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Jennifer M. Lind

Dartmouth College

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The East Asia Institute
909 Sampoong B/D, 310-68 Euljiro 4-ga
Jung-gu, Seoul 100-786
Republic of Korea
Tel 82 2 2277 1683
Fax 82 2 2277 1684

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Abstract

Analysts have speculated that regime type has a powerful influence on how states remember, and thus on the potential for international reconciliation. Scholars argue that whereas authoritarian regimes purvey chauvinist myths about their past behavior, democracies are more likely to remember the past in conciliatory ways, because leaders have electoral legitimacy, and because of a free marketplace of ideas. In this paper, (1) I deduce a hypothesis from this conventional wisdom. I show evidence that only democracies are willing and able to engage in self-reflective national debates about their past violence, and such debates have (as shown by the case of Germany) led to conciliatory remembrance. However I challenge the conventional wisdom with two arguments. (2) Authoritarian regimes do not necessarily always have incentives to foment xenophobic nationalism: they sometimes purvey xenophilic myths about states with which they seek reconciliation. Also, (3) I deduce an argument showing that a free marketplace of ideas will not necessarily eradicate myths as efficiently as many scholars believe. A free marketplace will supply the ideas demanded by its consumers, who often eschew self-reflection and guilt in favor of a more self-centered, and sometimes chauvinistic, historical narrative.

The political effects of memory have emerged as an important issue in contemporary international affairs. Scholars argue that the quality of a country's remembrance affects international trust and the prospects for reconciliation among former adversaries.[1] Nationalist, xenophobic remembrance is said to create disputes and sustain mistrust; scholars argue that conciliatory remembrance facilitates reconciliation. For example, Turkey and Armenia's tortured process toward diplomatic normalization has been obstructed by Ankara's refusal to acknowledge or apologize for Turkey's mass killing of Armenians in 1915-1918.[2] Holocaust denial by prominent Iranian leaders creates consternation in Tel Aviv and around the world, elevating threat perception and empowering advocates of a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[3] Arab-Israeli relations are fraught by disputes over history;[4] Japan's refusals to acknowledge its World War II atrocities aggravate relations in East Asia.[5]

Analysts have speculated that regime type has a powerful influence on how states remember, and thus on the potential for reconciliation. Scholars argue that authoritarian regimes, challenged for legitimacy and relying on a controlled marketplace of ideas, purvey chauvinist myths about their past behavior. This elevates distrust of their intentions among other states, triggers disruptive conflicts over history, and obstructs reconciliation. Conversely, scholars expect that in democracies, electoral legitimacy of leaders and a free marketplace of ideas lead to more conciliatory remembrance, enabling states to move relations forward.

Understanding the effect of regime type on national remembrance is important for many reasons. Although regime type is not necessarily a manipulable variable, a better understanding of what drives memory in autocratic versus democratic states is essential as individual countries or the international community become increasingly activist in their attempts to influence how states remember.[6] Moreover, given speculation about political liberalization in East Asia (Chinese political liberalization and Korean unification), understanding how changes in governance are likely to affect remembrance and nationalism in those countries makes this issue particularly salient for the region.[7]

This paper makes several contributions toward advancing a debate about the link between regime type and national remembrance. (1) I deduce a hypothesis (the "Scapegoating Authoritarians") from the conventional wisdom that authoritarian regimes are more likely to purvey chauvinistic myths about the past, elevating mistrust and creating international disputes over history. Bringing to bear evidence, I note that it is true that only democracies are willing and able to engage in self-reflective national debates about their past violence, and such debates can (as shown by the case of Germany) lead to conciliatory remembrance.

However, my second and third arguments show that remembrance in democratic states can be more chauvinist, and remembrance in authoritarian states can be more conciliatory, than this hypothesis would suggest. (2) Authoritarian regimes do not necessarily always have incentives to foment xenophobic nationalism. When it is in their interest, the control they wield over the ideational marketplace gives authoritarian regimes the ability to purvey xenophilic (i.e., conciliatory) myths about other countries, which can facilitate reconciliation. (3) I deduce an argument showing that a free marketplace of ideas within democratic states will not necessarily eradicate myths as efficiently as many scholars believe. A free marketplace will supply the ideas demanded by its consumers, who often eschew self-reflection and guilt in favor of a more self-centered, and sometimes chauvinistic, historical narrative.

In the second section of this paper, I operationalize the concepts of "national remembrance" and "regime type." In the third section I deduce the "Scapegoating Authoritarians" hypothesis from the conventional scholarly wisdom. The fourth section challenges this hypothesis with two arguments based on deductive logic and empirical evidence. The conclusion summarizes findings and identifies other factors that may be important drivers of national remembrance, which should be the focus of future testing.

Definitions

National Remembrance

Many scholars have studied collective or historical memory.[8] This paper focuses on national remembrance, which I define as *official* remembrance. Because this study is motivated by a belief in the important foreign-policy effects of national remembrance, I evaluate the kind of remembrance to which outsiders are most likely to look as representative of a country's beliefs. This is not to trivialize the role of societal remembrance, as reflected in the arts, media, and social activism.[9] In many cases outsiders do indeed notice and react to societal remembrance (particularly as improvements in communication technology makes societies increasingly transparent). But given that it is more difficult to observe and generalize about societal remembrance, and given the potential for mixed signals, I assume that outside observers will look first and foremost at a country's official remembrance as the most observable and measurable indicator of how that a country remembers its past.

I define official remembrance as the statements made by officials of the national government, reparations payments, legal trials, commemoration (museums, memorials, holidays), and history education (textbooks).[10] The more institutionalized a given policy is, the more representative and credible a signal of national beliefs outsiders will perceive it to be (for example, a treaty that had to be ratified by Parliament or a history textbook that shapes the views of future generations, as opposed to a quick statement by a Prime Minister).

Measuring Remembrance. I conceptualize national remembrance as a continuous variable with "conciliatory" remembrance at one extreme, and "chauvinistic" remembrance at the other. A country with conciliatory remembrance acknowledges its own past violence and recognizes the suffering endured by another state. The most conciliatory countries offer apologies, pay reparations, or offer other acts of contrition.[11] An example of extremely conciliatory remembrance is West German President Richard von Weizsäcker's extraordinary 1985 speech, in which he detailed German crimes and conveyed his abject remorse for these acts.[12] A less conciliatory example (but still on the conciliatory side of the spectrum) was a landmark statement offered to Iran by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 2000. Albright described how the United States orchestrated the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq and backed the repressive Shah, whom, she acknowledged, "brutally repressed political dissent." Albright said the United States "must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems" between the two countries. Though not an apology per se, the statement admitted American misdeeds and recognized the suffering that they inflicted on Iranians.[13]

At the opposite end of the spectrum is "chauvinistic" remembrance, which is imbued with what Stephen Van Evera has termed "self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning" myths.[14] Remembrance of this kind emphasizes the country's own suffering while denying, glorifying, or forgetting its own past violence, and ignoring suffering in the other state. An example of chauvinist remembrance is the statement by Japanese official Kubota Kenichiro, who in the early 1950s was negotiating the normalization of diplomatic relations with a South Korean delegation. Responding to Korean demands for reparations, Kubota asserted that Japan should be the one asking Korea for money, because "for 36 years Japan has changed Korea's bare mountains to a flourishing country with flowers and trees."[15] Kubota's glorification of Japanese colonization of Korea, and his failure to admit Korean suffering, reflects quite chauvinistic remembrance.

Toward the middle of the continuum is remembrance that might be described as "self-centered." Remembrance of this kind is focused on the state's own suffering and own problems. It acknowledges it committed violence in the past, but—while it does not

deny or glorify this violence—it justifies it as self-defense or a regrettable price to pay to further some larger goal. Remembrance does not necessarily slander or vilify the other country, but neither does it pay much attention to the suffering it endured. An example of this type of remembrance would be American views of World War II: the United States acknowledges that it dropped atomic bombs on Japanese cities, but popular opinion does not regret this action, seeing it justified by Japan's attack on the United States and by the need to end the war as quickly as possible. Similarly, for the most part, the Japanese explain their adoption of imperialism in the late nineteenth century as driven by the threat of Western colonization, and the need to obtain natural resources.

Regime Type

Scholars have long wrestled with the question of what exactly is a democracy.[16] For purposes of this study, I follow the framework used in the Polity datasets, which distinguishes democracies from autocratic states.[17] For the purposes of this analysis, a potentially important third category to explore is that of transitioning regimes. The "democratization and war" school warned that states undergoing political liberalization experience nationalistic mobilization: politicians in such underdeveloped institutional environments have incentives to mobilize nationalism in order to win votes and political allies.[18] This has potentially important implications for the ways that countries remember their past history: for example, Jack Snyder argues that elites who play the nationalist card typically scapegoat other countries, emphasizing the threat they pose, blaming them for the country's problems, and depicting them as culpable for historical wrongs.[19] Moreover, this question is particularly salient to East Asia, which faces potential political transitions in China and on the Korean peninsula.[20] Despite these important reasons to examine the effects of regime transition on remembrance and nationalism, this study confines itself to discussing only autocratic and democratic states. First, the state of the art in international relations theory has largely rejected the democratization and war finding.[21] Second, I examine the effects of democratization on nationalism in East Asia in another study.[22]

The Scapegoating Authoritarians

In this section I deduce a hypothesis from a conventional wisdom that sees authoritarian countries as more likely than democratic ones to remember the past in chauvinistic ways, thus elevating mistrust and fueling history disputes with other states. One reason behind this view is that authoritarian leaders, lacking electoral legitimacy, must manufacture legitimacy for themselves. Power, noted Max Weber, needs to justify itself. [23] Stirring up nationalism is a time-honored tactic for creating legitimacy where little exists. Scholars have long observed that the creation of national identity frequently leads countries to define an insidious "other" against which the country's own positive national identity is created. "The 'us' is maintained at the expense of others," writes Ned Lebow. [24] Authoritarian regimes can scapegoat foreigners to blame for their own domestic policy failures. The regime can discredit (and thus weaken) domestic political opponents with accusations that they are treasonous puppets of foreign oppressors. Alarmist rhetoric about security threats enables authoritarian regimes to justify conferring a large share of national resources to the military, which benefits the regime in many ways. It permits it to buy large internal security services (to better suppress domestic opposition); furthermore, the large share of national budget keeps the military happy, staving off a military coup.[25] Authoritarian regimes thus can reap tremendous political gains from cultivating xenophobic nationalism.

In the self-legitimizing, chauvinist narrative that they create for the country, autocratic regimes emphasize their country's positive history and the violence that others have wrought upon it, while downplaying the country's own misdeeds. The country's mythmaking is likely to elevate mistrust among other states, and to trigger international history disputes. Furthermore, legitimacy problems should not only create a nationalistic character of remembrance that makes history disputes more likely, they should also make disputes more difficult to resolve. If scapegoating a foreign enemy provides an autocratic regime with legitimacy and domestic political strength, then that regime benefits not from reconciliation but from discord. According to this view, history disputes are actually politically useful because they allow the regime to highlight the other state's lack of respect and overall antipathy. Autocratic regimes may have painted themselves into a corner: that after inflaming public sentiment with xenophobic ideas, a regime will feel it is too politically risky to negotiate or compromise.[26]

A second reason why scholars expect chauvinistic remembrance in authoritarian states relates to the marketplace of ideas. Within democracies, the rights of free speech, assembly, and a free press should combat the spread of bad information, including the

spread of chauvinist myths.[27] Philosophers and political theorists have long asserted the virtues of free debate. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes argued for the "free trade of ideas," saying "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."[28] Justice Louis Brandeis famously argued for the virtues of openness and transparency: "Sunshine is the best disinfectant."

With a free marketplace of ideas, democracies should remember the past in ways that will be less likely to antagonize other states. Scholars argue that self-reflection and accountability are core democratic principles. Notes David Aspin, perhaps the chief characteristic feature of democracy is "its constant concern for, and preoccupation with, self-examination, self-criticism, self-review, and self-assessment."[29] Moreover, a free marketplace of ideas should disinfect a country of myths. Actors outside the government can participate in debates about the past, obstructing mythmaking by leaders or other elites. Accessible archives and Freedom of Information-type legislation empower scholars, activists, and journalists to discover evidence about the country's past actions. Through an independent academe and free media, researchers can widely disseminate their findings. Recently, in international relations theory, democratic peace theorists have speculated that the free marketplace of ideas may contribute to the absence of war between democratic states.[30]

In countries that lack a well-functioning, free marketplace of ideas, myths can thrive: there is nothing to disinfect them from the marketplace. As detailed above, regimes with legitimacy problems often have the motivation to create a chauvinistic historical narrative. They have the *capacity* to do this through their control of the information environment. The chauvinist myths purveyed by a regime will be unchallenged because autocracies lack free speech, a free press or academe, and because autocratic regimes frequently co-opt scholars and journalists.[31] In sum, a common conventional wisdom views authoritarian states as more likely than democracies to remember their past history in chauvinistic ways: dictators have incentives to foment nationalism, and the myths they create can spread unopposed in the absence of a free marketplace of ideas.

The Scapegoating Authoritarians: Empirical Evidence

Ample evidence supports the view that authoritarian states often engage in chauvinist mythmaking, and that only democracies have engaged in self-reflective debates about the past. On the first point, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were legendary for their

chauvinist, xenophobic remembrance that they cultivated in service of their war effort.[32] Today, autocratic regimes in Iran, North Korea, and Cuba stoke anti-American sentiment in order to increase their domestic legitimacy.[33] In North Korea, Kim Jong-il's government purveys a deeply xenophobic historical narrative that lambasts Japanese and Americans as evil militarists, and South Koreans as spineless puppets of the evil great powers.[34] In Cuba, the Castro regime emphasizes hostile American policies such as the trade embargo and the attempted U.S. invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Iran's regime similarly emphasizes a litany of American perfidy: Washington's toppling of Mosaddeq and its support of the Shah; the shooting down of an Iranian airliner in 1989.[35] Americans are not the only scapegoats: Tehran engages in virulent anti-Israel rhetoric, and distorts history for the purpose of demonizing Israel.

In China, the CCP distorts national history in order to increase its legitimacy. Youth are not educated about national atrocities such as Tiananmen Square, or the thirty million people who perished in the famine caused by Mao Zedong's agricultural collectivization policies. Moreover, the regime has at times fomented xenophobic sentiment: during the 1980s, the CCP stoked anti-Japanese sentiment when this served its political purposes.[36] This increased tensions with Japan, just as China's nationalistic remembrance of its "century of humiliation" inflames contemporary U.S.-China relations.[37] In sum, both history and contemporary politics reflect ample evidence of autocratic regimes engaging in chauvinist mythmaking.

Further support for the above view is the fact that *all* of the states that have scrutinized and debated their past violence against other countries were democracies. Democracies have also been the only states to examine the violence that they have committed against their own citizens.[38] Authoritarian states simply cannot and do not engage in such self-reflective and self-critical debates.

West Germany (and then unified Germany) has engaged in several debates about past war crimes, leading to highly conciliatory national remembrance.[39] West German remembrance initially glossed over its recent violence, instead focusing on its own wartime suffering. But starting in the 1960s, it began an extensive and persistent process of self-evaluation, in which civil society—students, artists, journalists, authors, activists—often pushed the government toward more candid and contrite remembrance.[40] In 1987, conservative ("revisionist") historians sought to equate the Holocaust with Soviet political violence, and to characterize German policy as self-defense. This was essentially an effort to move the country away from self-critical, conciliatory remembrance toward a more self-centered narrative. In response, liberal scholars repudiated this effort in what was

dubbed the "Historian's Debate," (*Historikerstreit*) a debate held not only in university corridors but on the front pages of German newspapers.[41]

Germans conducted several other soul-searching national debates. One was held in response to an effort by German conservatives, at the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end in 1995, to focus the spotlight on Germany's own wartime suffering. Comments by novelist Michael Walser, who advocated moving the country forward from the Holocaust, sparked another debate in 1998. Many scholars, journalists, and activists prominently argued that national memorialization must remain deeply conciliatory (the Neue Wache monument; the "Crimes of the Wehrmacht" museum exhibition; the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe). These national debates reflect widespread societal engagement and influence on national policy—all toward the outcome of highly conciliatory remembrance.[42]

Elsewhere in Western Europe, other democracies followed a similar trajectory: initial whitewashing followed by increasing willingness to examine wartime culpability—albeit to significantly different levels (and never as self-reflective as the Germans).[43] After World War II, the French, for example, embraced a comforting "resistantialist myth" that exaggerated the extent of resistance.[44] But starting around the 1960s, led by political, intellectual, and cultural elites in a free marketplace of ideas, France as well as other democracies would begin to confront their wartime behavior.[45]

In Japan, scholars, activists, and the free media have drawn a great deal of attention to history issues and have fought official mythmaking. Efforts by Japanese journalists, activists and scholars have often stymied government attempts to whitewash World War II atrocities, and have led to greater recognition and atonement toward victims.[46] A notable case was scholar Yoshiaki Yoshimi, who, upon Tokyo's denials that the Japanese government was involved in the "comfort women" program during World War II, retrieved archival documents proving government administration of the program. As the *New York Times* put it, "Faced with this smoking gun, a red-faced Japanese government immediately dropped its longstanding claim that only private businessmen had operated the brothels." [47] Yoshimi's disclosure led to an eventual admission of involvement by the Japanese government.[48] Historian Ienaga Saburo also led a decades-long effort to counteract government censorship of history textbooks: his campaign led to greater coverage of Japan's misdeeds within Japanese textbooks.[49] In the 1980s, Japanese newspapers broke the story about alleged whitewashing within Japanese history textbooks.[50] All of this evidence supports the hypothesis outlined above: that a free marketplace of ideas empowers civil society to combat myths purveyed by governments, making remembrance in democracies more conciliatory.

Challenging the Conventional Wisdom

In this section I challenge the "Scapegoating Authoritarians" view with two arguments. First, I question the assumption that authoritarian regimes will necessarily benefit from and will foment xenophobic nationalism. Secondly, I deduce an alternative logic about the marketplace of ideas that suggests that remembrance within democratic states will not necessarily be conciliatory. I support both arguments with evidence from around the world.

The Peacemaking Authoritarians

The "Scapegoating Authoritarians" hypothesis posits that authoritarian regimes benefit from xenophobic, chauvinist myths, which they purvey through their control over the domestic marketplace of ideas. But autocratic regimes do not necessarily prefer chauvinistic historical narrative. First, scholars point out that autocrats often have *dis*incentives to rally mass nationalism: they are wary of mobilizing the energies of their people for fear that they will demand greater representation and better governance.[51] In essence, autocratic leaders fear that as they mobilize the people against an enemy, the people will mobilize against the regime. Second, autocratic governments, like any state, may frequently find it advantageous (for political or economic reasons) to reconcile with a former adversary. If this is the case, the regime has an incentive to spread *xenophilic* (benign as opposed to malign) myths about the other country in order to facilitate reconciliation.

When authoritarian regimes do decide to improve relations with a former adversary, their lack of electoral accountability and their control over the marketplace of ideas arguably makes this easier for them than the challenges faced by democratic leaders. Whereas electoral politics require democratic leaders to answer to the demands of their people, autocratic leaders answer at most to a selectorate rather than a mass electorate, so have more freedom to create a narrative that does not reflect public preferences.[52]

A belief in the relative chaos of the democratic policymaking process has deep intellectual roots. Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued that effective foreign policy demanded secrecy and the quick judgment of elites, rather than the uninformed and capricious process of democratic debate. Walter Lippman later argued that governments, who "usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient" were pressured by public opinion "to be too late with too little or too long

with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or too appeasing in negotiation, or too intransigent." George Kennan similarly claimed, "a good deal of our trouble seemed to have stemmed from the extent to which the executive has felt itself beholden to short-terms trends of public opinion in the country and from what we might call the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions." The public's "emotionalism and subjectivity," he argued, makes "a poor and inadequate guide for national action."[53]

According to this view, authoritarian leaders might have an easier time at peacemaking than democratic leaders, who may find themselves hamstrung by domestic opinion, expressed openly in the free marketplace of ideas. There may be times when elites would prefer a conciliatory policy toward another state in order to advance its own policy goals (for example, when negotiating a trade deal or security alliance). Yet if the public has historical grievances toward that state, elites may feel compelled by popular opinion to demand apologies, reparations, and so forth, despite the fact that the elites themselves would prefer to put the past behind.[54] In sum, according to this view, it is easier for authoritarian states—if it suits their political purposes—to show conciliation to past adversaries.

Evidence. Koreans suffered terribly under Japanese colonization, but authoritarian governments in Seoul adopted conciliatory stances toward Tokyo at different times in the postwar years. South Korean's authoritarian leaders chose to compromise with Japan in ways that would have been much more difficult (impossible?) in a democratic setting. Seoul, to be sure, did not engage in positive mythmaking toward Japan. But as Dudden writes, "the South Korean government has worked with Japan according to the apologetic script of "remorse for the past" at the expense of dealing with the specific content of the past."[55] Against strong public and political opposition, Korean President Park Chung-hee advocated normalization with Japan in the early 1960s. The normalization agreement ultimately signed by his government was only approved through the total suppression of the South Korean people, and an emergency session of the National Assembly in which the opposition was not present. In an environment in which critics and voters could be suppressed, the Park regime could craft an agreement that satisfied its own interests, rather than the demands of the people. For example, the regime negotiated for reparations in order to receive funds for industrial projects and political largesse. Reparations were not distributed to victims, notably the approximately 100,000 Korean comfort women survivors, or the Koreans who had worked in Japanese war industries as forced laborers. Decades later, after democratization, a chorus of voices would decry the government's betrayal of its own people, and would begin lobbying for reparations. In

sum, South Korean dictators' desire to normalize relations with Japan led to greater conciliation with Tokyo than would have seemed possible in a democratic setting.

The case of China also shows how autocrats' control of the ideational marketplace can also be used to create conciliatory remembrance that suits their political purposes. In the early years after World War II's end, the People's Republic of China viewed the Republic of China on Taiwan as its prime enemy, so sought to isolate the ROC and to discourage other states from giving it diplomatic or other support. Despite Japan's war and terrible atrocities in China, as Yinan He has argued, "Beijing quickly accepted Tokyo's superficial apology and renounced claims for war reparation in exchange for early diplomatic recognition."[56] The CCP adopted a xenophilic myth when it emphasized that both the Chinese and Japanese people had suffered tremendously in the war, and that guilt for Japanese aggression lay not with the Japanese people but from the "military clique" that had hijacked Japanese foreign policy before the war.[57] Through this xenophilic myth, the CCP de-emphasized Japanese atrocities against the Chinese people. This policy was part of a broader CCP strategy to cultivate Japanese support for Beijing instead of Taipei, and to draw Japan away from the U.S. alliance structure in the Pacific. He argues that as CCP leaders suffered from legitimacy problems in the 1980s, only then did they begin to engage in anti-Japanese mythmaking.

In contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, the CCP carefully reins in anti-Japanese nationalism so that it does not interfere with its foreign policy goals. One must not overstate this case: for example, Peter Gries rejects the idea that the CCP "can calmly construct China's foreign policies unfettered by domestic constraints."[58] The CCP cannot ignore popular nationalism, and xenophobic (particularly anti-Japanese) sentiment abounds. Despite this, the CCP is engaged in a careful balancing act. It permits some expression of xenophobic nationalism, but not to the point at which popular nationalism might escalate to anti-regime protests. By containing popular nationalism the CCP also seeks to protect China's thriving trade relationship with Japan, the United States, and other countries: Chinese global economic interdependence is essential to sustain the economic growth that is a critical part of CCP legitimacy.[59] The existence of xenophobic nationalism, as well as the regime's careful efforts to control it, were clear in the 1999 anti-American protests over the EP-3 incident, as well as the anti-Japanese protests over textbooks in 2005.[60] In sum, evidence from the South Korean and Chinese cases since World War II support the view that autocratic regimes do not necessarily craft xenophobic myths about former adversaries. Their control over the marketplace of ideas arguably makes them more effective peacemakers than democratic leaders, whose attempts to reconcile with hated adversaries must confront popular sentiment.

The Not-So Conciliatory Democracies

The "Scapegoating Authoritarians" hypothesis posits that debate conducted in a free marketplace of ideas will eradicate myths, leading to more conciliatory remembrance. Although the evidence above shows that this can indeed occur, it is also clear that remembrance within democracies will not necessarily be conciliatory. In this section I make a deductive case to explain why, and bring to bear empirical evidence.

Market theory tells us that markets cater to the taste of consumers, and that in a free marketplace, consumers will choose the products that give them the greatest utility. To give a food-related analogy, people love to eat french fries and do not like turnips. This is why McDonald's makes a lot of profit selling french fries, and why McTurnip's (if there ever was one) went out of business long ago. Turnips taste bad and are good for your health; french fries are delicious but are terrible for your health. People choose to eat french fries anyway, despite the fact that such food contributes to obesity and poorer public health, higher national health care expenses, and so forth. In other words, a free marketplace of food supplies the goods demanded by consumers. It does not necessarily supply nutrition.

To carry the analogy further, a free marketplace of ideas does not necessarily supply "truth." A free ideational marketplace will supply the goods demanded by its consumers, not necessarily the ideas that are "good for them." Social psychologists have argued that groups prefer to view themselves and their group's actions in a positive light:[61] thus in general, people will not like self-critical history, instead preferring to remember past events in ways that portray themselves, their leaders, and their country in a favorable light.[62] They tend to focus on how they suffered, rather than how other people have suffered. Thus given a free marketplace of ideas, people will "consume" ideas that satisfy this preference: ideas that tilt toward the self-centered or even chauvinistic side of the spectrum. The free marketplace of ideas does not adjudicate between what is right or good or true: it supplies the ideas that are in the highest demand.

Feel-good history will manifest itself differently in victim versus perpetrator countries. Victims will focus on the suffering that they endured, on the heroes who helped them endure it or repel it, and on the adversary's villainy. Perpetrators, for their part, may simply not discuss the atrocities they committed in the past: choosing instead to focus on sunnier themes in their national history. Or, perpetrators may discuss past violence but will justify it. They can tell themselves that they had no choice to do what they did: that they were only acting in their nation's best interests, or that the actions

were an unfortunate part of a larger, noble goal (*lebensraum*, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Manifest Destiny, etc.)

In sum, according to this view, consumers of ideas in a free marketplace generally prefer a tastier version of their past history, and the marketplace will reflect this preference. To be sure, remembrance in a free marketplace will probably be less distorted than in a regime-controlled marketplace. But the "french fries" version of history will nonetheless be offensive to former victims, and likely to prompt disputes over history.

Evidence. Democracies all over the world frequently remember their past in self-centered or chauvinistic ways. In the United States, remembrance of World War II is self-centered. People know little about the Asian theater, and hold a pervasive "Band of Brothers" or "Saving Private Ryan" view of the European theater (Americans edit out the immense role of the Soviet Union in defeating the Germans). Regarding the atomic bombardment of Japan, American textbooks are candid about the bombings, and scholars have engaged in debates about whether they were necessary. However, popular opinion approves of the bombings.[63] In 1995, a proposed Smithsonian exhibit that discussed the horrors of Hiroshima and questioned the necessity of the bombing unleashed a storm of protest, including statements of justification from Congress, veterans' groups, and the media. The U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution that declared the museum script "revisionist, unbalanced, and offensive."[64] The exhibition was rewritten. Two American presidents (George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton) refused Japanese requests for apologies for the atomic bombings. In sum, this evidence reflects that democracies can commit egregious violence without necessarily feeling the need to remember or atone for it.

Not only does this evidence suggest that people embrace feel-good accounts of their past history, other evidence suggests that even outright lies can thrive in a free marketplace of ideas. Despite a free and vibrant marketplace of ideas in the United States, public opinion regarding the September 11 attacks seems to have been strongly influenced by myths purveyed by the Bush Administration to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Poll data show that most Americans believe that Saddam Hussein was implicated in the 9/11 attacks. In a poll conducted among American soldiers in Iraq, 85 percent said that they were in Iraq "to retaliate for Saddam's role in the 9/11 attacks."[65] This is the case despite the overwhelming evidence and testimony that Saddam Hussein had no links to Al Qaeda and no role in the 9/11 attacks, as established by the independent 9/11 Commission, by declassified Defense Department reports, and by the 2006 report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Furthermore, in a study that examines the American marketplace of ideas in the days leading up the Iraq war, Chaim Kaufmann argues that the American marketplace did not live up to the expectations of political science theory. Kaufmann argues that the policy debate "resembles what Stephen Van Evera calls 'non-evaluation': that is, a debate in which little real evaluation takes place because those in power ignore or suppress assessments from internal sources that might contradict their preferred policy, and use their ability to influence political and media agendas to focus public attention on their own arguments at the expense of attention to external criticisms."[66]

In Japan, which has a free and thriving marketplace of ideas, lies about the past continue to thrive. Leading politicians who tell lies are sometimes, but not always, disciplined by their parties. They are routinely re-elected by voters. Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro has asserted that the Nanjing Massacre was a myth made up by Chinese to embarrass Japan. Many politicians and intellectuals, including the former Prime Minister Aso Taro, have argued—against evidence and victim testimony to the contrary—that the sex slaves of Japan's Imperial Army were not coerced. Similar denials are routine in the work of mainstream scholars, intellectuals, and other opinion leaders.[67] All of this evidence suggests that the free marketplace of ideas within democracies does not necessarily produce conciliatory remembrance.

Conciliatory Remembrance and Backlash. Efforts to offer conciliatory remembrance can backfire when they prompt conservatives to mobilize. To be sure, the German experience shows that debates about past misdeeds can push national remembrance in an extremely conciliatory direction. Within a free marketplace of ideas, social activism and leadership by elites can lead a country to more candidly confront its past history, and to offer conciliatory gestures to former victims (apologies, reparations, and so forth). This is particularly the case for domestic abuses—that is, crimes committed against a country's own people. However, calls for atonement toward foreign victims often do not lead national remembrance in a more conciliatory direction: they often trigger backlash, which can create disputes with, and elevated mistrust among, outside observers.[68]

Japan has experienced strong backlash in response to efforts to move the country's remembrance in a more conciliatory direction. For example, after Beijing and Seoul protested perceived whitewashing of Japanese history textbooks in 1982, the Suzuki administration's conciliatory response (namely its willingness to revise textbooks and to institute the "Asian Neighbor's Clause") mobilized a group of Japanese conservatives to produce a history textbook that glossed over past aggression. When the Ministry of Education approved this book for publication in 1986, this touched off another dispute with Beijing and Seoul. Prime Minister Nakasone's conciliatory behavior in that dispute

then prompted a statement of denial that year by Education Minister Fujio Masayuki; he said that Korea's annexation "rested on mutual agreement" between the two countries.[69] Similarly, a 1988 exhibition in Tokyo about the Nanjing Massacre prompted statements of denial by cabinet member Okuno Seisuke that "Caucasians" were the aggressors during World War II, and that "It is nonsense to call Japan the aggressor or militaristic."[70]

This pattern of contrition and backlash continued over the next two decades. An apology by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in 1994 triggered a statement by one of his cabinet members, Sakurai Shin, that Japan had not committed aggression. The cause-and-effect relationship between apologies and denial was never more evident than in the case of the 1995 Diet Resolution; conservative members of the coalition government, and powerful members of the Diet, hastened to distance themselves from the Socialist Murayama and his resolution. Debate over the resolution directly prompted unapologetic statements by several other cabinet members and important Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members. Later, in the same pattern observed in the 1980s, Ministry of Education approval of the mention of the sex slaves in textbooks triggered conservatives to mobilize and write the Fusosha textbook with the goal of presenting a more patriotic version of Japanese history. The approval and reapproval of this book touched off international disputes over textbooks in 2001 and 2005. Foreign pressure on Japan to apologize has also incited denials. The U.S. congressional debate over House Resolution 121 (which urged Tokyo to apologize to the sex slaves) prompted Prime Minister Abe Shinzo to do the opposite: he denied Tokyo's culpability in their forcible abduction.[71]

In Austria, discussions of the country's wartime culpability motivated Joerg Haider to champion a more "patriotic" version of Austrian history, and to defend the country's war heroes, including men convicted in the Nuremberg trials, as war criminals. Haider declared, "A people that does not honor earlier generations is a people condemned to ruin." He defended his attendance at a reunion of Waffen-SS veterans by saying, "While I reject National Socialism, I certainly do not approve of the wholesale disparagement of the older war generation. I stand by this generation and I fight against the way it is disparaged." The Austrian people responded positively to Haider's message, and propelled him and his party from the political fringe into national coalition governments.

In several other countries, apologies and other gestures have prompted outcry. The French, though more willing than in the early postwar years to confront misdeeds of the Vichy era, still reject efforts to come to terms with their past. When Jacques Chirac issued a historic apology in 1995 for France's deportation of 75,000 Jews to death camps, both rightists and the socialist opposition denounced the gesture. Many French lionize Marshal Petain as a patriot, rather than condemn him as a traitor. Conservatives in

Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium also mobilized against attempts to confront past collaboration.[72] In Britain, the Archbishop of York's call for the country to apologize for slavery prompted a national outcry; critics argued that Britain should be proud, not ashamed, because of its leadership in ending the slave trade. Earlier, Tony Blair's proposals to apologize to the people of Ireland for the Potato Famine and for the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre led to uproar among many British and Northern Irish unionists. Many critics of Blair's conciliation lambasted Ireland's "victim mentality."[73] In sum, as the cases of Japan and numerous other democracies shows, debates conducted within a free marketplace of ideas do not necessarily result in the eradication of myths, or the dominance of conciliatory ideas.

Conclusions and Future Research

Anticipating political change in East Asia, scholars have begun to speculate about its effects on how countries remember. Will Chinese democratization "disinfect" nationalist myths from China's marketplace of ideas, thus improving relations with Japan and the United States? A strong conventional wisdom says yes: that legitimate leaders and a free marketplace of ideas make remembrance in democratic states more conciliatory, thus facilitating reconciliation. Indeed, this view is supported by evidence showing that only democracies are willing and able to engage in self-reflective national debates about their past violence, and that such debates have in the past led to conciliatory remembrance.

However, remembrance in democratic states can be more chauvinist, and remembrance in authoritarian states can be more conciliatory, than many scholars expect. First, authoritarian regimes do not necessarily always have incentives to foment xenophobic nationalism. When it is in their interest, the control they wield over the ideational marketplace gives authoritarian regimes the ability to purvey *xenophilic* myths about other countries that can facilitate reconciliation. Second, this paper challenges the view that a free marketplace of ideas within democratic states will necessarily eradicate myths (even outright lies) as efficiently as many scholars believe. A free marketplace will supply the ideas demanded by its consumers, who often eschew self-reflection and guilt in favor of a more self-centered, and sometimes chauvinistic, historical narrative.

Future Directions for Research

Deductive and empirical evidence presented in this paper suggest that the influence of regime type on national remembrance is highly indeterminate—much more so than a common conventional wisdom would believe. Regime type appears to be much less influential a variable than other factors that shape how countries—both democratic and authoritarian—remember their history. Future scholarship should identify and systematically test such factors. Drawing on themes from some of the case studies discussed above, I discuss three promising hypotheses.

Domestic Politics. National remembrance might vary depending on the security of a regime's domestic political position. The "Scapegoating Authoritarians" hypothesis drew a stark line between democratic leaders (who have legitimacy) and authoritarian leaders (who lack it). One might question whether this is too simple: that at times there will be leaders in both democratic or authoritarian countries who face legitimacy problems or other domestic political threats, and use mythmaking to bolster their domestic political position. According to this view, embattled leaders facing domestic political challenges, such as economic downturn or political rivalries, rely on chauvinist mythmaking to shore up their own domestic political positions. Leaders who have a high level of political capital have more freedom to encourage conciliatory remembrance.

Yinan He has invoked this hypothesis in the case of China (discussed above).[74] She argues that the CCP's decision to politicize the past in the 1980s was the result of Deng Xiaoping's ambitious reformist agenda: in seeking to implement his reforms, Deng had to build a coalition with conservatives, and saw this as an occasion to side with them. This kind of hypothesis holds promise to explain variation in national remembrance, and merits further testing in other case studies.

Threat Environment. According to another argument, the character of a country's remembrance will be strongly influenced by its strategic environment, or by its strategic relationship with another state. States facing a high threat environment will tend to mobilize their people for war, which involves not only conscription and the accumulation of war materiel, but also nationalistic mobilization.[75] Textbooks, leader's statements, etc., highlight any violence the enemy has committed in the past, and any suffering the state has endured at its hand. History disputes among these states should be more frequent and more difficult to resolve. By contrast, states that are aligned or formally allied are more likely to remember the past in ways that portray one other as benign. In order to avoid disrupting a balancing effort, allies must manage their relationships, and will try to minimize disputes over history in order to prevent damage to the bilateral relationship.

Balancing should be viewed as a continuous variable: for example, looser alignments should produce less conciliatory memory than would closer ones. Additionally, the greater degree to which a state is viewed as threatening (and thus the more energetic a balancing effort a state is making) should produce more nationalistic remembrance.

There is strong preliminary support that strategic factors (a country's threat environment and alignment) shape how countries remember. Israel's willingness to examine its treatment of Arabs was nonexistent in the early years of that nation's struggle for survival, and has increased as its security has increased.[76] In East Asia, Yinan He argues that in the 1950s, China's strategic environment—the desire to isolate Taiwan and detach Japan from alliance with the United States—motivated Beijing's xenophilic mythmaking toward the Japanese.[77] Similarly, the Americans adopted the same "military clique" mythology as the Chinese, and whitewashed the Emperor's culpability, in an effort to promote reconciliation.[78] Washington needed Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (to quote Yasuhiro Nakasone), whose help was needed to combat the growing Soviet threat.

Strategic factors also appear to have facilitated reconciliation and affected national remembrance in Western Europe after World War II. The Soviet threat bearing down on both France and West Germany contributed to the ease and speed of Franco-German reconciliation after a hundred years of warfare. In another strategic setting, the Germans might have been less willing to be contrite, and French less quick to forgive.[79] The two countries also sought entente as a way around the frightful implications of alliance with the United States: under the Eisenhower administration's war plan, Washington would respond to a Soviet invasion of West Germany with immediate escalation to nuclear war (on European soil). A desire to create a "third way" in Europe pushed the French and West Germans toward entente in the 1950s.

Strategic factors sometimes make countries less likely to remember their history in conciliatory ways, making history disputes more likely. Japan's threat environment made Tokyo relatively unmotivated to engage in conciliatory remembrance toward China and Korea. Namely, alignment with South Korea was alarming because it conferred a high risk of entrapment in a second Korean war; with respect to China, Washington was pressuring Japan against closer relations with Beijing. In sum, this hypothesis posits that, for both democracies and authoritarian states, a state's threat environment is a key driver of national remembrance.

International Norms. My rebuttal to the "Scapegoating Authoritarians" hypothesis rests partly on the assumption that because people generally do not want to view their past in a negative light, remembrance in democratic states will tend to be self-centered or even

chauvinistic. But critics might argue that the extent to which this is true varies over time. As Paul Kennedy has demonstrated, it that clear that nationalism and history-telling have become much less chauvinistic in the liberal democracies.[80] Furthermore, conciliatory remembrance of past violence may also be increasingly viewed as a norm in international politics: after Germany's example, and after the growth of the international human rights regime.[81] All of these arguments suggest that people in the liberal industrialized democracies will be increasingly willing to confront past violence. This, and other, arguments about the causes of national remembrance merit further research. ■

Endnotes

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[11] On "apologetic" remembrance see Lind, *Sorry States*, Chapter 1.

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[20] See fn 7.

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[61] James W. Pennebaker, Darío Páez, Bernard Rimé, eds., *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (Hillsdale, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), p. 277.

[62] I discuss a counterargument to this view in the Conclusion of this paper.

[63] According to a 2005 Gallup poll, 57 percent of Americans say they approve of the bombs' use, and 38 percent say they disapprove. http://www.gallup.com/poll/17677/majority-supports-use-atomic-bomb-japan-wwii.aspx . For an example of the academic debate see Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb And the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Knopf, 1995).

[64] "Senate Prods Museum on Enola Gay Exhibit," Associated Press, September 24, 1994*; Washington Post,* September 26, 1994.

[65] According to a Harris poll in February 2005, 64 per cent of respondents said that Saddam Hussein had strong ties to Al Qaeda. 47 percent believe that Saddam Hussein helped plan and support the hijackers who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Additionally, 44 percent believed that several of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqis. See http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=544. For the military poll see http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2005_main.php.

[66] Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security*, Vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48.

[67] For Aso's statement see Reuters, February 19, 2007; on manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori see Dudden, *Troubled Apologies*, pp. 57-61.

[68] On contrition and backlash see Lind, *Sorry States*, pp. 181-186.

[69] Yoshibumi Wakamiya, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999), 180.

[70] Lind, *Sorry States*, 48.

[71] *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 13, 2007.

[72] Haider quoted in *Time Europe* 155, no. 6 (February 14, 2000) and in http://www.adl.org/backgrounders/joerg_haider.asp. Also on Austria see David Art, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 6. Other European cases are discussed in Art, "The Politics of the Past in Western Europe," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, February 28, 2007, 13. On France, see "Europe Socialists Reject Chirac Apology," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), July 18, 1995.

[73] On the slavery apology issue, see *Guardian*, March 26, 2007. On the Ireland apologies, see *New York Times*, June 3, 1997; "Blair Walks into Mire of Controversy over Famine," *Belfast News Letter*, June 9, 1997. On the Bloody Sunday apology, see *Evening Standard* (London), January 16, 1998; *Irish Times*, January 19, 1998; *Evening Standard*, January 19, 1998.

[74] He, "Remembering and Forgetting the War."

[75] Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 80-124; Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994); Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*.

[76] On the growth of revisionist history in Israel over time see Podeh, "History and Memory."

[77] He, "History, Chinese Nationalism, and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict."

[78] Benfell, "Why Can't Japan Apologize?"; Bix, *Hirohito;* Dower, *Embracing Defeat*.

[79] Lind, *Sorry States*, pp. 182-183; 190-194.

[80] Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973), pp. 77-100.

[81] Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001), 1-34; Thomas U. Berger, "Sorry States in a Sorry World: Beyond German Exceptionalism," in "Roundtable Discussion of Jennifer Lind's *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*," *Journal of East Asian Studies 9* (2009). (With Charles L. Glaser, Jennifer Lind, and Mike Mochizuki).

Author's Biography

Jennifer M. Lind
Dartmouth College

Jennifer Lind is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Master's in Pacific International Affairs from the University of California, San Diego, and a B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley.

Professor Lind is the author of *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*, a book that examines the effect of war memory on international reconciliation (Cornell University Press, 2008). She has also authored scholarly articles in *International Security* and *Pacific Review*, and has written for wider audiences within the *Atlantic and Foreign Policy*. Professor Lind has worked as a consultant for RAND and for the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, and has lived and worked in Japan. Her current research interests include the resilience of the North Korean regime, planning for U.S. military missions in the event of North Korean collapse, energy competition and its security implications for East Asia, and democratization and stability in East Asia.

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- Young-Hwan Shin, the Executive Director of EAI Fellows Program
  Tel. 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 112)   fellowships@eai.or.kr

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

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