

## Closing Session Transcript

### Speaker

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## MacArthur Asia Security Initiative 2010 Annual Meeting

### Closing Session Concluding Speech

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- **Date:** July 9, 2010, 09:30~10:30
- **Venue:** Orchid Room, Westin Chosun Seoul

#### Chaesung Chun

Now we will start, the second day, fourth session, it's a wrap-up and conclusion, so we have three speakers including me. We'll start now and try to finish by 11:30. And then we will have lunch from twelve with General Sharp of the USFK. So this is a wrap-up session, but I don't think three speakers will wrap-up all the wonderful discussions we had yesterday. So I guess the speakers will give some thoughts on two subjects that we dealt with yesterday. The three speakers are representatives of core institutions of the ASI. First, let me introduce Professor Qingguo Jia, even though you know him very well. Professor Qingguo Jia is a professor and associate dean of the Schools of International Studies of Peking University. He has taught at the University of Vermont, Brown University, University of California San Diego, University of Sydney, Australia, as well as Peking University. He is also a member of the standing committee and the foreign affairs committee of the national committee of the Chinese people's political consultative conference, and a member of the standing committee of the central committee of China democratic lead. Please welcome Professor Jia.

#### Qingguo Jia

Thank you very much. It's a great honor to have this opportunity to address this distinguished group of people. I'm speaking on behalf of the

center of international strategic studies of Peking University. My boss is not here, so I'm free. During the past day and a half, I've been sitting in the sessions, I've learned a lot by listening to the presentations, briefings, and also the discussions. We have talked about various issues concerning global and regional order after the international economic crisis. And also the East Asian community. Member institutions have given briefing on what they have done in the past year. I'm very impressed with the quality of the presentations and discussions. I'm also happy to learn how much has been accomplished by various institutions in materializing their perspective MASI programs. Indeed, we have a lot to celebrate. Congratulations.

In the rest of my time, I'd like to share with you some of my thoughts in regard to the subject matter in discussion, in this conference, and how we may go about it. One of the common themes of the conference, it appears, is how the rise of China has affected the international and regional order, and the chance to create East Asian community, especially against the background of global financial crisis. We all agree that the rise of China has affected regional order and the global order to some extent. What we find difficult to agree on is how and to what extent it has affected the orders at the regional and the global level. Some say that impact is positive, now the Chinese government suddenly belongs to this group, and a lot of other people in and outside China share this view. Some say it's negative, and China does not lack critics home and abroad. And some say the impact is great. So some argue that it's time for G-2. We

spent a lot of talking about G-2. I'm still puzzled by the concept. It appears to me, most of the major countries do not say G-2. Some people say that China has been shy by not saying G-2, or China has been calculating by not accepting G-2. But the reality is, China does not believe in G-2 for various reasons. And, of course, some people say that the impact is not so great; it's too early to talk about G-2, or even talk about substantial varying role that is appropriate to the size of China and actual power of China. So the impact has not been that great.

I guess the more fruitful way to explore this issue is to identify a few criteria for us to measure the impact of the rise of China on regional and global order. The first criteria we may use is the nature of order. When we talk about international order, we must mean one aspect of it, the nature of international order. We are talking about stability, prosperity, progressiveness and justice. There are the things associated with the nature of international order. If we want to evaluate the impact of the rise of China on international order or regional order, these are the themes that we should look at how the rise of China affected the nature of the order. Second criteria we may use to measure the impact is the mechanism of decision-making. Let me put it this way. The way decisions are made, here we can talk about the level of participation, other decisions made by one country in a dictatorial way or in a consulted way, or in a democratic way. This might be the part of the international order we need to look at. The third aspect of the criteria is the type of cooperation, whether it is bilateral, or mainly bilateral or multilateral or mainly multilateral. I think this is another aspect of international order we need to look at. The fourth aspect is the depth of cooperation. Here we are talking about the degree of institutionalization. Do we have a secretariat for these multilateral efforts? Do we have a constitution, other decisions binding? These are things we may need to look at. The fifth aspect we may look at when we talk about international order is leadership. Who is taking the leadership, or the quality of the leadership? The sixth aspect is the direction of development, whether it's moving in a positive direction or a negative direction. And, of course, probably another aspect to it

is the variation between regional and global level, impact at different levels, how that may be different.

With these criteria, if we use these criteria, we can find probably the following. I don't know if it requires further exploration. First, the rise of China has not caused significant damage to regional stability, prosperity, progressiveness, and justice. On the contrary, it has enhanced some of these virtues. For example, China's handling of its border problems over the past decades. China concluded quite a number of border treaties, agreements with its neighbors. Of course we have border disputes, but most of China's land border problems, and even some of the naval border problems are being addressed. China used to have border problems with most of the countries along its borders. Now it doesn't have many. So by signing treaties and agreements, China has demonstrated that it does not want territorially expansionist power. China's policy in the six-party talks has, in a way, demonstrated China's preference for stability in the region. China's ASEAN FTA is a way China finds to promote economic prosperity. And China's economic relationships with most of its partners, major states, have been very fruitful. China seems, of course, we have trade disputes, RNB issue, but most of China's trading partners do not have significant problems with trade or economic relations themselves, they just want to improve it. And also China is increasing efforts to deal with such problems as environmental pollution, climate change, transmitted diseases, transnational crimes, and more recently, increasing protection of labor rights. So all these things have shown that China has made efforts to enhance regional cooperation, regional stability, and regional prosperity over the years. Even China's position on the *Cheonan* incident, you know, South Korea and the world probably look at China for taking a position because somehow, they believe that China's decision in this may be useful. So on the first criteria, China made some contributions.

And also, in the second place, when it comes to international decision-making, the rise of China has led to greater consultation and consensus building in regional affairs. One of the things that China has been arguing repeatedly, and probably to the frustration of some people

who want to get this done, is let's talk, have dialogues, negotiate, six-party talks, China has been more patient than some of the great powers, maybe to their frustration to some extent. And China's participation in ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), you know, China's support of ASEAN's way to deal with regional matters in favor of consensus building, and also China, Japan, South Korea summit, again is more like a place where you get to know each other and then to establish trust and understanding rather than to address sudden specific problems right away. China believes in dialogues, confidence building, ultimately to get things done on the basis of that. So China favors greater consultation and consensus as a mechanism for decision making.

In the third place, the rise of China has enhanced both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. China used to be a country that believes in bilateral cooperation. Now China increasingly favors multilateral cooperation. This maybe a positive theme to many people in the region and the world.

In the fourth place, the rise of China has contributed to the deepening of cooperation in the region. We talked about the Chiang Mai initiative, we talked about Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we talked about the code of conduct in the South China Sea. These themes, China has made contributions.

And in the fifth place, the rise of China has brought into question of the previous unquestioned leadership of the U.S. in the region, but has not brought about, or is unlikely to bring about, China's replacement of the United States as a leader in the region. And also on the other hand, China referred to ASEAN leadership in ARF, actually China supports ASEAN leadership in the ARF. China has shunned leadership; to some people this is bad because they think that China has been shunning responsibilities. But, you know, what China seeks is sort of a leadership based on consultation. But, of course, I don't think at this stage China is capable, has enough wisdom to carry on the leadership that is necessary. So maybe China is adopting an approach appropriate to its ability at the moment.

In the sixth place, when we talk about the direction of

development in the regional order since the rise of China, I think it has largely been positive. China has created problems, but largely, the rise of China in the direction of change in regional order has been largely positive. That's a proposition that may be further evaluated by research.

And finally, what happens in terms of the impact of the rise of China on regional level, or regional order, has somewhat been repeated at the global level. So I would argue, so far, at the moment, we can say that the rise of China, the impact on global order has largely been positive. Otherwise, China will not have so many friends. And, otherwise, the western countries and a lot of other countries would not have accepted the rise of China. Given this sheer scale and speed of change in the distribution of power with the rise of China, we should congratulate ourselves for how much our lives have been positively affected, and how little it has been negatively affected so far. This is a huge country that rises so rapidly. It might be something, we end up like this, so far, rather than something very different. Guess my time is up, the previous comments are not conclusions; rather they are propositions for the further research. I want to take this opportunity to wish the MASI programs greater success. Thanks for the EAI and Professor Lee for playing such a wonderful role as a host. And wish everybody good health and pleasant trip home. Thank you.

#### **Chaesung Chun**

Thank you. Our next speaker is Mely Anthony, as you know. She is an associate professor at RSIS, Singapore, and the head of the RSIS center for non-traditional security studies. She is also the secretary general of the newly established consortium on non-traditional security studies in Asia. She has also published extensively on a broad range of security issues in Asia Pacific, which appeared in peer-review journals and a number of book chapters. Dr. Anthony is also on the editorial board of the Pacific Review and newly established journal, Global Responsibility to Protect.

#### **Mely Caballero-Anthony**

Thank you, Professor Chun. President Lee, distinguished

partners, friends, ladies and gentlemen, I also will follow the lead of Professor Jia, I'm speaking on behalf of our dean of the RSIS, and at the same time as the coordinator for the cluster three of the MacArthur Security Initiative that looks at internal challenges. Let me also start by thanking the EAI and the able leadership of Professor Lee for very excellent hospitality. We were a bit nervous when we came into our rooms on the first day when we saw how wonderful the preparation has been, and I think this is a major challenge for your group next year when you host the final meeting of MASI.

On a more serious note, I think it has indeed been very good for all of us to have gotten here in Seoul after a year of very fruitful start of our own respective ASI initiatives. The speeches we have heard yesterday, and the lively discussions from each group, have affirmed the fact that the security challenges that we face in our respective regions are not only diverse, they are complex in nature, and require no less than very robust responses to address these challenges. When I listen to our Korean and other Northeast Asian colleagues about the pressing security concerns facing them today, I am often struck, though this should not really come as a surprise, how distinctly different it is from the security concerns that we face in our part of the world in Southeast Asia. We hear about nuclear threats, we talk about disasters and we talk about infectious diseases. We talk about major power competition, we talk about the need for enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation. I think the same holds true when I hear security challenges discussed by our South Asian colleagues. However, despite what seems to be huge disparities in our security challenges, they are, I must underline, similar security challenges that we all share that present themselves to be equally pressing and, if and arguably, more grave in their presentations. I am referring here to a host of what we call non-traditional security threats coming from the resource constraints, the challenge of sustainable development arising from the repercussions of climate change, its impact on energy security, water and food security, infectious diseases, to name just a few. I'm therefore very glad that the MacArthur Foundation in its decision to establish cluster

three, has provided with a platform to put these issues on the security agenda, and to examine how states can respond to them, how to prevent these threats from creating more competition and conflict between states, and, more importantly, how to protect societies, making them less vulnerable to these challenges and risks. I think, for some of us who have been passionate about these issues of human security, it also allows us to drive home the point that these challenges, security challenges are equally important and should not in any way play second fiddle to the wide range of major so-called hard security issues that we have been discussing. Hence, over the past few years, the institutes around this cluster have conducted a number of political policy-oriented research on wide arrays of issues, all geared towards understanding how these issues have become security threats, and how the international community can work together to respond to these challenges. Allow me to briefly provide an overview of the work that has been done by clusters around this group, if only to highlight the cross-cutting issues that these various institutions have been working on.

Our colleagues from the NBR have been working on examining issues of non-traditional security challenges in Southeast Asia, focusing mostly on food, water security, environmental security, disaster management, health and human security. They also have a project on maritime energy resources in Asia, exploring developing maritime resources in three critical bodies of water with overlapping maritime claims. These are the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Gulf of Thailand. Our friends from the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security have recently joined the cluster, in the midst of launching their project on the security impact of climate change, specifically examining the impact of this socio-economic and administrative national security of the country. The Strategic Foresight Group has had very successful studies on water scarcity and food and have launched a very successful report on the Himalayan river basins that have also generated a lot of interest, not only in South Asia but even in Southeast Asia. The Center for International Security Studies in Sydney is also working on the issues of security, examining

how political economic demographic environmental pressures will impact for security and demand in the region of the next 20-30 years, and accept the consequences of these for regional stability. The Center on Asian Globalization of Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore has been working on issues of energy security and global governance, and they have done extensive work in looking at issues of formulating an energy security index. Similarly, the Nautilus institute, through its East Asia science and security network, has been focusing its resources and efforts on engaging activities with the DPRK, specifically looking at the future of nuclear power and safeguards in East Asia. At the RSIS Center for NTS Studies, we have been working multi-level approaches to issues of internal and cross-border conflict, climate change and energy security. And the latest one to have joined the group, Japan Center for International Exchange, I think the only group in this cluster, has been working on the role of civil society in promoting regional cooperation and regional security. I think this is a very important study, which often did not get hearing when people talk about hard security issues or security issues for that matter. There are also other institutions that look at internal conflict, the center for security analysis in India as well as Center for Humanitarian Dialogue that looks at various cases of internal conflicts.

As we have arrived in the half-way mark of the ASI, I think it is important to bear in mind, and this is what we have discovered in our discussions, that while our respective governments or states have the main responsibility for addressing these non-traditional security issues, and making sure that these do not in any way cause interstate conflict, we also recognize that multilevel states and non-state actors and multilateral approaches and cooperation can certainly help in crafting policies at the most appropriate level. Hence, yesterday, there was a lot of talk about global governance, because global governance, as we know, is not only about governments, it's also about the kind of institutions that we have, what kind of principles we share, what kind of actors we engage in, it becomes more complex. It is our hope that in our facilitation and development of networks between states, civil society actors and other related

institutions through the Asia Security Initiative, it helps us in developing efficient and more robust policy makings. These networks have generated awareness with policy-relevant analysis, with the hope of building regional capacity to address these emerging security challenges in the region and beyond. These efforts assist us in reaching our goals, which we often hear about in promoting regional peace, regional prosperity in Asia and the Pacific through the building of multilateral security cooperation through our institutions, like in Southeast Asia the ASEAN, in East Asia ASEAN+3, East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the APEC, and of course, the SARC (South Asia Regional Cooperation). We recognize that in dealing with non-traditional security issues, and even, the so-called traditional security issues, institutions matter. They provide a framework for countries to work together to address a number of issues, and in the process, deepen the regional and global cooperation and in the process, enhance this big goal of global governance.

Having said that, however, we are also mindful of the constraints faced by our institutions in the region. In the two sessions that we had yesterday, for instance, on the theme of post-crisis global and regional order, we had acknowledged the salience of institutional designs. We have been reminded by our speakers, like John Ravenhill who has been working on institutions, particularly when he looks at economic integration, that non-binding commitments and soft law do not allow for deeper regional integration, and more importantly, effective regional responses. There's been talk about ineffective coordination; there's been talk about all these alphabet soups without effective secretariat. But while new ideas of an East Asian community and the Asia-Pacific community had been mooted in response to the inadequacies of current institutions, and of course the frustrations of the perceived inertia, we nonetheless appreciate the fact that Asia, as T. J. Pempel has argued, has made some institutional progress that has not diminished the value of the progress of the ASEAN finally having a charter, the Chiang Mai initiative being multilateralized, the East Asian Summit putting into agenda the non-traditional security issues like disaster management,

energy security, maritime security and, of course, the six-party talks for what its worth has always and still is very much around. Meanwhile, we also stress the fact that ad-hoc regional mechanisms and arrangements had been established to address emerging issues like infectious diseases, responses to natural disasters, and even humanitarian emergencies. The role of ASEAN in cooperation with the United Nations in addressing the problems of humanitarian crisis after the result of cyclone Nargis is a theme that comes to mind.

If I were there to go back and think about three highlight takeaways that I'd like to take away when I leave Seoul, I think I'd like to highlight three things, and I'd like to conclude on these notes. When we talk about regional security cooperation and regional order or even regional security architecture, we have to acknowledge the fact that the role of major powers do matter; institutions matter, and so do major powers. There is a lot of talks about the continued salience of the United States, and of course, the role of China. In Asia, the role of the United States and China are critical if the Korean Peninsula embroil is going to progress any further. And we forget even the role of Russia working closely with the United States in the issues of nuclear non-proliferation. In the area of non-traditional security issues, the agreement among the US, China, and India on climate change is absolutely critical in advancing a post-Kyoto protocol. The commitment and leadership of the major powers advance any security regionalism that has them as key stakeholders also holds true even for economic regionalism. For instance, under the framework of the wider ASEAN+3, the Chiang Mai initiative asserts liquidity support mechanism in times of capital accounts crisis. This would require financial support of both China and Japan, which hold the world's highest foreign exchange reserves. More importantly, with the competition of economic supremacy in the region, perhaps in the US and China, how these two powers are able to work towards more meaningful partnership will either bode well or break the region in terms of its economic future and security. The current global economic and strategic landscape is no longer dictated by the actions and preferences of the single hegemon-

ic power; that much we have heard yesterday. Similarly, the provisions of collective goods is no longer dependent on the single ambition of the U.S., particularly so in a highly fragmented Asia. The US finds itself compelled to work together, and not against any single power. In this regard, the value of multilateral security and/or economic frameworks that bring together the major powers in the region must be calibrated to promote to the extent possible, the common interest and security concerns of both small and big powers.

Second, when Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-interference remain paramount in regional security and economic cooperation, it must be acknowledged that spaces are also being opened for negotiation and compromise. All of the current regional security arrangements across East Asia, at least in East Asia, have been grounded on the norms of protecting state sovereignty and non-interference. Against these norms, one can argue that the prospects are doubtful for any deepening of security and economic regionalism in Asia, unless the notion of ceding sovereignty to a supernational institution, a la Europe, can happen. But while this is largely true, security and economic regionalism in Asia, particularly in East Asia, has gone this far to allow for some space for negotiation. Note, for example, the advances brought on by having a regional surveillance framework in this surveillance mechanism. You cannot think of a more intrusive mechanism than that, when states are compelled to report on the outbreaks of infectious diseases, health issues by the way as has been reminded by the World Health Organization on national security issues. The ASEAN+3's progress of the Shanghai initiative, albeit slow, is also indicative of the willingness of the states to negotiate in economic interest with the furtherance of the common benefits derived from open regionalism. Similarly, while it is inconceivable for the states to abandon these Westphalian principles, the imperative of working together to address common threats make for a compelling case to promote cooperative practices. As antaeus challenges like climate change, food and water security are more likely to extend the trans-border impact, the urgency for regional security institutions to respond effec-

tively to common and shared risk, will necessitate collaborative approaches, which in turn results in what is often called as the pulling, rather than ceding, of the sovereignty.

Third and finally, I have to talk about the Asian security community, the theme of the other group. While the language of the security community may still be confined largely to Southeast Asia, or maybe some extent to East Asia, its salience as a way of framing and promoting cooperative approaches to security presents prospects for broader iterations across Asia. The array of antaeus challenges confronting us provides opportunities for enhancing functional security cooperation. Antaeus challenges offer possibilities for mitigating inter-state competition. For example, cooperation in combating transnational crimes like drug trafficking, smuggling, etc., has allowed organizations like the Shanghai Cooperative Organization opportunities to build cross-regional linkages with institutions like the ASEAN, or the ASEAN Regional Forum. The “we” feeling, the so-called security community feeling, associated with this notion of community, can therefore be translated, I would argue, to a greater sense of interdependence between and among the plethora of regional security institutions, which will be created with common purpose of managing complex security issues. Arguably, it is a growing trend of regional interdependence that serves as a powerful deterrent of conflict, reinforcing the idea that cooperative security engenders peace, retains regional order and security. As to whether a strong sense of regional community building, a regional identity paves a way for institutional transformation remains to be seen. Some would argue regional security institutions are still very much organized as inter-governmental bodies. That said, the rhetoric and assertion about identity and about how communities can be built allow Asian states and societies in their respective of the region and beyond, to have a greater voice and a bigger role to play in shaping the regional security architecture and their vision of regional order. Asia, therefore, will see the proliferation of security institutions as long as new security issues emerge, and there are willing builders. The region’s history of coexistence allows for the accommodation of mosaic of institu-

tions. In a highly interconnected global environment, the high task, of course, remains in the balancing of competing state-centric interests and the urgency to respond to pressing trans-border security challenges. That’s against obvious institutional limitations or domestic constraints, the future of the regional security institutions in Asia will be contingent on how regional actors, both state and non-state, can strike a delicate balance between the push and the pull factors for greater regional action. The ASI cluster 3 to conclude, is therefore fully committed towards the development of more studies on non-traditional security issues and the continued progress and achievements of our partner institutions in the future. Thank you very much.

#### **Chaesung Chun**

As I have some slides, I have to move to the podium. Thank you. I made this morning. So I’ll try to wrap-up discussions we had. I represent the EAI, but unlike professor Jia, I have my boss here, Sook Jong Lee, so I’m not free. I’ll do my best.

We were making questions about two themes: first, post-crisis order and East Asian community, and I think I did more than we expected. This year, we thought that what will be the outcome of economic crisis, when we have a different balance of power. But on the other hand, we have had various versions of discourses on East Asian community, from Japan, from China, even from South Korea in a different form. So this contrast gives us a very good idea in thinking about the future of regional order, and we had a very good discussion yesterday. So my job, so far, was to raise questions and in this wrap-up I think I’ll raise another set of questions which we will need to ponder upon. The current organizing principle in the international relations theory term, is a balance of power system. We lack, especially in Northeast Asia, a formidable multilateral regionalism, but we are facing fundamental power transition coming from the rise of China obviously, and then normalization of Japan, re-rise of Russia, and developing South Korean economy, and North Korea problem, and Taiwan with developing economy. But, do we have any managing mechanism to peacefully control this power

transition? That's a big question. In this process, we have economic crisis, what will be the outcome, will we have a different power distribution?

We talked about the decline of American hegemony, and also the advent of G-2. Or, will we have a chance to make East Asian community, which is a very strong term, community, which is based upon common regional identity. We talked about the we-ness. So what will be the future course? So we need to evaluate various versions of discourses on East Asian community, and then we can find out what will be our tasks of developing common regions for East Asia among ASI network institutions. So the issues that we dealt with yesterday were the impact of the economic crisis, the end of American unipolarity, and the formation of the G-20. G-20 for me is a very interesting phenomenon, especially because South Korea has become a member of G-20. But I think it is not just mechanism to cure the economic crisis; from it, we might have a new kind of governance, both at regional and global level, and we already have, as Mely has just said, we have some different versions of East Asian multilateral mechanisms. Someone called this alphabet soup, so different ones. So we have a network of these institutions. So what will be the final outcome of this very confusing process? In a modern term, we have a different power distribution, so some people say it's G-2. To me, it is a very vague concept as professor Jia just mentioned; it's rhetoric, we don't really know what G-2 really means. So it's a political rhetoric, anyone can use this rhetoric for their own political interests, so we have to define it in very precise terms.

We talked about the conditions for East Asian regionalism, or even community, so I'll write down the questions first. I thought our scholars would be opposed to the idea of community, because it is a very strong word. It is identity-based, not power-based, or interest-based versions of regional multilateralism. So, as we expected yesterday in the group 2 discussions, people were to some extent skeptical of the prospect of making a community, because even Northeast Asians lack common identity, even conflicting identity that comes from past, pre-modern regional order, or modern transitional times, imperialism, colonialism

and so on. Then what will be the moderate, more realizable prospect for East Asian multilateralism? That was the main theme for East Asian community group, and we witnessed the changing political leadership, which supported the idea of East Asian community. So what will be the result after the change of this old political leadership? So I tried to add some thoughts on these different issues.

First, the economic crisis. What I hope, I don't know if this is realistic or too much wishful thinking, but I think we're witnessing some new type of governance after the economic crisis. After the economic crisis of 1929, we saw the Second World War. As we all know, the hegemonic stability theory, that was the phenomenon following the realist logic, every state trying to revive their economic by enhancing their own power in a zero-sum game setting. But, with that lesson in mind, we have a new type of governance of G-20, and what's interesting about G-20 is that very different levels of actors are playing in this game: superpower, rising power, the BRICS, the middle powers which represent each region, and they say in terms of norm, not in terms of power. Maybe they are pretending, but we are developing from realist logic to more liberal or norm-liberal logic, so they balance each other but not based on pure power. They do perform so-called soft balancing, or institutional balancing, and in that space, there is a leeway for middle powers to play if they have a sound knowledge, sound vision, then they can raise their voice even though they lack power. And we have very different levels of G-politics. You know, G-1, the United States, G-2, with China, again, this is a rhetoric, in G-2 they can cooperate with each other. They can compete for the future hegemony, that's another issue, we have G-8, G-20, even G-192. So the issue is how to make the networks among these different G-X politics. This means that when we do with the order, we might be entering into a period in which a concept of national sovereignty or the zero-sum game is changing.

Then, the power field. The concept of power is changing; we talked about this in the session 1 group 1 discussion. So the soft power, knowledge power, or even network power, if some player has some positional power to link

different actors then he might be in power, even though he lacks resource power. So we are playing in the multilateral setting. Also, even an actor with a great material power, for example, if they lack soft power, then it's very hard for the actor to become hegemonic. In 2001, there was a security crisis, 9/11, and after that, the US administration tried to follow not multilateralism, some very difficult situation. As a result, we see there was a unilateral response. To some extent it was inevitable, I think, but after the economic crisis, the US adopted a very different position, which was multilateralism, tried to persuade people, tried to revive its legitimacy, and also tried to enhance effectiveness in the format of G-20. Is it just a change of an individual state's foreign policy, or does it reflect the rise of a new power field, which means that if one state wants to become powerful, you have to share power, you have to persuade other audiences. Then we have a different logic of different international relations. Maybe it resembles the logic of domestic politics, so we have very blurring boundaries between domestic and international relations. Then what about Asia? Asia, for example China, if China wants to be a leading country, we know it has a material power, but it also has to have soft power to persuade people, the U.S, as well. So China is trying its very best to represent itself as a responsible great power, trying to have a charm-offensive strategy, and some people are persuaded by Chinese efforts.

Then, the new results, after all this economic crisis, the power transition, maybe we will not have a different polarity, or different modern logic, maybe we will have a more governance type, or networked Asia in which state level, civil society level, and individual level cooperation reinforces this new order. Then which will be the right concepts for the desirable East Asian regional order? We thought it is community. Maybe we follow the precedent of Europe, but as we've talked about, Europe has very different environment from 1945. So we wonder if that experience can be copied in East Asia. We are living in a very different world in the era of globalization, democratization and information technology revolution. So if we want to have a regional unit, then it might be somewhat different from community. Or if you look back upon the experience

of East Asia, very conflictual relations with each other, we should have a more modest purpose. So we have to re-define our regions, our concepts: is it a community, just regionalism, network or governance? I think that's a very important job to define the future of East Asia with proper concepts. Also we have to think about various ways for East Asia multilateral network. Is it interest-based, power-based, liberal, realist way or constructivist way? We have to combine this. That's a purely theoretical distinction, so how to combine this? We have a very structured basis on which we can build a community, but we also need identity-based work. Also, we should think about networks among bilateralism, mini-regionalism such as trilateralism and regionalism at large, and globalism. In G-20, what we see is import of global norms into Asia. So it's very useful. If we adopt global norms to regional level, then we can have more normative debates in dealing with regional issues. So these days, the division between regional and global is blurring, so we can adopt very freely bilateralism. In South Korea, for example, we hoped to combine ROK-U.S. bilateral alliance with some kind of collective security-type of regional mechanism, but also have very global norms in dealing with issues such as North Korea nuclear problems by depending on the norm of non-proliferation, or even normalizing the rogue states. It's not just peninsular or regional issues. We combine all these different levels of norms very freely, we are in that stage. But this does not mean that we are overcoming power logic. Power is always there, even though we have more institutionalized national politics. But the form of power game is changing, as I said. Military and economic power—so-called hard power—is still important. However, some people ask why there are so many international institutions in East Asia, because they want to balance against each other in the institutional settings. So in this kind of institutional balancing, they observe norm to some degree, but by observing the norms or even designing the norms, designing the institutional settings, they want to enhance their power. So it's a little bit more institutionalized power politics. It will continue.

We also talked about, it was professor Ravenhill I think, who gave us the idea that there should be a market

of institution designs, and we will see the equilibrium which will win and last. So we are entering into all these different ideas, but it is not just ideas, ideas with their own designs for enhancing their national power. So it's still realist logic, but with institutional settings.

Also, transnational issues. So East Asia, to me, has a very specific nature in terms of regional order. We still have modern transitional legacy in our memory politics, for example, identity politics, if you look back upon the relationship between South Korea and Japan, even though we share a lot of strategic interests, if the question of Dok-do or historical textbook comes up, every relation just stops there because of identity politics, which means that we are still experiencing this modern transitional time. It has its own specific organizational principle. Modernity, as I said, we move according to the logic of the balance of power. It has specific organizing principle. But also, as I said from G-20 probably, or from many regional international institutions, we have post-modern logic, in which sovereignty is pulled, or sovereignty is networked, so the national government doesn't monopolize sovereignty anymore. So sovereignty somewhere, but it's shared. So if you want to deal with these transnational problems, then we should have a different view in East Asia. So all these different periods are contracted in just one period, so every issue has different levels of problems to me.

Then how to solve all these problems at once, or by degrees? First, to me the idea is to cultivate a new culture of cooperation in dealing with new issues, more transnational issues as Mely said, non-traditional security issues. So I just imagined that non-traditional security issues will be easier to develop this cultural cooperation and I've learned yesterday that NTS issues are not so easy; still there are a lot of conflicts in dealing with food, water, and so on. But, it's free from past experience so if we try very hard to deal with these new, so-called post-modern issues, more cooperative settings, then we'll have a new hope.

Then, the last issue. What can South Korea do as a middle power? Well, very vaguely we can have some scenarios for the future East Asia: basic American hegemony, bipolar confrontation, multi-polar competition, Chinese

hegemony, bi-gemonic cooperation, regional cooperation. Let's just skip this. You know, worst case, if South Korea is in between China and the U.S., then it's a disaster for South Korea. So we have to prevent this from happening anyway. The best case is the last one. If we have a more multilateralized regional setting, then it will be easier for South Korea to pursue its own national interest because it's still a relatively small and weak country. We have four great powers: the U.S., China, Russia and Japan. But how, one example, is to internationalize our own problem. Then, we might have some co-evolution process of peace. For example, if you deal with the North Korean problem, we want to internationalize the North Korean problem, and cultivate a new culture of multilateral security cooperation, six-party talks for example, interest coordination, and we find a new way for norm-finding for solving North Korean problems and so on. Then South Korea, we cannot maximize our power. We have to follow normative politics and try to persuade other powers to conform to this new kind of game. That's South Korea's only way for survival, I think.

So tasks for the future. We have to develop common visions with very precise concepts. East Asian community, well, we have to think about it, rise of Asia as a civilizational unit, contributing to the global community. Very fantastic idea. Solving security dilemma of most states. So as I hear the debate between Chinese and Americans yesterday, still there is a problem of security dilemma: no one is aggressive, however there is no way to guarantee a peaceful coexistence between two countries. So we have to solve this very traditional security dilemma. To transform this fundamental organizing principle from balance of power to more networked or more cooperative type of sovereignty, like Europe has now, but it should have different forms, taking advantage of global norms, peace among civil societies, and we might create some regional public sphere, and we have very developed civil society in each country; South Korea, Japan, and even China. So we might develop some public sphere of regional level. What's it important for ASI is to develop a track to exchange and then publish these visions to other Asians or other people in other regions. Last issue, after the cluster meeting, just two slides

more, we have done all the first-review, what I think and what I learned yesterday was that we have done very well in developing our research in each institute. The problem, however, is that we are not very successful in establishing networks among these institutions. We are willing to do that, but we need to create venues and ways to be connected with each other, like common conferences, common projects and so on. Even the trans-cluster cooperation. EAI has tried to do some, but still I think we should try more. This is not just tasks given by the foundation but also it would be very good for the purpose that I said before. And also, we need to focus more on the policy-relevant studies. EAI tries to collect very young good scholars with policy sensitive but academically trained background, who can write in English. It's very hard. It's a very small number of scholars. However, if we don't think about this policy relevancy, scholars used to write articles very academically, it's good, but not good for ASI network purposes. So how to find good scholars and researchers with these ideas about policy? Lastly, core institutions are developing emerging leadership program. We collect some new leaders from academics, media, and even politics and try to have them in one of three institutions, and make them do their research. So we'll see. Thank you very much.

#### **Chaesung Chun**

So we have a discussion session. Three speakers thought that it should not be a Q&A session. You just raise any issues that you have from yesterday, so if you have any final thoughts to any of these issues, then please give us comments or questions.

#### **William Tow**

Thank you all very much, all of you, very fine presentations. I'd like to focus on the last one, Chaesung. You have talked about the importance of developing a common vision. Agreed, but I'm wondering if, before we can even do that, maybe we have to derive a common language or frame of reference. I'm old enough to remember when Aleksey Kosygin came to New Jersey, I think it was 1967, to start talking to Americans about strategic arms control

negotiations. It took about four and a half to five years until SALT I was signed between the Soviet Union and the U.S. After about three years, Russians and Americans were actually learning how to talk to each other in a common frame of reference, what's strategic nuclear delivery system, how do you define it.

I was wondering if we don't have perhaps the same problem here. That is, before you develop the common policy objective or common vision, you actually have to derive a common language or common frame of reference. In the last day and a half, I've seen, I don't know how many different derivatives of polarities, or lateralisms, and in your presentation, just to take one example, we have mini-regionalism, which may or may not be the same as multilateralism. I'm sorry, mini-lateralism, which the Foreign Policy magazine recently had a special issue devoted to mini-lateralism. Victor Cha of Georgetown recently branded it another way, plural-lateralism. Well, where's the beef? As they say in the McDonald's hamburger ad, where is the common frame of reference, and how, who makes the decisions on which language we actually use to operationalize our policy objectives. It's really important, because if you don't have a common frame of reference or lexicon, it seems to me that in the framing problem that Mely talked about in her talk, you're not going to get there. So maybe one of the things we can do over the next year is to really focus on developing some kind of common frame of reference, and how we speak to each other. Thank you.

#### **Chaesung Chun**

Thank you. May I have some more questions?

#### **Tadashi Yamamoto**

Thank you very much. I would like to speak to the speaker just now. I agree that the common frame of reference is important, but when we are doing this sort of regional comparative and joint studies, people sitting on the desk and frittering around the papers will not help that much. In fact, it will add more confusion in future discussion. I would strongly urge ourselves and you to think of more case studies or surveys of what is going on. Since yester-

day's discussion, in our discussion group, a great deal we discussed about human security and East Asian community. By the way, we more or less resolved at that point that East Asia cooperation will be more adequate way to put what we are trying to do at this moment. There was very much aspirations for community-building in the future, but I think we will go by stages, we cannot jump on to the stage-building right away, which would make things a bit more complicated. But going back to my suggestion of more case studies and more kind of work-based what is going on in the region, we may be surprised to see so many things going on in this area. But analyzing in what ways they are operating that can be successful, useful, or what are other constraints is maybe the way to go. I will be very happy to get into the debate on that matter.

Just as much if I have microphone with me, yesterday we talked about East Asia community in discussion, I think it would be too much to think of community-building, shared values, or those things. But again, if we share values, a kind of exercise now taking place in some areas, I think we can't just kill it right there and then try to analyze. I am kind of repeating the same point perhaps, but we follow very much the suggestion made by Dr. Lee the day before about the need for studying the functional cooperation as a basis for regional cooperation, and which eventually leads to community-building.

Also I would like to mention that regional development is something that we should be taking a closer look at. In particular, so to speak as it was referred to, but I think human security dimension is very much promising area, at least from my own bias. That is my view. I think perhaps I should stop here. Thank you very much.

#### **Chaesung Chun**

Thank you very much. Is there any other comment? While we think, let me let other speakers respond to this shortly. Well, I like professor Tow's suggestion. Three or four years ago, I participated in one project, which was called "why is there no non-western international relations theory," and it's now published in a book. We have writers from almost all Asian countries, and what we have found out was that

first, we don't have any Asian international relations theory based upon our own experience. So we failed to, so far, theorize our own experiences in theoretical terms. So we don't have common concepts. We borrow our concepts in English from Western academia, but we have different connotations in speaking of different concepts. From that failure comes the confusion of policy terms, as you said. So, first what we need to do is to develop common languages, common theoretical terms, based upon our own experience. So first, I think we have to study very hard.

Second one is, there's a real demand in reality for confusing all this kind of theoretical or conceptual confusion. For example, mini-regionalism, you know, Northeast Asia wants to have their own multilateralism, but there could be mini-lateral need, for example, across sub-regions. So there's a different demand from reality. So the part of the responsibility for the confusion is realistic demand from reality. But again, we have to theorize all these things in a very coherent format as you said, so I think it will be our future's great task. And this can be assisted by case studies so what I think, one of the most important things is case studies. For example, for South Korea, how to deal with North Korean problem and make it an example to transform the fundamental principles of East Asian politics. So let's not just deal with North Korea from the national interests of South Korea, let's make it an example in dealing with local issues from a very global normative structure. So how to normalize North Korea. It might have, enlighten some other efforts to normalize all the rogue state, maybe, I don't really like the term rogue state but in different regions. Then they can read the Northeast Asian example and learn from it, like we read European case and try to adopt it. Then the case study might have universal meanings. So I really agree with Yamamoto sensei in dealing with these case studies.

#### **Mely Caballero-Anthony**

I appreciate the intervention that Bill has made on having a common security language, but sometimes it's good to problematize security, too. I think, if I could tell you what we do at this consortium of non-traditional security stu-

dies in the region. It's really to find the space for, perhaps, a wider group of people who use language of security, and understand what it means to them. In this strict sense of security, I mean, military security, we all know when we talk about security, it's always protecting state boundaries from military threats. I mean, we all know that, we all study that in our field, but what happens if somebody from the streets of Jakarta or the streets of China say security to me is having food in my stomach or a roof over my head. Hence, in 1994, as well know, came the concept of human security. So RSIS together with other partners across Asia has tried to first map out what security means for many people, and for the lack of a more appropriate term, we sort of, the other side of securities from traditional and non-traditional security. But, in the process of identifying what are these issues and why they have become security issues, we then turn to the more rigorous exercise of understanding why they have become security issues. So we use the Copenhagen School of securitization. That's the academic part, Bill, but more importantly I think, for think-tanks, for policy-makers, this also, while you talk about the language of security, try to understand what it means, there's also the urgency of responding to these issues.

And, in responding to these issues, this is where also the non-traditional approaches come in, and I think General Banerjee talked about it yesterday. If you talk about a common security response, you let your military come in and respond. But what we are increasingly finding, as we deal with some of the security issues, it's not just military that comes on the board, it's also the other sectors of other agencies of the government. I always use an example, when you deal with issues, for example, dealing with infectious diseases. Our experience in Asia - I see in the cases of China, Japan, Southeast Asia countries - when you deal with these infectious outbreaks, the military can be involved, for example, making sure that the movement of people are actually controlled. It's worrying for some transitional states like Indonesia when military gets involved, however in responding to these infectious disease threats, which is a major security threat, you don't only have your medical

officers coming on board, you also have the immigration officials, you also have your veterinary officials, you even have other scientists coming in. So it becomes what they call the multi-sectoral approaches. And in dealing with emerging crises, we talk about multi-sectoral responses, and even that, we need to understand what it means in each case as my mentor here, Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto has said. We find that even in dealing with emergency responses, it's not just the military that comes in. It's your other multilateral institutions like those that protect children from being trafficked, protect women from abuse. So this is where your NGOs come in. They come in very very useful. And security situations require multi-actors. This is what we mean by multi-level, multi-sectoral. So as we are doing this, it will be ideal if we can come up in three years with a common security language, but I think it's an aim that we should aspire for but in the meantime, we should identify across regions what are the common security issues, how are we dealing with it in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia, and if you were to talk about defining a regional order by promoting multilateral security cooperation, what is the best way to do it, and how do we then get major powers' commitment and buy into these things. That's my point. Thanks.

#### **Qingguo Jia**

Just a few words to add. I think with regard to the language problem, I think it's not just an Asian thing. It's also in the western academic community. For example, are we in a unipolar world? I think you have different answers, even among western scholars. Some people argue that the unipolar moment is over; some argue it's still there. Well, depending on your criteria of measuring what is a unipolar moment. And also, I think the lexicon problem is also the result of changes in reality that the slower pace of change in terms of lexicons. We can't agree whether it's a unipolar moment, partly because of changes in reality. One of things we use to measure power, or increasingly, we use soft power to measure power, which is highly subjective. So it's difficult to measure power. Much more difficult than old days when we used harder indicators. But even with harder in-

dicators, there are problems of adding them up, and especially with the concept of military alliance. What do we mean by military alliance nowadays? In the old days, you had threat and then you had military alliance. Now the threat is gone, but the military alliance remains. Some people say that it's no longer the military alliance in the traditional sense; it's partnership. I remember, I attended a conference in Tokyo, it was about military alliance during the post-cold war period, and then they say the reason that we still call it military alliance is because we don't want to have unexpected problems. So it's like political convenience. Because I said, look, if you say it's partnership, why don't you dissolve military alliance and set up partnership? And they said, no we can't do that, because once the military alliance is dissolved, partnership can never be established. So, what do you mean by military alliance? Military alliance is no longer existing to deal with even the potential threat, or clearly defined, existing and potential threat. It has quite a lot of more other functions, so old bottles, new wine. We have a lot of problems like this. I don't know how to solve the problem but this is part of the messy reality we now live in.

### **Chaesung Chun**

Thank you. Any other comment? Ok, if you don't have other comments, let me conclude this session, and let me explain today's schedule. ■