesting than who might be in it. Taiwan, of course again, no luck. Sorry, you may use chopsticks, you may be Confucian but you are not sitting at our table. The DPRK not in it. We don't want the crazy cousin or nephew here. And Mongolia, poor old Mongolia just largely gets forgotten really. So those are three added reasons.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Good. Please. I'll come to you maybe after this round, okay? Because we want to still continue please, come in.

Jennifer Lee

Well, I would like to second the idea of Ralf and Malcolm

in a sense because (Yamamoto: Would you speak a little louder? Please?) Yeah, okay. (Yamamoto: Thank you.) Because I lived in Southeast Asia and East Asia, but like people in East Asia, or Northeast Asia, they don't really consider Southeast Asians as Asians. When they think of Asia, they kind of think of China, Japan and Korea and if you go to Southeast Asia, they consider Southeast Asians as Asians. It's very different. And also if you think about South Asian people, they are very different as well. So, not to mention Australia or New Zealand, so it's very difficult to define that Asian "we-ness," I think. And although there are I mean, it is impressive to see Asia have a bigger voice in the global economy, global community but still, I believe that you shouldn't force this Asia to become like, one. I mean, if you look at Europe and we compare a lot of our situations with European situation, but Europe has like, its mainly democratic societies and if you do monitor their economics, they have a fairly level economic development stage whereas in Asia still it's very, very diverse and as he mentioned, we have North Korea, and we have Myanmar, and we have China which is just not a democratic country, and also we have yeah, like Mongolia. So it's very difficult, and as we can see from the European case the peripheral European countries are having trouble being united with the other EU main countries. So we should consider that.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Okay. I think, would you mind waiting for the next round? Soon there will be a great deal of our interactions taking place from here on. By the way, I heard something to the effect that common enemies' the best way to create community. So we may have a community now emerging, trying to hit back at you, and maybe that's a good strategy. Brad, would you respond to them less violently and intellectually?

Brad Glosserman

Those are tough questions and I don't have answers for all of them quite frankly. But what I think is interesting is first of all, while we are all confessing that we can't find a common identity and it's not a good idea. Community, whatever

er our particular objections are, the fact is that's the title of the session. That's what the title of the initiatives are. That's what we are spending countless dollars, time, intellectual, political, policy, etc. talking about community. So we may all think it's nonsense, but a lot of other people don't. So maybe we haven't quite found the appropriate silver stake to put through the heart of this idea, in which case it will keep coming back at us. My point is, I think, despite my skepticism, this is a vital issue. And I think that we need to understand it better. It is not going away. It appeals, on some level, perhaps to elites. But I think on another level, even perhaps to the masses, the civil society group, the fact that there is an Asian Parliamentary Union, there are various groups that are meeting together. They are discussing these questions. There are attempts to create an Asian currency unit. I see, again, the operative elements here being the invisible thing. I am in a maze for example, the talk of creating a subway token, or subway pass you can use in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore. Some may say that's a nifty innovation. That's where communities come from. And so, I don't really have particularly good issues here. But just the fact that this is something that matters to way too many people for us to just say, "We can't define it. It won't work. It will go away," because I do think it has implications. While it's very difficult to disagree with Malcolm's point, I think, in particular, about national grievances overshadowing regional ones, the fact is, it's not true on a level that there are shared grievances and the world needs to change. And this is one way in which we can make the case for change. But again, I think the way you make the case for change is by addressing the issues squarely and identifying what the consequences of those changes are. That's our failing. That's what we're not doing.

Now, to some of the questions, and I can talk for hours. I know you don't want that. So let me really be quick. Number one, this focus on "we-ness" and identity, and identity because that's the topic that's given us, I am not sure where identity goes. But I think it's an intriguing question. The discussion about Europe is interesting on two levels. Number one: six, seven years ago when we talked

about communities, anybody mentioned "Europe" at the table, most Asian participants said, "that doesn't matter. Those are not applicable experiences." Strikes me that we've come a long way to this discussion intellectually to admit that at least there are things to learn from that. We should acknowledge that. I think it speaks to some maturation of process. Interestingly enough, for those that want to think about Europe, the lack of European identity, which, I think it's a legitimate comment, the problem then is Turkey because the discussion about the entrance of Turkey goes to some changing of fundamental identity of the EU. So clearly there's something there, even if we can't find it. So again, maybe there is this inchoate notion that we need to be discussing. In regard to Dr. Lee's comment, I think about the European Coal and Steel Community, which I think is very interesting and I think it goes to Dr. Itoh's point that precisely, you know, the ESCS was about constraining the means of making a war. You know, and it goes to this comment about this regional peace building. It was a way of keeping an eye on that so it was a functional approach that had in fact a broader sense of values attached to it as well. I know I didn't address the questions, all of them were directed at me, but I can't.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

That's good. You can come back when you remember. (Brad Glosserman: Oh, I remember them; I just can't answer them.) Okay, go ahead.

David F. von Hippel

I don't know if I have a huge amount to add to the discussion. I guess the way I see it is, I am not sure that you need an overarching East Asian Community in order to address some of the issues and problems that they've laid out and in fact, conversely, maybe you need to address the issues, one at a time, collaboratively, in order to build that community in the first place. The parallel that you run into, there are some issues, for example, climate change, global climate change, are so multi-disciplinary if you will, that it may take much more of a community rather than an issue-by-issue approach in order to address them. In the case of

global climate change, maybe that's what IPCC is for, the framework convention on climate change. But I see maybe these challenges as opportunities for Asians to get together on a number of different topics, and through gradual economic integration, even if it's bilateral to start with, which is what's been happening, and/or relationships on environmental issues, relationships on North Korea, which is as our chairman pointed out, it really is a pan-Asian issue because it's going to take inputs from a lot of different countries, including concessions and creative thinking from a lot of different places to solve, or even to address the North Korean issue. So I guess I see it as the community building as topic-by-topic, agreement-by-agreement type of process.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Okay, let's go to the second round. Ambassador, and then John here?

Dongsun Park

Thank you. It's fascinating. When I was listening to Dr. Hippel's presentation I thought, "Well, we do have East Asian Community," and then, when I listened to Mr. Glosserman's presentation, "Well, it doesn't exist yet." So I am puzzled by this. And then I have reached conclusion of my own that, maybe we're talking about two different things. On one level, we are talking about regional community, security community. On another level, we are talking about sort of a functional community. By that I mean, on the one hand, we're talking about security partners. So, for instance, if Korea's talking about security partners, we're talking about the U.S.-Korea alliance systems, alliances, whereas when we are talking about trade, we're talking about China more in the sense that China has become more important trading partner than the United States is recently. So, all these regional building could be done on the basis of sense of security. Therefore, we may be talking about two different things, but complementary things. I hope I am making my point clear here. So to make my points a little more clearer, let me introduce the conversation I had with my Chinese friends in the morning, and over lunch.

That is that, basically, my Chinese friend was saying that, "You don't need the United States for East Asian Community. Just throw the United States out of this area because it doesn't belong to East Asia anymore. Why do you cling to this thing?" That, I think, was his point. My point was this that because we have the U.S.-Korea security alliance, we feel confident enough to approach China and free trade agreements. If you don't have these security alliances, we cannot sit around with these big giants, Japan and China, because China and Japan may agree with each other and carve up the Korean peninsula again. So we may be talking about two different things here. That's one thing. So maybe coordination would be what we're after, rather than cooperation. Even in this community where we have different values, we may have needs for some coordination, some standardization, some, you know, exchanges although we don't have the same values. That's the point.

And, which reminds me of the debate that was unleashed by this idea of clash of civilizations, which I didn't agree. I mean, I don't think civilizations clash with each other. Interests clash with each other. And of course, Korea, Japan, you know, fought each other you know, although we are in the same civilization. So basically, I admire this rigor of the logic of Mr. Glosserman. I, too agree with every point he made. In terms of this logic of security, we may not be talking about the community. So we're talking about security community on one hand, which I don't think is a regional arrangement. But in terms of common coordination or trade, shared interests we may be talking about community, East Asian Community. Thank you.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you. I shouldn't get in though, but somehow you're suggesting to use coordination rather than cooperation. I think we have enough cooperation, but we don't throw that out the window simply because it can create some problems in some areas, but we can get into that later on. John?

John Schaus

Thank you, Yamamoto Sensei. I have two observations to put out on the table, and one I think is more of a realist

camp kind of concept, and one is more a, “the world might end up here, and at least I will think about it.” So the realist, “small R” idea first which is, this morning we talked about the various, different regional fora that are existing, that are being developed that will continue to expand and we’ll get new ones in the coming years. Dr. von Hippel’s presentation looked at the various kinds of energy competition and cooperation opportunities there are. Andrew mentioned various tensions that are rising. I think a lot of them because of the economic success in the region people are feeling a little bit more robust about their domestic situations. It led me to think that one of the fundamental pieces to any kind of community isn’t just the ability to subsume one’s own interest for providing public goods, but maybe more specifically, the ability to surrender rivalries, or at least put them a notch or two down. The Germans and the French yes, they don’t get along, but for the sake of the EU, they are willing to say, “Here are certain things that we will agree to.” As an outsider looking at Asia right now, I don’t know that anybody’s willing to play even fiddle, a tied position much less second fiddle to anyone else and until there’s some sort of you know, common understanding of how that would work, whether it’s interest-based, or goal-based, or aspirational, or practical, I don’t see a community coming together. So that’s the realist observation.

The hopeful observation comes from an experience I had in previous profession which was political campaigns. In local political races, often come out of people who have no political experience, but were community organizers. They got their neighborhoods together to work on safety, or children’s issues, or something like that and that catalyzes them to run for the office. But it gives them a built-in domestic constituency. So, I think to Brad’s question of, you know, maybe we think here that this is silly idea of an East Asian Community, but others out there want it to happen. I think the conversations are valuable in and of themselves, because it creates a nascent kind of capacity to galvanize action once there is a catalyst. I don’t think that this will organically happen on its own, given pathway and calm waters. But if there is a shock to the system, and there is an ongoing conversation around which to galvanize ac-

tion, it can happen. So I think there is a great value to discussing what a community would look like, what are the issues it would focus on, even if we don’t specifically talk about who would be involved, but just the general concepts I think are important to continue discussing. Thanks.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Mr. Yen, by the way, your name is the most easiest name to remember. (Tiehlin Yen: Yeah, Japanese currency. I should introduce myself, just remember once from currency in the world, Yen, Japanese Yen.) – *Sound mumbled and mixed due to laughter and two people talking simultaneously.*

Tiehlin Yen

Well, thank you, Mr. Yamamoto. I just want to make two quick points. Let me confess myself first. I am not an expert in this field. Having heard from two speakers, I sensed that first, that we may be talking about, there’s a need for environment, energy, all these issues cooperated under the new East Asian Community. My question would be, is there any current international organizations not able to deal with questions like that, and why? So why do we need this East Asian Community, or identity, to deal with North Korea problem, and deal with the other kind of problem? Secondly, Brad was talking about, wanted to know more about this idea. What’s the purpose of it? What would be the community in the future? And in the last session, discussion, I haven’t heard any answers to Brad’s questions. So, if that’s true, the only thing I can think about is to look at the EC, and EU, the development from coal and steel coalition eventually to economic and political integration in Europe. If that’s the case, we can look back in retrospect when there’s late 1980s and early 1990s when I was in the United States, I heard lots about the concerns from my American friends worry about, “if there is EU being established, what would be the United States’ role in the European spheres?” Then, in the late 1990s when the European wanted to establish their independent military capability, my American friends worried again. But when you look at last twenty years, all those worries were not necessary. Just the community kind of idea played along. Eventually, the

United States still has its influence. Still, it's a group of power and you can help provide assistance to either community or institution, whatever, it's everybody, everybody needs America. Even some people say, "we don't like America, but we need America." That's the reality we all have to live with. So, Ambassador was talking about our Chinese friend wanted to establish a community, and they don't want America be part of it. That's the kind of thinking. But look at the history, last twenty years. I mean, even though when EU assembled, America is still there. So why don't we just let it play along to see what kind of good can be generated from that kind of organization?

And secondly, from Taiwan's point of view, any new international organization, we all that kind of have that misgiving, "What would be Taiwan's role in the future? Or would Taiwan be marginalized again?" So that's kind of thinking we've experienced for thirty years I think with the ASEAN, ARF, all those kinds. Fortunately we are still part of, a member of APEC, and thanks to American friends, they've been working very hard to maintain our status in that organization. Just these quick two points. Thank you so much.

Nikola Mirilovic

I am Nikola Mirilovic. So, going back to earlier points made by Brad and Ralf, so presumably the purpose of regional community building is: one, to prevent inter-state war; and two, to regulate economic flows beyond national scale, international economic flows. Given that, we have this question that why states should choose to do these things – regional institution as opposed to global institutions. And in Economics, the mainstream view is that international solutions or global solutions are actually more efficient than regional solutions and yet, we do observe regional solutions such as the EU, such as the institutions in East Asia, and NAFTA, and so on. And asking these types of questions can help us get leverage over understanding how and why regional community or identities may matter is that they may be a factor that helps explain why regional solutions get chosen as opposed to global ones.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

One more before we go to the two panelists. And they will come back to you more. Please. You can register your,... yeah, go ahead.

Kiho Yi

Okay, thank you. My name is Kiho, and I work as a Nautilus director in Seoul office and a professor in Hanshin University.

Well, I just tried to put a two or three my comments on both presenters. The first one is about when you just think about this East Asia Community, why do we need an East Asia Community as a regional community? Well, one answer I could say in some negative words, it's a kind of some power game actually. Because ASEAN, or ASEAN Plus Three, or APEC, or some ARF, there are many kinds of some regional categories that are very competitive in their national interest is already there. So, in some sense we could say that there is some, a power-oriented category to define about East Asia in some sense. But in other sense, if we just also find some, what is really happening in there, I could find that there are many mutual living, or mutual cooperation in this region already among the people. Just for example, several years ago one TV broadcasting company made an experiment without "made in China." How can you really live? It is impossible already. It was proved as a kind of, something for the company. As you also mentioned about the emotional connections, solidarity or some of the music, J-Pop, K-Pop, whatever, well, that is already very prevalent in this region as well. If we just think about it, can you also think about East Asia, not community only, but East Asia civil society? Well, when I just mentioned several years ago in Tokyo, about East Asia civil society, many people were very resisting to use it because in some country we cannot find civil society, and some people say that can you say that there exists in North Korea civil society or in China, can there be a kind of civil society partner to other countries as well? But civil society is not such a solid entity like a government, but it is changing and it is growing. And so in other sense, it is very flexible. And in other sense, it has a very good frame to contain such kind

of some spirit, or solidarity about the community itself. So that is one thing.

And second one is about, when I just mentioned about East Asia civil society or East Asian Community. We also have to think about North Korea, not as just kind of headache country, but also as a kind of a partner to make some kind of momentum to build up such kind of the East Asia Community. And when I just think about this, I would like to say an alliance in this region is really secure, the regional security, because the alliance system usually needs kind of some enemy. Sometimes the alliance invents enemy as well. If we just think about this kind of some security community can really overcome such a kind of alliance system, so usually the alliance system needs kind of some extended deterrence, nuclear extended deterrence, or some conventional extended deterrence issues as well. But usually, such kind of the imperialistic deterrence system can really make a kind of a more safe system to keep such kind of security in this region.

And thirdly, if I could say such kind of a new paradigm shift from such kind of an alliance system to build up some kind of a new security system, then I think the answer should come from East Asia civil society. To answer for such kind of things for example, can we transform this kind of nation-state to civic-state, which really can cooperate with other civil society by groups? If we just see in about next twenty years, such statistics especially since 1992 when China and Korea had some normalization relationships, actually there was so rapid growth about the sisterhood relationship among the local governments as well. In other words, so if we could say about the civic-state and at the same time not only the regional level, but also in the local level, can the local community like city or some other provinces can have sovereignties, or diplomatic independence to build up kind of some cross-national relationships or cooperation in many ways? Well, it is actually evolving. It is very small, but it is really changing. So how can we interpret such kind of some new changes to build up the new kind of East Asia civil society? Well, I am sure when David presented about North Korean energy issues or some other people say about the Chinese issues, they

should become new actors, civil-society related, even in North Korea as well. So, that is my some short comments about the presenters.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Okay. David, would you like to take your one question? He raised that, I forgot what it was.

David F. von Hippel

Yes, I think Professor Yen, I think you asked whether there are current organizations to deal with specific issues, and why do they exist. Examples of regional organizations, certainly, I think there is a regional organization here in Asia on maritime issues. That was affective at least a decade ago. NOWPAP? I think it's called. I am hoping for an expert better than I in this issue. That has worked on marine issues and their examples in other regions for example, and with regard of acid rain. And in North America and in Europe, that would have helped substantially clean up acid precipitation issues there. So there are examples of regional organizations that have worked on these issues. They are not necessarily communities per say, they are issue-based organizations. Does that answer your question?

Tiehlin Yen

Sorry. Actually I didn't want to ask question. I just expressed why there is a requirement to do the community building. Your presentation talked about the issues. The North Korean issues, energy issues, and implied that those issues can be solved under the framework of community. So that's why I posed this question: Is there any local, I mean, regional organization or group organization that is not able to deal with the question you posed? I mean, the problem, the issues you posed? Why do we need to build a community to deal with all those questions? We do have the U.N., APEC, ASEAN, ARF, all those kind of organizations. They can deal with, and six-party talks dealing with North Korean issues. Why there is a need to build a community and deal with those issues? It's not my intention to ask you to provide answers. It's just thinking. (Tadashi Yamamoto: *sound jumbled*) yeah, but it's okay.) Thank you.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Why don't you...?

David F. von Hippel

I guess I view community in a broader sense that doesn't have to be a formal construct or even a regional identity, but as organization-to-organization, business-to-business, civil society-to-civil society, and when in need government-to-government types of arrangements that maybe over time build up into a new community. That can take fifty or to hundred years. But my presentation is just noting that there are so many different opportunities and challenges that absolutely need to be addressed that can't be addressed by a single company, or a single state, or a single organization. Whether it takes one community or a whole constellation of regional communities, I certainly wouldn't want to argue one-way or the other.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you. Brad, would you pick and choose whatever issues you wish to address yourself to and try to be provocative because at this hour, people are getting a little tired and sleepy? So we have to go thirty minutes more.

Brad Glosserman

You know how hard it is to be provocative. (Tadashi Yamamoto: yeah.)

First, let's start with David's point that he made which I think is really important, and sort of got to your last point of question to answer, which is, I think there are some issues in this region that are so complex that they need to be addressed I think, in a broader sense. North Korea is one of the problems. I mean, you mentioned all of those little institutions that exist, right? The U.N. and APEC, ARF and you said the six-party talks. Now the fact is six-party talks is completely artificial mechanism that just popped up in the last few years. I think before the six-party talks formed, I wrote a paper with a nuclear scientist about a large, sort of anticipating almost the six-party talks, an institution that we are going to set up I think in Handan or something, no maybe Harbin, I forget which that would have had to

do with non-proliferation, new energy needs, economic development.

I mean the fact is that the array of issues, the complexity of these concerns are such that to do with ad-hoc every time is a killer. It won't get done. So I think that's a powerful argument. And I need to make this clear. All of my skepticism, and I keep repeating this point, does not mean that I do not embrace the idea, and don't support the point of an East Asian Community. I think it's essential. So let me stipulate a couple of things I've been thinking about, both provocations and clarity.

Let's stipulate that this East Asian Community is a good thing. Number one, because it is a way for countries of the region to maximize their resources to apply them to problems because if you tackle them individually, there is a chance of duplication. There's no sense that you will necessarily establish the mechanisms to insure that they are all brought to use. You need to establish the habits of cooperation if you will, but you also need to establish the confidence that allows you to work together, the modalities that allow you to move forward. So, it is both a resource-maximizing proposition. Secondly, it is good because it responds to some emotional needs. I mean, if you trace back over the last ten or fifteen years or even longer, the rise of the Pacific century is in some case an emotional response to a sense that this part of the world is underrepresented in global decision-making, that the world would be different when Asia rose. Now we've heard that the Asian century, the Pacific century, China's rise, all of this, I mean, we have the East Asian economic community, we have the G-20, which represents the new, global model of economic decision-making. And what do we have? Call for an Asian Caucus within the G-20! That speaks to some psychological need. So let's scratch that itch. I'm all for it.

Now, I would accept, you want a practical reason apart from the one I gave you in problem solving, and to get to my "small R" realist perspective and to take it back on the ground I am comfortable with, let's also acknowledge the fact of the U.S. decline and go back to my definition of public goods. And the community is providing those goods, the U.S. is not going to disengage from Asia,

but we are facing a ranching adjustment. And we can go through a whole laundry list of reasons why that's going to happen, but there are all sorts of reasons why the American empire is going to get a whole lot more expensive in the next couple of years. And we're already seeing the demands of support from our Japanese friends, from the Korean OPCON discussion, in many different ways what we're looking for is more money because we can't afford this. I mean, if you go to the national security strategies, get your economic council in order, there are implications that flow from this. An East Asian Community is a good counter-weight. I do not believe, third point, that this means that the U.S. is not going to disengage, is going to disengage. I do not support that. We're integral to this region. But let's face the facts of how it will work.

Now what's intriguing to me, is that there is no indication thus far, of any inclination, any, any, any, with exception perhaps is Korea, of any Asian nations prepared to genuinely lead. I mean we did, I did some surveys of elites in China, Japan and the United States several years ago and they all showed absolutely a desire for status and no desire for responsibility. That's why I don't worry about the U.S.' position overall, because no one is prepared to step up. Nobody believes in public goods that they pay for. That's got to change. That's why community matters.

Finally, in regard to John's no, I think it was Nikola's point, about regional versus global mechanisms. I think you're right on one level, except for what we're talking about is the desire to change the global mechanisms that give greater voice to the region. That's the irony about your position, but I think you're quite right.

Finally, on civil society, I can't agree more on the need for this thickening web of relationships at the grass roots level. That is where an identity will come from. The problem is that in some cases the political leaders oppose to it because it's a process they don't control. But nevertheless, civil society engagement is where identity such that exists will ultimately emerge. If such that exists, if it emerges.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Brad I with apologies would like to present you the devil's

advocate award of the day, and your articulation of the reasons why East Asia Community is needed are really quite convincing and persuasive. Now, you may turn around the table and you may challenge Brad on those points if you wish, or whatever questions you would like to raise. I mean, we have thirty minutes or so to go. I think we have done pretty well thanks to the help of the panelists and trying to define what the East Asia Community is all about, and what its utility and its limit, I think we can get a little bit wiser in next thirty minutes. So I would like to invite you to yes, Madam Fu, and anybody else and we don't necessarily ask questions, I think you may want to just talk back and forth now. Go ahead.

Xiao Fu

I would like to respond to the gentleman over there. So far in East Asia there is a number of regional security (Brad Glosserman asked her to speak up) okay, so far in East Asia there is no multi-regional security mechanism to deal with security issues, And what factors play the similar role might be the three factors. First is allies. Like the U.S. is Japan's allies, and the U.S. and South Korea are allies. Second is the relations among the regional powers, like the China-U.S. relations, and the U.S.-Japan relations. Third is the regional organizations, like the ARF, APEC or ASEAN. I think all these factors contribute to the stability of East Asia. I think it's still a long way for us to establish the mechanism. So coordination between the major powers among the East Asian countries would be very important.

And I would also like to have a question for Mr. Yamamoto. In East Asia, Japan might be the first country to put forward the East Asia Community, this concept. It can be dated back in the 1970s and Japan also made a lot of efforts in this regard. And the former Prime Minister Hatoyama put forward the East Asian Community and I think he was very serious about this proposal. But unfortunately, he didn't have enough time to make it happen and on other side, this concept didn't get enough response from the regional powers. So my question is whether the current Japanese administration still sticks to this idea. Thank you.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Well, I don't speak for Mr. Hatoyama for good reasons. But in fact, he was not well prepared to present that theme. He didn't believe in it. His wise speech writer wrote it more or less. And because normally, that sort of thing is presented you know, the political leaders should have all the requirements to bring about such community, which they didn't do. I mean, they could have come here and then take notes and talk about what do we mean by East Asia community building. Having said that, I think there has been an element, quite always, starting even from the time of Mr. Obuchi. He still doesn't believe that East Asia community building, the term itself is the making of Hatoyama. He stole it. I mean, he did not steal it. He has picked up what has been there already and because there has been sufficient interest amongst Japanese about East Asia community building, for different reasons.

We of course have witnessed Europe, and despite some comments Malcolm you have mentioned, but many Europeans pooh-poohed the notion of European community we mentioned before. I mean, when it got started. But I think now the European community is fairly solid existence seems to me and we have people say because they have kind of sense of community as far as I can tell. And in that sense, I really do feel that for Japan to be a part of the world, we have to have a community, not that Japanese made community. But community in the region we live in, and I think for East Asia Community it's a kind of area where Japan can play, make contributions to the global affairs, well that was the kind of thinking. And also in fact, we, my Center created the first community trust. And I quote it: "Asian Community Trust," ACT Act. That was 1970 or so. People have started talking about that, sort of, early on. So, I think at the moment, my reading is that there is a very strong support for East Asia Community, as long as politicians raise it. Because it is really coming from civil society actors, we have a role to play in Asia through community building. I am sorry this is sketchy response to your question. We might want to talk more later on. But Jim, do you have any questions or points to add to that?

James Gannon

I've been quiet because frankly, I've been a little confused, and it'd been very thoughtful statement so I am trying to digest them and tie them together. What is community, and I think you start, I mean, the right question is, where do you start the community building? Brad, I think that was completely right. Identity, not to be repetitive is probably a dead-end to the starting point. So the question is, what is the purpose? You know global governance, are you going to give Asia voice? (Tadashi Yamamoto: Can you speak a little louder?) One point is, are you going to give Asia more voice in global governance? I am just going through my thought process here. It's compelling domestic politics, I don't know if that effective in the end, if it has an effect in the end. But two, the functional issues, I mean, something has changed. The threats in the region here, are non-traditional things, things across borders, more threatening than they were ten, fifteen, twenty years ago, and you do, your neighbors share these threats more with you than somebody on the other side of the world. So that does link the region together, the shared interest in fighting it. Third, of course, if we are learn anything is human race, if we had a thousand years of war in Europe, how do we avoid that here? So it is a confidence building, and managing power relations. So if you look at these three as the main motivations for community, you look, how do you go forward?

I think what David was talking about, starting with the issue of threats, how do you deal with the energy issues and so on, it really is the starting point. This is to have an action-oriented cooperation. I mean, real initiatives that are really delivering the goods. Agreement by agreement, this cooperation is just not enough here. It's more of the strength that is in the web of cooperation. If you have Northeast Asia energy supply network, that's fragile. If China and Korea come into dispute, that can collapse rather quickly. But if you have numerous web of these cooperative initiatives, that becomes self-reinforcing and that also has the purpose of overcoming the major power rivalries and these national rivalries in the region. So the one test before us is you know how do you make this cooperation action-oriented? In building the community, two, how

do you tie them together and make them self-reinforcing? And then the third was, Ambassador brought up this coordination because, and I think this is really where community comes in, if you're having all these initiatives you do need to coordinate them. What's the agenda, really? What are the priorities? Who gets the resources? That's where we need to have the community, need to have more institutionalization, but in a flexible manner. So that's sort of my muddled thought process here. Now it's what this community is.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Ambassador, do you want to say something to add to that? Yes.

Dongsun Park

(Sound dispersed due to technical problems.) I would like to go back to Dr. Glosserman's one important phrase here. He says, and I quote, "Common interests don't make for a common identity." It's a very powerful statement. I agree with it. Maybe he means that common values may make for a common identity, and perhaps common community, with which I agree. On that basis may I present one thought? That is, that we Asians are moving gradually towards common values. I say that in the sense that China for instance, is getting more democratic. When I was in China as a Consulate-General to Sìchuān, I was surprised to watch a program where the Taiwanese broadcasters discussed, debated Taiwanese democratic politics with the Mainland Chinese counterparts and I thought that Mainland Chinese leaders are introducing some kind of democratic education to the Chinese public and maybe Hong Kong is playing a similar role in the sense that Hong Kong can be a very good, sort of, an experiment for the Chinese public. And I was fascinated when earthquake took place when I was listening to the leaders of China speaking to the public. I was thinking that he may be a democratically elected president, like in the United States or in South Korea. So, what I am saying is maybe in the jargon of Fukuyama, we're moving toward the last man's, "end of history" where we seek the common values in democracy. So

basically, I wonder if the panelists agree with me, that East Asia may lack common values at the moment, but we are moving indeed, toward the democratization process in the long term. So maybe I have reason to be to remain optimistic for East Asia to emerge not only from the cultural perspectives and all civic perspectives, but also from common value perspectives. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you. In fact, Dr. Lee had her hand up earlier, but I kind of delayed the response partly because I want you to go back to what you said yesterday afternoon. But you were talking about kind of the functional cooperation is the basis, no. 1, on the regional cooperation. And you talked about also, the importance of political cooperation as a basis for regional cooperation. And also, I think you made a very, to me, precise comment on the regional cooperation is essential for the global cooperation, something to that effect. I may be misquoting you but I think it will be extremely useful to us if you would, in your comments, whatever you meant to make comments, if you could touch on some of the points I just mentioned, reflection of this discussion on this concept you presented to us yesterday. So that's a tall order maybe but say whatever you wish to say.

Sook-Jong Lee

In the previous session I mentioned because many people raised the utility of the East Asian Community, I said this micro level, more issue-specific functional cooperation, no. 1, I think has been achieved already. And I also mentioned the political utility of East Asian Community discourse to restrain the divisive nationalism and put some restraint on the aggressive behaviors, and more, that kind of thing. And third, I mentioned, for the region to kind of, complex linkages between global governance and regional governance, and I mentioned the East Asia, why East Asia is becoming active about this talking about East Asian Community as a way to participate more actively in the, as a path to entering the broader world.

You know, I observed two sessions about this agenda

called the East Asian Community, and I observed three groups of people. One is skeptics. People say they put them “realists,” and many of them happen to be from the U.S.A. and from Australia and they emphasized lack of identity, lack of the willingness to sacrifice national interest, and lack of willingness to invest in public goods, and that kind of thing. I understand. And then there is another group also, I think, more pushed by Chairman Yamamoto saying that there is a sense of community, and it’s been quite old and existed before the kind of, suggestion from Hatoyama or Prime Minister Rudd. I think there are certain people like me, in between, maybe Ralf or myself. I regard this East Asian Community building as a process of institution building in East Asia. So I was wondering, if we made this agenda as East Asia regionalism, rather than East Asian community maybe we could have saved much time talking about all this differences, different positions about the concept of community.

You know, if I recall my work in late 90s, midpoint, I think before 1997-1998 the financial crisis, East Asian crisis, I don’t see, I couldn’t recall the quote on quote “community” was a popular term at all. I wrote many articles about trade cooperation in East Asia, monetary cooperation in East Asia even after the outbreak of the financial crisis in late 1990s. The “community” term itself, I think has arrived much later and became popular for the past, I think half decade maybe. And for that matter, I think there is of course, no consensus at all, but I think there is a consensus looking community as a future image of institution building, not something that has arrived here.

So therefore, when we started for example, Japan and Korea the scholars gathered together to write a common report, because we faced this problem. We didn’t use “community.” We used “networks” rather than “community.” So therefore, it’s a future image, but we have to ask then, why we are still talking about this “community”? So I think there’s a kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy about community building. That means, many Asians actually want this image to be realized as a progression from this current institution building. So for that matter, we’re still using this “community” you know, it’s very popular concept for the

international conference these days I guess maybe because that creates this very active discussions because many people all tend to disagree. But we have to really question, “Why is it still popular?”- maybe because we’re looking for something more, before this cooperation concept or coordination concept or even after network concept. Because community asks us, demands us, the political unity and more solid or more routinized, institutionalized kind of *gemeinschaft* creation going beyond interest. So that maybe reflects kind of, dreams of East Asians.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

In fact, I do hope that you will not throw away “community” word. Stick to it. I do stick to it very much. And to perhaps make a confession you know, I hope this will not disrupt the discussion. You still have to speak. You know, I am a Catholic to make a confession and community has special connotation there - love and community, instead of Ten Commandments, something to govern ourselves. So in a way, I take your point about, keep that community for the future aspiration of a kind and I am not trying to turn you guys into Catholic or anything like that but I am simply saying that I think that go back to the question of shared values.

I think shared values are shared aspirations, something to that effect, and I think Asians, I mean of course we can bring in the Americans here and there, but Asians have a way of thinking, and hopes not just sharing only values but shared kind of, even the mannerism how you do things. I mean, you bow to people, at least my generation, talking to mostly Korean friends or Chinese friends. And I think that sort of thing is very much shared by broadly defined Asians. Of course, we can bring in Australians easily. So in any case, I think I agree with your view that kind of, future-oriented, kind of notion of community. But I would hope very much that community is the kind of the ultimate goal in the future. Wait after I will pass the scene but I would hope that that’s the case. I would like to now turn to two panelists to make final comments. Final abrasive or accommodating comments. I thought that when you raised the question of value, you may be opening Pandora’s

Box again. But nonetheless I mean, let us continue discussions for next conference. So, please.

Brad Glosserman

Let me, I like having glasses so I can do that. Let me start with the last two points because I think they are really interesting. Start first with Yamamoto San's point about "we Asians do things differently." How? How different is that "different" because that's the point of the entire day's discussion? There is implied, and I don't disagree, but I don't get it. What is it that you do differently? And so as we magnify Asia's voice in the world rightfully so, how will the world work differently Because you just implied that it does? And I sense that, and I've been trying to figure out where, what it means and nobody can tell me, even the so-called spokesman of Asia, I just finished Kishore Mahbubani's most recent book, and it reminds me of the statement about Lee Kuan Yew years ago was asked "what are Asian values?" and he went through this great long list: frugality, education, respect for elders, everything that made America great. So I think we are on to something. You sort of made my point. That's number one.

And I think, because you really (Tadashi Yamamoto: but to confuse your point: I am not a typical Asian.) Okay, but I think there are a lot of people that nodded when you made those comments. Second, I want to thank Dr. Lee for, I think what was very eloquent point - wish you said that really earlier, that clearly because I don't know we would've stopped this conversation, but I think you certainly, or it's best that the end of the day for summarizing it because I think you've hit it. We're talking about aspirations. That's why we're talking about community. It matters. Okay, why? Why does it matter and that, we haven't answered yet. But I think that's your, you're absolutely right. I don't think you should diminish that. We shouldn't. Even if we choose to talk instead about regionalism, at the end of the day we come back to "community" because there's some aspiration and I think it's important to have aspiration. And I think all aspirations that represent half of the world's population, those are aspirations that deserve to be heard. So, let's figure out what that is. Again, my frustration is our inability

to get to, only come to these conclusions at the end of this discussion we never really defined our terms better.

Very quickly, my final point is, I can't remember who made it earlier, about the notion of creating interdependence. And the point that I would make is that community and interdependence, interdependence creates community. Those are the results of political choices. What we have to do, there is a desire to create an Asian community that Asia's leaders because they ultimately make the decisions. And yes, civil society can create the pressure. The leaders have to make choices that create interdependence. They have to somehow tie their fate to that of other countries not to their neighbors, to other countries in the region. That is what creates community. Those are conscious choices. So what we should do as an epistemic community, one of the other phrases I love to use because I really don't know what it means, in our work, if we think this is a good idea, then what we have to do is to reinforce those choices. At the end of the day, it's human behavior. You change the incentives. For human behavior you want to create a community, create interdependence, so that the actions you take to hurt someone else will hurt yourself. It's that simple. That's enough, isn't it?

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

Thank you very much. That was very, very good. David?

David F. von Hippel

And I don't think I have a whole lot to add to that, not to mention the fact that it's 5:40 and jetlag is certainly kicking in. But creating interdependence, I drag everything back to micro scale because that's sort of where I think about it. So just thinking about North Korea, thinking about the power line going from Russia to North Korea to South Korea and maybe as far to China or Mainland China, that is an independence that is going to have to rest on negotiated legal settlements, and a way of indexing the cost of the power that goes further North, further South, the environmental laws that are associated with citing the power line, building the power line, there is a whole host of coordination and engagement issues associated with just what

sounds like something simple, building a power line from one place to another, that I think can really be the start of community building.

Moderator: Tadashi Yamamoto

I think we're supposed to end at 5:40 or so, but let me just finally say that in a way, the kind of dialogues we have had are essential for community building in my view. And in fact, the kind of dialogue-oriented community is not exclusive community. It will be open community to other communities. Little complex to throw at you at this hour but I really do put the value to this importance of community I mean, dialogue in the community building process. So, for that I would like to thank the organizers for making this dialogue possible and thank two panelists for making this discussion very, very good, and to all of you, thank you very much for your participation. Thank you.■